Captain Beverly King entered the operations center at COMSUBFOR headquarters, noting the unusually high density of personnel. Leading the augmented staff was Captain Murray Wilson, who was currently reviewing the Atlantic Fleet’s East Coast ASW barrier stretching from Newfoundland to Puerto Rico. There had been no detections of the Russian submarine that King was aware of, although she wasn’t entirely in the loop. As the Submarine Force’s senior public affairs officer, she dealt with myriad mundane, and sometimes peculiar, issues.
She had stopped by the operations center to evaluate a report received this morning from a trawler captain convinced he had snagged a submarine, demanding compensation for the net he’d been forced to cut loose. Although it was somewhat embarrassing, it did occur on occasion. The thousands of nets dragged by commercial fisherman were silent and undetectable by a submarine’s sonar system, and the only way to avoid a net was to avoid the trawlers.
However, a trawler’s engine sounded similar to the multitude of other merchants and pleasure craft, and while it was common practice to keep surface contacts a minimum distance away to avoid nets they might be dragging, it wasn’t always possible in high-contact-density situations.
A glance at the operations center display told King what she already suspected; the trawler captain’s claim was false. There were no submarines south of Cuba. She queried Captain Wilson, just to be sure.
“Murray,” King said as she extended her hand. “Beverly King, public affairs officer. It’s a pleasure to meet you.”
After Wilson returned the greeting, King explained the reason for her visit, then requested confirmation of her assessment.
Wilson didn’t need to check the display. “You’re correct. We have no submarines in the western Atlantic.”
“Thanks,” King replied. She was about to depart when she hesitated, then pursued the matter further. “The thing is, the trawler captain knows what he’s talking about. He was on a trawler seven years ago when Helena snagged its net. He said the situation was exactly the same.” King paused to let Wilson evaluate the new information, then added, “Of course, he could be making it up, hoping to make a few bucks by filing a false claim.”
Wilson pondered the matter, then examined the large monitor on the front wall displaying the ASW barrier in the Atlantic Ocean. Kazan was overdue. If the Russian submarine had traveled at ten knots on her electric drive, she would’ve hit the barrier two days ago. Either she was traveling slower for some reason, or had already slipped through. But if the latter, she was now within launch range, and what was the Russian captain waiting for? Was he approaching closer to the coast, so he could hit targets farther inland?
Or maybe …
Wilson’s eyes moved down to the Cayman Islands.
He turned to the operations center watch officer. “Plot a course from the GIUK Gap—from Pittsburgh’s position starting at the time she ejected the SEPIRB buoy—around Puerto Rico to the Cayman Islands. Use a transit speed of twenty knots and calculate the arrival time just south of the Caymans.”
The watch officer entered the requested parameters and a red line appeared on the display, representing the requested track.
To King, Wilson asked, “When did the submarine snag supposedly occur?”
“Last night, around 10 p.m. local—3 a.m. GMT.”
Wilson examined the display. If Kazan had followed the track on the display at twenty knots, it would have passed by the Cayman Islands last night at 4 a.m. Greenwich Mean Time.
Son of a bitch.
While establishing the ASW barrier, Wilson had assumed Kazan would attack the densely populated East Coast cities, including the nation’s capital, launching as soon as possible. Instead, the Russian submarine captain had done an end around.
It was a brilliant plan if the goal was to strike the broadest area possible rather than a quick strike along the East Coast. From the Gulf of Mexico, Kazan’s Kalibr missiles covered eighty percent of the United States; an arc sweeping from Los Angeles in the west to the Canadian border in the north, to Boston in the east. Wilson assumed the Russian submarine captain was planning for maximum effect, and would likely approach close to shore, increasing the available target set.
Still, before he repositioned ASW assets to the Gulf of Mexico, pulling them from the East Coast barrier, he wanted to be more confident of his conclusion. If Kazan had been snagged in a trawler’s net, it would most certainly have wrapped around the submarine’s screw. The Russian submarine would have surfaced to cut the net free.
Wilson asked King, “Do you have the lat/long of the trawler incident?”
King looked up the information in the incident report.
