THE FAILURES IN Iraq, like the earlier failures in Vietnam, will have a chastening effect. Almost surely, America will be more loath to get involved in another venture of this kind; it will, or should, proceed more cautiously in getting involved in another war that could turn into a quagmire. But with all the precautions and caveats, the United States will, someday, go to war again, and so we need to start thinking now about how to avoid the problems that have contributed to the failures of this war. We can, and must, put in place reforms that will help us the next time around. We can already identify some of the reforms that, if implemented, can help us avoid future mistakes. Some of these would improve the information and decision-making process—including budgeting. Others relate to the care of soldiers when they come home. The lack of planning and attention to our veterans is a grave error, but thankfully, one of the easiest to correct.
One of the fundamental lessons of this war is the failure of institutions such as the U.S. Congress and the United Nations to provide adequate checks and balances. The founding fathers were keenly aware of the abuse of executive powers, and they designed a system of government based on principles of checks and balances. There is a cost to these checks and balances—they often slow down the pace of making needed change; but the benefits—reducing the likelihood of abuses, or even costly mistakes—are well worth it.
At the time the U.S. Constitution was written, there was little need for limits on the president’s ability in the conduct of foreign policy. The United States was a new country and relatively powerless. France and England were the major powers of the time. Our founding fathers gave Congress control of the purse strings and that, in theory, was enough to check the power of the president and to prevent abuse. In the run-up to the Iraq war, we discovered that the existing checks were ineffective. The president’s party had a majority in Congress, and he controlled the sources of information. There is evidence that those in the administration manipulated this information to exaggerate the threat from Saddam Hussein. The president claimed that the nation’s security was at grave risk, and so Congress took him at his word and voted for the war.1
Our checks and balances failed at home, and there was no one abroad that was willing or able to stop us from the early and mad decision to invade Iraq.2 There are today no international institutions that can provide an adequate check against a major country determined to go to war, even if it is plainly contrary to international law. The United Nations was created after World War II to prevent armed aggression, but it failed here. According to the UN Charter, states are only entitled to take up arms in self-defense or if the Security Council authorizes force. But we ignored the United Nations and the great majority on the Security Council. The Iraq war was not claimed to be self-defense and it was not authorized by the Security Council. Nor was justification claimed on the grounds of “humanitarian intervention,” the use of force to prevent massive violations of fundamental human rights. The U.S. invasion amounted to an act of aggression and violated international law.
The U.S. stance of ignoring the United Nations was shortsighted. There may well come a time when other countries decide to wage war and we will need the United Nations to help us stop them. For this reason, it is important that international law be respected, so that it can act as a check on any one country’s ambitions. It is in the United States’ interests to have international law respected as much as it is anyone else’s.
There are other reasons why it is desirable to have international checks on the power of the U.S. president. In recent years, economists have drawn attention to a phenomenon they call the agency problem: the interests of those delegated to make a decision on the part of others (the agent) often do not coincide well with those in whose interests they are supposed to be working, or with those who will have to bear the costs of the decisions. In the case of the Iraq war, it is young people sent to fight who bear the biggest burden. As we saw in the last chapter, this discrepancy between national interests and those of the president extends to virtually every major strategic decision, including whether or when to leave. If U.S. forces withdraw and Iraq implodes, then President Bush will be blamed. But if we stay, there is always the chance that history will judge him more kindly: events could somehow turn out more favorably or the blame could be shared with a future administration. The scope for abuse is increased when information is imperfect—part of the reason that governments often like secrecy, and part of the reason that every modern democracy has tried to circumscribe secrecy, through the passage of Freedom of Information Acts.3
The first set of reforms that we propose involves making sure that citizens and their representatives have better information as we go to war—including information about the estimated human and financial costs of the venture. In the case of the Iraq war, we believe that faulty information, not just about the supposed threat from Saddam Hussein’s regime but also about the realistic cost of an invasion, was a key factor in ensuring congressional support for the invasion.
