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Anita Superson

Introduction

Ethics is the study of moral behavior, specifically, how we ought to act or what kind of persons we ought to be. Metaethics literally means “about” or “beyond” ethics. It has been described as the attempt to understand the metaphysical, epistemological, semantic, and psychological presuppositions and commitments of moral thought, talk, and practice (Sayre-McCord 2015 [2012]: 1). It presupposes no commitments to particular normative moral theories but goes beyond them or talks about them and their underlying assumptions. One major topic in metaethics concerns moral ontology. This issue covers the question of whether there are moral facts, and if there are, what their nature is. Are moral facts like scientific facts? Does wrongness exist in the world the way the water in your glass does? Suppose moral facts exist in some sense. Is the truth they yield relative to societies or even to individuals, or is it absolute, holding for all persons at all times? A second major topic in metaethics concerns the interconnection between moral action, reasons, and motivation. How can we rationally justify morally required action? Which theory of practical reason is best for grounding moral reasons? Does having a moral obligation to act necessarily entail having a motive to act? A third major topic in metaethics is that of moral epistemology: how do we come to know our moral duties? Is reason sufficient for knowing them, or do emotions play a role? These topics, which feminist philosophers have only recently begun to explore from a feminist angle, will be the focus of this chapter.

But there are other issues in traditional metaethics—e.g., the meaning of moral terms, the nature of moral disagreement, whether moral reasons are binding on us, and whether morality is just a fiction—that feminists have not yet directly explored. I suspect that this is largely because metaethics in general is done at a highly abstract level, allegedly completely independent of gender. Perhaps much of the work can be done at the level of normative ethics, modifying traditional theories in ways that address the main aim of feminism, which is to end women’s oppression (Dillon 2012; Hampton 2002; Kittay 1999; Tessman 2001), and then the answers to traditional metaethical questions will fall out in ways informed by feminist aims. Alternatively, feminists might challenge some of the assumptions made in traditional metaethics (Anderson 2002; Cudd 2002; Driver 2012; Superson 2009). More radically, feminists might question whether the entire framework of metaethics is askew by demonstrating that there is something sexist, or at least antithetical to the aim of ending women’s oppression, about the methodology or questions asked in metaethics (Noddings 1984: 50; Tessman 2011). Such groundbreaking work that would effect a wholesale change in the nature of the discussion in metaethics has not yet been robustly taken on. It might entail a shift away from issues such as the nature of moral disagreement or the meaning of moral terms to issues such as questioning the point of morality if actual persons do not follow it especially in oppressive contexts, or how best to bring about moral progress. This shift highlights the disconnection between theory and practice in much of traditional ethics that feminists have complained about, but it is just one direction feminists might go in a field that is largely untapped. Meanwhile, let us turn to areas where there has been feminist progress.

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Truth in Ethics

Moral realism is the view that moral claims such as “Rape is morally wrong” report facts and are true if they get the facts right, and that at least some moral claims are actually true (Sayre-McCord 2015 [2012]: 1). Some philosophers believe that on moral realism, moral facts have to be independent of humans, that they are somehow “out there” in the real world like natural properties, or occupy their own world like Platonic facts, while others believe that moral facts need not be real in these senses. For instance, Thomas Hobbes and Immanuel Kant believe that human reason gives us moral truths, so truth is not “out there” in the world awaiting human discovery. Feminists have said very little about this contentious metaphysical issue.

One worry that Julia Driver raises is that feminism is transformative, that is, that it creates new “realities” in the context of social change (Driver 2012: 175), which seems to be at odds with moral realism, especially the view that moral facts exist independent of humans. In light of this concern, Driver offers a complex version of feminist moral realism that construes moral facts to be dependent on humans. Driver’s theory is constructivist. Constructivism is the view that insofar as there is truth in ethics, it is determined by an idealized or hypothetical process of rational deliberation, choice, or agreement (Bagnoli 2015 [2011]). Hobbes is a classic example of a constructivist who believes that in order to arrive at the true moral code, we should presuppose hypothetically that persons are equal in strength and intent to satisfy their own desires, have as their strongest desire a desire for self-preservation, are self-interested in the sense that they want to maximize the satisfaction of their own desires whatever these are, have a right or privilege to everything including use of another’s body, and that goods are scarce. Hobbes argues that under these conditions, which he called a hypothetical State of Nature, rational beings would agree to give up some of their liberties in order to avoid a state of all-out war and to achieve the benefits of cooperation. When persons give up these liberties, they incur corresponding obligations. For example, if a person had a desire to harm others, she would be rational to give up the pursuit of satisfaction of this desire and incur an obligation not to harm others—provided that others do so as well, Hobbes believes, since otherwise she would jeopardize her self-preservation, which would never be rational to do. Hobbes believes that any rational person would agree to give up the same rights or liberties. The list of corresponding obligations constitutes the true moral code. Hobbes’s account is constructivist since morality is constructed by human reason, not “out there” waiting to be discovered.

