This chapter examines the two sets of actors who are involved in organizing and providing religious services abroad: diplomats and state religious officials. When religion becomes an object of state policy, it also becomes an issue that can be integrated into the same agendas, bullet points, and evaluation schemes, as any other public policy issue. The process of rationalization is reflected in the perspective adopted by state employees in their day-to-day management of religious affairs.
The actors of these policies may or may not be devout believers themselves: indeed, at times this may have an influence on their opinions and actions with regard to particular situations. On the other hand, an individual actor’s religiosity has no bearing on the fact that framing religion as a specifically delimited administrative category contributes to the secular manner by which religion is managed. Sacredness is not at issue: budgets, agendas, and logistics are. This perspective plays an important role in the way that Islamic issues are integrated into the diplomatic and consular services of Turkey and Morocco . Grouped together under a special heading in departmental titles and institutional reports, religious services abroad are the subject of studies, meetings, and bilateral talks and are handled to different degrees by a long list of ministerial departments, parapublic institutions, and the diplomatic networks of consulates and embassies.
The main question in this chapter concerns the weight of administrative decision-making procedures and interstate diplomacy as structural factors within the Moroccan and Turkish Muslim fields in France and Germany . In other words, to what degree are the dynamics of these fields influenced by the routine practices of state employees and institutions, as opposed to the political decisions of government leaders? I argue that certain dynamics of the Turkish and Moroccan transnational Muslim fields can be explained by the models of state religious governance prevalent in Turkey and Morocco and are not only the result of circumstantial political decisions.
Especially since 9/11, the explosive and highly politicized nature of issues concerning Islam has meant that Turkish and Moroccan diplomats have had to address such issues with the media and their counterparts in French and German state ministries. At the same time, the actual day-to-day work of organizing and supervising religious affairs is carried out by consular officials in the case of Morocco (“social affairs attachés”), and employees of the Diyanet in the case of Turkey (the religious affairs counsellors and attachés). Back in Morocco and Turkey, these networks abroad are coordinated by departments of the religious bureaucracy that are responsible for overseeing the organization of religious activities for the community abroad. The following pages will analyze the vision and perceptions of these two categories of actors with regard to one of the most direct ways by which they influence the Muslim fields of France and Germany : the sending of imams abroad.
1 Religious Authorities Abroad: Theory and Definitions
1.1 Religious Public Policy Instruments Abroad
Since religion is considered a public service in Morocco and Turkey, state action in the religious field is manifested through the use of public policy instruments . These instruments demonstrate the rationalized understanding of religious governance displayed by state religious institutions, which integrate Islamic affairs as an administrative category into the functioning of the state. The last chapter provided a summary list of these instruments in comparison with the cases of Germany and France; this chapter will now go into greater detail concerning one specific instrument by focusing on the procedures and actors involved.
There is an important asymmetry between Turkey and Morocco concerning these instruments: for the former, the sending of religious personnel abroad represents by far the most important activity it organizes in the Muslim field abroad. Moreover, the creation of Diyanet national-level umbrella organizations in foreign countries is closely tied to this activity. For Morocco, religious personnel are generally only sent abroad for the month of Ramadan and consequently represent a relatively smaller undertaking. On the other hand, Morocco’s practice of providing financial aid to Islamic associations and mosque projects means that it occupies a unique position in the religious field abroad, capable of wielding important influence by dint of its substantial donations. Finally, both states are involved in the dissemination of their “national” Islam through religious publications, conferences, and symbolic acts, all of which are designed to underscore the legitimacy of home state Islamic institutions as instances of religious authority .
These activities constitute the most important religious public policy instruments in terms of their lasting impact on the Turkish and Moroccan Muslim fields abroad. The different levels of diplomatic interactions they necessitate illustrate the role interstate cooperation plays in governing Islam abroad, which has been essential to the development of both states’ transnational networks (Chapter 4) and the creation of the CFCM and the Islamkonferenz (Chapter 5). While high-level interstate discussions on religious governance between government leaders are generally quite rare, the sending of imams to foreign countries represents a standardized institutional practice that brings together state actors from sending and receiving countries on a regular basis.
The Turkish and Moroccan states also incorporate Islam into their foreign policy concerning other regions. The Diyanet and the Turkish Diyanet Foundation (TDV) have sent religious personnel, built mosques , and established theological faculties from the Balkans through the Caucasus and across Central Asia, as well as hosted international conferences bringing together top religious officials from “Eurasia ” (Avrasya), Africa, and Latin American. As for Morocco , the Habous ministry has important ties to many West African countries, where it has funded the construction of mosques and provides scholarships for West African students to attend Moroccan Islamic institutions. However, in these cases, though the actors and the policy instruments involved are similar, the lack of significant migrant populations situates them outside the considerations of diaspora politics . Consequently, these international religious activities raise questions regarding foreign policy issues in other geographic regions and towards different populations and will not be considered in this book.
1.2 State Religious Services for the Community Abroad: Exporting Imams
The religious personnel Turkey and Morocco send abroad are generally referred to as “imams”; however, the term itself can give rise to confusion. In Islamic practice, an imam is simply a male member of the community who leads the prayer, its meaning coming from the Arabic root that means “in front” or “ahead” (amām). In other words, the term imam does not necessarily correspond to a permanent position and applies rather to a temporary function exercised by someone who may come from almost any walk of life.
In official reports in Turkey and Morocco , the administrative term that is more frequently used can be broadly translated as “religious official”: respectively, “din görevlisi” in Turkey, and “qayyim al-dīnī” or “préposé religieux” in Morocco. This is a more neutral designation that recalls similar administrative titles and covers a number of grades within the bureaucratic hierarchy, depending on training and function. The Turkish and Moroccan states are filled with görevlis, qayyims, and préposés, and naming them in this fashion has no basis in Islamic religious tradition, but rather corresponds to the rationalization of religious activities within the state administration. The Turkish term is much more common than its counterparts: the word görevli (“employee, attendant, official”) refers to someone who is given a “duty” or “task” (görev), and is used in many contexts to describe employees and officials. By contrast, the Moroccan qayyim (“guardian, warden, custodian”) is not a standard term when referring to religious personnel in Arabic—an Al Jazeera article (2011) on imams in Morocco even makes a point of calling attention to the expression—and has limited parallels with other semantic fields concerning the word “official” (the Turkish equivalent “kayyım” refers to mosque attendants).
The term “religious official” is most often understood in both countries as meaning a state-approved imam, though even here there are distinctions to be made. In Morocco , the main three divisions are between neighbourhood or local imams, who may exercise another profession; imam hatips (khaṭīb), who deliver the Friday sermon; and preachers (wāʿiḍ / vaiz). The educational background and hierarchical rank of these three rise from first to last: neighbourhood imams may simply be local individuals who have attended a Qur’an school, while imam hatips and preachers (especially the latter) have generally completed studies in Islamic theology. In many cases in Morocco, the imam may also fulfill the role of muezzin, depending on the personnel available. In Turkey, the Diyanet has four official categories for religious employees: imam hatips, Qur’an teachers, müezzin-kayyım, and preachers. Thereafter, there are also those who are higher up in the administrative hierarchy, such as members of Ulema Councils in Morocco, and district and provincial müftü in Turkey.
“Religious official” is also a gender-neutral term. When I asked the director of the foreign affairs for Diyanet why this particular term was favoured, his first response was quite straightforward: saying “imam” would exclude the Diyanet’s female religious personnel (Interview, Diyanet Foreign Affairs Director B, 23 November 2011, Istanbul). Both the Diyanet and the Habous ministry send female religious personnel abroad, an issue that has only been addressed quite recently with the opening of new positions in the religious administration for female preachers. In Morocco , the feminine form of the word preacher (wāʿiḍat) or guide (murshidat) is used to designate them, while in Turkey the terms “female religious official” (bayan or kadın din görevlisi) and “female preacher” (vaize) are used.
For a religious official to be sent abroad (imam or otherwise), the first step occurs when a mosque association in a foreign country makes a request. The request is submitted at the level of the consulate, which is responsible for maintaining contact with the associations of the local community, and usually has a list of all the Turkish or Moroccan associations in the district it covers. Aside from the embassy, Morocco has 16 consulates in France and two in Germany, while Turkey has five consulates in France and 13 in Germany, all of which are responsible for a certain geographic district. At the level of the consulates, the Turkish religious affairs attaché and the Moroccan attaché for social affairs are generally in charge of receiving these requests and including them in a report that is sent up through the diplomatic hierarchy. After being brought to the attention of higher-ranking diplomats, the requests are transmitted back to Rabat or Ankara, more specifically to the department in charge of citizens abroad in the foreign ministry’s division of consular affairs. Once the information has been processed by the necessary levels at the foreign affairs ministry , it informs the religious authorities (the Diyanet or the Habous ministry) of the number of requests for religious personnel that it has received from the community abroad.
The second step takes place at the level of the religious authorities, who have the task of determining the number of religious officials that will be sent abroad at that particular moment. Similar to other branches of state bureaucracy, this decision is mainly the responsibility of a specialized administrative department, which then receives approval from higher-placed authorities. In the Turkish religious bureaucracy, this specialized department is the Directorate of Turks Abroad, which is part of the Diyanet’s General Directorate of Foreign Affairs. In Morocco , it is the Department of Affairs of Moroccans Living Abroad, within the Habous Ministry’s Directorate of Studies and General Affairs and the Department of Religious Services for Moroccans Residing Abroad of the Islamic Affairs Directorate. In both cases, higher-ranking cabinet members supervise the issue as part of their general portfolio.
My interviewees at the Diyanet and the Ministry of Habous both emphasized that responding to this demand is no easy task: there are numerous financial costs involved as well as an extensive administrative selection procedure for the religious personnel who are to be sent abroad. Moreover, some states impose a limit as to the number of imams that can be sent, such as France in the case of Turkey. It becomes more difficult to generalize at this point, because the religious personnel that both Turkey and Morocco send abroad correspond to different categories and do not stay the same length of time. Consequently, the following two sections will consider both states separately.
2 Morocco
2.1 Categories and Selection
Morocco primarily sends religious personnel abroad for the month of Ramadan, an initiative that concerns the Hassan II Foundation (FHII), the Habous ministry, and the foreign affairs ministry. Moroccan financial support for imams who are permanently based in foreign countries or who stay abroad for extended periods of time has been much less the norm. The FHII at one time provided funding for upwards of 21 “permanent” imams across Western Europe; however, by 2008 this had dropped to only seven (El Moukhi 2008). The same year, for the first time ever, the Habous ministry sent a contingent of 30 imams to France for a four-year period, an initiative which I will discuss in the next chapter.
Turkey also sends a large contingent of religious personnel abroad specifically for the month of Ramadan; however, in contrast to Morocco it also has some 1500 imam hatips serving in foreign countries for generally four to five years. In addition to the religious personnel for Ramadan, both the Habous ministry and the FHII give financial support to selected Islamic theologians for occasional trips to attend special events and give lectures in mosque associations abroad (Interview, Moroccan Religious Counsellor, 23 May 2011, Paris). Here, as elsewhere, the accent is on responding to requests received from abroad, thus framing these activities as part of a service for diaspora communities and protecting home state authorities against charges of interfering or imposing their policies.
