28

Into War

Following the occupation of Prague and Memel, Hitler now focused once more on Poland.¹ On 21 March, its ambassador, Lipski, told Foreign Minister Ribbentrop that the Polish government was disconcerted about the German ‘treaty of protection’ with Slovakia, and that ‘the announcement that the relationship was based on protection was clearly directed against Poland’. Ribbentrop played this down, proposing Beck should make an early visit to Berlin, in order to discuss with him ideas for a common policy. However, for Germany the return of Danzig was non-negotiable. It would recognize the Corridor, provided Poland agreed to an extra-territorial transport link between the Reich and East Prussia.² Germany would also agree ‘to concur entirely with the Polish view of the Ukrainian question’. Two days later, Ribbentrop returned to the issue, instructing his ambassador in Warsaw to inform Beck that Germany was prepared not only to recognize the Corridor, but to guarantee the whole of the western border for a period of twenty-five years. Within the context of a common ‘eastern policy’, it would be prepared ‘to allow Poland to take the lead in dealing with the problem of the Ukraine as a whole’. Thus Ribbentrop was trying once more to play the ‘Ukrainian card’ with Poland, despite the fact that, during his visit to Warsaw in January, Beck had made it clear to him that Poland had no intention of engaging in common action against the Soviet Union. In view of Poland’s irritation about Slovakia, this was hardly the appropriate moment to renew an offer that had already been rejected. Hitler, for whom Ribbentrop’s offers had already gone too far, then intervened, and Ribbentrop, to his embarrassment, was forced to withdraw his instructions to Hans-Adolf von Moltke, the ambassador in Warsaw, who then had to cancel his appointment with Foreign Minister Beck.³

In fact, Beck did not come to Berlin, and the German proposals were unambiguously rejected by the Polish government; on 26 March, Lipski informed Ribbentrop, and on 28 March Beck informed the German ambassador in Warsaw. Instead, the Polish government demonstratively moved troop reinforcements to the Corridor. It then turned to Britain with a request for support, to which Chamberlain responded positively in a declaration to the House of Commons on 31 March. At the end of the month, the Polish Foreign Minister told the German ambassador in unambiguous terms that if Germany used force to resolve the Danzig question it would mean war. A quickly arranged visit to London by Beck led to the announcement at the beginning of April of a mutual assistance pact,⁴ which France joined shortly afterwards.⁵

Meanwhile, even before Poland’s rejection of the German government’s proposals had become known in Berlin, Hitler had informed the commanders-in-chief that, while he did not intend to resolve the ‘Polish question’ for the time being, the military should ‘work on it’. ‘Dealing with it in the near future would need particularly favourable political preconditions. Poland would then have to be crushed so that, for the next few decades, it no longer needs to be considered as a political factor.’⁶ War against Poland had now become a clearly defined political option for Hitler.

The document also noted that ‘the Führer doesn’t want to get involved’ in the Ukraine. They might at some point establish a Ukrainian state, but it was still an open question. Thus, Hitler had still not completely abandoned his speculative plans for the Ukraine; the Ukraine option was to reappear on a number of occasions during the following months.

Hitler’s decision to attack Poland

Hitler’s next move was to use the opportunity offered by the launch of the battleship, ‘Tirpitz’, the sister ship of the ‘Bismarck’, on 1 April in Wilhelmshaven, to deliver a tirade in the Rathausplatz attacking above all British ‘encirclement policy’. This attack was preceded and followed up by a vigorous anti-British press campaign.⁷ The slogan ‘encirclement’, which was increasingly used by German propaganda, was an overt reference to the situation at the beginning of the war in 1914, which, according to the dominant view in Germany, had been caused by an anti-German coalition led by Britain. In his speech Hitler referred to several alleged parallels with the situation in the summer of 1914, culminating in the threat to abrogate the Anglo-German Naval Agreement.

In his Wilhelmshaven speech Hitler justified his actions vis-à-vis Czechoslovakia with the argument ‘that for a thousand years this territory has been part of the German people’s living space’; he had merely ‘united what, on the basis of history and geography and, in accordance with all rational principles, ought to be united’. This obviously meant that the annexation of a large number of other European states could be justified by similar ‘historical’ and ‘spatial-political’ arguments.⁸ Hitler then spent a few days on board the ‘Strength through Joy’ ship, the ‘Robert Ley’, which was in the North Sea on its maiden cruise.⁹ Prior to embarkation, however, he authorized Keitel to issue in his name the ‘directive for the Wehrmacht to prepare for war’, which Keitel duly did on 3 April.

This directive provides documentary evidence that, under the impression of the Polish government’s rejection of Germany’s proposals at the end of March, and, in view of growing British–Polish cooperation, Hitler had radicalized his attitude towards Poland. Within a few days, the possibility of armed conflict, which he had sketched out at the end of March, had become a war plan.

In the directive of 3 April Hitler ordered the Wehrmacht to prepare for three scenarios, namely ‘to secure the borders of the German Reich and protection against surprise air attacks’, ‘Case White’, in other words war against Poland, and the ‘seizure of Danzig’. In relation to Poland, Hitler stated that basically Germany’s attitude was determined by the desire ‘to avoid upsets’. However, were Poland to adopt an ‘aggressive attitude’ then a ‘final reckoning [could] become necessary’. According to Hitler, in the event of a war with their eastern neighbour, Germany’s leaders saw it as their task to ‘limit the war to Poland’. This eventuality might occur in the not too distant future as the result of a ‘growing crisis in France’ and, ‘in consequence, a growing reserve on the part of Britain’. This statement clearly shows that Hitler was not making his decision on whether or not to go to war dependent on ‘Poland’s threatening attitude’, but, first and foremost, on the next available opportunity that would allow him to crush Poland, while simultaneously avoiding having to fight a war in the West. Equally, he pointed out that Russian intervention would be of no use to Poland ‘because it would involve its destruction by Bolshevism’. The directive had already been printed when he also instructed Keitel that preparations would have to be made for ‘Case White’ such that ‘it would be possible to implement it at any time after 1 September 1939’.¹⁰

Thus, Hitler’s decision to fight a war with Poland at the first favourable opportunity after 1 September was made after Poland’s rejection of his ‘generous’ offer at the end of March and its move towards dependence on Britain, in other words between 26 March and 1 April, the day on which he embarked on his short pleasure trip on the North Sea. During this week, it became clear to him that the destruction of Czechoslovakia, in other words his breach of the Munich Agreement, had led the western powers to adopt a hostile attitude towards his policy of aggression. It had also caused the loss of, and change of sides by, his hitherto most important partner, Poland, which was not prepared to submit to his revisionist demands. Hitler’s response to this setback is comparable to his reaction to the Weekend Crisis nearly a year earlier. He determined to destroy the Polish state just as, in May 1938, he had determined to crush Czechoslovakia. As far as he was concerned, by rejecting his revisionist demands both countries had caused him a serious loss of face, for which they would have to pay with their elimination.¹¹ As in the previous year, he believed he could ignore the risk of intervention by the western powers. If this proved unavoidable the Reich was far better prepared militarily than it had been a year earlier. His decision was irrevocable, which is clear, among other things, from the fact that diplomatic relations with Poland were now frozen. It was told that there was nothing more to negotiate; Ribbentrop’s offer had been ‘unique’.¹²

In contrast to the generals’ attitude to a premature war the previous year, the Wehrmacht now rapidly got to grips with its new task without raising any objections. War with Poland was studied by the general staff for the first time during a war game at the beginning of May; the assumption was that it would lead to a confrontation with the Soviet armed forces, which once again raised the question of a conquest of the Ukraine. Moreover, numerous agents from military intelligence, the Gestapo, and the SD were involved in stirring up the German minority in Poland, to get them to provoke incidents, thereby causing the Polish authorities to intervene, along the lines of the Sudeten crisis.¹³

Sabre-rattling and fear of war

The elaborate festivities to mark Hitler’s birthday on 20 April were designed to demonstrate his power and authority. However, it was striking that the only official representatives from foreign countries who came to Berlin to congratulate the ‘Führer’ were delegations from Italy, Japan, Spain, Scandinavia, and the Balkans. Since the ambassadors from Britain, France, and the United States were also absent – they had been recalled after the invasion of Czechoslovakia – it was only too clear that Hitler’s birthday celebrations were taking place in the midst of a growing international crisis.¹⁴

The festivities began on the afternoon of 19 April with a series of receptions and tributes, after which Hitler inaugurated the East–West Axis in Berlin. Designed by Speer, it was the first prestige avenue in Hitler’s scheme to redevelop Berlin. Two million people lined the brightly lit, seven kilometre road, choreographed according to a plan that had been carefully refined over several years,¹⁵ and witnessed a Wehrmacht tattoo and a ‘torchlight procession of the [Party’s] old guard from all over the Reich’. Around midnight, Hitler’s closest colleagues offered him their congratulations in the Reich Chancellery.