Driver’s feminist constructivism also purports to avoid a feminist worry about moral relativism—the view that truth in ethics is relative to cultures—which is that culturally relative truth might entrench oppressive norms. Her theory builds on Hume’s sentimentalism, the view that morality is grounded in emotion. It is in line with the ethic of care, a moral theory proposed by a number of feminists in the 1980s in response to Carol Gilligan’s book on moral psychology that argued that females’ responses to moral dilemmas were generally different from those of males in that they focused on caring, maintaining relationships, and fulfilling needs, while the “justice” perspective largely followed by male subjects in her experiments focused on rule-following (Gilligan 1982). Care ethicists argued that moral theories need to import emotions, particularly care, more than they do. Hume, however, did import emotion in his version of sentimentalism, arguing that our feeling of approval or disapproval of a number of instances of acts of a certain kind, such as honest acts, determines whether the act is a virtue or a vice. Hume’s theory has won the favor of some feminists because of its emphasis on virtues, particularly those concerning our relations with others. These involve the heart’s response to particular persons rather than universal principles of justice (Baier 1987: 41). His theory is also constructivist in that an impartial observer, one removed from the particular act in question, determines the moral status of an act. An act is deemed a virtue when an impartial observer has a feeling of approval of acts of this kind. The feeling of approval stems from this kind of act being pleasant or useful. An act is deemed a vice when acts of this kind generate a feeling of disapproval. Hume’s theory does not generate such idiosyncratic results as first meets the eye, not only because it invokes an impartial observer, but also because the feeling of approval is generated by a universal sentiment of benevolence that causes us all to make the same pronouncements about an act’s moral status. These assumptions, though controversial, attempt to remove the relativism in his theory that concerns some feminists.

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Yet many feminists worry that if rape is morally wrong, it is morally wrong regardless of how anyone feels about it. Hume’s theory seems to make wrongness contingent on emotional responses, albeit those of an impartial observer under the right conditions. But Driver’s Humean feminist constructivist theory has it that moral norms are both mind-dependent, because the property of being a virtue rests on the feeling of approval in an observer, and mind-independent in the sense that they are independent of any individual and cultural beliefs. This addresses the feminist worry that were moral norms mind-dependent in virtue of an observer’s approval, it could not be the case that rape is universally wrong. The notion of truth that emerges from Driver’s feminist constructivism is that there is no possible world exactly descriptively like our own but different normatively (Driver 2012: 189). This is not to endorse relativism; rather, the view is that wherever certain acts turn out to be morally wrong, in any society with the same conditions they will be wrong. Furthermore, Driver’s theory adds to Hume’s by requiring that caring agents, in order to be caring agents, endorse certain features of acts. Driver believes that this makes the view of moral truth almost universal. Almost, because non-caring agents will likely not endorse these features, but Driver dismisses these agents as not moral agents. Hers is a complex view, no doubt, but it demonstrates how feminists can be moral realists, incorporate care in their moral theory, and avoid a problematic relativism.

Most of the feminist debate about truth in ethics has not been about the nature of moral facts, but about whether feminists should endorse moral absolutism or moral relativism. While moral relativists believe that truth in ethics is relative to cultures or even individuals, moral absolutists believe that there is one true moral code. For the moral absolutist, if rape is wrong, it is wrong full stop, while for the relativist, rape can be morally wrong in one society but morally permissible in another. Why would feminists endorse moral relativism? If rape, or more generally, oppression is morally wrong, it would seem that it is wrong universally, and that there is some fact about it that explains its wrongness. Indeed, for any feminist claims about oppression to have any bite, it would seem that moral absolutism must be true.

