Chapter VI
Missions and Tactics
Although antiterrorist units train constantly for a wide range of hostage rescue or terrorist scenarios, months or even years may go by between incidents where their skills are called upon. Units used to carry out arrests of dangerous felons or military units that are deployed on terrorist hunts in Afghanistan or Iraq see more action and hence hone their skills. Real world deployments as well as realistic training teach operators to remain flexible in tactics so they can quickly adjust to an unfolding incident. Although each incident will differ, there are some basic precepts that will normally apply. Knowledge of these basic precepts and tactics is important to understand how antiterrorist units operate.
Hostage Rescue
The primary mission for the antiterrorist unit is hostage rescue. Some units only have the mission of rescuing hostages within their national territory while others will be tasked to rescue their citizens anywhere in the world. In some cases, too, the responsibility for specific types of hostage rescue may be divided among multiple units. In many countries, for example, the rescue of hostages at sea falls to naval or marine special forces. A few countries also grant responsibility for rescues aboard hijacked airliners to special forces drawn from the Air Force. In any case, though, there are basic precepts that apply to most hostage rescue operations. These will be discussed below, along with tactics for specific situations.
In the earliest stages of a hostage incident, the antiterrorist unit wants to establish a secure perimeter to keep the terrorists contained and to prevent them from being reinforced by additional terrorists. As was shown at Beslan, it can be highly critical to keep family members or others from getting too near the incident site as well. Generally, operators will not be used to establish the perimeter. That mission will rest with police or military personnel.
GROM Operators practice entering windows using other operators for assistance or by free climbing. (GROM.mil.pl)
The antiterrorist unit will begin to gather information about the site, the terrorists, and the hostages as early as possible to enable them to begin planning a rescue. Normally, too, a portion of the unit will be designated as a “Go Team,” which will be responsible for developing a plan to carry out a rapid entry should the terrorists begin executing hostages. The “Go Plan” will not be particularly sophisticated but will offer some chance of saving a portion of the hostages. As more intelligence is gained, the Go Plan will evolve until eventually it becomes a final entry plan.
Intelligence may be gained from a wide variety of sources. Freed hostages, for example, offer invaluable insight into the terrorists’ mood, weapons, location, and state of mind. Family members of hostages, co-workers, friends, and others can offer useful information about the hostages such as medical problems that may affect their ability to survive an assault. For example, the presence of small babies, or hostages with severe heart problems can weigh against using stun grenades. Blueprints of a building or aircraft, train, bus, or ship diagrams can aid the hostage rescue team in planning an assault. Members of the unit’s intelligence unit will also begin searching for a site where an assault can be rehearsed. If the incident is taking place in an apartment building, factory, office, or theater, one that is relatively close and was designed to the same plan will be chosen. The availability of buses, aircraft, trains, or subway cars of the same type can also normally be arranged.
A Lithuanian ARAS sniper/observer team in position on a rooftop. The rifles appear to be the PGM UR. (Lithuanian Ministry of the Interior)
Snipers/observers will have been positioned early in the incident and will feed information to the command center. If the number of terrorists is low, snipers may also be on alert for a “green light”: to take them out should all terrorists be in the crosshairs simultaneously. Unit surveillance experts will have attempted to place listening devices and other types of surveillance systems to gather intelligence about terrorist locations and intent. Obviously, having operators or intelligence experts who speak the language of the terrorists and hostages is important for gleaning information. In the case of some Islamic terrorist groups such as the Chechens at Nord Ost and Beslan, analysts will be very alert to signs that the terrorists may be preparing to die or execute the hostages. The chanting of certain prayers may be an indicator. Other acts such as separating certain hostages and hooding them may indicate that they are about to be executed. Intelligence analysts from the unit will also evaluate previous incidents in which members of the terrorist group have been involved to determine whether they are dealing with a group likely to kill hostages and then fight to the death or with a group known to negotiate for a compromise.
Speaking of negotiations, hostage negotiators will attempt to establish contact with the terrorists as early as possible. The primary objective of a negotiator is to end a hostage incident without loss of life by convincing the terrorists to lay down their weapons and release the hostages. However, if this is not possible, the negotiator will attempt to buy time for the assault teams to practice and prepare to “go in.” Skilled negotiators may also be able to convince terrorists to release some of the hostages (i.e. children, those who are sick, pregnant women, and such like). In some cases, they will make minor concessions such as turning on the air conditioning in exchange for the release of some hostages. Often, though, the negotiator will attempt to convince the terrorists that it will be easier for them to control fewer hostages or it will show their good faith if they release some hostages. Hostages who are released can then provide intelligence experts with very useful information. They also reduce the number of hostages for whom the rescuers must account during an entry.
Operators from Czech URNA prepare to clear a room by entering from both sides of the door. (Czech Republic Ministry of the Interior)
A four-man team of Italy’s NOCS simultaneously rappels down the side of a building while operators already on the ground give them cover. (Polizia di Stato)
One style of negotiating is to wear terrorists down over trivia. If they ask for fast food to be sent in, for example, the negotiator will ask which type, which condiments, which side dishes, and so on, and discuss them. This establishes a certain amount of empathy, but may also calm the terrorists as they are required to make decisions about mundane things.
As the negotiator talks with the terrorists, he or she must be skilled in gaining intelligence from the conversations and in gauging the mood of the terrorists. Note the words “he or she” in the previous sentence. There may be circumstances where a female negotiator will be an advantage while in others only a male negotiator will be able to establish the correct relationship.
A good negotiator will normally not give direct answers to demands as he will have to “refer that to my superiors.” One of the most important jobs of the skilled negotiator is to alert the assault teams if he believes the incident will not be negotiated out and that the terrorists are preparing to kill hostages. (Note: even when negotiators are trained members of the antiterrorist unit, SOP (Standard Operating Procedure) is normally not to let them actually see the entry teams preparing to go in, in case some slight change in their voice or manner might give the terrorists a warning. On the other hand, skilled negotiators can keep a terrorist leader occupied on the phone as the assault team goes in, lengthening his reaction time to give orders and giving the operators a few more seconds. This was the case with the negotiator at Prince’s Gate.
Specific tactics for dealing with different types of hostage situation will be discussed below, but units normally employ certain basic tactics for most incidents. Operators will be organized into teams usually of between four and seven, with the five-operator team being quite common. These teams will have trained intensively to carry out an entry of a building or onto a form of public transport. Their moves will be choreographed and they will have practiced their movements so they do not cross each other’s lines of fire.
For building entries, the “point man” will often be armed with a handgun so that he can hold a mirror, a pole camera, or a ballistic shield in his support hand. The second operator in a “stack” will be the primary shooter and will normally be armed with a submachinegun or carbine so that he can fire over the shoulder of the point man if a threat emerges. Once the initial members of the team have effected entry, the remainder of the stack, with the exception of the rear security man (the “tailgunner”), will follow them into the room to secure it and prepare to move on. On many teams, the rear security man is also the breacher who will use a shotgun to blow off hinges or locks or will swing a sledge. Once the door is breached he will stand aside and cover the rear of the rest of the team. If the operators are clearing rooms along a hallway, he will stay in the hallway to cover them as they emerge to move onto other rooms. As soon as a room is secured by the entry team, well-trained teams will move through it to carry out an entry on the next room.
Many units will also incorporate a follow-up team, which will take charge of any captured terrorists and help secure and evacuate any hostages encountered by the entry teams.
Operators may initially approach the site where they will carry out an entry using stealth and will only “go dynamic” at the moment when everyone is ready to carry out the entry or when they are compromised. Often, an explosive entry will be carried out after the team has gotten into position using a stealth approach. Diversions may also be incorporated such as the arrival of an ambulance with sirens blaring or something else transpiring on the side away from the intended point of entry.
When carrying out rescue missions that are complex, due to the number of hostages, the size of the building, or the complexity of the entry, operators will almost always effect entries from multiple points. Communication must be good and care must taken, however, that operators are aware of each other and do not engage each other during the chaos that can ensue. One reason that many units wear black “ninja suits” or other distinctive attire is so that other operators can instantly identify them. The “men in black” with helmets and masks also offer a certain intimidation factor to their targets.
Prior to entering a room, operators may deploy stun grenades or tear gas. In the fast-paced milieu of a hostage rescue operation anything that can gain a few seconds may well save lives. Just prior to an entry the power may be cut to a building to give the operators the advantage of using NVGs.
Members of GSG9 ready to carry out a simultaneous entry on two stories of a building. (BGS)
Snipers will have been deployed to provide intelligence or to take out threats that present themselves. In some cases, the actual entry will be “sniper initiated” as the sniper or snipers eliminate terrorist lookouts. Snipers will continue to watch for terrorists who present themselves or who may attempt to escape. In some cases when the sniping distances are relatively close, shooters may be equipped with suppressed submachineguns or certain types of suppressed rifles for the quiet elimination of lights or terrorist sentries. Operators may also be equipped with suppressed weapons to make it more difficult for terrorists within a structure to hear their initial shots.
Once the shooting starts, terrorists holding hostages in other parts of a building may well be alerted that an assault is underway and may start killing hostages. If another entry team can be ready to go in through a window, wall, or ceiling at this point to take out the terrorists the chances of saving the hostages are much higher. Obviously, though, intelligence about where the hostages are being held is very important. Although the rescue team must beware of booby traps or hidden terrorists, they must still move as quickly toward the points where hostages are being held.
An LAPD SWAT sniper prepared to give sniper cover from a helicopter. (LAPD)
In an active shooter scenario such as gunmen at a school, the rule followed by most antiterrorist teams is to move toward the sound of the gunfire. If they encounter wounded or injured civilians they leave them for follow-up teams with medical personnel attached. The team must get to the shooters as quickly as possible and neutralize them. That is the highest priority.
Operators from Spain’s GEO hone their rappeling skills. (Policia Nacional)
In the sections below, specialized tactics used by antiterrorist units for assaulting different types of building and modes of transport will be discussed.
BUILDINGS
When dealing with a hostage incident in a building, one of the first considerations is the number of stories in the building. As soon as possible rescue personnel will also want to determine to the best of their ability the number of hostages and terrorists and their location or locations within the building.