The second set of reforms focuses on treating our soldiers and veterans fairly. In January 2005, Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness Dr. David Chu caused outrage in the veterans’ community when he told the Wall Street Journal that the amounts being spent on veterans’ pensions, health insurance, and benefits for widows “have gotten to the point where they are hurtful. They are taking away from the nation’s ability to defend itself.”4 Yet his statement is an accurate reflection of how this administration has approached war funding. It has not flinched at asking for ever higher amounts of cash to pay troops while they are in combat, and it has not balked at the astronomical demands of private contractors such as Halliburton and Blackwater Security. We have behaved as if there were a direct conflict of interest between funding the war and taking care of the veterans after they come home. This has resulted, as we described in chapter 3, in funding shortfalls at the Veterans Health Administration, a backlog of 400,000 pending disability claims at the Veterans Benefits Administration, and hundreds of thousands of returning veterans having to cope with unnecessary bureaucratic roadblocks and red tape.
WE PROPOSE A number of reforms designed to ensure that we have better information in the event the United States considers marching into war, or as we continue with any prolonged conflict.
Reform 1:Wars should not be funded through “emergency” supplementals
Wars are sometimes not expected. It is understandable that at least some of the initial spending may be unanticipated; but there is no reason why a war should be financed by “emergency” appropriations for two years—let alone five. As we have pointed out, emergency funds are not subject to regular budget caps and—more important—they do not require the same level of budget justification as regular appropriations and are not subjected to the same level of scrutiny. With emergency supplementals, the analysts in Congress and the Congressional Budget Office do not have sufficient information or time to evaluate the request. As a result, the normal checks and balances designed to ensure financial accountability are circumvented. We would urge Congress to enact legislation limiting the use of emergency funding to the first year of a conflict.5
Reform 2:War funding should be linked to strategy reviews
If the administration resorts to emergency appropriations more than twice, or more than one year after initiation of a conflict, Congress should presume that the war is going worse than was expected. The administration should be required to explain why the conflict is going badly, identify what changes in strategy will be implemented, and estimate their budgetary implications.
Reform 3:The administration should create a comprehensive set of military accounts, which include the expenditures of the Department of Defense, the State Department, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Department of Labor, as well as Social Security and health care benefits that arise from military service
This set of budget accounts should be transparent, and presented on both a cash and an accrual basis—costs not just for the next ten years, but for the next forty. The costs of war continue long after combat has ceased, but they are hidden by the government’s “cash” accounting system and can remain so for a long time. There are a variety of budgetary tricks (besides cash accounting) by which an administration can obfuscate the real costs—which may be particularly tempting to an administration if, say, the war is unpopular.
In every war, the administration should be required to provide a set of budget accounts that not only include current expenditures in detail but take into account the cost of replacing equipment and supplies used in the war effort and the need to provide long-term medical care and disability benefits to soldiers. The budget accounts should also provide for the long-term costs of any structural changes in the DOD budget, such as increased combat pay and benefits. Any likely impact on other departments, such as the departments of State, Energy, and Health and Human Services, as well as large agencies such as the Social Security Administration, should also be reported.
Reform 4:The Department of Defense should be required to present clean, auditable financial statements to Congress, for which the Secretary of Defense and the Chief Financial Officer are held personally accountable
Unbelievable as it seems, basic information about outlays—what has actually been spent on them—is not available. President Bush has not presented, on a regular basis, an accounting of how much the war in Iraq has cost us. It is only through hard work that we—and others—have been able to piece together the accounts. The DOD classifies more than $25 billion in its annual Operations and Maintenance budget as “other services and miscellaneous contracts”—a catch-all category which the Congressional Research Service criticizes as being “too vague to be useful.” The accounting systems at the Pentagon are so poor at tracking expenditures that the department has flunked its financial audit every year for the past decade. Every responsible party looking at the costs of the war—including the CBO, the CRS, the Government Accountability Office, the Iraq Study Group, and the department’s own auditors and Inspector General—have found numerous discrepancies in the DOD figures.