The events attended by Moroccan religious personnel are focal points that put on display the individuals who make up the transnational networks linking Moroccan state religious institutions and their associative partners overseas. For example, during the annual conferences of the Lorraine Regional Council for the Muslim Faith (CRCM), the Rally of French Muslims (hereafter, the Rally) invites a large number of Islamic theologians, some of whom are members of the European Council of Moroccan Ulema (CEOM ) and are imams at different mosques in France or other European countries, while others come directly from Morocco . Amongst the latter group, there are some names that never seem to fail at Rally conferences, such as Abdallah Belmadani, a member of the ulema council of Beni Mellal; Said El Kamali, a preacher at the Sunna mosque in Rabat; and Laayoun Al-Kouchi, a famous Qur’an reciter and imam of the Al-Andalus mosque in Casablanca. All three individuals equally appear regularly on the state religious channel As-Sadissa (“The Sixth”), created in 2005, and are emblematic figures of state-promoted religious authority in Morocco today.
Aside from these temporary missions, the delegations of religious personnel sent during Ramadan represent the most important and routine religious activity carried out by Moroccan religious authorities abroad. Beyond the fact that Ramadan is spiritually the most important month for Muslims, it also entails certain logistical challenges. Mosque attendance during Ramadan is higher than during the other months of the year, which means that the need for religious personnel is even greater. In particular, the tarāwīḥ prayers, during which the totality of the Qur’an is recited, attract a large number of people and occur every night during the month of Ramadan. Consequently, the individuals who lead these prayers during Ramadan need to be capable of reciting the entire Qur’an, requiring a degree of training in special pronunciation techniques (tajwid) that many local imams in migratory contexts often do not have. For instance, Turkish religious authorities follow the school of imam ʿᾹṣim using the ḥafṣ reading (one of the most widespread in the Muslim world). On the other hand, Moroccan religious authorities favour the warsh reading of the school of imam Nāfiʿ and have been promoting its usage as an element of Moroccan Islamic identity (Interview, Director Mohammed VI Qur’an Foundation, 12 July 2011, Mohammedia).
These additional needs are the reason why Ramadan represents a unique moment for the sending of religious personnel abroad. For Moroccans, the tarāwīḥ prayers are principally given over to the mushafiʿi (reciters), imams who have the required degree of religious knowledge to recite the entirety of the Qur’an and make up the largest part of the delegations sent abroad. They are accompanied by a smaller number of male and female preachers (wāʿiḍ, wāʿiḍat), who have a higher degree of theological training and who are responsible for religious teaching, guiding, and counselling activities (Interview, Habous Cabinet Member I, 30 May 2011, Rabat). The training of murshidats (female preachers) began in the wake of the reforms of the religious field, and graduates of the ministry’s training programmes were sent abroad for the first time in 2008. Finally, Morocco also sends university professors who are specialists of Islam to give special conferences in mosques for the community abroad. The costs of sending these professors, preachers, and reciters are shared between the FHII and the Habous ministry. However, the most striking change since the beginning of the century and the reforms of the religious field has been the increasing involvement of the Habous ministry, whose contingent of religious personnel for Ramadan has grown to equal or surpass that of the FHII since 2008.
The selection of the religious personnel is the responsibility of another level of religious administration: the Ulema High Council and the Ulema regional councils. The official responsible for the religious affairs of Moroccans abroad in the cabinet of the Habous ministry explained to me that the process begins with the Ulema High Council, which asks the regional councils to propose Qur’an reciters and preachers, and after discussion, they propose a list to the Ministry of Habous. However, neither the Habous ministry nor the FHII carries out examinations of the religious personnel, leaving that task to the ulema councils during the selection process (Interview, Habous Cabinet Member I). According to another member of the ministry who prepares the delegations to be sent abroad, the ulema councils “demand minimal standards” of the religious officials, such as good knowledge of Islamic sciences and basic linguistic knowledge of the countries they are to be sent to. However, above all they require that the imams and preachers follow “the right path” (la bonne voie): “there can’t be any extremism; it can’t be someone who’ll say ‘don’t eat French meat’ or ‘don’t speak French’” (Interview, Habous Liaison Official, 16 June 2011, Rabat). For a cabinet member of the Ministry of the Moroccan Community Residing Abroad (MCMRE ), these criteria ensure that only veritable religious scholars are sent to foreign countries: “the imams sent by the Habous ministry, they’re academics, they know foreign languages, et cetera. This [imam], he goes abroad for a precise assignment, especially during Ramadan, and he’s responsible for what he says. There, it’s official” (Interview, Head of Cabinet MCMRE, 9 June 2011, Rabat).
Once the list of selected religious personnel has been approved by the Ulema High Council and the Habous ministry, the individuals on the list are divided between the FHII and the ministry for administrative and financial purposes. Indeed, though both the FHII and the ministry send religious personnel abroad for Ramadan, Moroccan officials with whom I spoke saw no difference between them because both lists are validated and proposed by the regional councils and the Ulema High Council in Rabat. According to my interviewees, it is simply a question of separating the administrative and financial management, meaning that it is impossible to speak of competition between the FHII and the Habous ministry; as one official pointed out to me, the ministry is on the FHII’s board of directors and can thus be considered a part of the FHII (Interview, CCME Secretary-General, 9 June 2011, Rabat).
My field research contacts generally agreed that the relationship between the ministry and the FHII concerning religious personnel sent abroad during Ramadan is that of a convenient arrangement that suits both parties. Moreover, they tended to see the greater involvement of the ministry in recent years as due to a rise in the number of requests for religious personnel coming from associations abroad and the limited means of the FHII, as well as owing to the reforms of the religious field in Morocco and the appointment of the current minister Ahmed Toufiq . The growing role of the Habous ministry concerns its financial contributions abroad as well, where it has superseded the FHII by far as the main source for overseas funding over the last decade.
Whether concerning the religious personnel abroad or these financial contributions, it is impossible to consider the FHII as an organization independent of the Moroccan state. The example of the Turkish Diyanet Foundation is perhaps a more suitable comparison, though the latter is currently in much healthier financial shape. While the religious affairs counsellor at the embassy in Paris mentioned the possibility of bureaucratic “entanglement,” all actors concurred that what mattered most was not which instance sent the imams but that the process was centralized and supervised by the state.
The centralized nature of the procedure is important in order to understand the different levels of control exercised by the Moroccan state. Not only is the religious personnel sent by the FHII subject to oversight ahead of time at the religious level of the ulema councils and the Habous ministry, but once the list of religious personnel is established, it is also transmitted to both the interior and foreign affairs ministries (Interview, Habous Cabinet Member I). This ensures that a second round of centralized political and administrative control occurs later on, which can have important consequences. In 2013, 45 imams were removed from the Ramadan delegation after they received a letter from the interior ministry, stating that the nation had “need of their services”—but not abroad. The intervention of the interior ministry was seen as linked to the Habous ministry’s recent policy of “targeting religious personnel who support the MUR, the PJD network, or ʿAdl wal Iḥsan” (Jaabouk 2013), which was further supported by the ministry’s suspension of five imams the same year for having prayed for Sheikh Abdessalam Yassine (the founder of ʿAdl wal Iḥsan) in their sermons a few days after the latter’s death (Lakome 2013). 1
Considering that the image and reputation of the Moroccan state are at stake with each delegation, authorities are careful that the religious personnel sent abroad abide by certain rules. The preachers are made to sign a document, where they commit themselves to “scrupulously respecting the task that they have been assigned, namely preaching,” as well as respecting the laws of the country and not interfering in its affairs, because they are “there for a specific task, you will accomplish it and come back, period” (Interview, Habous Cabinet Member I). In addition, the Habous ministry’s “Guide for the Imam” states that imams must avoid speaking of “personal, political, or media conflicts while giving a sermon,” and that indeed this would be “an unforgivable error” (Ministère des Habous et des Affaires Islamiques 2013). The formal control over the pronouncements and positions taken by religious personnel was made even stricter with a new decree in 2014, which forbids imams from being members of political parties and unions.
The ministry or the FHII covers all travel costs for the religious personnel sent abroad, while the local mosque community generally provides accommodation. In addition to their normal salaries, which are determined by their prior administrative status, imams and preachers in the Ramadan delegations receive a special bonus of approximately 30,000 dirhams. A ministerial decree in 2012 made the amount official (Ministère des Habous et des Affaires Islamiques 2012), prompting one newspaper to criticize the policy as a “luxury Ramadan for expatriated imams” (Aujourd’hui le Maroc 2012). Nevertheless, these increases are in keeping with the substantial raises that the Makhzen has given to religious personnel over the last years as part of the reform of the religious field.
2.2 Visas and Preparation
Once selected, the Habous ministry organizes meetings in order to prepare the religious personnel for their time abroad. These sessions are frequently given by Moroccans with experience as associative religious actors in Western Europe, who prepare the religious personnel for their time abroad and provide each individual with an official mandate (ordre de mission) from the Moroccan state.
These standardized mandates are sent along with the normal visa application forms and serve as a guarantee of the official nature of the assignment. They include the name of the individual; the dates during which he or she will be abroad; the means of transport; and the location, while explaining that the individual is being sent abroad “for the religious supervision (encadrement religieux) of the Moroccan Community in [name of city/town].” The mandate is issued by the office of the prime minister and is signed by the secretary-general of the Habous ministry, and states that all charges will be covered by the ministry, which acts as the official guarantor. 2
Unlike Turkey and other states, Morocco only issues two kinds of passports: normal (green) and diplomatic (red). As a result, Moroccan religious personnel are subject to the same visa and travel requirements as any other Moroccan citizen and only the diplomatic personnel of the consulates and embassies travel with a different passport. Once the list of selected religious officials has been transmitted to the Moroccan foreign affairs and interior ministries, and assuming both have approved it, the foreign affairs ministry notifies the consulates and embassies of the receiving countries. The embassies receive an official note verbale, which includes the list of the imams and preachers being sent abroad, while the consulates concerned with processing the individual visa applications receive the formal mandates and visa applications as well (Interview, Habous Liaison Official I; Interview, Moroccan Foreign Affairs Ministry A, 15 June 2011, Rabat). The French embassy confirmed that after receiving the note verbale they transmit the information to the consulates so that there are no problems with the visas (Interview, French Embassy Morocco, 17 June 2011, Rabat).