As soon as the incident is known, the first law enforcement or military personnel on the scene should set up a perimeter to keep the public and press as far from the incident site as possible. One of the initial mistakes made by German officials during the Munich Olympic massacre was not securing the area around the dormitory where the Israeli athletes were held. As a result, crowds in their thousands were allowed to congregate quite close or to observe from nearby dormitories. Not only did this expose a large number of people to possible gunfire, but it also allowed possible sympathizers to observe the area and relay intelligence about actions of the police or military to the terrorists. Camera crews were allowed to get close enough to film the police infiltrating over the roof for a potential rescue. Of course, the terrorists were watching the entire rescue unfold on television and took action to counter the rescue.
At the Beslan School siege, there were so many local residents, many of them family members of hostages, surrounding the school that Russian security personnel never did get complete control of the scene. As a result, drunken bystanders taunted and fired weapons at the terrorists. Even as the operators from Alpha and Vympel went in for the rescue, firing from the crowd meant that they had to fear being shot in the back.
On the other hand, during the siege of the Japanese Ambassador’s residence in Lima, Peru, a secure perimeter was established. As a result, Peruvian security personnel were able to dig a series of tunnels into the compound and under the residence to allow the operators to get into position prior to the rescue. Had a very secure perimeter not been established this extensive digging operation might have been compromised.
To prevent terrorists from receiving communications from accomplices on the outside, these days an electronic perimeter is normally established as well as a physical one. Within the perimeter, cell phones are blocked, as are television reception and computers.
Once the perimeter has been established and operators arrive on the scene, one of the first steps is to establish a “Go Plan”—what the SAS calls an IA (Immediate Action) Plan. Designed for use should the terrorists start killing hostages, the Go Plan is usually simple—along the lines of “Run Fast, Break Doors, Shoot Bad Guys!” Go Plans are not likely to save all of the hostages because they are not as refined as final rescue plans. They may, however, keep all of the hostages from being executed. Normally, as an incident progresses, the Go Plan will evolve, often eventually becoming the actual rescue plan. Sometimes, too, circumstances will dictate that the Go Plan will have to replace the more detailed rescue plan. At Beslan, for example, most of the Alpha operators who were to be tasked with the entry were at another location practicing their entry tactics when explosive devices planted by the terrorists reportedly exploded causing them to begin killing hostages. As a result, the members of Alpha and Vympel who were manning the close perimeter and who were tasked with carrying out a Go Plan had to quickly enter and attempt to save as many hostages as possible. Alpha members practicing the more sophisticated entry plan, meanwhile, were quickly helicoptered back and followed the initial operators in.
Very early on, too, sniper/observer teams will be placed to support future actions and gather intelligence. When the U.S. Delta Force carried out the rescue of Kurt Muse from a prison in Panama, Delta snipers infiltrated to shooting positions the day before in civilian clothes. Others infiltrated to the hills above the prison. They continued to rely on intelligence about the activities of guards and when the actual rescue started they eliminated guards and took out the prison’s electrical system with rounds from a .50 sniper rifle.
To aid in communication between the snipers and other personnel, a system of identifying points on the building will be used. A standard one widely used by antiterrorist units is to identify each of the four sides of the building with a color. Each floor will then be identified with a number. For example, “1” for the first floor, “2” for the second floor, and so. If there is a basement with visible windows it might be “0.” Windows and doors are also identified with numbers usually from left to right. As a result, the sniper might whisper into his radio, “Tango, white, 3, 3” indicating a terrorist is visible at the front of the building on the third floor in the third window from the left.”
Normally, an attempt to establish contact and begin negotiations will begin as soon as possible. Negotiators try to establish a rapport with the terrorists and if possible negotiate a peaceful solution to the incident. They will also attempt to gauge the mood of the terrorists and gather intelligence from things said and things heard in the background. By stretching out the negotiations, it is hoped that some degree of affinity will develop between terrorists and hostages—the “Stockholm Syndrome”—which will make it less likely that the terrorists will execute the hostages. By stretching out negotiations, the negotiator also buys the operators time to prepare a rescue. An absolutely critical skill for any negotiator is to be able to judge whether it appears that negotiations will not work and to be willing to pass the word that an assault is going to be necessary. In some recent incidents, particularly the Beslan School siege, it became apparent that the terrorists really did not have serious demands. They just wanted to create a massive incident and kill a large number of hostages. This has been a signature of incidents carried out by Chechen terrorists. Occasionally, “negotiations” can proceed in a more “indirect” manner. When Kurt Muse was being held in Panama, a soldier was stationed outside his cell with orders to kill him if a rescue attempt was made. As a result, shortly before Delta launched their rescue, a U.S. military officer visited Muse and in a loud voice likely to be heard by guards and picked up by microphones informed Muse (and anyone listening) that should Muse be killed no Panamanian would leave the prison alive! Ultimatum or negotiation with guards?
Unit intelligence specialists will begin to gather information about the site, terrorists, and hostages as soon as possible. Freed hostages may be a good source of information about the terrorists, their weapons, their mood, their positions in the building, the presence of explosives, and the identity and state of other hostages. Normally, intelligence specialists try to interview freed hostages immediately upon release to capitalize on fresh information they may bring. If the incident drags on, they may re-interview released hostages to see if they remember other details once they have calmed down. Hostages who have been held for awhile will usually have more information than those released almost immediately. During the siege at the Japanese Ambassador’s residence in Lima, Peru, for example, a large number of hostages were released after 17 days and gave intelligence personnel a great deal of useful information.
Electronic intelligence gathering methods may be used to gain real time intelligence about the terrorists. At Prince’s Gate listening devices had been placed and proved useful. During the Nord Ost Theater siege in Moscow, FSB operators infiltrated into the basement and placed listening devices. (Note that at the Beslan School siege the terrorists had learned from Nord Ost and blew holes in the school’s floors to make movement to place devices difficult.) One of the best sources of intelligence at Nord Ost was an FSB agent who was attending the performance and was allowed to keep his cell phone. He gave the FSB constant updates about the locations of the terrorists and the explosives. The listening devices at Nord Ost alerted FSB intelligence specialists when some of the female suicide bombers and other terrorists started chanting prayers, which seemed to be a forerunner to killing the hostages. This galvanized the Alpha rescue team to prepare for its entry.
During the siege at the Japanese Ambassador’s residence in Lima, communication devices were actually smuggled in to some of the military officers held hostage. These were used to communicate with the rescue planners throughout the siege and also to warn hostages when the assault was coming in.
Myriad other sources of intelligence will be tapped prior to a rescue. Those who work in the building will be questioned about entrances, air conditioning ducts, sewers, stairways, and various other aspects of the building that may be useful. Just knowing what type of glass is used in windows, the composition of exterior and interior walls, which way doors open, and locations of surveillance cameras can prove invaluable. Often, the local fire department will have building plans and possibly video tapes of the building that may be used in planning a rescue. Antiterrorist units also frequently carry out threat assessments at embassies, public buildings, national monuments, and other high risk locations and have videotape and diagrams on file. Units may well have practiced at the site for a rescue.
Ever since the massacre at the 1972 Munich Olympics, antiterrorist teams have planned how to deal with incidents at Olympic Games very carefully. The Chinese Snow Wolf Commando Unit (AKA Snow Leopard Commando Unit), for example, trained extensively on every venue being built for the Beijing Olympics. This has been the case at every Olympics over the last 30 or more years. Some units have gone so far as to pre-mark with coded symbols the positions for placing explosives to allow an explosive entry on some venues.
Psychologists trained in analyzing terrorist behavior may provide useful intelligence about what to expect from the terrorists. Prior to the Munich Olympics, one psychologist virtually predicted the likelihood of Israeli athletes being taken hostage, but Munich Olympic officials did not want to consider such a negative scenario!
As intelligence comes in from all of these possible sources including negotiators and sniper/observer teams, the Go Plan will evolve into a rescue plan. Operators will have found a building as similar as possible to the one where the siege is taking place. At the Nord Ost Theater siege, for example, Alpha practiced on another Moscow Theater built to the same plan. Highly trained Vympel operators acted as the terrorists during the practice assault.
Using the intelligence gathered, the team will begin creating an approach and entry plan. If a stealth approach is possible that is normally the best option as it delays the instant when the terrorists will realize an entry is under way. Darkness is the friend of operators carrying out a stealth approach, one reason that so many units wear black utilities and gear. Terrain around the building will be analyzed to determine if ditches, wooded areas, even rivers offer a route of clandestine approach. In some cases, gaining entry to buildings next door to the target one will allow operators to get close and prepare for a rescue.
Some special operations helicopters are designed to operate very quietly due to carefully balanced rotors and mufflers on the engines. It may be possible for these helicopters to deposit operators directly on the roof of the target building. Louder helicopters landing nearby may be used to cover the helicopter hovering to allow operators to fast rope onto the roof. U.S. operators train to be inserted directly from benches on the sides of 160th SOAR Little Bird helicopters that hover just above a roof. This method was used in Panama to insert operators onto the prison roof during the rescue of Kurt Muse.
Members of Finland’s Bear Unit fast rope to the top of a building prior to an assault. (Helsinki Police)
Often, to cover an approach, the ambient sound level around the area will be raised. When the Italian NOCS unit rescued Brigadier General James Dozier from the Red Brigades in 1982 they had road construction crews operating loudly in the area. During the Prince’s Gate siege, aircraft on approach to Heathrow were brought in over the area of the Iranian Embassy at a lower level than usual to cover the sound of any movements. Around the Japanese Ambassador’s residence in Lima, loud martial music was played to cover the sounds of digging.
As part of a stealth approach, it may be necessary to eliminate guard dogs or sentries with suppressed weapons. Lights may also need to be shot out with a suppressed weapon. In some cases, the power to the building may be cut to plunge it into darkness. The downside of this ploy is that it alerts the terrorists that something is happening. If the power is to be cut, it is better if it is done just as the entry begins to give the operators the advantages of their NVGs. Once a dynamic entry does begin, operators will throw in stun grenades, blow holes in walls, detonate frame charges on doors or windows, quickly accelerate towards the building on vehicles carrying ramps or ladders—whatever it takes to get shooters into position to neutralize terrorists and protect hostages.
Part of the preplanning is making sure the correct equipment is available and working. Proper frame charges or charges for breaching walls, roofs, or floors must be prepared. Unit explosive experts may also carry LINEX, which maybe fashioned into a breaching charge on the scene. Proper rappel ropes must be prepared for building descents. Fence climbers or other special climbing gear should be prepared, and any necessary breaching gear should be allotted to breachers going in as part of the entry teams.