The department is required under the Chief Financial Officers Act and the Financial Management Integrity Act to prepare financial statements that meet certain minimal standards of transparency and accountability.6 Since the enactment of these reforms, almost all the cabinet-level departments (with the exception of the Department of Homeland Security, which was created by merging twenty-two agencies and has not yet consolidated all of those accounts) have been able to produce “clean” financial statements that are approved by outside auditors. This has required a great deal of hard work at all these departments. Despite efforts by some of the career staff in the Pentagon, the leadership at DOD has not made the kind of intense, sustained effort (nor requested funds to do so) that would lead to a “clean” opinion—that the accounts provide an accurate description of the department’s spending.
It is ironic that Congress is willing to tolerate such lax standards and limited accountability. Just four years ago it enacted (almost unanimously) the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which requires CEOs to take personal responsibility for their companies’ financial statements and imposes criminal penalties for violations. The act also demands a high standard of transparency in financial statements and offers protection to whistle-blowers. Sarbanes-Oxley was passed in 2002 in response to the corporate accounting scandals of the late nineties at Enron, WorldCom, and Tyco, whose senior officers are now behind bars. If the Defense Department were held to similar standards of accountability, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and his former deputy Paul Wolfowitz might be held personally liable for some of the profiteering and financial lapses at the Pentagon during their stewardship.
Holding the Secretary of Defense and the Chief Financial Officer more personally accountable would likely spur the needed change.7 We urge Congress to begin by insisting on enforcement of the existing rules: require all major departments to file financial statements that cover their assets, liabilities, inventories, systems, and contracts.8 If this does not produce results, Congress should enact a mini–Sarbanes-Oxley for government that holds cabinet officers accountable for financial matters in their departments.9
Reform 5:The administration and the CBO should provide regular estimates of the micro-and macroeconomic costs of a military engagement
The large disparity between the budgetary and the total economic costs of war means that there is need for a comprehensive accounting of the cost to the economy. The attempt to keep the budgetary costs of this war down has increased costs elsewhere. There are thousands of economists in the federal government—serving at the Office of Management and Budget, the CBO, GAO, the Joint Economic Committee in the House of Representatives, and throughout government. Despite this capacity, the federal government has made only limited efforts to understand the full economic costs of war—and only after outside prodding. This should be made a matter of routine. The CBO should be given responsibility for preparing an economic report that addresses the main categories of these costs, along the lines provided in this book, and in a way that is sufficiently transparent that outsiders can validate its conclusions. Future costs that should be identified include future health care and disability payments over the lifetime of the injured, replacement of destroyed and depreciated equipment, and “resetting” the military to its prewar capacity.
Reform 6:The administration should be required to notify Congress of any procedural changes that might affect the normal bureaucratic checks and balances on the flow of information. The Freedom of Information Act (which enshrines the basic principles of citizens’ right to know what their government is doing) should be strengthened, with a more narrow carving out of exceptions, and with congressional oversight on these exceptions
Information about the war effort has been concealed, disguised, or delayed during the Iraq conflict. This includes basic data—such as the number of soldiers injured, the amount of time they wait to see a doctor in the VA system, and the number of suicides and desertions among soldiers deployed to the conflict. Veterans’ organizations have been forced to use the Freedom of Information Act to find these things out. We urge that Congress require that such data be made accessible.10
There were a number of other aspects of this war that were unusual, that have diminished the extent to which Americans feel the full pain of war. Two of these require careful review.
Reform 7:Overall, Congress should review the heavy reliance on contractors in wartime. In particular, the use of contractors for “security services” should be limited, both in number and in duration, with a detailed justification provided for why the military itself cannot provide these services. Careful attention should be paid to hidden costs borne by the public, of the kind uncovered in this book, such as the payment for disability and death through government-provided insurance
The war in Iraq is proving to be a wake-up call regarding the role of contractors. In Iraq and Afghanistan, we are using contractors to perform many of the tasks formerly done by military or civilian government employees. They are used not only in support roles but in key strategic positions, such as prison interrogators, bomb defusers, top-secret intelligence gatherers for the CIA, and armed bodyguards for U.S. officials. They have landed lucrative contracts to rebuild infrastructure and to feed American troops. Much of this work has been poorly managed and inadequately monitored, and yet private contractors have become indispensable to the war operation.