At the level of the embassy, the French hold yearly meetings with members of the Habous ministry to ensure that the organizational details of the delegations sent abroad are established in advance. According to a French diplomat involved, “calling it a meeting is perhaps an exaggeration, but yes we do meet every year to deal with all the practical issues: who’s to be sent where, which consulate takes care of which person, mostly all with the goal that everything goes smoothly” (Interview, French Political Counsellor, 14 May 2012, Rabat). Within the embassy, it is usually the second counsellor who is responsible for overseeing the issue of imams sent abroad, given that it involves coordinating multiple consulates. The Habous ministry prepares its lists in advance according to the relevant consulate and informs French authorities of the religious officials’ itineraries once the airplane tickets have been bought (Interview, Habous Cabinet Member I). These details demonstrate that the level of confidence and coordination between French and Moroccan authorities are impressively high. Furthermore, it is another example that interstate cooperation concerning religious personnel sent abroad has become such a routine procedure that the actors involved primarily consider it a technical and administrative issue.
Interestingly, when the note verbale arrives at the German embassy in Rabat, I was told that officials are always uncertain as to whether it should end up on the desk of the political counsellor or the cultural counsellor, so copies are given to both. The visa applications are dealt with at the level of the consular services, and the procedure is rather straightforward, considering that there is no special status and the imams receive normal tourist visas that allow them to stay for the month of Ramadan. During my interview with one diplomat, the procedure was described as so well established that “there’s not much to do”; the only problem mentioned was one year when the imams seemed a little too young, but otherwise “everything is quite trouble-free” (Interview, German Embassy Morocco , 6 June 2011, Rabat).
The dispassionate and nonchalant perspective presented by this last diplomat in many ways encapsulates the entire process. First, the confusion as to who should receive the list of religious personnel reflects the systems of partial governance in Germany and France , since religious affairs are only understood by the state through another policy domain for which it already has pre-established administrative categories. In this case, religious affairs fall on the line between cultural and political affairs, each of which comes with its own potential slant. Second, the esoteric aura of religious governance completely disappears for the actors involved: the entire process of sending imams abroad can be translated into practical administrative terms in which religion need not even be mentioned. These imams and preachers are simply state officials with a formal mandate sent abroad in order to accomplish a specific task.
According to my French, German, and Moroccan interlocutors, there is practically never any trouble concerning the religious personnel sent abroad. Quite to the contrary, there is an impressive degree of cooperation and confidence between these state partners: “it’s between friends, between partners. France counts a lot for Morocco and Morocco counts a lot for France. […] There’s a relation of fraternity, there’s history” (Interview, Habous Cabinet Minister). This is seconded at the French embassy, where the sending of religious personnel abroad for Ramadan is in fact “something that we encourage, because it’s an important period and Moroccan Islam, Maliki Islam , is very tolerant. It’s better for us that there’s supervision (encadrement) with competent and reliable individuals. So it’s cooperation, and it’s been going very well, the sending of imams” (Interview, French Embassy Morocco). The relationship of trust is so well established that French and German authorities know that they can depend on the Moroccan state to vet and scrutinize its own religious personnel. As one German diplomat stated, “the king has no interest that there be any problems here; you won’t find any hatemongers (Haßprediger) in their ranks” (Interview, German Embassy Morocco).
Despite this generally rosy picture, on occasion Morocco has been accused of interfering in local affairs in Western European countries, which has had an impact on the sending of religious personnel. This has more so been the case with the Netherlands, which has perceived Moroccan diaspora policies as an obstacle to the integration of Dutch Moroccans (de Haas 2009). In one such instance, one month and a half before Ramadan in 2008, numerous members of the Dutch lower house came out “fiercely against imams from Morocco” (Groen 2008). One Labour representative stated that Morocco’s “paternalistic behaviour must stop,” while a Socialist parliamentarian denounced “the long arm of the Moroccan king,” and others joined in “rejecting Morocco’s offer of seven imams” (Volkskrant 2008). This occurred in the midst of a tense debate on dual citizenship in the country. A similar case occurred in Spain in 2011, when the newspaper El País reported that Spanish intelligence services had sent out a confidential memo to the interior, foreign affairs, and defence ministers, stating that Morocco was using Islam in order to influence and control its citizens abroad (Cembrero 2011).
In the case of the Netherlands , regardless of the disapproval of Dutch legislators, according to Habous ministry reports five Qur’an readers and two preachers were nevertheless sent for Ramadan in 2008. On the other hand, three years later there was a sudden change: from 13 religious officials sent in 2010, this suddenly dropped to zero in 2011. The following year, the number rose once again to 20 imams and preachers. The difficulties that occurred concerning the sending of religious personnel to the Netherlands during Ramadan in 2011 were explained during the interviews as having had nothing to do with the kind of political declarations mentioned above. The Habous liaison official and the cabinet member both followed the issue personally and highlighted that there had been no political problems, only administrative misunderstandings. Despite allegations that it had been due to “some kind of stance adopted [by the Dutch],” my interviewees were adamant that “no no, there’s no such position. Our relations are very good” (Interview, Habous Cabinet Member I). It is equally likely that Dutch officials tacitly permitted these bureaucratic difficulties to obstruct the sending of Moroccan imams, essentially taking advantage of partial governance as an excuse.
The framework in which these difficulties arose once again draws attention to the systems of partial religious governance of Western European countries. Ironically, while efforts to nationalize Islam in Western European countries stall because state officials cannot decide which Muslim association constitutes a representative interlocutor, Habous ministry officials never know with whom to speak in receiving states, “simply because there’s no Ministry of Habous, or because there’s the separation of church and state.” They are forced to understand the particularities of each system, whether “it’s either a department in the [interior] ministry that handles it, or in the justice ministry, and every country has its own tradition in the management of this issue. It’s not easy. And us, from here, we have to understand everything. […] That’s our daily bread” (Interview, Habous Cabinet Member I).
In the case of Morocco ’s delegations of preachers and imams during Ramadan, the international state system appears as a series of relatively complicated administrative procedures, which, if not properly respected, result in refused visas. This technocratic perspective explains perhaps why politicized readings of events are so readily dismissed by members of the religious bureaucracy, who focus on the details of visa and immigration policies. Nevertheless, the formal mandates the religious officials submit along with their applications clearly set them apart from other non-state actors in the transnational religious field. Moreover, the cases mentioned above show that the politicization of these religious activities abroad by foreign politicians or receiving state governments is also tied to the perspective that they adopt: namely either considering these delegations as promoting a tolerant, non-radical Islam (as in France and Germany), or viewing them as an obstacle to integration and social cohesion (as in the Netherlands).
2.3 Destinations
The delegations of imams and preachers sent abroad for Ramadan are all sent to serve Moroccans living abroad. Unlike Turkey, which dispatches imams to Central Asia, the Caucasus, and the Balkans, Morocco does not send religious personnel to help in providing religious services to non-Moroccan populations, even though it does finance mosques and train imams for a number of Western African countries. The largest number of Moroccan imams and preachers are sent to France, where the largest number of Moroccans living abroad resides. Despite an extraordinary rise in the number of Moroccans living in Spain and Italy over the last twenty years, France still represents the most important country of Moroccan emigration in the world.
Moroccan Religious Personnel and Moroccans in Western Europe 2012
(Note The figure shows the combined total of the Ramadan delegations sent by the Habous ministry and the Hassan II Foundation. Source Ministère des Habous et des Affaires Islamiques 2017, Fondation Hassan II 2017, National Statistics Agencies. ©Benjamin Bruce 2018. With Cartes et Données and Illustrator CS5)
On the other hand, the growth of the Moroccan population in Italy and Spain has been reflected in the constant increase in the size of the delegations sent to these countries since 2008. In contrast, the number of imams sent to countries where Moroccans have been established for a longer period of time (Belgium, the Netherlands , and Germany) has risen at a slower rate or even decreased. In the case of France, the ministry’s delegation has increased from “around 60” individuals during the early 2000s to 156 imams and preachers in 2017 (Ministère des Habous et des Affaires Islamiques 2017). Other than Western Europe, Moroccans are present in many other countries across the globe; however, the only non-European countries to which the Habous ministry and the FHII send religious personnel are Canada and the USA in North America and Ghana, Senegal, and Ivory Coast in Africa.
The geographic destinations of religious officials sent abroad during Ramadan reflect the fact that this policy is aimed towards the Moroccan diaspora. The size of these delegations has adapted to the changing migration patterns of recent years while also revealing an across-the-board rise and now concerns over 500 imams, preachers, and professors sent around the world. Consequently, this operation requires an important degree of coordination and organization, which in France and Germany is assumed by the local consulates and the main Moroccan religious associations.
2.4 Organization of the Stay Abroad
The religious personnel sent by Morocco generally arrive directly in the region where they are to officiate and are supervised by the local Moroccan consulate, more specifically the social affairs counsellor. The social affairs counsellor oversees a broad range of issues concerning Moroccans abroad that are administratively divided into social, cultural, and religious activities. 3
Social activities are relatively extensive and can include organizing the repatriation of deceased citizens to Morocco for burial; helping Moroccan couples who are having problems in their relationship or with their children; visiting Moroccan prisoners in local jails, or patients in local hospitals; or accompanying Moroccans who are due to be deported from the country. Cultural activities include the organization of summer camps in Morocco, or the coordination of Arabic language programmes with teachers sent from Morocco, both of which are paid for by the FHII. Finally, religious activities primarily refer to the coordination of imams and preachers sent for Ramadan, but include as well the distribution of Qur’ans sent from Morocco and the processing of Saudi Arabian visas for the pilgrimage to Mecca. In the case of Turkey, all these religious activities are the responsibility of the religious counsellors and attachés, demonstrating once again the clear structural differences between both states in the organization of religious activities abroad.
When the imams and preachers arrive during Ramadan, they receive their assignment and schedule from the social affairs counsellors. The counsellors have lists of all the Moroccan mosques and religious associations located in the geographic region covered by their consulate, along with the names of the association presidents and their contact information. For instance, I was shown one such list during my visit to the consulate in Düsseldorf, which included all the Moroccan mosques in contact with the consulate in the state of North Rhine-Westphalia . As the head of religious affairs at the Moroccan embassy in Paris mentioned, “the social affairs attaché, he’s the one who deals with religious affairs. Because he manages all the Moroccan associations. Including the religious ones, the ones that manage the mosques. It’s within this framework” (Interview, Moroccan Religious Counsellor).
The social affairs counsellors draw up reports on religious officials they coordinate, but far beyond spreading extremism or hindering integration, one of the chief concerns is that the imam may spend his time sightseeing: “I mean, we don’t send them over there for tourism! There are cases, you know […] there’s the imam you send who gives one class a week, and the other who gives a class every day.” My interviewee, who was consul-general and department head during his 23-year career at the foreign affairs ministry prior to joining the MCMRE , describes the reports written by the consulates about the imams as “more of a confirmation of their presence, saying that Mr. X was there, when he started his service, so that he deserves the [financial] bonus.” They are not reports “on his activities or if he’s worked well or on the content of his talks,” which the consulate usually knows thanks to direct communication with communities: “they can tell you and of course, you can see it in the requests the year after: ‘we want this imam, we don’t want that one’” (Interview, Head of Cabinet MCMRE). Consequently, the feedback the consulate receives from the mosque associations can have an impact on the composition of future delegations. Finally, once the religious officials have fulfilled their mission and returned to Morocco , at the bottom-right of their formal mandates “there’s a little corner for the finance ministry, [which] signs and stamps the documents once the assignment has been completed” so they can receive their bonuses (Interview, Habous Liaison Officer I).