Operators must also determine which weapons are the best choice for the operation. For example, if the terrorists are known to be wearing body armor then rifle caliber carbines or other weapons that can punch through body armor must be used. During the Lima rescue, it was known that some of the terrorists were wearing body armor; hence, some operators carried FN P90 SMGs loaded with 5.7x28 mm AP (Armor Piercing) ammunition to deal with this problem. M4 carbines loaded with AP ammo may be chosen in some circumstances as well. In other scenarios, the possibility of hostages being held in multiple rooms nearby where overpenetration of bullets could be an issue might dictate the use of pistol caliber SMGs or handguns loaded with expanding ammunition. Operations where there may be large amounts of steel, as in a factory containing machines, might also indicate the need for frangible ammunition to limit ricochet. A rescue carried out around chemicals or flammable gases would indicate the need for suppressed weapons to limit muzzle flash, which might cause an explosion or fire. Approaches through sewers normally dictate suppressed weapons for the same reason.
An important consideration is the number of operators that will be required to carry out a successful rescue. Planners must allow for operators running into unforeseen problems, being injured, becoming engaged in a fire fight that ties them down, and so on. As a result, a reserve will usually be built into the assault force. For the assault on the Japanese Ambassador’s residence in Lima, Peruvian special ops deployed 140 operators. Given the size of the residence, the fact that terrorists were holding 72 hostages in various locations, and the presence of 14 terrorists plus the complexity of the plan—which involved operators approaching through tunnels and carrying out explosive entries through the building’s floors as well as other operators coming in through the gate—140 is not an excessive number. Despite the complexity of the operation, only one hostage was killed along with three operators. All of the terrorists were killed and the rest of the hostages were rescued, though some were wounded.
By practicing on a building as similar as possible to the one being assaulted, operators can anticipate many of the problems they will encounter, but not all. At Prince’s Gate, the SAS encountered a wall its intelligence had not indicated was there. Well-trained operators, however, are used to scenario training in which the “intelligence” is faulty, thus requiring them to quickly improvise. No matter what obstacles are encountered, the primary mission of antiterrorist operators is to move toward the sound of the guns and the location of the hostages. Sometimes, too, during the practice for an assault, operators will determine a major flaw in the rescue plan and it will have to be adjusted.
As was shown during the Beslan School siege, finding a building that most closely duplicates the incident site but is at some distance may be a disadvantage. At the point when an entry was required at Beslan. most of the Alpha operators tasked with the rescue were practicing some distance away, which delayed their arrival on the scene. In some cases, to keep the rescue team close by, it may be preferable to find a large parking lot or park area that is close by but out of sight of the terrorists. The building may then be recreated by chalking lines on the parking lot or setting up tape. This is not an optimum solution, but it does keep the rescue team close by. It can also be an advantage for smaller countries, the entire antiterrorist force of which may have fewer than 50 operators, with not enough to constitute a “Go Team” as well as a rescue team to be practicing far from the scene.
Once the rescue has been planned and rehearsed and operators have checked their equipment and their routes, the time for the assault must be determined. Generally, very early in the morning when terrorists will be least alert is considered a good option. However, intelligence may indicate that at a certain time, many of the terrorists gather at one point in the building ,as was the case during the Lima rescue. Therefore, the chance to neutralize a good portion of the terrorists at once makes that a desirable time to strike. In some cases, the rescue has to go in because there are indications that the terrorists are about to kill hostages. Snipers sometimes determine when the assault will go in as well. If they have multiple terrorists in their crosshairs and can cut the odds against the entry team by taking them out that may convince the team leader to give the “Execute, Execute, Execute!” order.
Generally, antiterrorist teams plan entries from multiple locations. When terrorists have separated hostages and hold them at multiple locations within the building, multiple entry points are a virtual necessity. Multiple entry points also allow operators to get to hostages quickly using an alternate route should one group run into problems at their entry point. Since terrorists will often occupy upper floors or hold the hostages on upper floors, units practice entries on upper stories extensively.
Various techniques may be used to reach upper stories. Entries may also take place on upper stories even if terrorists and hostages are on lower stories because of the advantages gained by helicopter insertion onto the roof. When Delta carried out the rescue of Kurt Muse in Panama, they landed on the roof, then did an explosive entry through a door and cleared down to the cell block eliminating any guards they encountered. During the Ma’alot School siege in Israel, Sayaret Matkal operators originally planned to enter the school via ladders as the children were being held on the second floor. However, terrorists threw grenades, which caused the operators to leap from the ladders to take cover. As a result, an alternate first floor assault through the doorway was quickly launched. Unfortunately, in clearing upward, operators missed the second floor where the terrorists held the children and went directly to the third floor. As a result, 18 children were killed (three more later died of wounds) and at least 50 more were wounded before the terrorists could be killed.
Building Entry–Multiple Points
In this illustration of a building entry from multiple points, it is assumed that the hostages are held in the upstairs room; hence, two operators rappel down to neutralize the terrorists with the hostages by shooting through the window. On the ground floor the breacher is ready to hit the door with a ram, while the rest of the entry team is stacked ready to storm in as soon as the door is breached.
Members of Austria’s MPs engage targets as they rappel through windows. (Osterreichs Bundesheer)
Rapid Hall Clearing Technique Illustrated is one technique used by operators to rapidly clear a hallway when checking for terrorists and hostages. A point security man (PS) moves ahead of the team to make sure a threat does not materialize ahead of them. A rear security man (RS) observes the area to the rear of the clearing teams to make sure a threat does not arise from that direction. Two teams of two operators (OP 1-OP 4) carry out the actual clearing while the breacher (BREACH) pops open the doors. Each team leapfrogs down the hall. As illustrated, the breacher has popped open the door of Room 5 and it is being cleared by Operators 1 and 2 (OP 1 and OP 2). As soon as they carried out their entry, he moved to pop the door of Room 6 (RM 6) where the team composed of Operators 3 and 4 (OP 3 and OP 4) have moved into entry position after clearing Room 4 (RM 4). Note that a green lightstick has been thrown into each room after clearing to show it has been secured.
To reach the upper stories of a building various methods maybe used. Most antiterrorist units practice free climbing on urban buildings, which may allow them to reach lower stories relatively quickly. Vehicles mounting ladders or ramps may also be used to quickly insert operators onto lower stories. More basically, operators carrying ladders may be used to gain entry. When coming down from the roof or a higher story, operators may clear down stairways as Delta did in Panama, but more often they will attempt entry from a window or balcony. Operators practice rappeling down the side of a building, then shooting through a window or crashing through to take the shot. They also practice shooting with their feet braced against the side of the building, braced against the windowsill as they enter, or after landing just inside a window. Some operators practice a variation on the Australian rappel, in which they come down the building head first, which allows them to peek into a room from above a window and, if feasible, take a shot from that position. Some European teams practice a technique based on the wide windows with shutters or large windows that open inward. Operators swing out as they rappel and crash through the windows or shutters feet first. As soon as they are in the room, they can then neutralize any terrorists. Normally, as they crash into the room they gain a few seconds from the surprise generated. During any of these entries from windows or balconies, stun grenades may be pitched in first to disorient the terrorists.
When the time comes to carry out the actual entry through doors, operators will normally form a “stack” of between four and six operators. For most external doors, they will line up along one wall as the breacher either blows the door with explosives or forces it with a ram or other entry tool. As soon as the door is breached, the breacher will move aside and the first two operators will quickly clear the doorway to avoid silhouetting themselves. Normally one will move to each side of the doorway and will engage any terrorists within their fields of fire. An imaginary line bisecting the room into two triangles is often used to delineate who looks where in the room. The imaginary line will also determine, to some extent, who shoots which terrorists to make sure all are engaged. By positioning themselves along the walls and with delineated fields of fire the chances of a “Blue on Blue” shooting are lessened as well.
If a room is large and contains a substantial number of hostages and terrorists, more operators may carry out the entry with at least two additional shooters following the first two into the room and along the walls. Too many shooters, however, can endanger the hostages and the operators. If the design of the building is such that one room leads into another, as soon as the first two operators secure the room, two more may move to the door to the next room to carry out another entry. Techniques will vary somewhat depending on the units, the floor plan of the building, and the location of the hostages.
When a building contains a hallway or hallways that must be cleared, one method is to approach a door, kick it in, pitch in a stun grenade, and shoot any terrorists encountered. This method is designed to be quick and dirty when many rooms must be cleared quickly. If the exact locations of the hostages are not known, the need to move quickly becomes even more imperative. However, when clearing a building it must also be borne in mind that the terrorists may have booby-trapped doors, floors, stairways, and so on. Operators must remain alert, therefore, while also moving quickly.
Because hostage rescue operations do require speed of movement and coordination among operators who may be carrying out entries from multiple points, communication is extremely important as operators must let each other know where they have encountered terrorists, whether booby traps have been discovered, whether hostages have been located and rescued, whether hostages are being evacuated and by what route, and where teams are in the building. Not only does good communication help operators carry out a difficult multifaceted plan but it also helps prevent them from shooting each other because they were taken by surprise. To help avoid Blue on Blue shootings, many teams wear some distinctive elements. Since when engaging a threat the eye is usually drawn to an opponent’s weapon, some units put some distinctive element of color on the forearms of their carbines or SMGs. The black “Darth Vader” outfits worn by many antiterrorist units normally help make them recognizable to each other as well.
When stairways are encountered, operators will move up them as quickly as possible while covering upward as they move and secure landings. The larger the building, the more operators and the more entry points will be needed. It should be obvious, though, why intelligence about the location of the hostages is so critical. Once the hostages are rescued, then any terrorists hiding elsewhere in the building may be mopped up more deliberately. At Beslan, for example, operators spent hours clearing remaining terrorists barricaded in the basement.
Some members of the rescue team will be detailed to evacuate the hostages as soon as the direct threat of the terrorists has been removed. They will normally be rushed from the building as quickly as possible with operators watching to eliminate any terrorists who might attempt to take a shot at the fleeing hostages. At Beslan, terrorists were hanging out of windows shooting fleeing children; hence, Spetsnaz snipers found themselves having to give constant covering fire to fleeing hostages. Some Alpha and Vympel operators died while acting as human shields for the fleeing children.