There are serious fundamental flaws with this reliance on the private sector. First, contractors are motivated by different incentives than civil servants. Whether they are giant corporations like Bechtel and General Electric or individual security guards who can earn $16,000 a month in Iraq, contractors are driven by making money. It is unrealistic to assume that they will be motivated by the same concern for the public interest as civil servants or soldiers. The current system relies on civil servants to manage contractors and hold them accountable. But—as has become painfully evident in Iraq—few civil servants, even in the military, have the training or skills to do this effectively; and we have simply not hired enough civil servants to provide adequate oversight.
Second, the taxpayer does not appear to be getting value for money. One of the main reasons for outsourcing is that the private sector is widely assumed to be more efficient. But in Iraq, much of the reconstruction funds went to high-priced American contractors rather than low-cost local labor. The GAO and other government watchdogs have repeatedly documented cases of overbilling, overpayment, and outright profiteering during the Iraq war. This has increased the operational costs. And a large percentage of military contracts in this war have been awarded without full competition. Giant contractors have become adept at gaming the system. Once firms win big contracts—often using low-ball initial cost estimates—the government becomes so dependent on their services that it’s almost impossible to get rid of them.
Third, the risks of losing control may well outweigh budgetary considerations—as, say, in the interrogation of military prisoners. But the pendulum has swung so far in favor of contracting out that the Pentagon typically even hires contractors to perform audits of other government contractors. In Iraq, this issue is compounded by the contractors’ murky legal status. Under the Geneva Conventions, they are non-combatants; but many of those working in Iraq carry arms and work as paramilitary security forces, or they are involved in training military security forces. Yet they are not always subject to the same discipline and accountability as U.S. troops.
The extensive and growing dependence on contractors is likely to accelerate even further. At the Department of Defense, 50 percent of civilian military workers will soon be eligible to retire. Many of those retirees, still in their mid-fifties, will end up in the “revolving door,” working for contractors after their obligatory one-year abstinence from government-related work.
Above all, our dependence on contractors has limited the extent to which America has felt the human toll of the war. The all-volunteer Army, National Guard, and Reservists perform heroically, but the percentage of the U.S. population bearing the cost of a conflict is the lowest ever.11 Rather than making more Americans share the burden, we hired, contracted, and required those who were in the armed forces, National Guard, and Reserves to work for longer. This is not only unfair; in the long run, it may even be costly, as it renders volunteering less attractive. Congress should undertake an extensive review of the entire philosophy and implications behind this privatization of the military.
Reform 8:The military should not be permitted to call upon the National Guard or the Reserves for more than one year, unless it can demonstrate that it is not feasible to increase the requisite size of the armed forces
We are supposed to call upon the Reserves and the National Guard in times of emergency. Five years into a war, we cannot credibly claim that in Iraq it is still an emergency. We have already seen the consequences of a first-responder National Guard that is overseas instead of able to take action quickly at home. Limiting the deployment of these troops to one year will compel the military to present alternative approaches. National Guard and Reserves would only serve more than one twelve-month tour if the military can convincingly prove that it cannot meet the force requirements any other way.
In the event National Guard or Reserve troops do serve more than one tour, the military would be required to pay double wages on a second tour of duty and triple on a third. Double pay should be given to any individual required involuntarily to extend his or her time in service beyond the originally contracted amount.
This will provide incentives for the military not to use the National Guard or Reserves for repeated tours of duty; not to force those who have signed up for four years duty to do a fifth or sixth; and will also compensate those called up and who have had the time of their service extended for the huge burden imposed on them.
Finally, the military should provide a compelling case that there are indeed significant cost savings and improvements in military effectiveness from imposing such a large burden on so few individuals, rather than sharing the burden more broadly.
It may, of course, be the case that military recruiters are not able to raise the additional troops required in an all-voluntary army, or at least may not be able to do so without raising compensation and lowering standards. But that should itself be sending an important message to our policymakers. Americans are patriotic. They volunteered in droves for World War II because they thought it was a just war. If America’s young men and women are saying that they are unwilling to fight in a conflict in which political leaders in Washington have got the nation engaged, our political leaders should listen to their message.