Wilson turned to the operations officer, relaying the coordinates. “Pull up satellite imagery of the western Atlantic, zoomed in to those coordinates. I want infrared scans at ten-minute intervals starting at 3 a.m. GMT this morning.”
A map of the Cayman Islands and surrounding water appeared on the display at the front of the operations center; a mass of black with intermittent bright spots scattered throughout. If Kazan had been running at twenty knots, its nuclear reactor would have been operating at high power and the submarine’s Reactor Compartment would be very hot. If Kazan surfaced to cut the net, the event should have been detectable.
The satellite imagery advanced in ten-minute intervals, and three hours after the reported incident, a bright white blip appeared at the coordinates reported by the trawler, disappearing two hours later.
There was no doubt in Wilson’s mind—the trawler had snagged Kazan.
To the watch officer, Wilson ordered, “Plot an area of uncertainty, starting at the lat/long reported by the trawler, expanding outward at twenty knots. Give me four-hour contour rings.”
After the rings appeared, Wilson calculated how long it would take to reposition the P-8A squadrons currently in the Atlantic Ocean, then issued orders for a new ASW barrier in the Gulf of Mexico, through which Kazan must pass if it moved closer to the U.S. southern shore.
Although the new barrier was much smaller than the East Coast version, it was still a wide arc—over six hundred miles long—spanning from Mérida, Mexico, to the base of the Florida Keys, and Wilson had only the P-8As to work with. The submarines and surface ships off the East Coast would take too long to reposition.
However … a thought occurred to him. It was a risky plan, but there was one more asset available, which might prove handy.
Wilson called the COMSUBFOR chief of staff, requesting an urgent meeting regarding Kazan’s status.
Inside the admiral’s conference room, Wilson explained the situation. Kazan had almost certainly skirted the East Coast ASW barrier and was heading into the Gulf of Mexico to launch its Kalibr missiles at a larger target set. The P-8A squadrons were being repositioned, but submarine and surface ship assets were too far away. Except one.
USS North Carolina was getting underway today, her first journey to sea since she was sunk two years ago during America’s devastating war with China. Fortunately, North Carolina sank in the shallow Taiwan Strait in only two hundred feet of water and had been raised from the bottom. With the Navy’s normal repair yards swamped, repairing five aircraft carriers and over two dozen submarines damaged or sunk during the conflict, North Carolina had been sent to Ingalls Shipbuilding in Pascagoula, Mississippi, for repair.
Wilson made the request. “I’d like permission to employ North Carolina against Kazan.”
Captain Mark Graham, the COMSUBLANT training officer, objected, as Wilson expected.
“This is North Carolina’s first time underway since she was repaired. Her replacement tactical systems and hull patch haven’t been tested at sea, she’s got a new commanding officer, and her crew isn’t certified for deployment. One-third of her crew has never even been to sea.”
Wilson pointed out, “The crew completed their shore-based tactical training and passed. They’re ready to go to sea.”
Graham replied, “Getting underway and engaging in combat are two different things. It normally takes a six-month at-sea workup to certify a submarine for deployment. I have a high regard for our submarines and our crews in general, but if we send North Carolina against the premier attack submarine in the Russian Navy, the odds of success are low.”
“Then we need to improve the odds,” Wilson said. “Transfer me aboard.”
There was no immediate response as Admiral Andrea and his staff evaluated Wilson’s unexpected request.
Wilson added, “That’s what COMSUBPAC did during the Kentucky incident. I was transferred aboard Collins because it was the only submarine within range. It’s a similar situation here. Let me take command of North Carolina.”
Admiral Andrea considered the request. Wilson was well into his second submarine command tour, and with the two tours bracketing his assignment as senior submarine command course instructor, he was the Submarine Force’s most experienced captain.
Andrea surveyed his staff around the table; none had additional objections.
Finally, Andrea spoke. “I’m not a fan of the proposal. It places North Carolina and her crew at excessive risk. However, I have to weigh the pros and cons, and employing North Carolina improves the odds of locating and sinking Kazan. Ultimately, that’s what matters.”
He turned to his operations officer. “Arrange a personnel transfer. Get Wilson aboard North Carolina as soon as possible, placing him in command.”
Admiral Andrea stood and shook Wilson’s hand. “Good luck, Murray.”