In case terrorists may have hidden themselves among the hostages as happened at Prince’s Gate and some other incidents, hostages will be secured and guarded until their identity can be sorted out. Of course, severely injured hostages will receive medical treatment.
Speedy medical treatment was especially necessary after Alpha used Fentanyl gas during the Nord Ost Theater siege. Although the gas did knock out most of the terrorists and prevent them detonating the massive explosive charges designed to bring down the theater, the lack of immediate medical treatment for hostages who had been gassed resulted in somewhere around 125 deaths. Given the large number of hostages and terrorists and the massive explosive charges, the decision to use Fentanyl was most likely a good one since, given that hostage incidents involving Chechen terrorists normally end badly, all of the hostages could have died. However, preplanning should have anticipated the need for ambulances and trained medical personnel to be readily available and to have the information about how to treat those exposed to the gas.
Building clearance is incredibly complex and it requires extensive training to choreograph the movements of multiple operators through a large building amidst smoke from stun grenades and the sound of gunfire. An overview has been given here of techniques, which will normally follow a basic pattern but will be adjusted to fit the specific situation and individual unit preferences.
AIRCRAFT
Although antiterror units must train in advance for all types of hostage incidents, this is even more of a necessity when dealing with a hijacked airliner. Units must take every opportunity to familiarize themselves with the types of aircraft used in their civilian and military fleets to transport passengers and freight as well as those types of airliners that fly into and out of their country under other national flags. They must also be familiar with private passenger jets that are widely used. Major units have mockups and in some cases actual fuselages of major aircraft types at their training facility. Normally, too, national units arrange with the airlines to train on actual jets when they are undergoing maintenance. Heads of security for major airlines are frequently veterans of national police units or military special ops units and hence will cooperate. Having access to the actual aircraft allows operators to learn where the various doors are located and how they open. It lets them practice approaches to learn where blind spots are beneath the aircraft, on wings, and so on. Airlines will often also allow them to do force-on-force training with Simunitions dye-marking cartridges aboard the aircraft.
A member of Lithuania’s ARAS antiterrorist unit checks an aircraft for explosive devices wearing full bomb search gear. (Lithuanian Ministry of the Interior)
Pre-planning and training for possible aircraft hijackings will also entail studying aircraft heights and obtaining ladders of the correct height to enter through aircraft doors. Today, major units have specialized assault vehicles with built-in ladders and ramps. They should have practiced so that they know in advance at what heights the ramps or ladders will need to be positioned to access different types of airliners. Some units, including the SAS, will send operators through simulator training on airliners so that they can fake being pilots to access the cockpit. If they actually have flight training that is even better. Other operators will learn how catering services work for aircraft or how ground crew operates—once again to gain knowledge that will allow them to get close to or board the aircraft. Units with female members may send some of them through training as cabin crew as terrorists will be less likely to suspect a woman in a stewardess outfit.
When a hijacking actually takes place it is most likely to happen while the aircraft is in the air. If there are air marshals aboard, whether from the antiterrorist unit or not, they may take action. If, however, the aircraft is taken over, the two major threats are that the hijackers will attempt to turn it into a flying bomb, as on 9/11, or that they will begin to kill hostages. If the plan is to turn the aircraft into a flying bomb and attempt to kill hundreds or even thousands and if the terrorists do not land for fuel, then shooting down the aircraft may become the final option, although some aircraft today do have special security features that can be implemented to prevent this scenario. Cockpits are much harder to access today and some pilots fly armed.
If, however, the plane lands, then an antiterrorist team has a chance to seize the aircraft to prevent its use as a flying bomb or to save the hostages. The primary problem faced by the antiterrorist unit is being in position to carry out an assault when the aircraft lands. If they are not in their own country, normally extensive negotiations will have to take place prior to permission being given to carry out an assault. Sometimes this will entail including members of the local police or military in the operation. This is an instance where friendly relations established during joint training will prove invaluable. Even so, permission may not be granted. In some cases, the aircraft may take off and land at another airport where negotiations to allow a rescue must again take place. If the aircraft does land where operators can carry out the assault, they will try to influence the location to where air traffic controllers taxi the aircraft. They will want it positioned in an optimum location for rescue, perhaps one where snipers and operators have already been secreted nearby.
Once an aircraft is on the ground, the antiterrorist team has to plan and carry out a three-step operation to successfully take down the hijacked aircraft: (1) the approach, (2) the entry, and (3) the assault.
If the aircraft has been taxied to a point where there is low ground beside the runway, buildings nearby, or brush or high grass growing along the side of the runway, operators may be able to get close to the plane before beginning their actual approach. Positions near the plane will offer the chance to gain intelligence as well. At Mogadishu, for example, GSG-9 operators observed the aircraft with NVGs from 30 meters away during the night and determined the location of two of the terrorists. The approach should make use of blind spots to the rear and beneath the aircraft. If a request has been made to service the aircraft or refuel it, operators can hide aboard service vehicles or pose as ground crew to get close. In some cases, operators may even gain access to the aircraft. The Israelis carried out the first successful rescue aboard a hijacked airliner in May 1972, against a Sabena aircraft using operators dressed as service crew. During the December 1994, hijacking of an Air France plane to Marseilles, GIGN operators posing as members of the service crew got aboard the aircraft and placed mini-cameras and listening devices, thus giving them excellent intelligence prior to the assault.
Often a distraction will be used to cover an approach, but it is more likely the distraction will occur just before the entry. If the hijackers are in contact with the tower and/or a negotiator, an attempt to keep them on the radio will help cover an approach. In some hijackings, terrorists have actually placed lookouts in the open door or on the ground to watch for an approach by rescuers. This makes a stealth approach very difficult and may dictate that visible terrorists be eliminated by snipers, possibly with suppressed weapons, to be followed by a ramped vehicle driving directly to the doorway to begin the assault. Note, too, that a contingency Go Plan will have been developed in case the hijackers start killing hostages. Normally a careful, stealthy approach will no longer be feasible at that point, and operators will try to board the aircraft and eliminate terrorists as quickly as possible.
GSG9 practicing the combat boarding of an aircraft; note that some operators crouch on the wing below the emergency exit while others are beneath the aircraft where they will not be seen. (BGS)
If the team do manage to approach the aircraft through stealth and get into position, they will normally position themselves beneath the aircraft. GSG-9 first discovered that on many types of airliner there is a blind spot just below the emergency exit over the wing that allows two operators per side to crouch by that window/exit. If operators can infiltrate to that point they are ready to enter through the emergency exits. Care must be taken not to set up vibrations in the wing that may be noticed.
Once the actual entry begins speed becomes paramount. A classic example of the advantage of speed of entry and assault took place during the March 1991, hijacking of SIngapore Airlines Flight 117. Singapore’s SAF stormed the aircraft killing all four hijackers and rescuing all crew and passengers within 30 seconds!
Aircraft takedowns require a substantial number of operators, too. For example, when GIGN assaulted the hijacked Air France aircraft at Marseilles in December 1994, in addition to snipers and support personnel, GIGN deployed 25 operators beneath the aircraft and 15 on one of the airport’s mobile stairways to carry out the initial assault.
Aircraft Assault Illustrated is one possible scenario for taking down a hijacked aircraft. Snipers (SNIP) and observers (OBS) have been placed wherever cover is available near the aircraft. Operators (OPs) have infiltrated to positions at the rear of the aircraft to access rear doors and on the wings to access the emergency exit doors. Other operators are on the ramp of an assault vehicle ready to enter through the passenger door. The operators on the wings will normally do the initial entry and attempt to take out as many terrorists as possible while the team on the ramp gains entry. The operators at the rear doors will normally protect and remove the hostages as quickly as possible.
Members of Czech SOG prepare to do a practice aircraft boarding using two ladders, one for the assault team and one for the operator who will open the door. (Amada Ceske Republiky)
Familiarity with an array of aircraft types becomes very important during the entry phase. Operators need to know the locations of all possible entry points as well as how to open them quickly. Knowledge of the height of wings from the ground will aid in climbing onto them and knowing the height of passenger doors and other doors will help in the selection of ladders and vehicle-mounted ramps or ladders. Just to give an example of the type of information needed in the team’s database, possible entry points for popular airliners break down as follows: DC-10: 8; 727-200: 9;747-400: 11; 737-400: 8; and Airbus 380: up to 16.
When possible, a distraction to cover the entry is desirable. At Mogadishu, GSG-9 used a fire on the runway in front of the aircraft to draw the terrorists to the cockpit just prior to the entry. When GIGN responded to the hijacking of Flight 8969 to Marseilles in December 1994, snipers were positioned with .50 sniper rifles to shoot into the cockpit if necessary. When the aircraft moved toward the control tower without permission and terrorists fired at the control tower, the snipers were given the green light to fire high into the cockpit to keep everyone’s head down since they did not know the location of the flight crew. In addition to stopping the hostile actions on the part of the hijackers, these shots acted as a distraction and launched the entry.
Generally, entry will take place from multiple points. A possible scenario would be to place two operators on each wing to go in through the emergency exits, other operators on a vehicle ramp (which maybe armored to protect them during approach) to enter through the passenger door, and still other operators to go in through a rear door, most likely to evacuate the hostages. If ladders are used for entry to passenger doors, most teams practice using two ladders—one for the operator opening the door and one for those who are actually entering.
Operators from Italy’s GIS with their ramped vehicle, which can be used for aircraft assaults. (Carabinieri)
Once operators are successfully aboard the aircraft they will carry out their assault to clear the aircraft of threats as quickly as possible. When they go in over the wing through the emergency exits, they will normally be the first “shooters” on board and will attempt to neutralize as many of the terrorists as possible. Aircraft configured with one aisle are easier to clear than those with two aisles but teams practice for dealing with both. On a one-aisle aircraft, the 2 two-man teams coming in over the wing will normally split with one team clearing forward and one team clearing backward. With an aircraft with two aisles it is more important to get additional operators on quickly, though there are ways for four men to begin clearing with two aisles. One on each side can clear forward and one rearward or 1 two-man team can still clear forward and one rearward. They may have to engage terrorists across the heads of frightened passengers in this scenario, however. In either case, operators must yell at passengers to stay down. Even when passengers seem panicked, however, operators must listen to them as they may be attempting to identify a terrorist hidden among them.
GIGN and RAID practice using dogs for tubular assaults as on aircraft. GIGN teams have inserted the dogs through the emergency exit on the wing. Since the dogs are trained to attack anyone with a weapon they encounter they can be very effective once in the cabin. They move quickly along the floor or over seats, making very difficult targets, and give the operators following them in a few more seconds to get into action.