The following day, which, at short notice, had been declared a public holiday,¹⁶ the main festivities began with a march past of the SS Leibstandarte in front of the Reich Chancellery, followed by more people offering their congratulations. At 11 a.m., a parade of the Wehrmacht, lasting almost five hours, began along the East–West Axis, the biggest demonstration of military power in the regime’s history. It was aimed at the European powers, but was also a signal to the German people, who were showing a lack of enthusiasm for war. After further congratulations, the festivities concluded with a ceremonial oath-taking by newly appointed political functionaries of the Party. The celebrations were given unprecedented media coverage.¹⁷ Hitler was glorified as an almost superhuman figure. Göring wrote in the Völkischer Beobachter that he was the ‘greatest German of all time’ and Rosenberg celebrated him in the same newspaper as the ‘founder of the greatest continental European empire’.¹⁸ The journalist Willy Beer wrote in the Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung that ‘a mysterious aura emanates from the Führer and stirs something akin to it in our innermost being’.¹⁹

During all these celebrations, Hitler himself remained remarkably silent. Presumably he avoided making any statement on his birthday because he would then have been forced to comment on the critical international situation, and that would hardly have been compatible with the elevated atmosphere of the occasion. There is no record of his own feelings on this day on which he entered his sixth decade; it was not in his character to comment on such personal matters. One can assume, however, that on this day he was particularly conscious of his none too optimistic assessment of how long he had to live. Time was threatening to run out and this fear may well have reinforced his decision to attack Poland by the end of the year and his willingness to fight the western powers, at the latest in a few years’ time.

The celebration of Hitler’s birthday on 20 April was in marked contrast to the depressed mood of the population in spring 1939. SD reports blamed a general ‘overstraining of the available . . . supply of labour, means of production, and raw materials’. In particular, there were complaints from the artisanal sector about discrimination in the awarding of public contracts, a growing flight from the land, causing a further reduction in agricultural production, as well as in the profitability of farms; this was leading to ‘a degree of indifference and sullenness’ on the part of the rural population. Moreover, there was growing concern about new tax laws and about the difficult foreign exchange and foreign trade situation; there was discontent over rail transport problems and the serious housing shortage, which persisted, as popular criticism pointed out, while prestige Party and state buildings were constantly being constructed.²⁰

The reports gathered by the SPD in exile fully confirmed this criticism. But they also made it clear that although this widespread discontent was caused above all by the accelerated rearmament programme, it was also accompanied by a real fear of war.²¹ This was an aspect of ‘popular opinion’ that was avoided in the official reports, as the previous November Hitler had, after all, made it clear that he wanted a propaganda campaign to strengthen the nation’s ‘willingness to fight’. In January the Social Democrats noted that, after a year of unexpected foreign policy successes, the population’s attitude to the dictatorship had become more critical . . . than the year before’. The decline in morale had also affected the middle classes, for whom the ‘nationalist’ successes had been overshadowed not only by dissatisfaction with their material situation, but also by their negative response to Jewish persecution.²² These reports on Hitler’s real personal popularity, compiled by the SPD in exile at the time of his birthday celebrations, present a mixed picture.²³ Above all, however, they noted: ‘In spite of all the flags and festive noise, the fear of war weighed heavily’ on the population.²⁴

On 15 April, the American President, Roosevelt, sent a message to Hitler asking him for reassurances that, during the following ten or twenty-five years, he did not intend to infringe the territorial integrity of thirty named states. This was in a response to Hitler’s Wilhelmshaven speech, in which he had justified the annexation of Bohemia and Moravia with arguments based on history and living space. In sending his list Roosevelt was pointing out that, by using such arguments, Hitler represented a threat to most European states. Hitler responded to this démarche in a speech to a special session of the Reichstag on 28 April.²⁵

He used this speech, for which Goebbels prepared the way with vicious anti-British attacks in the Völkischer Beobachter,²⁶ for a general reckoning with his foreign opponents. He expressed his disappointment at his failure to achieve an alliance with Britain and abrogated the 1935 Anglo-German Naval Agreement, as British ‘encirclement policy’ had undermined its basis. Moreover, he tore up the non-aggression pact with Poland, spelling out in detail the offer he had made to Poland a few months before.²⁷ Finally, he went on to deal with the American President and his message, laboriously and sarcastically rejecting this ‘peculiar document’ point by point.²⁸

At the beginning of May, following the abrogation of the non-aggression pact, anti-Polish rhetoric in the German media was intensified. Among other things, the press was instructed continually to report border incidents caused by Poland.²⁹ ‘Warsaw’, Hitler told Goebbels on 1 May, ‘will end up in the same place where Prague ended up’.³⁰ However, journalists were informed that the ‘big Poland campaign’ had not yet started.³¹

At the same time, the rearmament propaganda within Germany was stepped up once again in order ‘to strengthen the self-confidence of the German people’ and confirm their ‘trust in our military power’.³² Against the background of a growing international crisis, this propaganda, which was more and more obviously geared to preparation for war, together with Hitler’s threatening speeches and gestures, meant that, during the final months before the outbreak of the Second World War, fear of war was no longer openly expressed in a public sphere controlled by Nazism. While the rejection of war in 1938 had been in tune with Hitler’s rhetoric of peace, now such anti-war statements were no longer tolerated. Although it proved impossible to generate enthusiasm for war, since spring 1939 the majority of the population appear to have accepted its coming as inevitable.

Between 14 and 19 May, Hitler undertook a tour of the West Wall, a clear demonstration against the western powers. The journey took him from Aachen through the Eifel to the Saar, and then into the Upper Rhine up to the Swiss border. In Saarbrücken he was joined by the Party’s Gauleiters and Reichsleiters. He concluded the six-day tour of inspection with an ‘Order of the Day’ addressed to the ‘soldiers and workers of the western front’.³³

At the end of May, after the government had received indications that the British were going to stick by their commitments to Poland, the propaganda machine began to shift the main focus of attack from Poland to Britain.³⁴

Alliances

Meanwhile, the international situation had become even more critical, as the western powers were not prepared to allow Germany and Italy to consolidate their position in the Balkans any further. On 23 March, an economic agreement was signed between Germany and Romania through which Germany secured control of Romanian oil supplies,³⁵ and, on 7 April, Italy attacked Albania. This came as a complete surprise to Hitler, but he too had not hitherto considered it necessary to coordinate his attacks on foreign countries with his ally.

In response to these developments, on 13 April Chamberlain unilaterally guaranteed Greek and Romanian independence, offering the same protection to a number of other countries, including Turkey. France followed suit on the same day.³⁶ A British–Turkish mutual assistance pact was signed on 12 May.³⁷

The decision to attack Poland and Britain’s and France’s countermeasures prompted Hitler and Ribbentrop to secure Italy’s support. To do this they had first to overcome the annoyance felt in Rome about Germany’s attack on Prague. For the Munich Agreement, torn up by Hitler, had after all been largely Mussolini’s initiative.³⁸ Thus, to conciliate Italy following the invasion of Prague, Hitler decided to make a gesture over South Tyrol. Since the beginning of the 1920s, he had opposed a revision of the Brenner frontier; however, now he went further, ordering SS chief Himmler and the governor of Tyrol, Franz Hofer, to prepare for the removal of 30,000 ethnic Germans from the South Tyrol. This represented the first step in a comprehensive solution to the South Tyrol problem, which was to be agreed with Italy in October 1939. The South Tyroleans would have to decide between Germany and Italy, in other words either to move to the Reich, or, if they wanted to remain in their homeland, to adopt the Italian language and culture without reservation.³⁹

Hitler believed that this arrangement would contribute towards cementing the political alliance with Italy. However, in the spring of 1939, the project of a tripartite pact between Germany, Italy, and Japan, which had been pursued since the summer of 1938, was in crisis. In March, the Japanese were backpedalling, insisting that the alliance should be directed only against the Soviet Union.⁴⁰ In April, they modified this proviso by accepting that a pledge of general mutual assistance could be defined in the form of a treaty, but, at the same time, they wanted to inform the governments of France, Britain, and the United States that the alliance was not directed against the western democracies.⁴¹

The German government responded by starting to explore the alternative of a dual pact,⁴² carefully concealing its war plans vis-à-vis Poland from the Italians. It hoped that an alliance with Italy would help to minimize the risk of a war with the western powers arising from the attack on Poland, as Britain and France would be compelled to divert forces in order to protect their positions in the Mediterranean. Right from the start, therefore, Hitler and Göring tried to reassure the Italians that there was no immediate threat of a war with the western powers.⁴³

Meeting at the beginning of May in Milan, the two foreign ministers, Ciano and Ribbentrop, finally agreed an alliance between Germany and Italy. Ribbentrop had been forced to promise the Italians that there would be no war during the next three years.⁴⁴ Ciano signed the so-called Pact of Steel in Berlin on 22 May.⁴⁵ The pact involved the two parties promising to offer each other assistance in the event of their becoming involved in a war with another power. While the treaty offered the prospect of a future wartime coalition, it was initially intended by Germany as a clear warning to the western powers not to intervene in the event of a war with Poland. Ribbentrop reassured Ciano once more in Berlin that Germany wanted to have a period of at least three years of peace.⁴⁶ A few days after the treaty had been signed, Mussolini sent Hitler a detailed statement, in which he repeated that Italy would not be ready for war before 1942. Thus Hitler could not assume that he would receive the active support of his Italian ally in his planned war against Poland.⁴⁷

The joint meetings of the two general staffs, planned at the end of 1938, took place between April and June 1939, coinciding with the final stage of the negotiations over the Pact of Steel. Hitler set out the ground rules: the talks were to be general in nature, focused on tactical and technical questions. Political issues and the strategic and operational questions involved in joint military operations, which the previous November he had envisaged including in the talks, were not to be discussed. Thus, during the first round in Innsbruck at the beginning of April, Keitel advocated in general terms a joint ‘surprise assault’, but ‘following instructions’ he did not name a date for this action, indicating rather that the critical moment would not arrive for some years.