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One of the main reasons why some feminists have hesitations about moral absolutism is the worry about judging other cultures and tolerance. Since women have been judged throughout history according to patriarchal standards (e.g., “A good woman is not aggressive”; “A good woman serves her family first”; “A childless woman is selfish”), some feminists believe that we should refrain from judging women any further. A common belief is that if we are moral relativists, the only judgments we can legitimately make are ones about persons in our own culture who fail to live up to the culture’s moral code. Additionally, Western feminists have been accused of unfairly judging women in other cultures while not pointing the finger at women in their own culture for participating in patriarchal practices. Uma Narayan accuses Western feminists of unfairly judging Sufi Pirzada women in Old Delhi who veil for having a compromised agency because they see these women as either the “dupes of patriarchy,” who have only desires deformed by patriarchy, or the “prisoners of patriarchy,” who have extreme restrictions on their liberty (Narayan 2002). Narayan believes that the situation is much more complex. She portrays these women as “bargainers with patriarchy” who have both external constraints on their liberty as well as internal constraints in the form of deformed desires, but who also have non-deformed desires and can make autonomous choices about veiling. They both want to veil because of the message it sends about their sexuality, and do not want to veil because veiling is uncomfortable and restrictive, but not veiling flies in the face of deeply held religious convictions. Narayan compares them to Western women who do not go out in public without makeup or with their hairy legs uncovered and argues that Western women are wrong to judge veiling women as constrained while viewing Western women as having choices and full agency (Narayan 2002: 421). Narayan herself does not explicitly endorse moral relativism, but her concerns about unfairly judging women from other cultures make moral relativism appealing to some feminists.

Having said all of this, however, it is false that moral relativism necessarily endorses tolerance, since it is an open question whether any particular moral code endorses tolerance. Thus this is not a good reason for feminists to favor relativism over absolutism. Additionally, Margaret Urban Walker argues that it is possible to criticize prevailing moral standards while recognizing that morality is culturally and socially situated (Walker 2008). Walker believes that we justify and critique morality from the standpoint of our own society’s moral perspective, rather than from the standpoint of an objective, universal standard, in a way that is sensitive to the standpoint of the non-privileged in our society. We ask how we fare under our morality, what we get from it, and what we pay for it, moving back and forth and making changes as needed (Walker 2008: 247–249).

Another reason feminists might shy away from moral absolutism is their belief that it can lead to moral imperialism, having moral standards, particularly ones grounded in patriarchy, dictated for all. To avoid moral imperialism, some feminists endorse multiculturalism, the view that minority cultures should be protected by special group rights or privileges. But other feminists such as Susan Moller Okin, urge that feminists should be skeptical about multiculturalism because it is often at odds with the basic tenets of feminism—that women should not be disadvantaged by their sex, that they have human dignity equal to that of men, and that they should have the same opportunity as men to live fulfilling and freely chosen lives (Okin 2004: 192). Okin cites the French government’s tolerance of men bringing multiple wives into the country in the 1970s despite the fact that these arrangements were detrimental to the women involved because they lived in overcrowded apartments and had immense hostility and resentment and were even violent against the other wives and each other’s children (Okin 2004: 192). Lurking behind the tolerance of this practice is the belief that moral truth is relative to cultures: it is true that polygamy is morally permissible for these men, while it is true that it is morally wrong for others. Okin endorses an objective, universal standard of value consistent with the feminist aims listed above, using it to critique such practices. She rejects multiculturalism because it is at odds with a universal standard of value that protects the dignity, rights, and opportunities of women as well as men, and in doing so she rejects the moral relativism that lurks behind it. Similarly, Martha Nussbaum criticizes female genital mutilation on the grounds that it is objectively bad for women: it causes repeated infections, painful intercourse, obstructed labor and delivery, involves force against usually very young girls who have no chance to refuse it, is irreversible, and is practiced on females who are illiterate or poor or intimidated and so have compromised autonomy (Nussbaum 1999). These and other feminists who identify certain objective values that should apply universally are moral absolutists.