Follow-up operators will normally come in through the passenger door via their ramped assault vehicle and will engage any remaining terrorists as soon as they enter. Care must be taken, however, that they communicate with other operators already on the plane to prevent a Blue-on-Blue shooting. These follow-up operators maybe the ones assigned to secure the cockpit since the passenger door may be right behind the cockpit door. GIGN and some other units practice using dogs with entry teams coming in through the passenger door as well.
GIGN operators pour onto an aircraft from the ramp of their assault vehicle. Note the operator in the foreground covering the assault team. (Gendarmerie Nationale)
Still other operators will normally enter through the rear and help control and remove passengers and also watch for additional hidden terrorists. Other operators on the ground will secure the hostages until they can be sorted out. Team medical personnel will usually be available to deal with wounded hostages or operators immediately.
Once the plane has been cleared and all crew, passengers, surviving terrorists, and operators are off, it will be checked for explosives. Hijackers will often either have placed explosives or claim to have explosives rigged on the aircraft. As a result, operators assaulting an aircraft must be aware of this. Generally, if there is any fear that the terrorists do have explosives, any terrorists encountered, even if no gun is visible, will be shot in the eye-nose triangle (some teams prefer the mouth or the area between nose and mouth) to prevent them detonating a device. The hijackers of the Lufthansa aircraft at Mogadishu had grenades and threw some of them, but they rolled under the aircraft seats, which cushioned much of the blast. The design of passenger aircraft is such that seats are likely to dissipate the effect of grenades, though they remain very dangerous.
While two members of Slovenia’s Specalna Enota cover the aircraft cabin, other operators move down the aisles checking the passengers. (Slovenian National Police)
The seats on an aircraft can also dissipate the effect of stun grenades. Or, should the grenade land among passengers and be confined to the space between seats, its effects will be magnified. Generally, too, the use of smoke or gas grenades aboard aircraft is not advised since terrorists and hostages will be so close to each other that operators will have enough trouble acquiring targets without the problems of a smoke-filled cabin. There is also a chance of fire in the confined space of an aircraft cabin with passengers dying from smoke inhalation before they can be removed. The Egyptian Unit 777 assault on a hijacked airliner in Malta in November 1985 is a perfect example of how not to carry out a rescue. Various factors contributed to the botched operation, including lack of familiarity with the 737 and the use of smoke grenades. During this “rescue” 57 hostages died.
Of course, the best rescue would be one in which an entry did not prove necessary. Although information has been scant about the incident, reportedly, an attempt to hijack an Aeroflot passenger plane was thwarted due to the fact that each passenger’s seat was bugged with listening devices during the era of KGB omnipresence. Allegedly, by using these devices, operators were able to determine the locations of the terrorists and shoot them with full-jacketed rifle ammo through the fuselage of the aircraft!
TRAINS (UNDERGROUND AND CROSS COUNTRY)
There are so many miles of track crossing the continents of the world that terrorist sabotage is a constant threat to rail systems. Attacks on the London, Moscow, and Tokyo undergrounds by terrorists and planned attacks on the New York and other underground systems have shown the vulnerability of these systems to bombs, sabotage, and biological agents. Cross country trains have suffered terrorist attacks in India, Russia, and Spain among other countries, once again illustrating vulnerabilities. The derailing of a passenger train or an explosion aboard a packed train can create devastating loss of life. These are threats that security personnel must attempt to counter, normally with access control, surveillance systems, and vigilant security personnel and passengers.
For the antiterrorist unit, however, the primary concern is with the possibility of passengers aboard a train being taken hostage. In Japan alone, there are 22.2 billion journeys by trains every year. Japan’s SAT must, therefore, put great stress on training to take down trains. The busiest underground system is Hong Kong’s with 7 million passengers per day; hence, the SDU must be ready to take down a subway train if necessary. In virtually every country, operators train to assault a variety of types of train: cross-country passenger trains, cross-country freight trains carrying hazardous materials, underground commuter trains, urban trolley systems, elevated trains, and airport people mover trains. Antiterrorist operators plan for and rehearse rescues on all of these types of transport, using “war game” scenarios that simulate a worst case scenario on the assumption that if they can develop tactics for the worst case, they should be prepared for lesser incidents. For example, what would a unit do if the Eurostar Train were hijacked and stopped beneath the North Sea? The SAS and GIGN have planned for such a scenario.
Operators from Slovenia’s Specialna Enota swarm aboard a train during assault training. (Slovenian National Police)
In many scenarios, terrorists who seize a train will stop it in a location that they feel offers them the best security against an assault by antiterrorist operators. By stopping a train on a railway bridge above a river or in an underground tunnel, for example, terrorists can make a rescue far more difficult. Perhaps the best-known hostage incident aboard a train took place in 1977 at De Punt in Holland, where South Moluccan terrorists held hostages aboard a train for weeks. If the terrorists do not choose to stop the train but instead try to keep it moving, then it will be necessary to stop it, preferably at a point that lends itself to a rescue operation. In the past the SAS and other units have been trained to board moving trains by leaping to car tops from overpasses or using other methods. Reportedly, operators have been killed or injured practicing these techniques.
Since train routes are predetermined by the track system, if it is necessary to stop a hijacked train plans can be made to divert it onto a siding, which offers a relatively high chance of success for a rescue. For a train powered by electricity, once the train has been diverted power can be cut. For a diesel train, it may be necessary to move another train in behind it once it has been diverted to keep it from moving. Once a train is immobilized, then negotiations and rescue plans may begin. Immobilizing a freight train that has been hijacked because it is carrying explosives, chemicals, nuclear materials, or other dangerous substances before it can reach an urban area is obviously critical as well.
Two key considerations when developing a rescue plan are the linear nature of trains and the likelihood that a large number of hostages will have been taken since terrorists will be most likely to strike during a time when the train is packed. Not only will they gain the maximum number of hostages, but on a busy train they will have been more likely to escape notice from security personnel.
If a hijacked train is stopped above ground, then antiterrorist snipers will attempt to deploy into concealed shooting positions offering the best shooting angles. Trains have many windows that may offer shots at a substantial number of the terrorists. Because of the possible deflection of a shot through windows, however, it would be preferable to assign multiple snipers to each terrorist. The use of a heavier caliber sniper rifle that can punch through the car’s body is preferable as well. A weapon in .300 Winchester Magnum or .338 Lapua should give the sniper a better chance for a kill. The shooting angle may well be slightly downward or upward depending upon the situation of the train and the snipers, but skilled snipers will have trained to factor in angles when planning a shot. Although snipers in the traditional sense will not be appropriate for use in the confined spaces of dark underground tunnels, it may be possible to place marksmen with carbines or SMGs mounting night vision optics to take out some terrorists from yards away.
The snipers will also provide intelligence from observing the train. Additionally, the nature of train cars and rail beds makes it possible to place listening devices and possibly fiber optic cameras by crawling close to the cars at night. Plans of the trains should be obtained from the rail company. Normally, too, cars are standardized so operators should be able to find duplicates upon which to practice. In fact, most major teams frequently practice on passenger cars in use on their country’s railways and underground systems. They must be familiar with how to move through the doorways connecting cars quickly and how to breach doors or windows if necessary.
Assaulting a Hijacked Train To carry out a rescue on a hijacked train requires a substantial number of operators (Op) and snipers. In the illustration, snipers are positioned in cover overlooking the rail bed. Their mission is to track the terrorists and eliminate as many as possible when the assault goes in. Operators are set to enter two cars containing terrorists and hostages simultaneously. Note also that two operators are ready to enter through a sky light in one car. When multiple cars must be cleared, operators will move in the same direction—either forward or backward—to avoid a blue on blue situation which could arise if they entered the same car from opposite directions.
The large number of hostages likely to be involved makes gathering intelligence about passengers, crew, and terrorists important. Photographs of as many of the terrorists, crew, and passengers as possible should be obtained for operators to study so they can quickly sort friend from foe during an assault. Terrorists may well switch clothing with crew members or take other steps to make themselves hard to spot and shoot/no shoot decisions must be made instantaneously. Observers with the snipers may be able to shoot digital photos of many of the players.
Because roadbeds will often position a train a few feet above the ground and because windows tend to be somewhat high as well, a stealth approach along the side of a train will be possible in many cases. Once operators are in position, snipers can take out as many of the terrorists as they can. The “Go” order may not be given until the maximum number of terrorists are in snipers’ crosshairs. If there is high ground or an overpass, operators may also fast rope onto the top of the train. A helicopter insertion atop the train may well attract too much attention to the approaching helicopters, though the helicopters might also offer a distraction. A distraction to give the operators time to get aboard the train and ready to engage the terrorists would certainly be desirable. At De Punt, the assault on the train by Dutch Marines was preceded by Dutch Air Force jets flying low over the train and kicking in their afterburners, which forced everyone—both terrorists and hostages—to duck.
Stun grenades may be used, but the compartmentalized nature of trains can dissipate their effect, or, on the other hand, magnify it so that small children or those with medical problems might be seriously injured by the blast. There are special smaller stun grenades that are often used for assaults on linear targets such as trains. Some units also practice throwing the stun grenades to one side of the train to draw the attention of the terrorist away from the side where the assault will take place.
French units such as GIGN and RAID use dogs when assaulting linear targets. The dogs are trained to move quickly down an aisle and attack anyone with a gun. The growling dogs make excellent distraction devices against the terrorists as well as effective counters!
Ukrainian Alpha operators use ramps thrust through a train’s windows to allow operators to quickly board and engage terrorists. (Ukrainian Ministry of the Interior)
Some units—among them Russia’s Alpha and Vympel—practice using ramps that they ram through the train windows. Operators then run up the ramps and engage anyone with a gun. Still other units break windows and go through on the backs of other operators to engage terrorists. All of these entry methods are valid if well practiced and a team may well want to have all of them in its repertoire. The primary objective is to neutralize as many of the terrorists as possible immediately through sniper fire or operators entering the cars. Well-trained dogs work, too.