This describes the standard procedure for religious officials sent abroad during Ramadan from Morocco . Given the short period of time they spend abroad, these imams and preachers are generally only in contact with members of the local mosque associations and the consular services of the Moroccan foreign affairs ministry and thus are infrequently in contact with French or German authorities. Indeed, there is no reason for any such contact, given that they all have already received their visas before arriving and do not stay longer than their assignment requires.
However, there have been several significant changes since 2008. The Habous ministry has strengthened its partnership with specific religious associations in each country, which has been cemented by the financial donations it provides every year. This has been the case of the Rally in France (replaced by the Union of French Mosques in 2013), the Central Council of Moroccans in Germany, and the Union of Islamic Cultural Centres of Catalonia in Spain. On the one hand, the Habous ministry has come to hold a more central role in the sending of religious personnel abroad in Morocco when compared with other ministries and institutions. On the other hand, its partner associations in foreign countries have begun to take on the tasks carried out in the past by the social affairs counsellors of the consulates concerning the organization and supervision of the Ramadan delegations. These developments have occurred within the general framework of the reform of the religious field, and have been accompanied by the sending of 30 long-term imams to France, the founding of the CEOM in Brussels, and a greater degree of Moroccan state involvement in the funding of mosques and religious associations abroad, which I will consider in Chapter 7.
2.5 Organizational Support: Studies and Reports
Organizational support represents a policy instrument that allows home state institutions to structure the inner workings of Islamic associations in the French and German Muslim fields. Its main techniques include symbolic actions that reinforce ties to home state actors and institutions and the production of specialized knowledge concerning the Muslim field abroad. In turn, each of these techniques is manifested through tools such as visits by state officials to mosques abroad and the writing of studies and reports on religious affairs abroad.
Whereas the Diyanet has directly extended its institutional framework abroad, the Habous ministry has employed a more diffuse logic, relying instead on co-optation and the establishment of variable alliances. Though the amicales may no longer occupy the central place they used to, the strategy employed by the ministry in the organization of religious activities abroad has followed a similar pattern. The Moroccan state’s organizational model abroad continues to rely in part on the foreign affairs ministry , in the form of high-ranking diplomats and consular employees, and on the other hand, on Muslim associations with which the ministry cooperates in France , Germany , and elsewhere in Western Europe. The explanation for this indirect approach when compared with Turkey is twofold: first, the Moroccan state’s historical tendency to co-opt religious actors; and second, its use of another policy instrument that Turkish authorities do not have at their disposal: direct financial support.
In terms of symbolic visits, the Habous Minister Ahmed Toufiq has been present at the opening ceremonies of large mosques in France that have been largely paid for by Morocco , such as the Great Mosques of Saint-Étienne and Strasbourg in 2012. The Habous cabinet member in charge of Moroccans abroad also regularly visits Moroccan Muslim associations in Western Europe, while other employees have travelled abroad to accompany preachers or promote cooperation with local associations. Several of these individuals have prior experience in Western European Muslim fields, similar to the case of Abdellah Boussouf , who as secretary-general of the Council for the Moroccan Community Abroad (CCME) has been instrumental in organizing a series of conferences on Islam in Europe, which were held in Strasbourg in 2010 and in Fez and Casablanca the years before.
Once again contrary to the Turkish case, a glance at the Rally conferences of the last years reveals few Habous ministry members, though two other sets of actors stand out: on the one hand, diplomats such as the local Moroccan consul-general; and on the other hand, a select group of reciters and preachers such as Belmadani, El Kamali, and El Kouchi, who are linked to regional ulema councils and important mosques in Morocco , along with members of the CEOM , such as Amine Nejdi from France and Tahar Toujgani from Belgium. Similar constellations appear during public events, such as the iftar offered by the Moroccan embassy and the CEOM in Belgium in 2012, or the reception held for Moroccan Ramadan imams sent to France in 2014, which took place at the Évry mosque.
In terms of producing institutionalized knowledge on the Muslim field abroad, the main state publications are the annual activity reports of the Habous ministry. These reports are in Arabic and have been made available online going back to 2004. A special subheading in the report outlines the main activities regarding “Cooperation with the Moroccan Community Abroad,” and generally gives an overview of the participation of ministry representatives in events abroad, along with other activities such as the distribution of religious publications. At times, the reports include information on the composition and size of the Ramadan delegations, while in later years precise figures are given on the financial aid provided to Muslim associations (for an example, see Chapter 7). Moroccan theologians and religious bureaucrats have also been involved in international academic events, such as a conference held at Princeton University in 2007 on “The Many Ways of Being Muslim.” During this conference, the Habous ministry’s director of Islamic affairs and the president of the Ulema League both gave talks, while a Moroccan murshidat was the closing speaker (Princeton University 2007).
Other institutions have equally been involved in the production of specialized knowledge, such as the FHII, which has its own internal reports concerning the religious officials it sends abroad, as well as an academic publication on the diaspora called Marocains de l’extérieur that is published in coordination with the International Organization for Migrations (IOM). The CCME also has a working group on “religions and religious education” and has organized three large conferences , each of which resulted in a publication representing a who’s who of scholars, public figures, and religious association leaders involved in Moroccan religious affairs in Western European countries. According to the secretary-general, the CCME’s vision has been to promote dialogue between “three categories of actors: Muslim actors who on are the ground, political or public officials, and academics,” because “we have an interest in working together” (Interview, CCME Secretary-General). In addition, the CCME has commissioned a study on Moroccans living in six European countries (France , Spain, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands , and Germany ) and their transnational relations in 2009 and another survey more focused on Moroccan youth abroad in 2010.
The creation of the CEOM in 2008 and the increasing delegation of authority to associations abroad are signs of a new approach in the Moroccan state’s religious diaspora policy . This development has benefitted from the institutionalized knowledge produced by Moroccan institutions as well as the networks that diplomatic actors have established between state authorities and associative actors in part thanks to the sending of Ramadan delegations overseas. Nevertheless, despite the importance of both organizational support and the sending of imams, the main instrument by which King Mohammed VI and the Habous ministry have influenced the transnational Muslim field in recent years has been financial. The monetary support provided by the ministry for mosques and Muslim associations abroad constitutes the most visible manifestation of state religious policy in the transnational Muslim field and will be discussed further in the next chapter.
3 Turkey
3.1 Categories and Selection
Turkey’s religious personnel abroad can be divided along three axes: length of stay (short term vs. long term); hierarchical position (imam hatip; coordinator imam; attaché; counsellor); and geographical region. Unlike Morocco , the Turkish state does not provide direct funding to mosques; on the other hand, the Diyanet has a far more organized and extensive programme when it comes to its religious personnel abroad.
Short-term delegations are sent by Turkey for two major events: Ramadan and Kutlu Doğum Haftası (Holy Birth Week), the latter of which is known as Mawlid in Arabic and celebrates of the birth of the Prophet Mohammed. For Ramadan, the needs are the same as in the Moroccan case: imam hatips; a group of preachers; and cooks, who help prepare the iftar. On the other hand, Mawlid is a holiday that demonstrates both national divergence in Islamic traditions as well as the influence of state religious institutions. While it is an official holiday in Morocco , Turkey is the only country to celebrate a week of festivities, which Yaşar attributes to an idea of the Turkey Diyanet Foundation (TDV). In this sense, the creation of a “new Islamic tradition through the Diyanet Foundation, its adoption by the Diyanet and its spread across the world through the Diyanet’s organizations abroad, illustrate how influential the Diyanet network can be” (Yaşar 2012, 44).
Alongside the religious personnel sent abroad for Ramadan and Mawlid, there is another type of temporary religious personnel that is designated as “short-term” in the Diyanet’s reports in contrast to the “long-term” religious officials who constitute the bulk of the Turkish state’s religious personnel abroad. These short-term imams are sent to compensate for temporary shortages in specific countries. However, in some contexts, they can also represent a technique by which the Diyanet manages to bypass the official limits imposed by receiving states on the number of imams. This is especially the case in France, where the number of long-term Diyanet imams has been capped by a quota.
These short-term imams enter the country with a “special” passport, thanks to which they can automatically receive an entry visa without having to apply from Turkey. 4 However, they must leave the country every few months and re-enter in order to receive a new visa, leading to their frequent moniker “three-month-imams” (Drei-Monats-Imame) in Germany. French authorities have been keen on putting an end to this practice, which they explicitly mention in an agreement signed with Turkey in 2010. Irrespective of French demands, Turkish religious authorities themselves have planned to substantially decrease the number of these short-term imams and eventually do away with the position (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı 2012b). Nevertheless, during a visit to a mosque that had recently changed from Milli Görüş to DITIB in the French city of Montfermeil , I was informed that the quota was the reason why no long-term imam had yet been appointed. Instead, the mosque community had to content itself with an imam who had to leave the country every three months (Interview, DITIB Kuba Mosque, 29 May 2014, Montfermeil). Consequently, it may be difficult for the Diyanet to achieve its goal of phasing out its short-term imams if the demands for long-term imams continue to grow while the quota system in France remains in place.
The Diyanet’s personnel abroad is divided into the following categories: the counsellors and the attachés, who serve for four years abroad; “long-term religious officials” (uzun süreli din görevlisi), who stay for four or five years depending on the country; “short-term religious officials” (kısa süreli din görevlisi), who stay abroad for a total of two years; and those sent for Ramadan and Kurban Bayramı (Eid al-Adha). Between 2002 and 2013, long-term religious officials represented the lion’s share of the Diyanet’s personnel serving abroad at 41.7%, while very few of them were women: only 132 individuals, or 3.5% of the total (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı 2014). The number of long-term imams has continued to grow since they were first sent abroad at the end of the 1970s, reaching approximately 1500 individuals today. The religious officials all serve in mosques affiliated with the DITIB or Diyanet Foundation organizations and are supervised by the religious services attaché (din hizmetleri ataşesi) at the Turkish consulate. The attachés are themselves overseen by the religious services counsellor (din hizmetleri müşaviri), who represents the top religious authority abroad and is a member of the Turkish embassy.
As mentioned, none of these individuals are diplomats: they are members of the Diyanet who have been officially sent to foreign countries for the purpose of providing religious services to the community abroad. Conversely, since the attachés and the counsellor are appointed to serve in Turkish consulates and embassies, they are considered to be covered by the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic (1961) and Consular (1963) relations. This means, for instance, that the Diyanet’s religious attachés and counsellors hold diplomatic (red) passports, have diplomatic licence plates on their official vehicle, and benefit from diplomatic or consular immunity (Interview, Turkish Religious Attaché, 17 March 2011, Düsseldorf). German authorities in particular have chafed against these diplomatic privileges for Diyanet religious counsellors since the latter are simultaneously at the head and thus legally responsible for the locally founded association DITIB. Since 2011, they have accordingly negotiated with Turkish authorities that the counsellors would receive a long-term multiple-entry visa and work permit, but “without diplomatic status” (Interview, German Foreign Affairs Ministry B, 30 October 2013, Paris/Berlin). Normal imams do not benefit from any kind of diplomatic immunity and do not hold diplomatic passports, but as state employees working abroad hold either green (special) passports or grey (service) passports. The former grant more travel privileges than the latter and are given to public servants with a higher grade in the state administration.