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But this raises a third concern that feminists have about moral absolutism, namely, how do we defend universal values in a non-patriarchal way? How do we show, non-paternalistically, that some practices are objectively bad for women? Nussbaum is one feminist who offers a detailed account, what she calls the “capabilities theory,” an absolutist moral view according to which we should pursue the fulfilment of central human capabilities that are common to all, thereby treating each person as an end rather than as a tool of the ends of others (Nussbaum 2000: 5). Nussbaum dismisses the worries about imperialism and paternalism about women’s good as being unfounded. While she acknowledges that many existing value systems are paternalistic toward women, she believes that we should endorse a universalistic one that respects the universal value of having the opportunity to think and choose for oneself (Nussbaum 2000: 51). The capabilities that Nussbaum believes all humans have that, when fulfilled, lead to a good life include: being able to live to the end of a human life of normal length, to have good health, to have one’s bodily boundaries treated as sovereign, to use one’s senses, imagination, thought, and reason especially in ways that produce self-expression, to form a conception of the good and plan one’s life critically, and to engage in social interaction and to play (Nussbaum 2000: 78–80). Feminists could use the objective value of having a good life, and the capabilities that go into it, as a standard by which to measure and judge the practices in which women engage in any society. Using our example, the practice of rape would be condemned universally because it violates a person’s bodily boundaries and disrespects her own choice about having sex. Whether they endorse the capabilities theory, most feminists are moral absolutists because they believe there are objectively wrong acts and practices. This does not mean that feminists have not found Nussbaum’s approach unproblematic. Alison Jaggar critiques the methodology—but not the notion of universal value—used to obtain the list of capabilities (Jaggar 2006). She argues that it is a combination of a substantive-good approach that appeals to an independent standard of value and an informed-desire approach that relies on reflective equilibrium to eliminate preferences corrupted by patriarchy and misinformation. At base, however, Jaggar says that the method is a kind of intuitionism because we test out the list against our intuitions (Jaggar 2006: 307–308). Jaggar’s objections include the following: there is no guarantee that our desires are free from corruption or error; the procedure may be exclusionary because it fails to mandate that everyone participate; and the procedure is non-egalitarian because some unidentified “we” has the authority to determine whether people’s desires are “informed,” “corrupt,” or “mistaken” (Jaggar 2006: 307–308, 318). Thus, the approach might not avoid paternalism and imperialism after all.

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Most feminists also believe that we have made feminist progress, politically, socially, and economically, though we still have a way to go. Were moral relativism true, there could be no feminist moral progress, since progress implies a standard by which we measure improvement. Some feminists suggest that feminists make advances in moral knowledge faster than the general public because they engage in sophisticated analysis of oppression and come up with new terminology (e.g., “marginalize”) and categories that others do not have, at least not until this knowledge gets disseminated into the general public (Calhoun 1989). Once it does, there is room for blaming and holding responsible those who fall short, judging them according to the newly acquired knowledge about a universally true moral code.

Moral Skepticism

Suppose that moral realism and moral absolutism are true. Do we have reason to follow the true moral code? The skeptic about acting morally—the practical skeptic—denies that we do. The challenge for the moral philosopher is to show that every morally required action is rationally required.

On the traditional view, the practical skeptic adopts a theory of practical reason according to which rational action is action that maximizes the agent’s expected utility, or, the satisfaction of the agent’s interests, desires, or preferences. This is the expected theory of utility. In order to defeat the skeptic, the moral philosopher must show that practical reason dictates acting in morally required ways, even when doing so is against the agent’s self-interest, defined as maximal desire or preference satisfaction.

Feminists have raised a number of challenges to the project of defeating the practical skeptic. One objection is whether the expected theory of utility, or rational choice theory, is compatible with feminism, since if it is not, it is a poor starting point for attempting to defeat skepticism. Rational choice theory is put forth as a theory that explains and predicts behavior, which seems to be a purely empirical matter. But Elizabeth Anderson argues that it has normative import, and for this reason feminist values are relevant in determining rational action (Anderson 2002). Anderson recognizes different dimensions of rational choice theory. One is its formal version according to which people tend to maximize their utility. Anderson argues that this dimension is not nuanced enough to relate to feminist concerns for at least the reason that it is oblivious to how the formation of people’s preferences is socially influenced. Anderson favors, but still finds problematic, the rhetorical version of the theory, which is supposed to explain how people actually behave. According to this version, the rational agent, who is deemed to be male, is described as follows: he is self-transparent in that he knows what he wants and has no unconscious drives that interfere with his conscious desires; is opportunistic in that he takes every opportunity to advance his goals; is resourceful and enterprising; is self-reliant and expects others to be so too; is coolly calculating and not impeded by irrational thinking; and is autonomous and self-confident, in that he knows his own preferences and orders them as he sees fit, and sees himself as their source and feels entitled to be such (Anderson 2002: 375–378).