Also, after a lengthy visit by Brauchitsch to Italy and North Africa between 29 April and 10 May, it was agreed: ‘There will be no joint operations for the time being.’ Less than four months before the start of the Second World War, keeping Germany’s war plans a secret was more important to Hitler than close military coordination with his main ally. The way the two allies had treated each other during these past months had not exactly increased trust between them.⁴⁸

Although Germany had done everything possible to keep its Italian ally in the dark about its plans to attack Poland in the autumn, it could not prevent the Italians from obtaining from various sources a fairly accurate picture of Germany’s preparations for war. What was particularly alarming from the Italian point of view was the, as far as they were concerned, completely unrealistic assumption of their German ally that the war could be localized and would not lead to intervention by the western powers and, as a result, to a bigger European war. Mussolini and Ciano decided on a counter strategy and, at the end of June, suggested to their German ally that a meeting between Mussolini and Hitler should be held at the Brenner on 4 August, at which they should propose a European peace conference. Hitler and Ribbentrop naturally rejected this idea of a second Munich, however, and so the Brenner meeting did not take place.⁴⁹

During the summer of 1939, in addition to the German–Italian pact, Hitler endeavoured to persuade a number of medium-sized and smaller states to adopt a position of benevolent neutrality towards Germany, or at least tried to prevent them from drifting into the camp of the western powers. In order to demonstrate his desire for peace, Hitler to begin with took a number of steps to confirm his commitment to the territorial integrity of various countries, presumably in response to Roosevelt’s intervention of 15 April. After Germany had already confirmed Belgium’s neutrality in October 1937,⁵⁰ at the end of May 1939 it made a non-aggression pact with Denmark,⁵¹ and on 7 June identical treaties with Estonia and Latvia. Similar offers were made to Norway, Finland, and Sweden,⁵² who, however, declared that they did not need a specific confirmation of their neutrality.⁵³

In response to the British and French guarantees for Turkey, Greece, and Romania in April, Germany concentrated above all on trying to draw Yugoslavia and Hungary into its sphere. In summer 1939, it tried to persuade Yugoslavia to withdraw from the League of Nations and so draw it onto the side of the Axis. However, the new government under prime minister DragisČa Cvetkovic´, who had replaced the pro-Axis Stojadinovic´ in February, resisted these attempts and sympathized more with the western powers.⁵⁴

At the end of June, Hungary made an official approach to the Axis powers, requesting trilateral talks concerning economic matters during wartime. Four weeks later, however, the Hungarian prime minister sent a letter to the Italian and German governments informing them that while, in the event of a general conflict, his country would align itself with the Axis powers, ‘on moral grounds it was not prepared . . . to engage in a military action against Poland’. This Hungarian position was of a piece with its hesitant behaviour during the previous year, when Germany had tried in vain to get it to adopt an aggressive policy towards Czechoslovakia.⁵⁵ During a meeting in the Berghof at the beginning of August, Hitler bitterly reproached the Hungarian foreign minister, Csáki, for his letter, threatening: ‘If Germany were defeated in a war that would be the end of Hungary’s revisionist dreams’, whereupon the Hungarian government withdrew the statement it had made at the end of July.⁵⁶

Hitler’s war scenarios

On 23 May, the day after the signing of the Pact of Steel, Hitler made a speech in the Reich Chancellery to his top military leaders, the content of which has been preserved because his Wehrmacht adjutant, Rudolf Schmundt, took notes.⁵⁷ Hitler stressed once again that the main goal of German policy was the urgent issue of acquiring appropriate ‘living space’. ‘In 15 or 20 years the solution will be forced on us. No German statesman can avoid the issue for longer.’ The first six years of National Socialist rule had been ‘put to good use’; the ‘political unification of Germans in the nationalist cause’ had been, with minor exceptions, secured. Now, however, further successes ‘could not be achieved without spilling blood’. Compared with his key statements of November 1937, contained in the Hossbach memorandum, Hitler’s view of Germany’s future policy as a great power had undergone a remarkable change. Whereas eighteen months before, he had considered the final solution of Germany’s problem of living space as a task for future generations, now this period had been reduced to fifteen to twenty years; however, it still lay beyond Hitler’s expectation of how long he himself had to live or his period as an active dictator.

Later in his speech, Hitler turned to the question of Poland. The country was not ‘an additional enemy’, but would always ‘be on the side of our opponents’. ‘It’s not Danzig that’s at stake’; it was about ‘expanding our living space in the East and securing our food supplies as well as solving the problem of the Baltic states’. Colonies could not provide a solution to the problem of food supplies because they were always vulnerable to blockade by sea. In the event of a war with the western powers, it would be ‘a good thing to have a largish area in the East’. Although the population of territories annexed by Germany would not be available for military service, it would provide ‘labour’.

In the following passage Hitler developed the plan for a preventive war against Poland, making it clear that his main enemy was in the West. The problem of ‘Poland’ could not be separated from the conflict with the West. In the event of a war with the western powers there was the danger that Poland would stab Germany in the back. This meant that Poland could not be spared and so he had taken ‘the decision to attack Poland at the first available opportunity’. A two-front war must be prevented at all costs. Thus the following ‘principle’ must be followed: ‘A confrontation with Poland, beginning with an attack on Poland, can be successful only if the West stays out of it’. He had already pointed that out in his directive of 3 April.⁵⁸ But now he went further. For, if that was not possible then it would be better ‘to attack the West and finish off Poland at the same time’. Thus he had developed a strategy to cope with a two-front war, which he basically wanted to avoid. He had increasingly come to see the war against Poland as essential, irrespective of how the West responded to it. The similarities with his treatment of the case of Czechoslovakia the previous year are only too obvious. Hitler now expanded the possible scenario of an impending war by bringing Japan into play: ‘If Russia goes on scheming against us, we can move closer to Japan. An alliance of France–England–Russia against Germany–Italy–Japan would prompt me to deal England and France some crushing blows.’

Hitler went on to sketch out some ideas for a successful war against Britain. He justified this by basically doubting ‘whether a peaceful settlement with England is possible . . . England sees in our development the establishment of a hegemony that would weaken England. Thus England is our enemy and the showdown with England will be a matter of life and death.’ As Britain would not be able to defeat Germany quickly, it would, together with France, support Belgian and Dutch neutrality, but in fact try to use these countries as a base for an attack on the Ruhr. As far as Hitler was concerned, this meant that ‘if England decides to attack us during the Polish war, we must quickly invade Holland’. In the final analysis, Britain could be defeated only by cutting off its supply lines by sea, in other words by using the German navy, supported by Luftwaffe units operating from advance bases in western Europe.

In preparing for war the Wehrmacht leadership should, if possible, aim ‘at inflicting a heavy blow or even a knock-out blow right at the start’. ‘Rights, wrongs and treaties are unimportant’. However, to be on the safe side, they ought to prepare for ‘a long war as well as a surprise attack, destroying England’s prospect of allies on the continent’. Hitler’s hopes rested on such a surprise attack: ‘If we can occupy Holland and Belgium and defeat France we shall have created the basis for a successful war against England.’ Finally, in response to a query from Göring, Hitler ordered that the Wehrmacht branches should each determine what armaments they wanted. But the naval shipbuilding programme should remain unaltered and ‘the armaments programmes . . . be geared to 1943 and 1944’.

In this speech Hitler was evidently talking about three different wars: first, a rapid preventive war against Poland at the next available opportunity, if possible without intervention by the western powers; secondly, a war against the western powers, ideally from around 1943/44 onwards, beginning with a preventive strike against the Netherlands (and Belgium). However, at the start of his speech, Hitler had talked about a period of fifteen or twenty years for finally solving the ‘problem of living space’. When he later spoke of the ‘eastern area’ that was going to be conquered as being useful for a conflict with the western powers, he was evidently thinking of Polish territory, but probably also of the Baltic states. However, in talking about the conquest of further living space in fifteen to twenty years’ time he was certainly not referring to these territories. One can only conclude that he wanted to gain this living space at the expense of the Soviet Union, using Japan as an ally. However, he made only vague comments on this future war.

Developments in the armaments sector were one of the vital factors influencing Hitler’s war plans during these months. For during 1939 it became clear that the enormous increase in armaments production Hitler had ordered in October 1938 had once again exceeded the available raw materials and foreign exchange.⁵⁹

Brauchitsch approached Hitler directly in February, in order ‘dutifully’ to report ‘that, in view of these circumstances, I am not in a position to rearm the army to the extent and within the time span you require’.⁶⁰ Hitler replied on 3 March that ‘rearming the army’ was ‘to be regarded as a political priority’.⁶¹ On 15 April, Brauchitsch concluded in a report that the shortage of steel was preventing the army from equipping itself with modern offensive weapons. To underline the devastating consequences Brauchitsch compared the situation with that in 1914, when the imperial army had failed to secure a rapid and decisive victory because parliament had not approved the sums urgently needed for armaments.⁶² A few weeks later, he added that the rationing of non-ferrous metals amounted to ‘the end of the army’s rearmament’.⁶³

On 24 May, Georg Thomas, the head of the army’s armaments office, gave a lecture to Foreign Ministry officials in which he made an unvarnished comparison between the armaments expenditure of the democratic countries Britain, France, and the United States on the one hand, and the Axis powers, Germany and Italy, on the other. According to him, the western powers were not only spending two billion RM more in the current economic year, but – and this was the most alarming point – ‘were in a far better position to increase their spending than Germany and Italy’. At the moment Britain and France were spending 12 and 17 per cent of national income respectively on armaments, Germany 23 per cent, the United States only 2 per cent.⁶⁴