Attachés and counsellors receive their salaries directly from the ministry they represent given that they are appointed as ministry representatives in the consulates and embassies. Conversely, religious officials receive their salaries from the foreign affairs ministry, because they are state employees appointed to serve the diaspora in foreign countries, “and providing services to Turkish citizens abroad is a duty of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, not the Diyanet” (Interview, Turkish Embassy Germany, 7 April 2011, Berlin ). During the conversation, my interlocutor emphasized in particular the word “service” (hizmet) and the idea that Islamic affairs constitute a public service. According to this perspective, the imam officiating in a mosque is providing a service to citizens in the same way as a Turkish language teacher or a consular employee issuing a passport (more examples used by the same diplomat). Considering that these public services overseas all fall under the purview of the foreign affairs ministry, it is a logical consequence for my diplomatic sources that imams sent abroad should also be included in the foreign affairs ministry’s general budget.
Similarly, a diplomat at the Turkish embassy in France explained that the foreign affairs ministry pays the salaries of imams, teachers, and even police officers, who become “for a more or less set period of time, employees of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,” though “administratively speaking, they are of course tied to their counsellor, and the counsellor is tied to us” (Interview, Turkish Embassy France, 20 October 2011, Paris ). The overarching framework of laws, directives, and practices here all show that the Turkish state’s treatment of religion as a public service cannot simply be brushed away as discursive camouflage. No matter the political interests that may be involved, this conception of religious services is the result of a complex process of administrative rationalization.
The salary paid by the foreign affairs ministry represents a separate allowance that the religious officials are granted in addition to their regular salary, which they continue to receive in Turkey during their time abroad. The prospect of receiving a double salary has long been held to explain the interest of the Diyanet’s religious personnel for serving in foreign countries, especially during the 1980s and 1990s, when the Turkish economy was frequently unstable. During these years, many Diyanet imams decided not to return to Turkey after finishing their time abroad, at which point a large number were recuperated by the Milli Görüş network.
However, since the beginning of the 2000s, the Turkish economy has experienced unprecedented growth, which has had an impact on the motivations of Diyanet imams for serving abroad. While the financial benefits involved are by no means negligible, the imams with whom I spoke during my fieldwork emphasized other factors, such as the possibility to continue their education in foreign institutions or the desire to travel and experience new cultures. One Diyanet imam in Canada pointed out to me that the extra pay allowance in North America is lower than in Western European countries, but that he had turned down a possibility in Cologne because he and his family had wanted to be in a multicultural country where the local Turkish community was more educated. Moreover, he had preferred a country where the main language was English and had thus applied for Canada while thinking of the potential opportunities for his two children—one of whom had been accepted to a prominent Canadian university (Interview, Diyanet Imam Z, 18 April 2014, Toronto). Consequently, the motivations of Diyanet imams for going abroad reflect a broad spectrum of financial, professional, and personal reasons.
Salaries for Turkish imams are standardized along the same lines as other state employees sent abroad. Turkish religious officials sent to France or Germany (or any other Eurozone country) receive 1875 euros per month, paid by the foreign affairs ministry, on top of all initial and final travel costs. There are slight variations for other countries: for instance, 2000 US dollars for the USA, and 1500 pounds for the UK. The most frequent comparison, as in the case of Morocco , is with teachers. Teachers have been sent abroad by the education ministries of Turkey, Morocco, and numerous other countries for just as long as imams have. Their task has been to teach language and culture courses to the children of immigrant families in Western European countries, and the procedure concerning their entry and stay is in many respects the same as that for religious personnel. Indeed, culture and religion become intimately entwined at this juncture. For the FHII, sending teachers and sending religious personnel abroad are both filed under “cultural promotion” (Fondation Hassan II, n.d.), while the social affairs attachés at the Moroccan consulates are responsible for overseeing both religious personnel and teachers.
In Turkey, a cabinet decision in 2003 set out the legal and administrative framework for all personnel sent abroad with the goal of “making known, spreading, and protecting Turkish culture abroad, and protecting the cultural ties of our citizens and kin (soydaşlarımız)” (Türkiye Cumhuriyeti 2003). The decision established the salaries mentioned above along with many other work-related details and also established an interministerial commission called the Ortak Kültür Komisyonu (Joint Culture Commission, OKK). The OKK brings together representatives from the finance, education, culture, and tourism ministries, as well as from the Diyanet, and makes the final decisions regarding all religious personnel and teachers who apply for a long-term appointment abroad.
The selection process is extensive. It comprises an initial written examination, followed by an interview in person with a committee put together by the Diyanet’s Directorate for Turks Abroad. Those who are successful after this stage go on to a final oral interview with the OKK, though once the Diyanet has given its approval there is rarely an objection from the other ministries. The written examination includes questions on other religions, especially Christianity; questions for “religious professionals,” such on the Qur’an, hadith, tafsir, and fiqh; and “general knowledge,” including Turkish, Ottoman, and European history, as well as geography, psychology, and sociology. The interest amongst the Diyanet’s personnel for serving abroad is extremely high: during the examinations held in 2011, between 15,000 and 20,000 applications were received, and close to 4000 individuals were accepted for the interview stage. Candidates must be university graduates, explaining why the education level of religious personal abroad is much higher than the average for Diyanet employees. The entire process from application to selection and departure abroad takes between one and one and a half years and constitutes a major part of the work carried out by the Directorate for Turks Abroad (Interview, Diyanet Director Turks Abroad I, 11 November 2011, Ankara).
Diyanet Religious Personnel Abroad, 1979–2014
(Sources Aydın 2003; Başaran 2006; Bas et al. 2003; Bengin 1983; Bildirici 2005; Çakır and Bozan 2005; den Exter 1990; Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı 2008, 2009, 2010a, b, 2011a, 2012a, b, 2013; Gibbon forthcoming; Kalemli 1995; Karakaşoğlu 1994; Karaman 2004; Landman 1997; Manço 1997; Pedersen 1999; Tavukçuoğlu 1992; Yılmaz 2006. Elaborated by author)
3.2 Visas and Preparation
When it comes to international administrative procedures, the foreign affairs department of the Diyanet is just as much an expert as its counterparts at the Habous ministry, if not more so. The vast majority of the Diyanet’s religious personnel stay abroad for a period of four to five years, where they are supervised by the directorate for Turks abroad, which is responsible for “all official procedures during the period of time that [religious officials] are [abroad]: the payment of salaries, health expenditures, et cetera; all issues concerning personal benefits” (Interview, Diyanet Director Turks Abroad I). Despite the decades of experiences that the Diyanet and its foreign counterparts have in this domain, these practical issues can still be at the origin of difficulties faced by the imams and preachers on the ground.
The Presidency for Religious Affairs intends to appoint the following individual, whose personal and professional information is indicated below, as a religious official (imam) under the supervision of (the religious affairs attaché of) the Turkish Consulate in [name of city].
It includes the name of the imam; his total length of stay (four years in the case of France, five years for Germany); the name, location, and contact information of the association to which he is assigned; and the amount of his salary—both in Turkey and the extra allowance for serving abroad. The only aspect that breaks with the dry administrative language used is the addition of the word “imam” or “imam hatip” after the more formal “religious official” (din görevlisi / Religionsbeauftragter / fonctionnaire religieux). The letter also confirms that the Diyanet will cover all health care costs and that the local religious association will provide housing for the imam (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı 2011b).
The formal letter and the visa application serve as symbols of transparency whereby the Diyanet indicates all the circumstances and conditions under which its employees will operate abroad. They also indicate the high level of trust that exists in Turkey’s interstate relations with the countries where it sends its religious personnel, while demonstrating how religious activities are structured within the framework of interstate relations and standardized at the level of the Diyanet’s foreign affairs department. The department’s experience in these matters is particularly visible in its awareness of country-specific details. For instance, not all states recognize the category “religious official” as that of a state employee, which is especially a problem in the case of France. As a result, a 2007 circular stated that since professional titles such as “religious official, imam hatip, müezzin-kayyım, müftü, preacher,” were not accepted by certain countries, the passports of religious officials going to France would indicate “Assistant of Social Affairs” as professional occupation (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı 2007). For Turkish authorities involved in the daily management of these details, French laïcité is not so much a philosophy of state–religion relations, but rather another administrative hoop to jump through in order to arrive at the same result.
The partial governance of religion in France and Germany means that the religious nature of the imams’ mission is not taken into account in either country’s administrative proceedings; for example, there is no special kind of visa for religious ministers, as there are in a number of other European countries (see Kraler 2007). Accordingly, the Diyanet’s long-term religious officials receive a “visitor” visa in France and a “national visa – Type D” in Germany. The French “visitor” visa is valid in the place of a residence permit (titre de séjour) for up to one year, after which a “visitor” residence permit can be requested from the local préfecture; however, the permit must be renewed on a yearly basis and its holder does not have the right to work in France. Jouanneau (2013) highlights that these disadvantages are in fact intentional, as French authorities consider that the precarious status of these permits helps in maintaining control over foreign imams and ensuring their “docility.”
In the case of Germany, the “national visa” is a 90-day visa, which is valid for employment in Germany, during which the imams must contact the immigration authorities of their place of residence in order to receive a long-term residency permit. Despite the relatively easier procedure for Germany, one interviewee at the Turkish foreign affairs ministry still criticized it as pointless, given that the imams “go for a clear period of time, and it’s certain that they will return. I mean, they’re not going to stay. In the end, [their time] might be extended one or two years but they’re coming back, that’s for sure” (Interview, Turkish Foreign Affairs Ministry, 10 November 2011, Ankara). Indeed, the probability of Turkish imams leaving the Diyanet and deciding to stay abroad after finishing their official service no longer seems to be an issue like it was in the past.
In recent years, the internal regulations concerning the length of stay for Diyanet long-term religious personnel were increased to five instead of four years abroad. This change has been accepted by Germany, the Netherlands, and others—but not France. For the main Diyanet official in the country, the reason is that the French government has been “very sensitive concerning immigration issues,” (Interview, Diyanet Religious Counsellor France, 19 October 2011, Paris ) and according to European Union (EU ) law, an individual who has lived for five years in an EU member country has the right to ask for a long-term residency card (Council of the European Union 2004). Here again, interests tied to a different policy domain—in this case, France’s restrictive immigration policy—are the primary explanations for a receiving state decision affecting the religious field.