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Some feminists take issue with this view of rational agency because it is at odds with the caring and emotional engagement that are common in intimate interactions associated with women, such as mothering. However, other feminists welcome the same view because it counteracts stereotypically feminine vices of self-effacement, passivity, servility, and niceness (Anderson 2002: 378). Anderson suggests that this view of rational agency is a good model for all, so we could use it as a standard by which to measure how women fall short and to try to overcome the obstacles in their way. Moreover, this view of rational agency can account for the fact that women do not always act on their own preferences but are sometimes under the sway of oppressive social norms. But it wrongly assumes that we develop our autonomy in a vacuum without the support of others, particularly mothers who enable their children in this way (Anderson 2002: 392–393).

Some feminists see rational choice theory as a useful tool for feminism because it requires self-interested or “non-tuistic” action, which is action that is not motivated by the preferences of others. Self-interested action is distinguished from selfish action, which is to prefer one’s own well-being to that of others. Since women have tended to be caregivers, even to the point of losing their selves or not having or asserting their own interests, rational choice theory can show that it is not rational for them to give care unless doing so is reciprocated (Cudd 2002: 412–413). Alternatively, suppose we supplement the Hobbesian model of the State of Nature discussed earlier with Kant’s notion that every rational agent has intrinsic value. This would make it the case that all the bargainers in an interaction could assert their interests equally rather than [having] counting only the interests of the strong [count]. Rational action would not require servility on behalf of the weak, who have less to offer (Hampton 2002).

Rational choice theory can also be used for feminist ends by revealing that social structures need to be changed in order to promote feminist ends such as equality. Consider Ann Cudd’s analysis of the gendered wage gap (Cudd 1988: 36–40). Suppose Larry and Lisa believe that it is best for their family if one stays home with their children while the other enters the paid labor force, and neither subscribes to gendered social norms. They are rational in that they act self-interestedly by maximizing the amount of money their family obtains so that they can provide for their children as best they can. Since women make much less than men for equal work, they reason that it would be best for the family were Lisa to raise the children while Larry becomes the wage earner. One problem, however, is that if enough women make Lisa’s choice, this reinforces the stereotype that women are unreliable wage workers who put domestic work ahead of wage work, which was the cause of the gendered wage gap in the first place. A vicious cycle is set up where women make voluntary, rational choices that contribute to their own oppression if enough others do so as well. Rational choice theory reveals how this happens, and shows how women have bad or unfair options that need to be rectified.

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So far, we have questioned the skeptic’s starting point of rational choice theory and its implications for feminism. Other feminists question specifically how the skeptic’s position bears on demonstrating the rationality of morally required action. One issue is whether the traditional account of the skeptic is too narrow because a defeat of the skeptic would demonstrate that acting morally was rationally required only when moral action conflicts with self-interested action. The traditional picture of the skeptic is, among other things, supposed to leave open no further skeptical challenge by representing the worst-case scenario in opposition to morally required action. Defeating skepticism is a huge challenge because the skeptic accepts only self-interested reasons, and it might be the case that we have set up too big of a challenge, much like Descartes’s attempt to defeat the epistemological skeptic by doubting all of his beliefs. I argue that, nevertheless, we need to broaden the skeptic’s position so that it is more politically sensitive than the traditional one (Superson 2009). A complete defeat of skepticism would demonstrate that actions that discount, ignore, or even set back the status of women as full and equal persons would be irrational. Thus feminists should challenge the view that self-interested action provides the biggest challenge to morality because it is most in opposition to moral action. Other immoral actions that take sexist forms, such as doing evil for its own sake, displaying moral indifference, moral negligence, conscientious wickedness, and weakness of will, and acts that are performed as part of harmful social practices that may not directly be in the agent’s self-interest but only indirectly benefit the group of which he is a member, should also be represented in the skeptic’s challenge to morality. I argue for changing the skeptic’s position to one according to which the skeptic endorses reasons relating to privilege rather than self-interest so as to capture many immoral acts other than self-interested ones, particularly ones that take sexist forms.