Because trains are linear and may contain hostages and terrorists spread over many cars, the rescue plan must get operators into position all along the train. If there are enough operators available, a team may be assigned to each car, which they will clear, then secure. If not, great care must be taken that operators moving through cars do not encounter and engage members of their own unit moving from the opposite direction. If there are not enough operators to cover each car, then teams assigned multiple cars may be ordered to clear the train front to rear or rear to front so that they are not moving toward each other. The tactical situation will dictate the plan that is used.
Other types of trains can present different challenges. Elevated trains that run above urban areas, for example, can present real problems if seized and then stopped in the middle of a city. On the positive side, there are likely to be buildings where snipers may be deployed. If the terrorists can be located within the cars, shots from above or below might possibly be used to take them out through ceilings or floors of the cars. If an assault is necessary, however, the options become fast roping onto the train from above or using ladders to reach it from below. A stealth approach along the tracks or rail at night remains a possibility as well, though power would have to have been cut so the rail was not hot. Some units have special vehicles with ladders and ramps attached and, depending on the height of the elevated train, these might be used. Fire trucks or trucks for repairing overhead stop lights or street lights might be used as well.
If a hijacked subway train is stopped in a tunnel, operators will have to approach in darkness using their night vision equipment. Power may have been cut to the train, but if it hasn’t terrorists may actually be easily spotted by operators from the darkness. If power has not been cut, operators will have to be extremely aware of the third rail, which will have enough current to kill them if they encounter it. Most underground systems today have cameras in the cars, tunnels, and platforms that should provide intelligence. On the other hand, terrorists may well disable the cameras as soon as possible. Still, images of the terrorists may have been captured that will make identifying them during an assault easier. If the car has remained illuminated, it would be advisable to cut power just before the assault to give the operators using NVGs and possible IR illuminators an advantage and also to make it more difficult for terrorists to identify targets. Because of the possibility of flammable gases being in some tunnels, suppressed weapons would be advisable for tunnel operations. Should the terrorists have hand grenades, the presence of rows of seats in trains will be an advantage as they will help stop fragments from spreading too far. It is quite possible, too, that some grenades will roll under seats and have most of their blast absorbed.
There are training facilities specifically designed to train operators to deal with underground train incidents. In the USA, the Washington Metro Area Emergency Response Training Facility has a 260-ft long section of subway tunnel that contains two 75-ft long underground railway cars. As a result, all types of training scenarios may be staged for operators. Many units will also have one or more railroad and/or underground cars available at their live fire training facility and can use them for live fire training or “force on force” training using Simunitions.
BUSES
The number and array of buses used around the world makes them an attractive terrorist target. Urban transit buses, cross country buses, airport buses, school buses, even buses transporting military or police personnel have been terrorist targets. As a result, the antiterrorist unit must prepare to carry out a rescue on any buses likely to be used in their country.
Like trains, buses are a linear target, though a more contained one. Normally, terrorists and hostages will be spread out to some extent on a bus. During the Munich Olympic hostage incident, while moving the hostages to waiting helicopters via bus the terrorists placed the hostages in the back of the bus and they remained in the front. This was a situation designed for the use of snipers. If the terrorists can be identified, the large number of windows on a bus makes it relatively easy for a sniper to identify and neutralize them. When terrorists seized a school bus transporting French children in Djibouti, GIGN chose to use snipers to end the incident. They sent drugged food to the bus, which put the children to sleep causing them to lie down on the seats. This left the terrorists as very visible targets. Snipers eliminated all but one of the terrorists with precise shots, but an assault team had to rush the bus to eliminate the final one. One consideration today, however, is that many urban and cross-transit buses have tinted windows, which make the passengers more comfortable but can make a sniper’s job more difficult.
Members of Poland’s GROM antiterrorist unit demonstrate techniques for assaulting a suspect vehicle in an urban area. (Grom.mil.pl)
Terrorists may also mingle with the passengers making the use of snipers problematic. In that case an assault will be necessary. First, however, the bus will have to be immobilized. Having a large truck stop in front of the bus and behind the bus can stop it. If this technique is used it should be made to appear a normal traffic jam. Road construction may also be used to stop the bus. Some units have practiced using a large vehicle to ram a bus to immobilize it; however, this method may well result in injuries to many hostages, and is normally only used as a last resort. A bus may also be immobilized if a trained operator can reach the back or undercarriage of the bus while it is stopped. Many buses have an ignition switch in the rear so mechanics can work on the engine. Using it, the bus may be switched off. Cutting certain brake lines may also cause the brakes of the bus to lock up. Puncturing the gas tank will eventually result in the bus stopping, but operators have no control over where it will stop and the risk of fire is increased.
Vympel operators have used ramps to quickly gain entrance to a bus with large windows. Note that one operator provides rear security while other operators cover the bus or remove terrorists or hostages. (FSB)
In some incidents, terrorists will request a bus to take them to an airport or elsewhere with hostages. Should a unit commander on the scene decide that there is a better chance of carrying out a rescue if the terrorists remove the hostages from a building they could be granted a bus. Operators can supply a bus with a remote cut-off or with a gas tank that is almost empty—the gas gauge may be altered to show full. It is highly preferable that the bus be stopped at a point determined best for a rescue; hence the remote cutoff has advantages as does using a fake road crew or a stopped truck. An alternative, however, is to have operators hidden in a commercial truck that can pull alongside the bus as it stops, at which point the operators rush the bus.
Members of FSB Vympel are hoisted into shooting position and braced by other operators during bus assault training. Operators are armed with Makarov pistols. (FSB)
A member of Holland’s BBE deployed off the Somali coast on anti-piracy duties practices engagement from the deck with his C8 carbine with Aimpoint sight. (Royal Netherlands Marine Corps)
When buses are supplied, they may also be prepped to make a stealth approach prior to an assault easier. Side mirrors maybe adjusted to allow for dead spots along the side of the bus, for example, or doors may be rigged to allow easier entry. Prior to assaulting a bus, if there is time, practice assaults should take place on a bus of the same type. Most units will also have already practiced on a variety of buses and are quite likely to have one or more at their training facility.
Whichever method is used to immobilize the bus, operators must act fast to prevent the terrorists from killing hostages. The SOP is to get operators to the windows on one side of the bus quickly to eliminate as many terrorists as possible. Various techniques are used to get the shooters into position. Some teams use ladders that are thrust against the bus to allow shooters to run up and take their shots. Often another team member will help support them. Learning to balance and take the shots requires some practice. Other teams have some operators crouch while shooters run onto their back to take their shots. Russian units such as Alpha and Vympel have practiced running a canvas-topped truck up next to the bus, then jamming ramps through the windows. Operators then run across and take their shots as they enter the bus. The Russians and other units have also used ladders, which they ram through the windows of a bus so operators can run up and engage. At least some teams have practiced taking out terrorists through the roof of the bus with a short burst of fire if their location is known and hostages are not too close. Normally, submachineguns or handguns that can be swung quickly to engage are the preferred weapons. As with train assaults, stun grenades may be effectively thrown to the side of the bus away from the assault to draw attention.
Although snipers and assault teams along the side of a bus may take out all of the terrorists, it will still normally be necessary to board the bus. If a terrorist has been driving the bus, an operator on the driver’s side may eliminate him, then reach in to open the door. If the driver is a hostage, an operator can come along his side and order him to open the bus, or if the driver freezes reach in and release the door himself. Doors may also be pried or rammed open. If the entry is through windows via ramps or ladders, then those operators carrying out the entry can gain control of the bus.
Many buses have multiple doors—either at the rear as on school buses or the rear side as on commercial transport buses. Although there can be advantages to entering from the rear, entry from the front is normally best as it allows operators to watch faces to identify terrorists and to watch hands for weapons or explosives. As soon as the first two operators are in position to control the bus—usually from the front with one on each side of the aisle—they should order everyone to raise their hands and show they are empty. Normally, then, a pair of operators will board the bus and move down the aisle checking each row for terrorists, weapons, explosives, and so on. Due to the narrowness of the aisle operators will normally move, one right behind the other, each facing the seats on his side of the aisle. As soon as they check an aisle, those in the aisle may be ordered to move toward the door with hands raised. A team will take control of them and restrain them until their identity has been determined. While clearing a bus, some hostages may have panicked and will attempt to leap up or rush for the doors. Operators must be willing to elbow them back into a seat or take other firm action to retain control until the tactical situation becomes completely clear.
At this point, there still may be terrorists hidden among the hostages. Some teams prefer to keep everyone seated until all rows are cleared; then a team will begin to remove them. By keeping everyone seated with their hands raised, operators limit terrorists’ speed of movement should they still be among the hostages. If there is reason to believe the bus is wired with explosives, getting hostages off quickly will be a priority. The two cover men will remain in position to cover seated passengers, though great care must be taken not to point their weapons at the team moving down the aisle to clear. If the operators who took positions to fire through windows remain in position they can help cover, but they will have to point their muzzles in a safe direction as the clearing team reaches their position.
Once the bus has been evacuated, medical personnel can deal with any injured hostages and EOD personnel can give the bus a thorough check for explosives. Once hostages have been checked and cleared, they will be debriefed and released.
Members of Croatia’s ATJ Lucko unit carry out a surface approach during a combat boarding operation. (Croatian Police)
Maritime Antiterrorism
Antiterrorist units charged with the MAT mission might be called into action for a variety of reasons. A hijacked cruise ship, for example, would create a massive hostage situation and would call for a carefully planned assault. Pirates might also seize a tanker, or freighter. The crew could be considered hostages but, depending upon the cargo, should the terrorists kill the crew—as they often do—and abandon the ship, a tanker might create an ecological nightmare as could some container ships. Ships such as natural gas tankers might well be hijacked and turned into massive bombs to be exploded in a harbor or near a defense installation. An antiterrorist unit might be charged with retaking the ship or, in some cases, sinking it. Still another scenario might involve a ship being used by terrorists to transport WMDs. Once again the ship might be seized, but it might also be destroyed. Other ships might be targeted because they are transporting high-value terrorist suspects to be snatched by the antiterrorist operators.
The first critical element that will affect how an antiterrorist unit deals with a ship is whether it is at sea or anchored, either in a harbor or off shore. If the decision is made that the best option is destruction of the ship, then combat swimmers will approach an anchored ship and place explosive charges or teams in fast boats will approach a moving ship and place charges. Of course, if a ship carrying dangerous materials is anchored in a harbor, destruction is not an option since it would create the same dangers as if the terrorists detonated the ship.