The cooperation between the Diyanet and its French and German partners has developed in recent years to include a series of language and culture classes that are jointly organized with the German Goethe Institute , the Konrad Adenauer Foundation , and the Institut Français (French Cultural Institute). The Diyanet has its own training programme for religious officials before their departure, which lasts six months and is carried out in the Diyanet’s many training centres (eğitim merkezleri) in Turkey (Interview, Diyanet Foreign Affairs Director A, 17 March 2009, Ankara). However, since the beginning of the 2000s, it has also sought out help from foreign states to help prepare its personnel for their time abroad.
The German language courses at the Goethe Institute in Ankara began in 2002 and involve around 50–60 imams a year. The cultural programme includes five different units on the German educational system; practical issues of everyday life; state–religion relations; holidays; and intercultural training. Two of these units have been taught by a former migration consultant from Bremen, while the class on state–religion relations has been given by the diplomat at the German embassy who is responsible for interreligious dialogue. The vice-director of the Turkey division at the German foreign ministry highlighted this last aspect when I asked if there was a special process for the Diyanet imams’ visa requests, further stating “it’s of course a special group – not any normal tourist that wants a visa – but of course a group that is known and determined in advance, and where we also have an interest that they be well-prepared and able to take up their activities here [in Germany]” (Interview, German Foreign Affairs Ministry B).
Though originally an initiative of the Diyanet, these courses are actively supported by the German foreign affairs ministry , which shares the costs with the Diyanet. The satisfaction of the ministry is apparent in its publicity of the programme: it has been brought up in parliamentary reports on German’s “foreign cultural policies” and is the subject of an article on the ministry’s website in the section on “concrete dialogue with Islam” (Bundesrepublik Deutschland 2004). Both Turkish and German authorities have celebrated the programme as “an especially good example of bilateral cooperation,” and one of my interviewees stated that it was a “self-sustaining success” (Selbstläufer) (Interview, German Foreign Affairs Ministry A, 1 March 2011, Berlin ). Once the courses have been completed, the religious personnel appointed to Germany are often invited to the embassy for a reception.
Since 2006, the Goethe Institute programme has been complemented by a week of intensive seminars organized by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation , one of Germany’s largest political foundations tied to the centre-right Christian Democratic Union (CDU ). One of its main organizers explained that the idea originally arose when the secretary-general of the foundation was on a trip to Turkey and met with the Diyanet President Ali Bardakoğlu . The curriculum was prepared by a German academic, and the courses are given in Turkish by German Turks or Turks who have lived and studied in Germany (Interview, Konrad Adenauer Foundation Turkey, 14 November 2011, Ankara). The course covers a wide range of themes, from lifestyles and culture (including pictures of punks, Bavarians, and parties) to Islamic groups in Germany, which gives information on the demographics of German Muslims and the main Islamic organizations in Germany.
It also focuses on issues such as the recognition of Islam and the status of “corporation of public law ” (see Chapter 5) and includes a particular focus on Alevi groups. The Diyanet covers similar topics in its own training seminars, but many imams still arrive with preconceptions concerning the German state’s treatment of Muslims. In particular, “they see it all from Turkey ” in the sense that “for them there’s a Diyanet […] and why the counterpart of this authority [DITIB] isn’t accepted, why one has to struggle with other groups over there; that is sometimes hard to describe.” For many religious officials, it seems that Germany does not want to accept DITIB due to Islamophobia, though by the end “around 90 per cent understand why these problems arise” (Interview, Konrad Adenauer Foundation Turkey). The vision of these religious officials shows the other side of the coin: for them, every difficulty arising from structural differences in the German system of partial religious governance is a sign of prejudice.
The only other state that has similar programmes with the Diyanet is France , though its version is both smaller and more recent. The first agreement was signed between the French ambassador and the vice-president of the Diyanet in 2009. The initial group of 40 religious officials received language lessons as well as classes on French culture and civilization, while the costs were shared between the Diyanet and the French foreign affairs ministry . Smaller groups have also followed this programme in the years thereafter.
The main forum in which the details for visa procedures and these preparatory courses are discussed is bilateral consular meetings, which occur between state authorities on a yearly basis. As one Turkish diplomat explained, these meetings constitute a “roof, and in this framework, for example, we have a [meeting] on religious affairs, or education, or at another moment only on visa issues” (Interview, Turkish Embassy France). The bilateral consular meetings last numerous days and alternate between state capitals each year. They are led by the general directorate of consular affairs of each state’s foreign affairs ministry, but the composition of those involved changes with regard to the topic under discussion. This is because they touch on all aspects of bilateral consular relations: “tourism issues as well as family dramas, or questions on visa regimes. So it’s really something that goes far beyond the Diyanet, religious affairs, but it’s a point which is included” (Interview, French Embassy Turkey, 14 November 2011, Ankara).
Religious affairs at this stage are thus viewed in technical terms and within the framework of the agreements that have been officially or unofficially determined beforehand by higher political authorities. The former director of religious affairs abroad for the Diyanet, who was thereafter appointed religious affairs counsellor to Germany, explained that the delegations address the details of these agreements and any changes that may have arisen during the year; however, “[they] can’t regulate everything at once. […] They discuss and make suggestions, which are then reviewed by the authorities in both countries.” The Diyanet’s involvement in this process is generally peripheral, and religious affairs are only treated “when there is a need. It can also be that they are not discussed at all. If, however, there are questions or problems, then they are brought up and discussed within the framework of these talks.” In general, the Diyanet is informed in advance of the talks and is asked for its input: the foreign affairs ministry writes that the yearly consular talks with a given country are to take place and asks whether there are any subjects that the Diyanet would like addressed (Interview, Diyanet Religious Counsellor Germany, 28 September 2011, Cologne ).
This situation can change when there is an important issue to discuss, or a change to be made to a pre-existing agreement. For religious affairs, just like any other issue, the foreign affairs ministry determines which personnel is required so as to best address these questions and at times contacts the Diyanet to request that a representative be present. Nevertheless, this rarely occurs: during the seven years that my interlocutor served as the Diyanet’s foreign affairs director, he was invited only once to a meeting on renegotiating an agreement with France concerning the quota on long-term religious personnel. As most interviewees noted, the main details are already worked out in advance by higher-placed political figures, while other issues are handled directly by the Turkish foreign affairs ministry’s department for Turks living abroad.
Even if he [the counsellor] doesn’t know the technical details, there’s still a political sense in all this. […] If there’s a problem between a […] representative of a French institution and an imam, or an education counsellor, he will be the one who will listen – we have a political consensus on the issue in the end. […] So the point of his presence is to guide politically so that there are not too many technical disputes and also so that we can overcome the technical problems with a little political will. Because they exist, and if you look you can find technical problems everywhere. Sometimes you have to push. (Interview, Turkish Embassy France)
The difference between the management of “technical details” and the role of “political will” is brought up by French and German diplomats as well. This dichotomy provides an indication of how diplomats perceive the delimitation between political and routine administrative work not only in general, but also in particular with regard to the religious issues. It also suggests the possible limits of the Diyanet’s activity: while it can benefit from this political will, its policies can also suffer from a potential lack of political will. Indeed, it recalls the dubious explanation by the Habous ministry that “administrative misunderstandings” were the reason why no Ramadan imams had been sent to the Netherlands in 2011, and raises the question of why there had been no political will to resolve the problem.
The Turkish state’s bilateral talks parallel similar relations that Moroccan authorities maintain with foreign state representatives concerning their own religious personnel abroad. In both cases, interstate relations are intertwined to such an extent that religious affairs seem to have been reduced to a routine technical issue that simply requires bilateral administrative coordination. While reflecting a degree of pragmatism on the part of the French and German states, both of which are limited by partial governance, this development demonstrates how Morocco and Turkey have managed to export their models of religious governance abroad and institutionalize them within the scope of interstate relations.
3.3 Destinations
The vast majority of Turkish religious personnel sent abroad serve Turkish communities in Western Europe and in a few other select countries (Canada, Australia, the USA, and Japan). However, and unlike Morocco , the Diyanet has actively sent its religious personnel to dozens of other countries around the world for years, pursuing its vision of “being the most respected and active institution, consulted in all matters pertaining to the Islamic religion, in Turkey and in the world” (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı 2012d, 3).
The Diyanet has three main “foreign service regions” (yurt dışı hizmet bölgesi): the Turkish diaspora (Western Europe, “Overseas”); “kin and related societies” (the Balkans, the Caucasus, and Central Asia); and “other Muslim societies,” which in fact includes the rest of the world (Türkiye Cumhuriyeti 2013). Almost all long-term religious personnel are sent to Western Europe and the few “overseas” countries mentioned above; however, some are also sent to countries in the second group, such as Kazakhstan, Kirgizstan, Ukraine, Romania, and Azerbaijan. Ramadan imams are usually sent to Western Europe or the Balkans, with which Turkey has important historical ties and where there are still important Turkish-speaking populations, especially in Bulgaria and Greece.
The number of religious counsellors appointed to Turkish embassies worldwide fluctuates depending on the year, but in general they are to be found in around 20 different countries, divided approximately half and half between the “diaspora group” and “kinship group” countries. The consular attachés are almost all appointed to serve the community abroad in “diaspora” countries, and over half of them are in different cities in Germany, where they coordinate, organize, and supervise the religious services given by Diyanet imams in DITIB or Diyanet Foundation mosques.
By contrast, there are very few religious officials who are sent to “kin” countries, meaning that the work of the counsellors and attachés is directed towards other issues. Amongst the most important activities are promoting educational ties with Turkish theological faculties, especially by founding similar faculties at foreign universities and encouraging students to travel to Turkey to study theology and Islamic sciences. In addition, these counsellors are involved in coordinating the activities of the Turkish Diyanet Foundation, which has been very active in the creation of faculties abroad, as well as funding the construction of mosques. In this fashion, the Diyanet’s activities abroad—along with the support of the Turkish Diyanet Foundation—have been integrated as components of Turkish foreign policy.
The number of Diyanet imams in Western Europe has grown steadily over the years, and the largest delegations are to be found in Germany, France, and the Netherlands. Germany has by far the largest delegations, and Diyanet officials acknowledge that there is no problem regarding religious needs in Germany; the problem is rather with France, where the Diyanet cannot respond to requests from local mosque communities due to the quota imposed by the French officials. The rise in Diyanet personnel abroad is the result of policy decisions made by Turkish authorities, but these decisions are also in response to the requests of communities abroad. These requests for long-term religious officials (kadrolu din görevlisi) appear in a number of the Diyanet’s statistics and were notably indicated in a Turkish parliamentary report on the situation of Turks abroad in 2003.
The number of imams sent abroad depends on several factors: on the Turkish side, this includes the number of demands received; the budgetary means the Diyanet has at its disposal; and the internal quota limiting the number of Turkish state personnel abroad. However, once a decision is made to raise the number of imams abroad, this change requires the assent of receiving state authorities. It is precisely at this moment that the number of Diyanet imams can become a bargaining chip in interstate relations and the political interests behind diplomatic negotiations become more visible.