Reform 9:There should be a presumption that the costs of any conflict lasting more than one year should be borne by current taxpayers, through the levying of a war surtax
War has become too easy for America.12 The average American was not asked to risk his own life, or the life of his children, in Iraq. Nor has he been asked to pay higher taxes. The war has been financed by debt. The combination of a volunteer army and a war financed by debt made it initially possible for most Americans to support the war, without ever asking: would they be willing to sacrifice their lives or the lives of their children to fight this war? Would they be willing to pay $25,000 of their own family’s money (and their children’s money) to fight this war?13 The incentives of average Americans to act as the check and balance against the abuse of presidential power was short-circuited. We believe that, at a minimum, the financial costs of running the war should be borne by its current citizens, not simply transferred to the next generation.14 This means that current revenues must cover current spending; a war tax should be levied to fund such expenditures. The tax would fund both current operations and additional contributions to the Veterans Benefit Trust Fund that we propose later in this chapter.15
As the United States has emerged as the sole superpower, with an imbalance of military power even greater than the imbalance in economic power (spending 47 percent of the total for the entire world on armaments), there is no last line of checks against its abuse of military power—other than the active involvement of its citizens. The fact that the death and destruction occurs from bombs dropped from 50,000 feet, on people who are neither seen nor heard, most of whom can be written off as “collateral damage,” should not make the act of killing any easier.
THE NINE REFORMS just described are designed to make it more likely that we make intelligent decisions about going to war—good information is required to make good decisions, and it is important that Americans know, and confront, the costs of war. The United States will almost surely go to war again. Americans may disagree about whether or when to do so. On one issue, however, almost all concur: we should treat those who fight for their country well—better than they have been treated by the Bush administration. The next nine reforms are designed to ensure that this happens.
Reform 10:Shift the burden of proof for eligibility (presumption) for health care benefits and disability from soldiers to government
If a veteran claims a war-related disability, then the veteran should be presumed to be entitled to that claim. It should be up to the Department of Veterans Affairs to provide evidence that the veteran is not eligible. We should think about veterans’ disability claims the same way we do taxes: the IRS automatically accepts nearly all tax filings from everyone, and then audits a subset to detect and deter fraud. For veterans, we should require that all returning servicemen and women have a complete medical examination on their discharge from the military, especially for traumatic brain injury and post-traumatic stress disorder. Any disabilities apparent at that time should automatically qualify the veteran for benefits. The department can then accept claims immediately. Several studies by the Inspectors General of the VA and DOD have found almost no fraud among veterans’ claims. Nevertheless, the VA can then audit a sample of claims later on, adjusting payments where necessary.16
The current system sets up an unfair battle between the government and the veteran—with the presumption (and the resources) on the side of the government. In the current conflict and in the Gulf War of 1991 the VA eventually approved 88–90 percent of all claims (at least in part), paying them retroactively. It makes more sense to approve the claim up front rather than force disabled veterans to wait between six months and two years before approving a claim.
Reform 11:Veterans’ health care should be viewed as an entitlement, not a matter of discretion
Veterans Health Administration expenditures should not be part of the discretionary budget (in the same way that Social Security and Medicare benefits are not part of the discretionary budget), subject to annual appropriations. If the Veterans Health Administration cannot provide the health care veterans are entitled to in its medical facilities, then veterans should have access to the Medicare program, paid for by the VA’s (non-discretionary) budget. The fact that these costs may be higher (especially when it comes to rehabilitation, a VA specialty) should provide the administration with an incentive to expand VA health facilities.
Reform 12:A Veterans Benefit Trust Fund should be set up and “locked,” so that veterans’ health and disability entitlements are fully funded as obligations occur
There are always pressures to cut unfunded entitlements. So, when new military recruits are hired, the money required to fund future health care and disability benefits should be set aside (“lockboxed”) in a new Veterans Benefit Trust Fund. We require private employers to do this; we should require the armed forces to do it as well. This would mean, of course, that when we go to war, we have to set aside far larger amounts for future health care and disability costs, as these will inevitably rise significantly during and after any conflict.