Moreover, there was another warning note. At the end of May, Britain introduced conscription;⁶⁵ within a few years it would be in a position to build up a considerable military reserve, thereby massively strengthening its land forces. In response to a request from Hitler for a survey of the projected state of German rearmament on 1 April and 1 October 1940, the Army Weapons Office reported, on the basis of detailed figures, that, because of the shortage of raw materials, in a few months’ time the munitions programme would collapse. Nor was there any sign of improvement.⁶⁶

Thus, Hitler knew that it would be impossible to fight a lengthy war in 1939/40, However, the Army was in a position to survive a short war, if necessary against the western powers, with some prospect of success. Contrary to his observations in May 1939, when Hitler told his generals that the ideal time for a war against the western powers would be 1943/44, he seems, during the summer, to have come to the conclusion that such a long wait would not have any decisive advantages. He was increasingly coming to accept that the western powers would intervene in the event of an attack on Poland; indeed, he may have concluded that this would be better than postponing for several more years a conflict that he in any case believed inevitable.⁶⁷

Summer performances

During the three months before the outbreak of war, Hitler conspicuously avoided Berlin; instead, he spent most of his time on the Obersalzberg and in Munich; as usual, he attended the Bayreuth Festival, and went on a number of trips within ‘Greater Germany’. His summer programme during 1939 was totally geared towards conveying the impression to the world and his people of a cultured and relaxed dictator, but also one who was self-confident. His public statements tended to be statesmanlike; he kept emphasizing, not only in words but also through demonstrative gestures, Germany’s military strength and readiness to repel all attacks from abroad. He left anti-British propaganda, which from the end of May increasingly superseded anti-Polish rhetoric,⁶⁸ largely to his propaganda minister. Behind this facade Hitler was preparing for the war against Poland.

On 2 June Hitler arranged an impressive military parade in Berlin, lasting two hours, in honour of the state visit of the King of Yugoslavia and his wife.⁶⁹ Two days later, on 4 June, he visited the ‘Greater German Reich Warriors’ Day’ in Kassel, to reassure 500,000 veterans of the First World War that ‘even if British encirclement policy has remained the same as before that war, Germany’s defence policy has fundamentally changed!’ Hitler confirmed his policy of ‘educating the population in soldierly values and making it adopt a soldierly attitude as a matter of principle’. The press was recommended to use the speech as a ‘means of further strengthening the nation’s military preparedness and military consciousness’.⁷⁰

On 6 June, he took the parade in Berlin of the Condor Legion returning from Spain. In his address he openly stated that he had decided to commit troops to the Spanish Civil War in July 1936, thereby admitting that, three years earlier, he had misled the international community about his Spanish policy. If the ‘international warmongers should ever achieve their aim of attacking the German Reich’, he insisted, they would meet with ‘resistance of a kind of which the propagandists of encirclement appear not to have the faintest notion’.⁷¹

His began his relaxed summer programme a few days later with a trip to Vienna. On 10 June, he attended a performance of the opera Friedenstag at the Vienna State Opera on the occasion of the 75th birthday of its composer, Richard Strauss, and the following day a performance at the Burgtheater. After these two performances he spent the remainder of the two evenings in the company of artists. On 12 June, he visited the grave of his niece, Geli, in the Vienna Central Cemetery, and then flew on to Linz, from where he made a detour to Hafeld, where the Hitler family had lived for some time in the 1890s; he also visited his former primary school in Fischlham before returning to the Obersalzberg.⁷²

Hitler’s summer programme also, however, included overt demonstrations of Germany’s political and military strength. On 23 June, Britain sent the German government a memorandum, making it clear that Hitler’s unilateral repudiation of the 1935 Naval Agreement at the end of April was contrary to the terms of the Agreement, which could only be changed or abrogated with the consent of both parties.⁷³ Hitler responded two days later in a speech at a reception for Italian veterans, which was also published in the press. He declared himself convinced ‘that we shall defeat any attempt by the democracies and capitalist plutocrats to prepare the fate they may imagine they have in store for us through the common strength of our two nations and revolutions, through the strength of our common ideals, our courage, and our determination’.⁷⁴

These tough words were accompanied by the continuing anti-British propaganda campaign that the regime had begun at the end of May and continued into July.⁷⁵ The ‘high point’ of this campaign was a series of leading articles that Goebbels published in the Völkischer Beobachter, as well as a number of his high-profile speeches, above all a speech in mid-June in Danzig.⁷⁶ Apart from that, topics addressed included Germany’s ‘lack of space’, the alleged ‘encirclement’, as well as the ‘blank cheque’ that Britain had given to Poland, the arrogance of the old imperialist nations, possessing a surplus of land, compared with the young, rising, ‘have not’ powers, and in general, the moral responsibility for war that Britain and the western powers were acquiring as a result of their behaviour.⁷⁷

Behind the scenes, Hitler urged Goebbels not to ease up on the anti-British campaign, trying to convince him of the effectiveness of his threats to foreign nations. At the beginning of July, he told him: ‘Work up hatred against England. The German people must come to see it as the core of the opposition to us. Then we can more easily wear it down. The Führer is hoping to have ten more years. His aim is to wipe out the Peace of Westphalia.’ And, a few days later, Hitler commented: ‘We must put pressure on the Poles by making some more quiet preparations. They will lose their nerve at the decisive moment. England will be ground down by incessant propaganda.’⁷⁸ In response to pamphlets sent to various Germans by the British politician and journalist Stephen King Hall, Hitler got Goebbels to publish a reply in the Völkischer Beobachter, which he edited himself.⁷⁹

Apart from that, Hitler devoted himself to his usual summer pleasures. On 16 July, as in the previous two years, he gave an address in Munich on the occasion of German Art Day, spending a few days in the city. Then, after inspecting the progress of building work on the Party’s parade ground in Nuremberg, from 25 July onwards he attended the Bayreuth Festival, as he did every year.⁸⁰ There he spent time sorting out the Goebbelses’ marriage. For, in the meantime, Magda had been having an affair with Goebbels’s state secretary, Karl Hanke, a liaison which Goebbels was not prepared to tolerate. Magda put the case to Hitler, who decided, as he had in the Baarova case, that the couple had to stay together at all costs.⁸¹ After the end of the Festival he returned to the Obersalzberg for the next three weeks.

Based in his summer residence, Hitler set about trying to secure a pretext for war with Poland by creating a crisis over the status of Danzig. He had told his generals in May that the conflict was not going to be about Danzig, but about living space. However, he believed that, in order to provoke a war, rather than threatening the integrity of Poland itself, it would be better to challenge the privileges given to Poles within the ‘Free City’ under the complicated arrangements made at the end of the First World War. The long-standing differences between the two countries over the authority exercised by Polish customs inspectors in the city were now to provide the pretext for provoking Poland. The Reich government was portrayed as the defender of the ‘German city’, Danzig, just as, in the previous year, it had used the alleged subjugation of the Sudeten Germans to further its anti-Czech policy. Underlying this was the assumption that the western powers would not want to get involved in a war with Germany arising from a dispute over obscure legal quibbles. Hitler was calculating that, once war had broken out and Poland had been defeated within a few weeks, the western powers would in the end accept a fait accompli.⁸²

At the beginning of August, the Danzig authorities escalated the customs dispute, but then very quickly had to backtrack.⁸³ German propaganda now intensified its attacks on Poland having, during the previous months, tended to treat the conflict with Warsaw more as a byproduct of British ‘encirclement policy’.⁸⁴ From 7 to 9 August, the Gauleiter of Danzig, Albert Forster, was staying at the Berghof, where Hitler gave him detailed instructions about what to do next. The result of this meeting was a note sent by the Foreign Ministry to the Polish government on 9 August, stating that the most recent development in the customs dispute was seriously compromising German–Polish relations. This was an indication that the Reich government now intended to intervene massively in the relations between Poland and the Free City.⁸⁵ On the evening of 9 August, Hitler travelled from the Berghof to nearby Salzburg to attend a festival performance of Don Giovanni.⁸⁶ Gauleiter Forster flew back to Danzig, where, on the following day, he gave a tub-thumping speech in the Langer Markt demanding: ‘We want to return to the Reich’.⁸⁷

On the same day, Hitler invited the League of Nations High Commissioner for Danzig, Carl Burckhardt, to come to Berchtesgaden the following day, in order to convey a message to the western powers about the crisis he had just provoked. He received his visitor in the Eagle’s Nest, his luxurious Tea House, 1,800 metres up on the Kehlstein, near the Berghof. There, against the imposing backdrop of the Berchtesgaden Alps, he endeavoured to impress Burckhardt with a mixture of furious threats and apparent willingness to negotiate in a rational manner.⁸⁸ Burckhardt noted down one of Hitler’s key remarks: ‘Everything I am doing is directed against Russia; if the West is too stupid and too blind to understand this, I shall be compelled to come to terms with the Russians, to defeat the West, and then, after its defeat, to turn against the Soviet Union with all my forces. I need the Ukraine, so that we can’t be starved out, as in the last war.’⁸⁹ Burckhardt passed on the essential points of the meeting to the French and British foreign ministries, which evidently did not feel the need to offer an immediate response.

On 12 August, Hitler received Ciano on the Obersalzberg.⁹⁰ He began the meeting by talking at length about the Reich’s military situation and concluded by saying that ‘at the present moment, the rapid liquidation’ of Poland could ‘only be beneficial for the inevitable conflict with the western democracies’. Ciano showed considerable surprise at his host’s determination to go to war. There had been no mention of imminent war either during Ribbentrop’s visit to Milan or during Ciano’s stay in Berlin on the occasion of the signing of the Pact of Steel (both meetings had been in May). Accordingly, Mussolini had geared his plans for a war with the West, which was naturally ‘unavoidable’, to occur in two or three years’ time; this would undoubtedly be a more favourable juncture from the Italian point of view. Ciano spent the rest of the meeting explaining to Hitler in detail how inadequately Italy was prepared for war. Hitler, however, emphasized even more how committed he was to war. In response to the ‘next Polish provocation’ he would use the opportunity ‘to attack Poland within 48 hours and in this way solve the problem’. Ciano, however, concentrated on outlining a proposal of Mussolini’s for international consultations in order to resolve the European conflicts that were threatening peace. As regards the war Hitler was planning to launch in less than three weeks, the two allies could not have been further apart.