For instance, despite the French state’s generally favourable disposition to the religious officials of the Diyanet, its position nevertheless is strikingly different from that of Germany and other Western European countries. France is one of the rare states to have continually imposed a top quota on the number of Diyanet imams allowed in the country. The only other state to have done so is Switzerland, which for many years had set the limit at 20 imams. After a series of exchanges between Turkish and Swiss authorities, this quota was lifted in 2012 (Interview, Diyanet Director Turks Abroad II, 12 August 2014, Paris /Ankara). In contrast, according to a German foreign ministry official, the German state does not seem to have ever attempted to impose a limit on the number of Diyanet imams (Interview, German Foreign Affairs Ministry B). Rather, the issue is discussed during bilateral consular talks and the number of imams is adjusted in light of new demands.
Diyanet Imams and Turkish Population in Western Europe 2002–2003
(Source Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı 2015, National Statistics Agencies. ©Benjamin Bruce 2018. With Cartes et Données and Illustrator CS5)
Diyanet officials and Turkish politicians are aware of the difficulties imposed by the international circumstances. A 2011 presentation by the Diyanet’s head of foreign relations listed the Swiss and French quotas on religious officials as specific obstacles, along with problems involving residency permits (Paçacı 2011). This latter problem has been noted by Turkish authorities for some time: the aforementioned 2003 parliamentary report on Turks abroad emphasized the “difficulties” that had arisen following 9/11 in the USA and the “majority of countries to which religious officials are sent,” and highlighted the high monetary sums required to pay for visa extensions in countries like France, the Netherlands, and Australia (Baş et al. 2003). These difficulties have led the Turkish state to develop new strategies, especially focused on training and hiring Western European citizens of Turkish origin to serve as religious officials abroad.
3.4 Organization of the Stay Abroad
Once the Diyanet’s religious officials arrive abroad, the relations that they have with local French or German authorities depend on the type of role they are to fulfill. For the short-term and temporary personnel who arrive with a three-month visitor or tourist visa, there is no need for any further administrative formalities: either they are not staying long enough to warrant it or they are intentionally flying low under the radar, leaving and returning every three months so as to circumvent an existing quota policy.
For long-term imams, their next step is to obtain their residency permit (titre de séjour in France, Aufenthaltstitel in Germany). In Germany, there are generally very few problems concerning this aspect. The question of the residency permit, as well as other details such as the permitted length of stay in the country and the number of imams, is all determined in advance by the exchange of official letters (Briefwechsel) between German and Turkish authorities. The information submitted for the visa is thus sufficient to receive a residency permit in Germany (Interview, Diyanet Religious Counsellor Germany). Indeed, considering that the “national visa – type D” they receive gives them the right to work, it is usually a fairly straightforward procedure whereby they “contact the foreigner authorities (Ausländerbehörde) at their place of residence, and then receive a residency permit for the length of their stay” (Interview, German Foreign Affairs Ministry B).
If ever there are problems, the Turkish consulate is able to provide help. According to the consul-general in Berlin , “in case there is a problem with a visa, of course we know some people […] in Germany, we write a letter to seek advice or facilitation. Usually they respond positively, so far so good” (Interview, Turkish Consul-General, 22 March 2011, Berlin ). Even if the problem concerns a simple technicality, it goes without saying that the support of the Turkish consulate is not something that every imam in Germany can count on. This cooperation between state authorities is rather unsurprising if the situation is considered from the perspective of public servants being sent on an assignment abroad by a foreign state. However, an analysis of the German Muslim field comparing the situation of other imams in Germany, along with the main non-state Muslim organizations that employ them, highlights instead how DITIB benefits from a degree of diplomatic support that no other association could even imagine. The DITIB espionage affair that began in 2016 (see Chapter 7) has similarly demonstrated this advantage, despite occurring in a moment of deteriorating German-Turkish relations. By contrast, several groups such as the Süleymancılar and the Alevis have increasingly taken to employing religious personnel who are German citizens or who hold permanent residency cards, in stark opposition to DITIB imams who overwhelmingly hold temporary residency permits (Halm et al. 2012).
In recent years, imams have become a focal point in German media, academia, and policy studies. They have come to be seen as “multipliers” (Multiplikator), in the sense of public figures whose opinions and views can have a broad influence over different sectors of society. As a result, the Goethe Institute in Germany began a series of integration and language courses for DITIB imams (i.e. Diyanet imams) called “Imams for Integration” in November 2009, which continued until December 2012 (Degener 2013). The programme was organized with the backing of the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF), which is under the supervision of the German interior ministry. When I confused this project with that of the German foreign ministry in Turkey during an interview with an interior ministry official, he immediately corrected me and proudly pointed out that it was an “in-house programme” (Interview, German Interior Ministry). “Imams for Integration” is perhaps the largest and most prominent example of many projects that are run by associations, foundations, and municipalities with the goal of better “integrating” foreign imams—whether by improving their linguistic capacity or their general knowledge of the country. It is also another telling example of the generally favourable and welcoming stance adopted by German authorities vis-à-vis DITIB and imams sent by the Diyanet. Indeed, there are no imams affiliated to any other Muslim associations in Germany that benefit from the language and culture classes organized by German and Turkish authorities in both countries.
In France , the problems frequently occur at the level of the préfecture. In a country known for the centralization of state power, the relative independence of this level of government is surprising. Moreover, the state policy of laïcité can give way to confusion for the public servants involved. Jouanneau (2013) shows how different préfecture members responsible for relations with the Regional Councils for the Muslim Faith (CRCMs) were unsure of the limits of their actions. In many cases, this uncertainty led to differing and inconsistent interpretations of state–religion relations in their dealings with Muslim associations.
One domain in which these difficulties are visible is that of the Diyanet’s long-term imams and their residency permits. In my interview with the French DITIB president and Turkish religious counsellor, he gave voice to the dissatisfaction of Turkish authorities concerning the treatment the religious officials receive, “as if they were any ordinary citizen.” Moreover, he emphasized the constant variability concerning the granting of residency permits, which “changes from préfecture to préfecture” and at times was resolved quickly while in other moments led to problems. The counsellor brought up the international level to underscore his frustration, stating: “whether you like it or not there’s an agreement with the French government that entitles [our officials] to come here. We have the right. Our organizations provide [French authorities] with the information that they desire” (Interview, Diyanet Religious Counsellor France).
In the interview, the Diyanet official criticized the poor coordination between French central authorities and the local level; however, a French préfecture official explained to me that although the interior ministry may be able to conclude such agreements, there is no predetermined number of imams that must be accepted by each préfecture. The question of foreigners’ rights is entirely within the competency of the prefect, and there is nothing that obligates them to issue residency permits for the Diyanet’s imams. As a result, the préfectures have a certain room to manoeuvre vis-à-vis the interior ministry (Interview, French Interior Ministry Z, 7 April 2014, Paris ).
The main problem raised by the préfectures usually concerns the imams’ work contracts, given that they are not paid by the local DITIB associations but rather the Turkish foreign ministry, while the Diyanet covers their welfare benefits. As a result, the situation of these imams remains legally “a mess,” and there is “not enough political pressure or will for anything to change, to facilitate things for these imams.” Nevertheless, the explanation for the imams’ complicated situation is not limited to bureaucratic misunderstandings. The “grey zone” of “legal uncertainty” in which these imams find themselves is in fact a “means of exerting pressure” (Interview, French Interior Ministry Z). Indeed, if for some reason French authorities are looking to expel an imam, it is much easier to catch the individual on a technical detail concerning his visa or residency permit than to prove that he constitutes a danger to public security, which requires a much longer and more complicated procedure.
For the official with whom I spoke, these examples are another reflection of how the logic of national security interests determines how Islam is managed in France. It also displays the more cautious position taken by French authorities compared with Germany or other Western European states. For Turkish authorities, this attitude is a continual source of irritation, as they are aware that “[French] security forces and similar agencies, the intelligence agencies, they collect information on this subject” and if they find nothing negative, “there is no sense in [revising] the issue over and over again” (Interview, Turkish Religious Counsellor France). In fact, Turkish authorities emphasize that if there are any difficulties with an imam, France can rely on them to take care of the problem: “the [imams] in the associations tied to Diyanet […] – if they do anything wrong, we carry out an investigation. If it comes to them needing to return to Turkey, they go back, and we let French authorities know of this by means of our ambassador” (Interview, Turkish Religious Counsellor France).
French authorities are well aware of this level of control and know that they can make use of it if need be. During an interview at the interior ministry’s Central Office for Religions (BCC), I was told the story of a Diyanet imam close to the Nakshibendi order who had been holding “troubling” sermons in his mosques. Once the BCC had been informed and decided to take action, it had no need to take any legal action of its own: it was enough to speak with the Diyanet’s religious counsellor to make sure that the individual would be sent back to Turkey (Interview, Director BCC, 13 May 2009, Paris ).
The capacity to directly intervene in the local Muslim field if need be thanks to interstate diplomatic cooperation is perceived as an advantage by all state actors involved. Indeed, it is in the interest of state actors to maintain a degree of control over what is said and heard in mosques in Western Europe. The Diyanet had an even more direct means of influence until recently by dint of its hutbes (Friday sermons), which were prepared by the religious attaché and a commission, and then distributed amongst the affiliated mosques (Interview, Diyanet Religious Attaché, Düsseldorf, 17 March 2011). The models used by these commissions and other individual imams were often taken directly from the Diyanet’s monthly journal or the Internet, with the result that the sermons “read in DITIB mosques between 1997 and 2006 were mostly identical to those read in Turkey” (Gibbon forthcoming, 20).
However, the character of this influence needs to be nuanced. As in many cases, it is not a question of censorship and control, but rather scholarship and religious “expertise” (uzmanlık) (Interview, Turkish Religious Counsellor Germany). Those who are in charge of preparing these sermons are not perceived as dictatorial bureaucrats by the individual imams or those who attend the mosque. The Diyanet’s hutbe commissions are composed of professors and experts in different domains of Islamic sciences, meaning that they are respected authorities in the Turkish religious field. For this very reason, using material prepared by them can serve to reinforce the religious legitimacy of Diyanet officials serving abroad.
Moreover, there is also a much more practical element: these 400-word “ready-made sermons were both time-saving and a convenient way for imams to avoid getting in trouble should anyone object to a sermon’s content because the imams could not be held liable” (Gibbon forthcoming, 20). As mentioned, such objections can lead to the end of an imam’s overseas career, which consequently gives rise to an element of self-policing amongst Diyanet imams abroad. The hutbes in Germany have since become the responsibility of DITIB and are no longer checked by the religious attaché (Interview, Diyanet Religious Attaché), while in France , “each imam writes his [own] hutbes, and since quite a long time” (Interview, President CCMTF, 22 April 2009, Paris). Nevertheless, those who write the hutbes are still imams sent by the Turkish state, meaning that the influence of the Diyanet continues in the same vein: not as a form of outright control, but as a form of seduction (Allen 2003), relying on the Diyanet’s Islamic expertise as religious capital in the Muslim field.