Reform 13:National Guard and Reservists who fight overseas must be eligible for the Benefits Delivery at Discharge program and other all military benefits programs
There is mounting evidence that National Guard and Reserve veterans are being rejected for disability benefits more frequently than active duty forces, even though fewer file claims (cf. chapter 4). This may be due to the fact that they have not been eligible for the Benefits Delivery at Discharge program, and the DOD should move immediately to make them eligible. In addition, National Guard and Reserve troops who have served overseas should be eligible for the same benefits as the military, such as low-cost loans for homes and education.
Reform 14:A new office of advocacy should be established to represent the interests of veterans
The military chain of command rightfully requires that troops take orders from their superiors. Especially in times of conflict, there cannot be the usual bargaining that marks the ordinary employer-employee relationship. But this means that the interests of the ordinary individual serviceman or woman may be given short shrift. Someone should be speaking out for their interests, both while they are serving and afterward.
This office would provide a lifeline to young men and women who are currently at the mercy of wrongheaded policies and decisions by the huge, impersonal military establishment. Just one example is that the military has been demanding that combat-wounded veterans repay a portion of their enlistment bonuses if they fail to serve out their full tours of duty as a result of their injuries. This legal but morally offensive policy was discovered by the Dole-Shalala Commission and would be reversed by legislation that has just been passed by the Senate. But there are hundreds of obscure regulations that can have adverse consequences. Ordinary rank-and-file members of the military need someone who can speak up on their behalf.
Reform 15:Simplify the disability benefits claims process, especially for veterans with PTSD
The actual process of claiming disability benefits is outdated, paper-intensive, and needlessly complicated. Every commission, panel, and organization that has looked into this subject has reached the same conclusion. In 2007, the National Institute of Medicine published an exhaustive 300-plus-page critique of the current system, which urged a radical overhaul and modernization of disability benefits.17 The Dole-Shalala Commission also recommended a major restructuring of the disability claims process. Veterans’ organizations have some disagreements about the precise characteristics of the new system, but most agree that the current one has become unworkable. This situation will worsen in the next few years as the number of complicated claims increases, and as a large number of the most experienced claims adjudicators retire from the VA.
We urge extensive revisions of the claim form itself, of the rating scale, and of the formula for calculating disabilities, as well as modernization of the medical terminology and conditions rated. The current 26-page form, with its detailed requirements for documentation for each disabling condition, should be shortened to a one-page document modeled on the IRS “short form” for taxes. We also urge the VA to consider a radical simplification of categories, based on five levels: not disabled; mild disability; moderate disability; severe disability; and very severe disability. This would replace the current ten-step percentage increment scale, which is highly subjective and applied inconsistently in different regional offices. We recommend that current veterans be grandfathered into the new system at the nearest equivalent ranking on the five-step scale, rounded to the higher equivalent. The new system not only would reduce errors, inconsistencies, and complexity, but also would make it easier to train new claims adjudicators. The problems with the current formulas and medical conditions are well documented in the National Institute of Medicine report and we urge adoption of its recommendations.
In addition, there is an urgent need to fast-track the process for filing for disability for those suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder. This should be a top priority. The current system, which is geared to physical ailments that are immediately apparent, is especially cruel to those suffering from PTSD because the illness seldom manifests itself immediately. Filling in forms and securing detailed documentation is not easy even for people in full mental health. The veterans with PTSD are at higher risk of homelessness,18 substance abuse, underemployment, domestic violence, suicide, and other social problems. Since PTSD is fast becoming endemic among returning troops, it is essential that this system be reformed by automatically approving (a presumption of service connection) all disability compensation claims where the veteran was deployed to the war zone and was diagnosed with PTSD.
Reform 16:Restore medical benefits to Priority Group 8 veterans
In 2003, former VA secretary Anthony Principi suspended all veterans who were in the lowest-priority category, “Priority Group 8,” from eligibility for VA medical care. His intent was to free up scarce resources for the higher-priority veterans, those who are disabled or have a very low income. However, this decision meant that at least 400,000 veterans since 2003 have been denied access to care.19 These veterans are not rich; a veteran earning $30,000 a year can be disqualified from access to VA care because of his income.20 While we understand that Principi was attempting to preserve access for the most needy, the fundamental problem is that we are not fully funding the VA so it can provide care to all veterans who wish to participate. We urge that Congress restore the funding and capacity necessary to the VA health care system so that Priority Group 8 veterans can be accepted.