I also endorse the Kantian view that each person has intrinsic value, which gives each equal standing to make claims on anyone else or to put forward reasons relating to her ends. These reasons are sufficient for making her a being we ought to respect. Failure to respect another is to privilege oneself, by not recognizing another’s worth, disregarding it, seeking to set it back, failing to focus on it, or not caring about it, all of which are captured in the various forms of immoral action. On my view, feminists might re-construe the skeptic’s position as the view that rationality requires acting in ways that privilege oneself and one’s reasons. A successful and comprehensive defeat of skepticism will demonstrate that these kinds of disrespect for others are irrational. We might apply my account to the issue of rape: a common feminist view is that rapists rape because it gives them a sense of power over their victim and over all members of her group (Hampton 1999), not because they are self-interested and seek to satisfy a preference. Rape attempts to lower the victim’s worth along with the worth of all women. My account of the skeptic in terms of privilege rather than self-interest can make better sense of the irrationality of rape, were skepticism defeated.

Yet other feminists believe that the project of defeating the practical skeptic ought to be jettisoned or at least reframed. Some are suspicious that reason, though put forward as universal, is a male-biased concept since women have been associated only with emotions and men with reason throughout the history of philosophy (Lloyd 1984; Tong 1993; Tuana 1992). Some believe that the notion of reason could never be neutral, but that it has gender built into it in such a way that it would have to be a different concept were gender eradicated from it (Held 1990: 323). Feminists must be careful, however, in jettisoning reason and the project of justification lest they reinforce the stereotype that women are more emotional than rational.

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A more recent suggestion in the realm of action theory is to expand the scope of philosophy to include psychology and other empirical sciences to help critique actual moral practices with an eye toward making them not support oppression. Lisa Tessman argues that the project of defeating skepticism needs to speak to actual persons, not the skeptic, since real people are not skeptical in the sense that they refuse morality only if they are given justifying reasons for following it, but only in the sense that they question or reject pieces of morality or ground morality in something other than merely their rationality (Tessman 2011: 884). But Tessman misses the point about the traditional skeptic’s position, which is defined broadly to cover all possible cases of immoral action, and thus assumes that any rationally required act is self-interested. Describing the skeptic’s position this way does not mean that actual people reject moral action wholesale; rather, it means that were the skeptic defeated, there would be no immoral action about which the skeptic can claim that it may be rationally required or at least permissible to act that way. The description is strategic, not intended to represent reality. Tessman’s suggestion that the project of defeating skepticism tap into other disciplines in order to change oppressive practices is addressed by my expansion of the skeptic’s position to include behaviors that are performed as part of harmful social practices that indirectly benefit an agent who is a member of a privileged group. Both Tessman and I want changes in oppressive social structures, but I insist on the project of justification because demonstrating the rationality of acting morally would strengthen morality by backing it with reason, whether or not the reasons take on real people. When they do take, a successful defeat of the skeptic promises to make headway in achieving the desired effect of people’s acting morally.