That also became apparent when the discussions were continued the following day. Hitler stuck to his aim of attacking Poland as soon as possible (he now gave the end of August as the preferred date) and of following the ‘old Germanic path to the East’. Ciano ‘thanked the Führer for his exceptionally lucid statement of the situation’, adding that Mussolini would ‘presumably not have to make a decision, since the Führer had said that he was convinced that the conflict with Poland could be localized’. This was a diplomatic way of saying that Italy would not be joining Germany in the event of war with Poland.⁹¹

Getting the generals on board for war

On 14 August, Hitler once again gave a speech fully geared to the coming war to the commanders-in-chief on the Obersalzberg.⁹² Referring to Stalin’s speech of 10 March 1939, Hitler told them that Russia was not prepared to ‘pull [the West’s] chestnuts out of the fire’ and would thus not intervene in a war. Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Switzerland, the Netherlands, and Belgium would remain neutral. Italy had ‘no interest in a major conflict’; but wanted to revise its borders. Victory for the democracies would mean the ‘destruction’ of Italy.⁹³ Thus Britain and France would have to bear the whole burden of a war with Germany. An attack on Germany’s western frontier between Basle and Saarbrücken would be useless. Hitler exuded confidence: ‘The brains of Munich [he meant Chamberlain and Daladier, P.L.] won’t take the risk.’ Had England given it assurances, ‘Poland would be being much bolder.’ However, Hitler was worried – he was naturally thinking of Munich – that the British might complicate ‘the final settlement by making offers at the last moment’. In any event, the Germans had to show the world they were ready for war. They would have ‘sorted out Poland within 6–8 weeks’, even if Britain intervened. However, Hitler kept reassuring the generals that this would not happen.

That evening he continued with his summer cultural programme: he appeared at Salzburg in order to attend the Festival production of Mozart’s Die Entführung aus dem Serail.⁹⁴

Figure 9. In August 1939 propaganda photos such as these were used by the regime to make the German population ready to accept the imminent outbreak of war. Although this ‘ethnic German’ woman and her children have supposedly fought their way through barbed wire, they are shown looking remarkably neat and tidy and are given friendly assistance by the German border police.

Source: ullsteinbild / TopFoto

On 11 August, in other words the day after his meeting with Burckhardt, Hitler ordered the propaganda campaign against Poland to be at ‘80% volume’, and four days later, to start the ‘final sprint’.⁹⁵ Following these instructions, the German media launched strident attacks on Poland, while at the same time the German population was being persuaded that war was unavoidable.⁹⁶ On 19 August, Hitler gave instructions for propaganda to be cranked up to ‘full volume’ in two days’ time.⁹⁷ Now the German media concentrated on blaming the impending outbreak of war on the attitude of Poland and the western powers.⁹⁸

Meanwhile, following consultations with the Foreign Ministry, Gauleiter Forster had opened the negotiations between Danzig and Poland over the customs dispute with such provocative demands that the Poles broke them off, as he had intended.⁹⁹

On 24 August, Forster had the Danzig Senate declare him ‘Head of State’, a unilateral promotion, intended to provoke the Poles and underline the fact that the Germans considered the position of the League of Nations High Commissioner of no importance.¹⁰⁰ On the same day, Forster got Hitler to approve further provocations. They were contemplating removing the Polish customs officials from the city and the customs border between Danzig and East Prussia. If this proved insufficient to provoke the Poles into taking counter measures, the next step would be to ‘deal with the Westerplatte’.¹⁰¹

German–Soviet rapprochement

At the end of the summer, Hitler was about to embark on a complete reorientation of his foreign policy. The Berlin–Rome–Warsaw alliance he had envisaged up to spring 1939 had not come about because of Poland’s refusal to submit to his demands. The Berlin–Rome–Tokyo alliance the Germans had sought in spring 1939 had proved abortive because of Japanese reluctance, and the alliance with Italy that finally emerged, the Pact of Steel, was extraordinarily unreliable on account of Italy’s lack of commitment to war. In the light of the whole direction of Hitler’s policy since the mid-1920s, what remained was a positively breathtaking option.

During the spring of 1939, the Foreign Ministry had already taken note of various signals from Moscow indicating an interest in normalizing relations with Germany. Stalin’s speech to the XVIII Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on 10 March 1939, in which, referring to the West, he declared that he would not ‘pull the chestnuts out of the fire’ for warmongers, could be interpreted as such a signal,¹⁰² and was followed by others.¹⁰³ The replacement of the foreign minister, Maxim Litvinov, by Vyacheslav Molotov also appeared to point in the same direction. The opening of talks about a trade agreement provided the opportunity for improved relations.

In response to the German occupation of Prague, in the middle of April the Soviet Union had offered Britain and France a tripartite pact to secure the status quo in eastern Europe, and negotiations had been continuing since May. The more the conflict between Nazi Germany and the western powers intensified, however, the more Russia was inclined to seek a separate arrangement with Germany, stay out of the impending war, and possibly use the conflict to regain former Russian territories it had lost in the First World War.¹⁰⁴

The Germans’ initial response to the first cautious Soviet feelers was mistrustful and reserved.¹⁰⁵ The uncertainty stemmed from the fact that the Soviet Union was already involved in negotiations with France and Britain, which suggested that it might be planning to start talks with Germany simply in order to strengthen its negotiating position with the western powers. There was also a need for caution given the fact that Japan could regard a German agreement with the Soviet Union as a breach of the Anti-Comintern Pact.

A change came about with Hitler’s decision at the end of May to sound out the willingness of the Soviet Union to negotiate via a meeting between Weizsäcker and the Soviet Chargé d’Affaires in Berlin.¹⁰⁶ Although this test proved positive and further signals of the Soviet willingness to negotiate were received,¹⁰⁷ at the end of June, Hitler suddenly decided not to pursue the trade talks any further, as the Soviet conditions attached to them were unacceptable. However, a few days later, this position was reversed and the German embassy in Moscow received detailed instructions to begin trade negotiations and, on 22 July, the Foreign Ministry informed it that the ‘pause’ that had been inserted to allow for discussion of political questions was now over.¹⁰⁸

Germany now became actively engaged. After the first approach by a member of the economics department of the Foreign Ministry to the Soviet Chargé d’Affaires in Berlin, Georgi Astachov, at the end of July,¹⁰⁹ Ribbentrop told Astachov in the course of a lengthy conversation that the Germans wanted a ‘reshaping of German–Russian relations’, and, according to his own account of the meeting, he gave a ‘slight hint’ that Germany wanted to ‘reach an understanding with Russia about the fate of Poland’.¹¹⁰

After Molotov too had signalled his willingness to negotiate,¹¹¹ on 14 August, Ribbentrop instructed his ambassador, Count Friedrich Werner von der Schulenburg, to arrange a meeting with Molotov and inform him that the Reich government considered ‘that there was no issue between the Baltic and the Black Sea that could not be arranged to the entire mutual satisfaction of both countries’, including, in particular, ‘the Baltic, the Baltic states, Poland, and south-eastern issues’. He, Ribbentrop, was willing to come to Moscow for a lengthy visit.¹¹² Ribbentrop felt under pressure, not least because, two days earlier, a Franco–British military delegation had begun further discussions in Moscow about the project for a trilateral pact with the Soviet Union, which was still a live issue.¹¹³ On 16 August, Schulenburg reported to Berlin that Molotov had specifically asked about the possibility of a non-aggression pact.¹¹⁴ Ribbentrop told Schulenburg that Germany was prepared to enter such a pact and to guarantee the Baltic states jointly with the Soviet Union. And Ribbentrop then passed on the message that was decisive for Molotov: ‘The Führer believes that, in view of the present situation and the possibility of serious events occurring (please explain to Herr Molotov that Germany is not prepared to go on putting up with Polish provocations indefinitely), a fundamental and rapid clarification of German–Russian relations and of the attitude of both countries to current issues would be desirable.’¹¹⁵

Molotov replied that they welcomed Germany’s ‘reorientation’ and, to begin with, wanted a trade and credit agreement that could smooth the way for a non-aggression pact.¹¹⁶ Ribbentrop’s reply of 18 August revealed Germany’s impatience: ‘German–Polish relations were deteriorating every day. We believed that incidents could happen at any time, leading inevitably to the outbreak of hostilities.’ Thus, Hitler considered it necessary to clarify German–Soviet relations before the outbreak of a German–Polish war. Once again, Ribbentrop made clear his wish to visit Moscow, sketched out the non-aggression pact that was envisaged, and proposed a special ‘protocol’ in which, for example, ‘the spheres of influence in the Baltic region, the question of the Baltic states etc.’ could be clarified.¹¹⁷ The following day, 19 August, a credit agreement was signed,¹¹⁸ and Ribbentrop was invited to Moscow.¹¹⁹ The Soviets also presented a draft agreement with an attached protocol ready for signature.¹²⁰

The following day, Ribbentrop delivered a letter from Hitler addressed to ‘Herr Stalin, Moscow’.¹²¹ Hitler ‘warmly’ welcomed the signing of the trade agreement ‘as the first step in the reshaping of German–Soviet relations’. A non-aggression pact would represent for him ‘a long-term commitment of German policy. Germany was once again adopting a political approach, which in past centuries had been beneficial to both countries’. He accepted the Soviet draft and was convinced that the attached protocol could ‘be substantially agreed in a very short time’. Hitler continued: the ‘tension between Germany and Poland’ had ‘become intolerable’. Germany was determined, ‘in view of this unreasonable behaviour, from now onwards to defend the Reich’s interests with all means at its disposal’. Hitler now proposed that they should ‘lose no more time’ and that Ribbentrop should go to Moscow as soon as possible. His foreign minister would be bringing ‘full and comprehensive powers to draw up and sign a non-aggression pact as well as the protocol’.