For ships at sea that are to be assaulted, the options are a surface assault from small boats and a helicopter assault by fast roping operators onto the ship. A combination of these two may prove an even better option. When a ship is at sea and small boats are to be used, the boats and the operators may be inserted into the sea from helicopters or aircraft over the horizon prior to the approach. For ships that are anchored, surface or helicopter assaults are viable, but an underwater assault by combat swimmers might be even more effective. Many of these techniques are being used by units countering Somali pirates.
Members of the Icelandic Viking Squad prepare to do a combat boarding. Note the special hooked ladders they will use to reach the deck. (Icelandic National Police)
Members of Pakistan’s Naval SSG practice combat boarding operations in conjunction with U.S. Naval personnel. (USN)
When inserting operators from helicopters, normally at least two transport choppers will be needed. These will have been rigged for fast roping and the pilots will have trained for MAT operations. That means they will be skilled at flying at night and will be capable of skimming the waves and approaching from behind then flaring up to insert the operators while trying to match the helicopters’ movements to the bobbing deck. Helicopter insertion onto the deck of a ship takes a great deal of practice. Generally, operators will be inserted as close to the bridge as possible so that it can be seized quickly. The first members of the assault team to hit the deck will set up a security perimeter for those following them. Once the operators are on deck they will begin to move toward their objectives, leapfrogging to give each other cover. Different teams will train to move through the ship with slightly different techniques. The SBS, for example, avoids stairs or ladders that might be booby trapped while other teams move up stairways with one or more team members stopping at each level to provide cover.
U.S. Navy SEALs fast rope to the deck of a ship while team members already on deck provide cover for them. (USAF)
The type of helicopter in use will determine how many operators may be inserted by each bird. For example, U.S. CH-46 helicopters can each carry 16 SEALs or Marine operators, while Blackhawk MH-60s of the 160th SOAR can only carry 8. In addition to being rigged for fast rope insertion, the transport helicopters should also be rigged for extraction via a trooper ladder or SPIE rig since the helicopters will not normally be able to land to remove operators after an operation or if some are injured.
Two additional helicopters will probably escort the transport choppers and act as sniper platforms. These are usually smaller, more lively choppers of the Lynx type used by the SBS or 160th SOAR LIttle BIrds. One sniper chopper will flare off to each side of the ship and provide cover for the fast-roping operators. Generally, an approach angle of between 45 and 60 degrees to the deck is considered best to lessen the chances of a sniper round hitting one of the operators. Any crew members who appear with a weapon will be taken out. Normally, each helicopter will carry only one sniper. The sniper will generally be armed with a self-loading rifle with a relatively low power scope that offers a wide field of view. In the past, the SBS has used the G3 rifle with a 4x scope. The sniper helicopters can also offer an intelligence source as they hover above and to the sides of the ship. They can warn operators of obstacles or crewmen as they move across the decks.
Members of Spain’s UOE provide cover with a .338 Lapua and a .50 BMG rifle during a combat boarding of a North Korean ship. (USN)
As mentioned above, surface assaulters may have initially been delivered into the water with their boats by aircraft or helicopter, but they then speed toward the ship, once again approaching from the rear. Operators with small boats can also be inserted via submarine. Since the small surface craft used by MAT teams can exceed 50 knots, they can normally run down any target ship from the stern. Teams normally have some type of hook and pull ladder system, which may be extended for hooking the deck. A ladder is then dropped, which the operators climb to board the ship. The first couple of operators up the ladder will often have suppressed pistols to silently eliminate any sentries encountered. Even if the surface assault is simultaneous with a helicopter insertion, the first operators to reach the deck from the boats will normally provide cover for the others coming over the rail. Although the specific type of ship and tactical situation will determine movement, generally on a combined helicopter/surface assault, the operators who fast rope from the helicopter will move to secure the bridge and other areas above decks while those inserted by boat will move to secure the areas below deck.
Members of Lithuania’s ARAS antiterrorist unit move to secure the bridge during an antiterrorist exercise. (Lithuanian Ministry of the Interior)
A subsurface assault allows a more clandestine approach to a ship that is stopped at sea, docked, or anchored off shore. When ships are close to shore, operators may swim from points along the beach to the ship. At sea, the swimmers would likely be inserted from a submarine. They might then use an SDV (SEAL Delivery Vehicle) to approach the ship underwater. Once swimmers reach the ship they might climb anchor chains or ropes to reach the deck or deploy hook and pull ladders of the type already mentioned. As with a boat insertion, the first operators over the rail will normally have suppressed pistols to deal with sentries. Subsurface assaults can be used in conjunction with helicopter or surface assaults as well.
Members of Lithuania’s ARAS practice a sub surface approach then boarding during an antiterrorist exercise. (Lithuanian Ministry of the Interior)
In some cases, distraction may be used to gain time for operators preparing to carry out a combat boarding operation. A “yacht” with attractive girls sunbathing on deck offers a distraction in daylight while a “yacht” with a party—once again with attractive girls—can offer a distraction at night. Very bright lights on the “yacht” or a spotlight from a passing ship can degrade the night vision of sentries aboard the target ship. Numerous other options might be used (i.e. a fire boat with sirens and horns blaring or a fishing boat with a large catch hanging in plain view). A device known as an LRAD (Long Range Acoustic Device) emits a very high-pitched and disabling sound in a 15–30 degree arc that can be very painful at 100 meters and remains effective to 500 meters. If a nearby ship is equipped with an LRAD and it is pointed at the target ship just before the boarding operation, it can help disorient the crew. Obviously, operators will need to wear ear protection. Passing yachts or ships can also carry hidden snipers who will help cover the assault. Most of these distractions will only work in harbors or near to shore, however.
An important determinate for choosing the type of assault or combination of assaults will be the nature of the mission. If there are hostages, possibly in multiple points around the ship, then getting a large number of operators aboard and beginning to clear above and below decks quickly is a high priority. If, however, the ship is carrying WMDs or has been turned into a potential floating bomb, then gaining control of the bridge and engine room so the ship may be stopped is most critical. Whenever possible, operators will have studied diagrams of the ship from their unit’s database of world ship types.
Divers from Russia’s Omoh. (MVD)
Ship Assault At Sea I This diagram shows the initial stage of an assault on a ship at sea. All four helicopters have approached from the rear, hugging the waves to escape detection until the last minute. The two smaller helicopters, each carrying a sniper, flare off to the sides to allow the snipers to give fire support to the operators fast roping onto the deck. The two transport helicopters carry operators. Note that Transport 1 is inserting its team as close to the bridge as possible so that it can take control of the ship quickly.
Ship Assault At Sea II Once operators from Transport 1 have fast roped to the deck that helicopter moves off to allow Transport 2 to deposit its operators. Note that the operators (O) on deck have moved to secure the bridge and set up perimeter security for the landing of the next flight of operators. The helicopters carrying snipers continue to give overwatch and provide covering fire as needed. Note that the sniper in Sniper 2 is engaging an armed terrorist (T).
Ship Assault At Sea III Once operators (O) from both transport helicopters have reached the deck, they move out to secure the upper deck areas and check any cabins. The transport helicopters move off and may circle in case they are needed for extraction of casualties or personnel. The helicopters bearing snipers continue to give overwatch. In some cases, additional operators are inserted via boats (B) and will climb the sides of the ship to help secure the lower decks and guard any prisoners.
Once operators are aboard using any of the techniques described, they will begin clearing the ship using fairly standard tactics. Normally, weapons loaded with frangible ammunition and often with suppressors will be used during combat boarding operations. As has already been mentioned, securing the bridge is a priority. A four-man team is fairly standard to secure personnel on the bridge. If desirable, the ship may be stopped from the bridge or its course changed if moving. The ship’s master and other bridge crew can be secured and possibly used for intelligence about the remainder of the crew or others on board.
Australian Clearance Divers armed with C8 carbines mounting ELCAN sights are assigned to MAT (Maritime Anti-Terrorism) duties with the Tactical Assault Group East. (Royal Australian Navy)
Because passageways below decks are tight on most ships, two-man entry teams are used to clear compartments. Usually one or more breachers combine with these entry teams. If a compartment door needs to be breached, a breacher does so, then moves to the next compartment. In that way two-man teams leap frog down a passageway. Normally, for follow-up personnel some method of marking cleared compartments is used (i.e. throwing in a light stick). Larger compartments such as the engine room will normally merit a four-man clearing team. A few operators will have set up a holding area where captured crew or others aboard may be detained after having been searched and secured with flex cuffs.
Upon reaching cross passageways, point men will check the passageway, then the clearing teams will move into them with rear security covering the passageways. Internal stairways will also normally be cleared by a point man moving ahead of his team. External stairways—because they are exposed from multiple directions—will normally require a four-man team to clear. Once the stairway is secure another team will move through the team securing to take the next level. The teams will carry out this maneuver until reaching their objective. It should be apparent by now that clearing below decks of a large ship will require a substantial number of personnel. In some cases, additional teams will be inserted via boat or helicopter once the upper decks are secure.
During a MAT exercise members of Greece’s DYK move to secure the bridge. (Hellenic Navy)
When the location of hostages or crew taken by pirates is known, then getting operators to that area quickly is a priority, though they still must maintain security while moving and be alert to booby traps.
If the ship is carrying suspected WMDs or explosives wired to detonate a dangerous cargo, then operators will normally shoot any nearby terrorist to prevent him detonating the devices. Once the area is secured, if feasible, specialists in nuclear, biological, chemical, or EOD, will be inserted onto the ship. Members of the antiterrorist team with EOD or WMD training will normally be assigned to the team going for the devices so they can make an initial assessment of the threat and what will be needed to neutralize it. A ship containing possible WMDs or explosive devices will normally be stopped at sea or, in some cases when taken over in harbor, moved out to sea.
As with other types of hostage situation, hostages will be initially secured as well until operators have a chance to sort out who is who. Those hostages or, in the case of pirates, freed crew members, will be medevaced as soon as possible. Once the ship is secured and terrorists detained, hostages will be removed as will the terrorists. Operators will then normally leave the ship in the hands of other security personnel such as Marines and specialists to deal with any dangerous materials.
A variant type of MAT operation is assaulting an offshore oil platform. The combination of possible destruction of a high value economic target, creation of an ecological disaster, and the taking of hostages makes oil platforms a potential terrorist target. Nations that have offshore oil platforms, therefore, normally also have a unit tasked with carrying out antiterrorist operations against them.