Suppose we defeat the skeptic. How do we motivate persons who recognize moral reasons to act on them? Internalists about reasons and motivations believe that reasons necessarily motivate a rational agent who recognizes them, while externalists deny that they necessarily do so (Smith 2007). Some feminists question internalism and its consequences. Some challenge the view that part of the concept of a reason is that it motivates, arguing that unrecognized psychological habits such as stereotyping, or social pressure to conform to the attitudes of others, can make a person who is somewhat aware of her moral demands fail to attend fully to them and be motivated to act (DesAutels 2004). Other feminists question whether if a rational agent acts immorally because he is not motivated, he could not possibly have believed the relevant moral judgment. Lacking the motivation need not mean that he completely lacks an authentic belief about what morality demands. He might truly believe that his society takes something to be morally required, but not be fully motivated by these requirements because they dictate sexist behavior (Nelson 2004). Still other feminists question the view that if an agent fails to be motivated by her moral judgment, she must be irrational. Some people who are victims of oppressive socialization are confused about their worth as persons and so fail to be moved by the moral judgment that one ought to be self-respecting. For instance, the deferential wife puts her husband’s and family’s interests ahead of her own when she even recognizes the latter because she believes that women ought to serve their families (Hill 1995). Since she does not see herself as having the same worth as a person as others, she is unlikely to be motivated by the moral judgment that one ought to be self-respecting rather than servile. Judging such persons to be irrational when they fail to be motivated is to blame the victim for her bad circumstances (Superson 2009). Some feminists suggest that we ought not to blame persons for harboring implicit bias, the unconscious bias that affects how we perceive, evaluate, and interact with people who are members of groups at which our biases are directed, for at least the reason that they may be completely unaware of having the bias which is the product of living in, for instance, a sexist society (Saul 2013: 40, 55). Thus invoking internalism does not solve the motivation issue about acting morally, even if the skeptic is defeated.

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Moral Epistemology

How do we know that rape is morally wrong? According to traditional moral philosophy, reason gives us this information, and our will or motivational capacity responds or not. Reason and motivation are completely separate on this model; a person can know what is morally called for yet fail to be moved in the right way. Margaret Little objects to this model of obtaining moral knowledge. Borrowing from the ethic of care, which showed the significance of emotion to morality, Little argues that the possession of various emotions and desires is a necessary condition for seeing the moral landscape (2007: 421). Little attributes the separation of reason from affect to the historical association with and subsequent devaluation of emotion along with women. Contrary to the traditional model, Little argues that moral deliberation begins with being aware of the salient features of a moral situation, which involves emotion. In particular, if one cares about something, one is ready to respond on its behalf in a way that is receptive to the particularities of one’s situation, including one’s hopes, fears, and worries, as is a mother who notices that her child needs help (Little 2007: 423, 245). Someone who is truly morally aware has a certain attentiveness, a gestalt view of a situation that allows her to see things a certain way rather than to approach a moral situation with a conscious grocery list of moral features to check for (Little 2007: 423). She sees an action that causes pain not just in this way but also as a cruel action. Furthermore, she sees it as meriting a response, such as calling for some action or responding appropriately emotionally. Most importantly, she sees the morally salient features of the situation as constituting a reason for the response, as when a person sees the evil of torture as constituting a reason not to torture because of the revulsion of torture (Little 2007: 426). If a person lacks the appropriate response, she does not see clearly the moral status of a situation. Only when she has the response and lets it inform her moral judgment of the situation can she acquire moral knowledge. Little gives the following example to illustrate the gestalt switch and appropriate emotionality involved in seeing the moral landscape. Suppose that a woman gives to a homeless person only because she wants to avoid guilt, but one day has a change in perspective and identifies with the person’s loneliness, and helps him because he is a fellow human in need. (Little 2007: 426).

Applying Little’s view to our example, a person who has the right perspective on morality comes to know that rape is wrong not just in virtue of its meeting certain objective criteria of wrongness, but also because he has the right affect about it in that he sees it as cruel, disgusting, and degrading of a person’s worth, sees how it affects a particular victim, and sees that this response yields a reason to avoid rape. The insight from feminism is that traditional moral theory has ignored affect because of its association with women, when it turns out that affect is necessary to knowing the moral landscape, making correct moral judgments, and acquiring moral truths.

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Conclusion

We have seen that feminists have weighed in on some timeless, intractable issues in metaethics. They have offered accounts of moral realism that incorporate the sentiment of caring rather than being grounded strictly in reason. They have debated whether it is better for feminism for us to be relativists or absolutists about moral truth, and have offered ways of justifying objective, universal values. They have challenged many of the assumptions associated with the project of defeating the skeptic about moral action, including the notion of rationality and whether traditional philosophers have described the project broadly enough to cover all sexist behaviors. Finally, they have expanded traditional philosophy’s view of how we acquire moral knowledge to a more poignant account that is grounded in both reason and emotions so that we can better respond to our moral world. The area of metaethics is ripe for further feminist challenges.