The following day, Stalin telegraphed his agreement and, late in the evening of 21 August, Germany was able to announce to the world – including its astonished allies, Italy and Japan¹²² – the surprising news that it was about to sign a non-aggression pact.¹²³

War aim: ‘The destruction of Poland’

Assuming that there would shortly be an agreement with the Soviet Union that would seal Poland’s fate, on 22 August Hitler once again spoke to around fifty high-ranking officers he had summoned specially to the Berghof. We do not have an actual copy of Hitler’s speech, which was of vital importance for the outbreak of the Second World War,¹²⁴ but its contents can be reconstructed from the notes made by various members of his audience.¹²⁵

Hitler explained to the generals that he had already taken the decision to attack Poland in the spring following the occupation of Memel. At first, he had thought that in few years’ time he would first move against the West and only after that against the East. But then he had realized that, in the event of a conflict with the western powers, Poland would attack Germany. He had to preempt that.¹²⁶

He justified his decision to go to war at this particular point in time by explaining that both Germany and Italy currently had exceptional leaders. His own supreme self-confidence is revealed in one of the transcripts of the speech: ‘Essentially, everything depends on me, on my existence, because of my political talents. Also, the fact that probably no one will ever again have the confidence of the whole of the German people in the way that I have. In future, there will probably never again be a man who has more authority than I have. Thus, my existence is a factor of great value. But I can at any time be eliminated by a criminal or a lunatic.’ After praising Mussolini and Franco in a similar fashion and declaring that Italy’s loyalty as an ally and Spain’s neutrality depended on these friendly leaders, he went on to mention another key point: ‘as a result of the constraints on us, our economic situation is such that we can only hold out for a few more years . . . we have no other choice, we must act.’

The ‘political situation’ also made it advisable to act now. ‘In the Mediterranean rivalries between Italy, France, and England, in East Asia tension between Japan and England, in the Middle East tension that is alarming the Moslem world.’ Another factor was that the position of the [British] Empire and France had deteriorated since the end of the First World War. In addition, in the Balkans, ‘since Albania . . . [there was] a balance of power’. Yugoslavia and Romania were in an extremely weak position, Turkey was ruled by ‘weak and feeble men with small minds’. ‘In two or three years’ time’ all these ‘favourable circumstances [will] no longer’ prevail. ‘And no-one knows how much longer I shall live. So, it’s better to have a conflict now.’¹²⁷ The founding of Greater Germany, Hitler continued, was ‘politically a great achievement, but militarily it was questionable, as it was achieved through bluffing by the political leadership’. It was now necessary ‘to test the military’ by ‘getting it to carry out individual tasks’.¹²⁸

The relationship with Poland had become ‘intolerable’. It was Britain’s fault for intervening and blocking his initiative in the Danzig and Corridor question. It was time to act, he repeated, as ‘it was still highly probable’ that the West would not intervene. In any event, they would be taking ‘a great risk’ that would demand ‘iron nerves’ and an ‘iron resolve’.

Britain and France, he continued, were not ready for war. Neither a blockade, nor an attack from the Maginot line would be successful and an attack through neutral states was out of the question. If, contrary to expectation, the western powers did intervene, they would defend the West until they had conquered Poland.¹²⁹ Hitler went on to describe his rapprochement with Russia, which excluded any risk from that quarter.¹³⁰ All in all, there was only one final risk left, that some ‘chap’ (‘Schweinehund’ in another version)¹³¹ would screw it up with an offer to mediate.¹³²

He told the generals he would ‘provide a propaganda pretext for starting the war, however implausible. The victor is never asked afterwards whether or not he told the truth. When starting and waging a war it’s not being in the right that matters, but victory.’ And he went on: ‘Close your hearts to pity. Act brutally. 80 million people must get what is their right. Their existence must be made secure. The stronger man is in the right. The greatest harshness.’ For the generals this meant: ‘The military goal is the total destruction of Poland. Speed is of the essence. Pursuit to the point of complete annihilation.’ He announced that the war would ‘probably’ start on Saturday 26 August.¹³³ The process of military mobilization began accordingly.¹³⁴

Hitler interrupted his speech briefly to say goodbye to Ribbentrop, who was going off on his trip to Moscow.¹³⁵ His entourage consisted of some thirty persons, including, apart from the diplomats, Hitler’s personal photographer, Hoffmann.¹³⁶

Arriving in Moscow on 23 August, Ribbentrop immediately began the final stage of the negotiations with Stalin and Molotov.¹³⁷ They quickly came to an agreement: the non-aggression and consultation pact was to last ten years and stated that, in the event of military measures undertaken by a third power against one of the two treaty partners – the word ‘attack’ was carefully avoided – this third power would not be supported by the other treaty partner. More important, however, was the additional secret protocol, envisaging the partition of Poland and the Baltic states into Soviet and German spheres of interest. Although he had been given plenary powers, Ribbentrop sought Hitler’s approval for a concession in the division of spheres of influence: Stalin was demanding the Latvian ports Libau (Liepaˉja) and Windau (Ventspils). The ‘Führer’ agreed and the treaty was then signed.¹³⁸

Hitler was now not only certain that, in the event of an attack on Poland, he had excluded the Soviet Union as a potential opponent, but he would also be able to let his new ally share in the spoils.¹³⁹

War or peace?

The conclusion of the Nazi–Soviet pact was followed by a week of hectic diplomacy, involving Germany, Poland, Britain, France, and Italy: notes were exchanged, emissaries sent, and there were last-minute attempts at mediation. The decision over war and peace lay entirely in Hitler’s hands. His attitude during this last phase before the outbreak of war was contradictory and wavering, which led to speculation among his contemporaries and later historians about his motives. Had Hitler become the victim of a miscalculation arising from his own disparate aims, so that he stumbled more or less blindly through the crisis, which then ended in a two-front war he had not intended? Or had he been aiming for a war with the western powers from the very beginning, believing that it would be better to face the inevitable confrontation in 1939 rather than a few years later?

When, immediately after the conclusion of the Hitler–Stalin pact, Chamberlain told Hitler in writing that Britain would go to war if Germany attacked Poland, Hitler responded in his written reply just as decisively: he would not withdraw his demands on Poland and if this meant war with Britain then Germany was ‘ready and determined’ to fight.¹⁴⁰

While Weizsäcker believed that Hitler was reckoning on a ‘localized war’,¹⁴¹ the latter left Goebbels the same day with a somewhat uncertain impression as to whether the western powers would intervene: ‘At the moment one can’t be sure. . . . It depends on the circumstances. London is more committed than in September 1938 . . . England probably doesn’t want a war at the moment. But it has to save face.’ At present Paris was holding back, but there too ‘one can’t be absolutely certain’. Italy was not enthusiastic, ‘but it will probably have to join in; it has hardly any other choice.’ Hitler dismissed the fact that the new alliance with Stalin completely contradicted the regime’s post-1933 anti-Bolshevik policy with a terse comment: ‘The question of Bolshevism is at the moment of minor importance. Also, the Führer believes he’s in a tight spot . . .’ ‘It’s an emergency and beggars can’t be choosers’. Finally, during the night, the long-awaited communiqué arrived in the Berghof from Moscow, confirming the final version of the alliance with Stalin.¹⁴²

The following day, 24 August, Hitler flew from Berchtesgaden to Berlin,¹⁴³ in order to begin the final preparations for the attack. That evening, accompanied by Göring and state secretary Weizsäcker, he met Ribbentrop, who had just returned from Moscow.¹⁴⁴ The foreign minister declared that in Moscow ‘he had felt as if he was among old Party comrades’, and Hoffmann praised Stalin as intelligent, amiable, and cunning.¹⁴⁵

Hitler only found the time to inform Mussolini, his most important ally, about the conclusion of the non-aggression pact with Stalin and the background to it in an official letter sent on 25 August. As far as the impending war was concerned, Hitler merely wanted to tell Mussolini that they had been ‘in a state of alert for weeks’, that the German measures were naturally ‘keeping pace with Polish mobilization’ and ‘that I will take immediate measures if Polish actions become intolerable’.¹⁴⁶

Later on that day, Hitler met the British and French ambassadors. He told Henderson that he could put up with Britain declaring war on Germany, if Germany attacked Poland.¹⁴⁷ However, Hitler was evidently impressed by the firmness with which the British government, supported by its population, was sticking to its policy, and offered Britain comprehensive cooperation for the period after this ‘problem had been solved’. He was determined, he said, to play a decisive role in protecting the British Empire, was willing to accept restrictions on armaments, and had no intention of altering the borders in the West. However, not even Propaganda Minister Goebbels considered this offer convincing: ‘England won’t buy that any more.’¹⁴⁸ Nor did Hitler’s meeting with the French ambassador lead remotely to a de-escalation of the situation. Robert Coulondre told Hitler ‘on his word as an officer’ that, if Germany moved against Poland, France would fulfil its responsibilities.¹⁴⁹

In the early afternoon, in other words immediately after his meeting with Henderson, Hitler gave Keitel the final order to attack Poland the following morning,¹⁵⁰ 26 August. This was the date for the attack that he had already given to his generals on 22 August. Thus he did not even bother to wait for the British government’s response to his ‘generous’ offer of an alliance. Evidently, it was merely designed to embarrass the British government the following day, a few hours after the start of the German attack.