Generally, oil platforms are relatively isolated but remain a static target. The same basic options exist for assaulting an oil platform as a ship. Operators can come in via helicopter, small boat, or subsurface via SDV and scuba. Most maritime antiterrorist units have determined that the subsurface assault may be the best initial option. Operators train to swim to the rig under water, then climb the legs to eliminate any terrorist guards on the platform. Because of the waves in areas such as the North Sea, operators train to time the rise and fall until they can grab a guy wire or strut to begin their climb. Units normally have their best free climbers do the original climb, then lower ropes for the rest of the team.
Once on the platform, operators move to eliminate any terrorists who are visible, normally with suppressed weapons. At this point, some units practice having additional operators inserted from a helicopter via fast rope or from small boats. However, some units have the entire operation carried out by swimmers. In either case, the next step is to clear the interior spaces of the platform as quickly as possible to free hostages and to check that there are no explosives wired to the platform.
Terrorist activity in Nigeria, where foreign workers have been taken hostage on oil rigs, has caused some units to specifically practice for an operation to rescue their citizens who are working in the Nigerian oil industry. U.S., British, Australian, and other Western oil workers are employed on rigs all over the world so the possibility of mounting a rescue of their citizens or assisting local operators with a rescue remains a constant for units such as the SBS, OAT, DevGru, Commando Hubert, and COMSUBIN.
Dignitary Protection
For virtually all antiterrorist units, dignitary protection is a secondary mission to hostage rescue. In a few cases a country’s Presidential or Royal Protection Team actually goes through the same training as the antiterrorist team. Although France’s GSPR has recently been re-organized, it was originally formed from personnel who had been trained as part of the GIGN antiterrorist unit. Indonesia’s PASPAMPRES draws its members from those trained as part of the country’s special forces or antiterrorist units. Normally, however, antiterrorist units are assigned dignitary protection roles to supplement regular protection teams.
Members of the SAS, for example, have augmented Royalty Protection teams if the Queen or other members of the Royal Family are traveling in areas of heightened threat level. Operators from the U.S. Delta Force or DevGru have augmented protection teams for U.S. officials in war zones. Many antiterrorist teams rotate operators through their embassies in more dangerous areas so that they can assist in hardening embassy security and augment the diplomatic protection teams. Such assignments also allow them to become familiar with the embassy in case a rescue is ever required there.
In some cases, members of the antiterrorist unit provide specialized members for a close protection effort. For example, the U.S. Secret Service has its own CAT (Counter Assault Team), which provides heavier firepower should a motorcade be attacked. In other countries, however, members of the antiterrorist unit provide this function. The SAS has carried out this mission for the British Prime Minister and the Queen. In Italy, NOCS often functions as a counterassault team for Italian officials, the Pope, or visiting dignitaries. Because of the skill of their snipers, many antiterrorist teams will also provide highly trained countersnipers during VIP visits.
Units drawn from a country’s national police will often provide actual close protection for important visiting dignitaries. Among those carrying out such duties are Austria’s EKO COBRA, the Slovak Republic’s UOU, and Italy’s NOCS. Some units have specialized hardened vehicles—NOCS has both hardened limos and SUVs for counterassault teams.
Members of antiterrorist units can also be useful in preparing threat assessments. Operators drawn from military special ops units that may have a wartime mission of taking out enemy leaders can offer chilling insights into the weaknesses of a standard protection effort based on their analysis of what they would do in the terrorists’ boots. Many operators have served in Iraq and Afghanistan and have become quite knowledgeable of the current state of IEDs (Improvised Explosive Devices) and can apply that expertise to helping protective teams guard against them.
Training Exchanges and Training Assistance
At any given time a few members of most antiterrorist units will be carrying out exchange training with other friendly units around the world. Teams will also take part in tactical competitions against other teams to hone skills and to learn techniques. Training exchanges are useful for many reasons. The most obvious is that operators learn different techniques and see new equipment they may not have encountered before. However, by working together units also develop relationships that will be very important should they ever have to mount a joint rescue operation or work with a unit to rescue their own citizens in another country. Some units work so closely together on training exercises that operators become almost interchangeable. Operators from the Combat Applications Group (Delta), British SAS, Australian SASR, and Polish GROM have worked together so often that this is the case with them.
Another advantage of exchange training is that certain units have a special expertise in certain areas or their country offers special facilities or geographical features that lend themselves to a specific type of training. The United States has a substantial number of excellent combat shooting schools, for example, and many foreign operators who are on exchange with DevGru or Combat Applications Group take advantage of the expertise at these schools. The USA also has a facility in Washington, DC, with two subway cars and a subway tunnel that’s excellent for training to carry out assaults on underground systems. Because the Israelis deal with suicide bombers and other terrorist acts constantly, many units send operators to Israel to learn from this experience. Although there are areas of the USA and possessions that can be used for jungle training, American operators will often go through jungle warfare training with the Malaysians, the British SAS in Belize, or the Australian SAS.
Such exchange training often results in lifelong friendships. Since operators in antiterrorist units can rarely share their lives with those outside of the antiterrorist community, having friends around the world who understand the life offers them a chance to take a holiday away from home yet still with trustworthy colleagues.
Training assistance is slightly different from training exchanges in that members of a unit sent on an assistance mission are normally helping a friendly state form an antiterrorist unit or improve the skills of the one already in existence. Operators sent on such exchanges must not only have a sound knowledge of tactics and weapons, but also the ability to teach these techniques. Foreign language skills can be very helpful in such exchanges. Training a unit in another country, especially in the developing world, may come with a few pitfalls. For example, in one country a well-trained antiterrorist unit was developed with assistance from a major power. The commander of the unit then used his highly trained operators to stage a coup and install himself in power.
Normally, though, the benefits far outweigh any potential disadvantages. Some have speculated that training foreign antiterrorist units, especially in parts of the world with endemic terrorism, could be giving potential terrorists knowledge that they could use against an antiterrorist unit should alliances change. There is some truth in this, but tactics are constantly changing and major units upgrade tactics and equipment. Also, the same message applies that I used to impart when training VIP protection units around the word. Occasionally, a student would ask, “What if I should become an assassin and turn what you’ve taught me against a principle you are protecting?” My standard answer was, “Just because I taught you everything you know doesn’t mean I’ve taught you everything I know!” No unit teaches everything during training assistance missions!
As with exchange training, one of the most important benefits of training assistance is that contacts may be invaluable should an incident occur involving citizens of the country that has supplied the training assistance. Should British citizens, for example, be taken hostage in a country the antiterrorist unit of which was trained by the SAS, the odds are quite good that an offer of SAS assistance would be accepted. Although most major units offer training assistance, the French have been especially willing to send teams from GIGN or RAID to former colonies in Africa to develop teams. Pakistan’s SSG has carried out a great deal of training assistance to some other Muslim states, their religion being considered as important as their expertise.
Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction
Since dealing with potential weapons of mass destruction falls under the umbrella of antiterrorism in some countries the antiterrorist unit has members trained to carry out operations in a hazmat environment. Normally, the actual handling of WMDs (Weapons of Mass Destruction) requires people with substantial scientific training in nuclear, chemical, or biological sciences. As a result, scientific units will be on call to assist antiterrorist operators.
The larger the country, the more likely it is to have multiple agencies that will be involved in a terrorist scenario involving WMDs. A good example occurred shortly after the 9/11 attacks on the USA. There were grounds to believe that as a follow-up there would be an attempt to use a nuclear device in the USA. As a result, joint teams comprised of members of NEST (Nuclear Emergency Search Teams), who have sophisticated equipment and the training to locate nuclear devices, and members of the FBI HRT were formed. The plan was that HRT members would take out the terrorists who had the device after NEST had located them.
Because of attempts to smuggle nuclear materials in the former Soviet Union, Russia, Ukraine, and other countries have units trained to counter nuclear smugglers. The Slovak Republic’s UOU had an instance in April 2007, in which they helped seize 37.4 lb of radioactive material being smuggled through their territory. In the USA, the Atomic Energy Commission offers overseas training for SWAT teams specializing in countering an incident at a nuclear power plant. In many countries, however, the national antiterrorist unit will have this mission.
Training in full hazmat gear is very difficult as it limits physical movements, field of vision, and use of certain types of weapons. Nevertheless, operators have to practice donning the suits and actually learn to be inserted, move through an installation, and engage possible terrorists while wearing their hazmat gear. Units that also have the mission of seizing drug labs often get a chance to carry out real operations wearing at least some of their hazmat gear.
Functioning as Air Marshals
In at least a few antiterrorist units, operators sometimes fly as air marshals on their country’s airliners. This may only occur in times of increased threat or operators may rotate through the air marshal assignment on 30–90 day assignments before returning to the unit. The problem that arises is whether the air marshal job is a proper use of highly trained operators. Air marshals do need to be well trained in close combat with and without firearms and proper techniques for engaging terrorists aboard an aircraft as well as first aid, recognition of IEDs, and terrorist psychology; however, they do not need all of the sophisticated hostage rescue or special ops training normally given to operators. Since many national antiterrorist units may number 60 operators or less and there are quite likely more flights than that per day, it becomes a numbers game.
When members of an antiterrorist unit are tasked to function as air marshals, it will often be on flights that have been determined to carry an especially high risk due to their point of origin or destination. In other cases, intelligence may indicate that a flight has a higher risk of terrorist attack, in which case members of the antiterrorist unit could be assigned to function as air marshals on that flight. Many countries do not have air marshals, but US requirements that flights to the USA must have an air marshal aboard might dictate that members of an antiterrorist unit are assigned that mission just for those flights.
In addition to putting highly skilled “shooters” aboard aircraft, there are other advantages to having members of the antiterrorist unit who have undergone air marshal training and have flown as security on flights. Operators who have undergone air marshal training and flown to provide security often gain more insight into how commercial aircraft and airports work. As a result, should they have to take down a hijacked airliner, they will have additional knowledge of aircraft entry points and vulnerabilities. They will also have gained practice shooting within the confines of an airliner. Putting members of an antiterrorist unit through air marshal training gives them additional useful training and makes them available should they be needed for that mission.
There are a few antiterrorist units that have the air marshal mission full time. In some cases, these units are within the special operations forces of their country’s Air Force. They have the antiterrorism mission for any situation involving aircraft whether assaulting a hijacked aircraft on the ground or acting as air marshals while flying.