Reform 17:Harmonize the transition from military to veteran status, so that it becomes a truly “seamless” transition
Perhaps no issue has been as roundly criticized as the apparent inability of the DOD and VA to work together to provide a seamless transition for soldiers from military to veteran status. This is a particular disgrace since it is not a rare occurrence. It has caused untold suffering, as was revealed in the Walter Reed Army Medical Center outpatient fiasco. The Dole-Shalala Commission, the Gates Commission, the Commission on the Future for America’s Veterans, and other groups of the DOD and VA remain unable to fix this problem. But most of the reforms needed are straightforward common sense, and many of them were outlined in a set of recommendations by the Department of Veterans Affairs’ “Seamless Transition” Task Force in 2004.21 They include better coordination in the medical and payroll systems between the DOD and VA; better access to DOD facilities for VA employees; and synchronization of the DOD disability ratings with the VA system, as well as more trust and information sharing at all levels between the two departments.
Reform 18:Increase education benefits for veterans
During World War II, America made a contract with its troops that enabled an entire generation of veterans to gain access to a good education after the conflict. The G.I. Bill covered the full cost of a college education, including tuition, books, and a living stipend. Current education benefits (provided under the Montgomery G.I. Bill of 1984) are less generous. Today’s active duty forces can receive up to 75 percent of tuition costs at a public college or university, with no provision for books or living expenses. Moreover, in order to qualify, a service member must pay an upfront premium of $1,200 within the first year of military service; otherwise, he or she is not eligible to receive education benefits at all. There are eleven individual states which provide free tuition to home state veterans at their state colleges and universities. But for veterans from the other thirty-nine states, the cost of a good education may well be out of reach.
Today’s military is all volunteers: some have not even completed high school. In an effort to bolster recruiting, we have hired more soldiers from the lower socioeconomic quintiles, and fewer from the top. We have doubled the number who lack a high school diploma.22 Having already spent $3 trillion to wage this war, one of the best investments we could make would be to substantially increase education benefits to the post–World War II G.I. Bill levels as an investment in our young men and women who have fought for America.
EVEN UNDER THE best of circumstances, the United States will be spending many billions more in Iraq in the coming decade. Already it is committed to providing Iraq with long-term security guarantees; to training, equipping, and arming the Iraqi Security Forces; and to fighting “Al-Qaeda, Saddamists and all other outlaw groups.”23 This virtually guarantees that U.S. troops will be required to maintain a presence in Iraq for the foreseeable future. Our hasty decision to invade Iraq in 2003 has long-term implications that will be paid for by generations of Americans to come.
The eighteen major reforms that we propose in this final chapter will help us avoid becoming embroiled in another Iraq or Vietnam in the future. Our system will not be fail-safe. Even the best and the brightest make errors of judgment, and America’s political system does not always ensure that the best and brightest reach the pinnacles of decision making. But these reforms would make such mistakes less likely. At the very least, they would ensure that if we do become embroiled in another such conflict, we will do so with our eyes open and with an ability to deal with some of the long-term social and economic problems that follow.
Wars should not be undertaken without an appreciation of the likely human and economic costs and without plans to treat our troops and veterans in the way they deserve. War inevitably involves not just the killing and injuring of enemy combatants; it also harms innocent bystanders who are unlucky enough to be in the wrong place at the wrong time. In Iraq, this human suffering, euphemistically referred to as “collateral damage,” now includes hundreds of thousands of civilian deaths, 2 million international refugees, and a further 2 million who have been displaced within the country.
GOING TO WAR is not to be undertaken lightly. It is an act that should be undertaken with greater sobriety, greater solemnity, greater care, and greater reserve than any other. Stripped of the relentless media and government fanfare, the nationalist flag-waving, the reckless bravado, war is about men and women brutally killing and maiming other men and women. The costs live on long after the last shot has been fired.