At that point, however, a dramatic development completely upset Hitler’s calculations. In the early evening, ambassador Bernardo Attolico shocked Hitler to the core with a message from Mussolini to the effect that, for the time being, Italy was not in a position to take part in the war. Mussolini reminded Hitler that ‘during our meetings . . . the war was envisaged for after 1942’ and, in accordance with this understanding, he would then naturally have been ‘ready on land, at sea, and in the air’; but, at this point, Italy was not ready for war.¹⁵¹ This message shook Hitler, who was visibly affected and downcast.¹⁵² Moreover, during the afternoon, news arrived that the military pact between Britain and Poland, which had been agreed on 6 April 1939, had just been ratified in London.¹⁵³ This made it unlikely that, the day after Germany had started a war, Britain would seriously engage with Hitler’s offer of an alliance. Thus, Hitler responded to this new situation by continuing the clandestine mobilization, but, in order to win time for final diplomatic negotiations and for troop reinforcements on the western and eastern frontiers,¹⁵⁴ the attack planned for the coming night was postponed for several days.¹⁵⁵ On 26 August, the Army was given 31 August as the new date for the start of the war.¹⁵⁶

On 25 August, Hitler, who was not content with Mussolini’s negative response, enquired of the ‘Duce’ what war matériel and raw materials he needed in order to be ready for war.¹⁵⁷ The following day Mussolini’s reply arrived containing an enormous list of matériel and raw materials that Italy desperately needed in order to be ready for war. Mussolini could not have made his lack of enthusiasm for war any clearer.¹⁵⁸ Hitler responded immediately by giving his ally the chance to save face, while simultaneously diverting attention from his own miscalculation. In a lengthy reply he dealt in detail with the ‘Duce’s’ wish list, but wrote that ‘to my regret, your wishes . . . cannot be fulfilled for purely organizational and technical reasons’. He wrote that he understood Mussolini’s situation and requested that he should ‘as promised, tie down English and French forces through active propaganda and appropriate military demonstrations’.¹⁵⁹ Mussolini responded the same evening with a letter to Hitler in which he agreed to his request, but advocated a political solution to the conflict.¹⁶⁰

In the meantime, Göring had asked an acquaintance, a Swedish businessman, Birger Dahlerus, to try to mediate in London. Dahlerus had already made an attempt to facilitate discussions between the British and German governments.¹⁶¹ He returned from London on 26 August with a letter from Halifax to Göring, underlining Britain’s willingness to negotiate. Göring immediately passed the letter on to Hitler, and that night Dahlerus was summoned to the Reich Chancellery, where Hitler initially regaled him with a lengthy account of his efforts to reach an understanding with Britain. Dahlerus’s attempts to turn the monologue into a conversation were only partially successful.¹⁶²

According to Dahlerus, Hitler’s eloquence ‘was undeniable, his ability to make his own opinions appear convincing impressive; however, he suffered from the regrettable inability to acknowledge or respect his opponent’s views’. Hitler appeared to Dahlerus extremely tense and unstable; the scene late at night, with the dictator pacing up and down in his study, in the end uttering wild threats, in fact actually screaming them – all this made an alarming impression on his Swedish visitor.

Finally, Hitler gave Dahlerus a concrete offer to take away with him: Germany sought an alliance with Britain and was prepared to participate in defending the Empire. It was exactly the same proposal that he had made to Henderson. Hitler now increased his demands, however: for the first time he now demanded, in addition to Danzig, most of the Corridor (apart from a strip providing access to Gdingen, which would remain Polish), whereas hitherto he had declared himself content with an extraterritorial transport link through the corridor. Moreover, according to Hitler, Germany would be prepared to guarantee Poland’s borders. At the same time, it wanted guarantees for the German minority in Poland and a settlement of the colonial question. By increasing his demands relating to the Corridor, making it impossible for Poland to agree, while, at the same time, suggesting to Britain his willingness to negotiate, he was trying to drive a wedge between Poland and its guarantor, Britain. This tactic is revealed in a note by Halder, who, in the late evening of 26 August, wrote: ‘Faint hope that we can get Britain to accept demands through negotiation that Poland is rejecting: Danzig-Corridor.’¹⁶³

This was therefore Hitler’s last attempt before the attack on Poland to use a diplomatic manoeuvre to prevent Britain from intervening, even though she had repeatedly threatened to do so in the event of such an attack. Britain was to be persuaded to accept the German demand for the Corridor, and Germany’s negotiations with Poland were then, using some pretext, to be broken off. It was hoped that, in this event, the British government would pull back from starting a European war and, without Britain, France would not move. If this failed, then he would still be able to put the blame for the war on the other side, as he had, after all, shown himself willing to negotiate right up to the last minute.

On 26 August, a letter from Daladier to Hitler also arrived, in which he implored him to solve the problems in dispute through negotiation.¹⁶⁴ Goebbels noted Hitler’s view that the letter was unimportant and evidently written only ‘for the possible future issue of war guilt’.¹⁶⁵ Hitler replied the following day with a long letter indicating that he was determined to seek a solution to the Danzig and Corridor questions ‘one way or the other’. He made it clear that he was no longer interested in the idea of an extraterritorial transport link, but rather in a much more extensive annexation: ‘Danzig and the Corridor must return to Germany.’ Although the Germans had promised the French confidentiality, they published the correspondence on 28 August.¹⁶⁶

On the afternoon of the 27 August, Hitler received the Reichstag deputies, who had been summoned to Berlin, in the Reich Chancellery. Originally, he had envisaged using this day, which had been intended to be the second day of the war, for an address to the Reichstag justifying the opening of hostilities. As a kind of substitute he made a speech to the deputies in the Ambassadors’ Hall and Halder took notes: ‘Situation very serious. Determined. Eastern question to be solved one way or the other. Minimum demand: return of Danzig, solution to the Corridor question. Maximum demand: “depends on military situation.” If minimum demand not fulfilled, then war: Brutal! He would be in the front line. The Duce will do his best for us. War very difficult, perhaps hopeless. “So long as I live there will be no talk of capitulation.” Soviet pact perhaps misunderstood by Party. Pact with Satan, to drive out the devil. Economic situation.’ According to Halder, ‘the applause was as required but thin.’ Halder’s general impression of Hitler was not good. ‘Bleary-eyed, haggard, his voice cracking, distracted’.¹⁶⁷ Goebbels, by contrast, had encountered his boss on the same day ‘in the best of moods and very confident’.¹⁶⁸

On the afternoon of 27 August, Hitler received a telegram from Mussolini, replying to his request to keep the Italian decision secret and to continue with military preparations for appearance’s sake, in order to tie down the Allies.¹⁶⁹ Germany too declared Italy’s refusal to act a state secret.¹⁷⁰ The ‘Duce’ accepted the German proposals, informing Hitler of what moral and military support Italy was prepared to give.

During the late evening of 27 August, Dahlerus returned from Britain, bringing with him the British government’s reply to Hitler’s proposals.¹⁷¹ Britain declared that, in principle, it was prepared to sign a treaty with Germany, but urged direct negotiations with Warsaw over the questions of Danzig, the Corridor, and the German minority in Poland. The Polish borders ought to be jointly guaranteed by Russia, Germany, Italy, France, and Britain. It rejected Germany’s claim for the return of her colonies, but was prepared to discuss the matter after the crisis had come to an end and following Germany’s demobilization. The German offer to take part in defending the Empire was ‘incompatible with the dignity and interests of the British empire’.

The official response of the British government, brought by ambassador Henderson the following evening, explicitly referred to Britain’s alliance commitments to Poland,¹⁷² prompting Hitler to postpone the attack scheduled for 31 August by a further day. ¹⁷³

On 29 August, during a stormy meeting, Hitler gave Henderson his reply: there was little point in any further negotiations with Poland; he was, however, prepared to receive ‘a Polish emissary with full powers’ for talks in Berlin, but he must arrive by the following day, in other words on the 30th.¹⁷⁴ Goebbels was afraid that if the Polish foreign minister, Beck, actually came, people’s sudden hopes of peace might lead to ‘an unstoppable wave of optimism, which would ruin the government’s whole position’.¹⁷⁵ This he summed up as ‘possibly still managing to prise London away from Warsaw and finding a pretext to attack’.¹⁷⁶

During 29 August Attolico, the Italian ambassador, brought a letter and an oral message from Mussolini, offering his services for mediation with Britain. According to the interpreter, Schmidt, Hitler’s response was distinctly cool: he himself was already in direct contact with the British and had offered to receive a Polish negotiator.¹⁷⁷ He wanted to avoid another Munich at all costs.

Late in the evening of this same 29 August, Göring summoned Dahlerus, asking him once again to go to London to underline Germany’s willingness to negotiate, and to announce that further German proposals would be made the following day.¹⁷⁸

On the morning of 30 August, Hitler received the Danzig Gauleiter, Albert Forster, to give him final instructions for the intended take-over of Danzig. In addition, on 30 August he signed the ‘Führer Decree for the Formation of a Ministerial Council for the Defence of the Reich’, creating a committee composed of Göring, Hess, Frick, Funk, Lammers, and Keitel, which was entitled to issue decrees with the force of law.¹⁷⁹

During the afternoon, Chamberlain sent a message that the British government was examining the German note in detail and would reply in the course of the day.¹⁸⁰ Meanwhile, Hitler was already working on a memorandum designed above all to demonstrate to world opinion that Germany had been willing to negotiate in good faith, even though, as intended, the negotiations had collapsed. The memorandum, comprising a total of sixteen points, demanded the annexation of Danzig, and a plebiscite in the Corridor, with the losing side being provided with extraterritorial links.

At midnight on 30 August, Ribbentrop received Henderson to tell him, in the course of a very heated conversation, that they had prepared proposals for settling the dispute with Poland. However, these were now redundant, as Germany’s demand for a Polish emissary to arrive that day had not been met. Ribbentrop then quickly read out the 16-point memorandum without giving Henderson a copy.¹⁸¹

Hitler also summoned Goebbels at midnight in order to give him details of his ‘proposals for negotiation’ and to fill him in on the background: ‘The Führer thinks it’s going to be war.’ Hitler told Goebbels that he wanted ‘to release [the 16-point proposal] to the world at a suitable opportunity’, demonstrating once again that his memorandum had been intended purely as propaganda. Neither Poland nor Britain was to be permitted to respond to the German proposals before the outbreak of war.

In the early morning of 31 August, Hitler confirmed the order to attack Poland the following day. At 12.40 he signed the ‘Directive No. 1 for the Conduct of the War’, in which he ordered the attack to begin at 4.45 a.m. In the West, German forces were to remain strictly on the defensive, so that ‘England and France unequivocally bear the responsibility for beginning hostilities’. Around midday, Halder noted: ‘Involvement of the West now said to be unavoidable, but Führer still decides to attack.’ A few hours later, however, the fact that Hitler had initially countermanded the comprehensive evacuation of the frontier zone in the west that had been planned was leading Halder to conclude ‘that he [Hitler] reckons that France and England won’t be marching’.¹⁸²

On the afternoon of 31 August, the Polish ambassador contacted state secretary von Weizsäcker with a request to be received by Hitler or Ribbentrop. Hitler did not wish to see him, however, and when that evening Lipski visited Ribbentrop to present his government’s response to the British proposal for starting direct negotiations, the German foreign minister terminated the meeting on the pretext that they had waited in vain on the 30th for a Polish emissary with plenipotentiary powers. In fact, Lipski had to concede that even now he did not possess powers going beyond those he already had as ambassador. Shortly afterwards, the Foreign Ministry sent the 16-point programme to the British, French, Japanese, American, and Soviet ambassadors, declaring that Poland had not taken advantage of the opportunity for negotiations.¹⁸³ Shortly before, around 21.00, both this statement and the memorandum were broadcast on the German radio.¹⁸⁴ At this point, Hitler gave Goebbels the impression that he did not believe ‘that England will intervene’. But, Goebbels continued, ‘at the moment no one [can] say’ whether or not this forecast would prove correct.¹⁸⁵

Whereas in 1936 Hitler saw himself on the defensive against a looming communist alliance, in 1937 he began to act from a position of strength. Cooperation with Italy, which might turn into an alliance, subsequently extending to east and south-east European states, appeared to him to change the balance of power in Central Europe. At the end of 1937 he was already envisaging the possibility, in certain circumstances, of annexing Austria and Czechoslovakia, without having to fear intervention from France, Britain, or the Soviet Union, an assumption that was not, however, shared by the military. The fact that the alliance with Britain that he had originally sought had not come about appeared initially to increase his diplomatic room for manoeuvre.

The transition to an expansionist foreign policy during 1938 was not, however, part of a long-term plan, but in fact improvised. In February 1938, looking for a foreign policy success immediately after the Blomberg–Fritsch crisis, Hitler forced the Austrian Chancellor Schuschnigg to make substantial concessions that amounted to the ‘coordination’ of Austria. The further move towards the Anschluss of Austria by mid-March 1938 was not originally envisaged by Hitler as coming about in this way; it arose out of the unexpected countermoves by Schuschnigg and Hitler’s determination to break this resistance through intervention. He only decided to annex Austria immediately when the invasion was already in progress.

This exceptional success encouraged Hitler to accelerate the break-up of Czechoslovakia. The so-called Weekend Crisis of May 1938, which he interpreted as a major loss of prestige resulting from the devious cooperation between Czechoslovakia and the western powers, dramatically radicalized his thinking and actions. For Hitler now became convinced that war with the western powers was unavoidable in the medium term. As far as he was concerned, the destruction of Czechoslovakia was now, unlike in 1937, no longer an option in the event that France was paralysed, but had become for him the precondition for a later war against the western powers, for which he wanted to protect his rear. Thus, at the end of May, he fixed the deadline for a move against Czechoslovakia as 2 October, at the same time initiating a massive increase in rearmament and the building of the West Wall to provide security against an attack by the western powers.

Hitler achieved a remarkable bloodless success when, after several months, the Sudeten crisis was settled by the Munich Agreement at the end of September 1938. However, he interpreted the Agreement as a defeat because he had not succeeded in destroying Czechoslovakia. The ‘bringing home’ of the Sudenten Germans had simply been the pretext for attacking Czechoslovakia. Moreover, the lack of enthusiasm for war, not only among the population, but also among his regime’s political and military leadership, had become very evident. In response, he launched an exceptional rearmament programme and switched the focus of propaganda to preparing the population for war. Finally, in March 1939, as soon as possible, he destroyed the rest of Czechoslovakia, soon afterwards forcing Lithuania to return Memel to Germany.

After the destruction of Czechoslovakia, however, all Hitler’s plans to compel Poland, his partner since 1934, to accept his terms for the settlement of the Danzig question and to join an anti-Soviet alliance failed. Instead, Poland preferred the safety of the Anglo-French guarantee. As in the previous year vis-à-vis Czechoslovakia, and strengthened by the Pact of Steel with Italy in May, Hitler fixed a specific date, 1 September 1939, for military action against Poland. This time he was certain that no new ‘Munich’ would get in the way of his military triumph. The coup of the Non-Aggression Pact with Moscow of August 1939 seemed to him, in all probability, to rule out a military intervention by the western powers.

Hitler’s approach was, as so often when it came to important decisions in his career, ambivalent. On the one hand, he counted on being able to keep the western powers out of the war at the last minute through a combination of assertions of strength and generous offers. On the other hand, he was quite prepared to accept the possibility of a major war, in which case he assumed that, by ostentatiously showing his willingness to negotiate, he would be able to place the blame for the war on his opponents. During these decisive days, this dual-track approach enabled him to behave towards the western powers sometimes as if he were cynically determined to go to war and, at other times, as if he were hesitant and concerned to preserve peace, while allowing him also to take account of the different views among the military and political leadership. He led his regime by means of a dramatic decision-making process, at the end of which a result emerged that was irrevocable and was accepted by those who had been sceptical about going to war.

Within a period of one and a half years, his policy of conquest had brought him to the brink of a major European war. Reviewing the most important stages in this process, one is compelled to conclude that Hitler was the decisive, driving force in this process. He was not dragged into war by either the political or the military leadership, nor was he the victim of a rearmament dynamic that finally left him with no other option than war.¹⁸⁶

Analysis of the SD and Sopade situation reports for the years 1938/39 shows that the Germans were far removed from forming a great, united Nazi national community. On the contrary, the sources at our disposal show a picture of a decidedly disunited society suffering under great burdens imposed by an accelerated rearmament programme. The various sections of society were particularly sensitive to perceived social injustices placing great emphasis on preserving their social status. Clashes between the interests of particular social groups were often publicly expressed, such as between employees and employers, producers and consumers, country and city. Above all, German society was far from becoming a united, national ‘community of struggle’, willing to make great sacrifices in order to restore Germany to great power status, if necessary through war. However, this had been the main aim of Hitler’s domestic policy since 1933, and, in this respect at least, the majority of the population had failed to follow him.

The decisive point about the national enthusiasm generated by his foreign policy successes was that it was always overshadowed by the fear of war caused by his risky policies. Jubilation over the Anschluss with Austria broke out only when it was evident that there were not going to be any serious international repercussions. During the critical diplomatic situation between May and October 1938, it became clear that the regime was having difficulty in imposing great material burdens on the population, while simultaneously keeping it in a constant state of tension. When the crisis reached its climax at the end of September 1938, the population reacted with an obvious lack of enthusiasm for war, while applauding the preservation of peace following the Munich Agreement.

Slightly more than five weeks later, the Nazi activists unleashed their frustration at the German population’s lack of enthusiasm for war, for which they blamed ‘the Jews’, in the November pogrom. Hitler, who played the key role in launching the pogrom, used the orgy of violence to initiate a general change of course in the field of propaganda. The population was to be gradually got ready for war. In his Reichstag speech on 30 January, Hitler put down an important marker for the new course by combining the themes of war and anti-Semitism in his threat that a world war would lead to the annihilation of the ‘Jewish race’ in Europe. His anti-British ‘encirclement’ speech of 1 April, referring to the outbreak of the First World War, as well as his Reichstag speech of 28 April, in which he abrogated the Anglo-German Naval Agreement and the Non-Aggression pact with Poland, determined the course of propaganda, which was now intended to prepare the population for a new war. During the months that followed, Hitler tended, however, to keep a low profile, and handed the role of chief agitator to his Propaganda Minister, Goebbels. Although it proved impossible to whip up enthusiasm for war during the August crisis, by this time the population had evidently come to accept what appeared likely to be a limited war.