Diyanet imams abroad must operate within the framework pre-established by the Turkish state and its foreign counterparts, meaning that they are aware of the restrictions that this entails. In general, the Diyanet imams with whom I spoke did not wish to be cited or were hesitant in their responses to my questions, because they did not know how their superiors would react, and preferred to err on the side of caution. At the same time, these imams must also establish a good relationship with the leaders of the mosque association and the community. The imbalance of power between imams and local community notables is frequently overlooked by journalists and scholars who attribute an exaggerated degree of influence to imams, without first taking into account the precarious position of these religious actors. In their respective studies of imams in Catalonia and France, Moreras (2007) and Jouanneau (2013) both demonstrate the tenuous and circumscribed authority of imams, while highlighting the influence held by mosque associations and their presidents. Indeed, the president is elected by the members of the mosque association in both France and Germany, attesting to the social standing, status, and support that these individuals already hold in the local contexts where they are based. It is thus no surprise that in the event of a conflict between a Diyanet imam and a DITIB mosque president, it is rarely the latter that backs down.
One study by a Turkish theology scholar on Diyanet religious services in Germany reported that conflicts between the association leadership and the imam occurred in over 25% of all cases (Tosun 1993). The reason for these conflicts may seem insignificant: for instance, there was an imam who became angry after the mosque president told him to go and prepare tea for a visitor who had arrived. However, such anecdotes reflect a larger category of problems that occur when the association leadership attempts to make an imam perform tasks that he does not consider as corresponding to his role. Moreover, the Diyanet imams sent abroad are usually more experienced, high-ranking religious officials, some of whom were already müftü for an entire province or district. Not only does this difference in status liken the possibility of hierarchical conflict with the first generation of poorly educated and working-class mosque leaders, but also with the community itself. For the same reason, the Diyanet is careful to underline that its imams “never get involved in the affairs of the mosque associations; they don’t understand [these affairs] either: land purchases, contacts, tax offices, et cetera” (Interview, Diyanet Religious Counsellor Germany). This division of labour was echoed during my interviews, and one imam explained to me that “[DITIB] is independent”: he did not represent it, he just did his work there (Interview, Diyanet Imam Y, 14 March 2011, Münster ).
At the same time, the relationship between the imam and the mosque leadership is greatly conditioned by the former’s own knowledge of the local language and conditions. For instance, in recent years mosque visits have become an increasingly generalized practice in Germany, with groups ranging from elementary school classes to interreligious dialogue associations and from police officers to rotary clubs. The imam’s role during these visits is ambiguous. The Diyanet’s religious personnel is trained to provide religious services to the Turkish community abroad, not to explain the principles of Islam to curious German visitors. However, engaging in these highly symbolic social and cultural activities aimed at the wider society is favourable to the DITIB’s image as an open and transparent religious association.
During my fieldwork, I participated in these mosque visits in the cities of Berlin , Duisburg , and Münster . The first two mosques were large and well-known, at times resembling veritable tourist attractions. Local, regional, and international groups visit these mosques for their architecture and particular histories, while the mosque in Münster mainly attracts local and regional groups. Mosque tours are never led by the imams, but by DITIB members, especially the regional DITIB spokespersons (Dialogbeauftragter) or regular members who have followed a special series of seminars. Amongst the tours I attended, it was only in Münster that the imam was present and actively involved. However, his participation remained highly constrained: due to his sparse linguistic skills, the imam was limited to enacting the role he performs during the prayer in front of the watching public. In other words, while the DITIB guide explained to the audience the main mosque activities, along with the different steps of the five daily prayers and the weekly sermon, the imam wordlessly mounted and descended the minbar in his official dress at the appropriate moments and solemnly stood in front of the mihrab. On the one hand, the imam’s presence during the tour offered a welcome opportunity for direct exchanges with the visiting groups. On the other hand, from my position as a spectator, his muted, obedient performance seemed to be a striking metaphor for the limited agency of the Diyanet imams, whose authority is structurally restricted by the institutional framework of the transnational Turkish Muslim field.
3.5 Organizational Support: Studies and Reports
Organizational support as a policy instrument is much more prevalent in Turkish religious diaspora policies than in the case of Morocco and covers both symbolic actions as well as knowledge production . The difficulties faced by Diyanet religious officials abroad have been the subject of numerous studies in Turkey and display the intertwined relations between Turkish theology faculties and the Diyanet. Moreover, the production of specialized information concerning the Turkish transnational field by both bureaucrats and academics (who are often one and the same) constitutes a central element in the development of Turkish religious policies abroad.
Following the first research at the beginning of the 1990s, these studies have employed quantitative and qualitative surveys to determine the expectations of the mosque communities abroad; the main areas of difficulty; and the overall perspective of the imams sent abroad. These topics largely echo similar studies on state religious services and officials that have been carried out by theology students and professors in Turkey. The overlap between theology scholars and religious personnel has given rise to a situation in which students and professors write academic articles and Ph.D. theses that reflect the same goals that can be found in the Diyanet’s institutional strategy reports. These goals include improving religious services in specific countries, such as Germany (Tosun 1993; Yılmaz 2006), Austria (Tavukçuoğlu 1992), France (Sağlam 2011), Belgium (Tavukçuoğlu 1997), and Denmark (Kahraman 2007). At the same time, this overlap is hardly surprising given that a large number of top Diyanet officials are or have been university professors in theology faculties , while many of the students and professors of these faculties have also had experience as Diyanet employees. This body of research represents an extensive source of academic expertise that the Diyanet can draw on in the elaboration of its policies concerning the religious field abroad. They also succeed in depoliticizing the subject of governing Islam abroad and do not seek to question the power relations or political struggles that are inherent to the religious field.
The Diyanet also organizes conferences and workshops on its overseas religious services, some of which are very large in scale. This includes the Diyanet’s “Religious Assembly” (Din Şûrası), which attracts a varying mix of religious officials, Turkish and foreign academics, media, and students. Other events are more restricted and are destined mainly for the religious counsellors and attachés, such as the Diyanet’s “Services Abroad Conference” (Yurtdışı Hizmetleri Konferansı), which has taken place over a three-day period every year since 2012 (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı 2012c). The religious counsellors in each country abroad also meet frequently with the attachés and the attachés in turn organize meetings with the religious personnel in their jurisdictions. Finally, the religious counsellors submit term reports on their activities, which are similarly coordinated with higher-level diplomats if need be.
The DITIB “News Bulletin” (Haber Bülteni), a magazine that reports on institutional and community DITIB events, provides a wealth of information on how frequently these meetings between religious personnel occur as well as the different themes they address. For instance, in the first three months after becoming DITIB president in January 2007, the Diyanet’s religious counsellor Sadi Arslan organized multiple meetings with the religious attachés in Germany, as well as with 80 German-speaking Diyanet imams and the DITIB mosque presidents in Germany. At the same time, Arslan also met with the US ambassador, Turkish politicians, and Turkish and German business and civil society leaders (DITIB 2007a, b, c)—as befits his double role as a Turkish state representative and a German civil society leader. The regular contact between the hundreds of Diyanet employees in Germany is indicative not only of their high degree of organization, but also of the financial and logistical resources that the Turkish state can mobilize in order to create solid networks far outside of its borders.
The reality of these transnational networks in Germany is made visible by the frequent visits of top Diyanet and Turkish state officials to DITIB mosques and events. For instance, my analysis of the DITIB News Bulletins between January 2007 and June 2010 shows that there was at least one monthly visit by a representative of the Turkish state to a DITIB mosque or event during 30 of the 42 months covered. Over the course of this three-and-a-half year period, the director of the Diyanet’s foreign affairs department was in Germany almost every second month, while the vice-president, who was also responsible for foreign relations, was in Germany approximately once every four months. The Diyanet president made one visit each year for ceremonies concerning symbolically important mosques, such as in Duisburg and Cologne , as well as an event in 2007 in the Cologne Arena stadium organized by the four main Muslim federations that attracted 20,000 people.
Alongside the individual Turkish members of parliament (in general AKP members) who visited DITIB mosques on a fairly regular basis, more formal groups also visited DITIB during this time period: for instance the Turkish state’s Joint Culture Commission (OKK), responsible for choosing the long-term imams and teachers who are sent abroad, as well as the Turkish parliament’s human rights commission. The latter commission has published numerous reports on the situation of Turks living in different European countries, as well as on more specific themes such as Neo-Nazi violence in Germany and policies towards youth of Turkish origin in different countries (see İnsan Hakları Komisyonu, n.d.). Turkish MPs also frequently ask questions in parliament concerning DITIB and other Turkish organizations abroad, while special commissions of Turkish parliamentarians have compiled extensive reports on the situation of Turkish citizens living abroad that have had a special focus on religious services (Kalemli 1995; Baş et al. 2003).
The frequent exchanges and meetings between Diyanet officials demonstrate the highly structured institutional framework within which Turkish state religious activities take place in foreign countries. Information circulates directly between all levels of the Diyanet’s hierarchy abroad thanks to these regular meetings and reinforces the Diyanet’s proximity to the on-the-ground lived realities of the Turkish Muslim field in foreign countries. Moreover, thanks to the periodic reports that the imams, attachés, and counsellors send back to Ankara, knowledge of the situation is directly transmitted to the central structures of the Diyanet, where it is processed and analyzed.
The unit responsible for the analysis of this data within the Diyanet is the “Strategy Development Department,” which is also in charge of carrying out internal evaluations of policies and programmes. This department is not unique; indeed, it runs on the same model as other such departments bearing the same name, which exist in all major Turkish state ministries. The department is responsible for drawing up the yearly “activity reports,” the multiyear “strategic plans,” the yearly “performance programme” as well as other studies on the Diyanet’s institutional activities. It employs modern management techniques, most notably “PEST” (Political, Economic, Social, and Technological) and “SWOT” (Strengths, Weakness, Opportunities, and Threats) analyses, which constitute the basis for the Diyanet’s short- and long-term strategic planning. These plans concern every area of religious services abroad, which are structured in terms of goals, strategies, and performance indicators that are used to produce quantitative data in order to carry out policy evaluations.
The Diyanet’s close ties to academia and its own strategic planning department represent fundamental resources in its governance of the Muslim field, both in Turkey and abroad. Its ability to carry out studies on quantifiable variables within Turkish Islam recalls Foucault’s (2009) work on governmentality whereby the state employs specific techniques and procedures in order to “know” and subsequently control different aspects of society. As a modern bureaucratic state entity, the Diyanet operates using managerial techniques that categorize and quantify distinct aspects of religious life in order to “provide a religious service of higher quality” (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı 2012b, 61), as if it were a marketable product. Moreover, the approach adopted by the Diyanet in its official institutional reports corresponds to the definition of public policy instruments , techniques, and tools as discussed in the last chapter.
The usage of these instruments serves a double purpose: the first is practical and permits the Diyanet to evaluate its policies, such as the sending of imams abroad. Armed with its statistical data, it can then set about improving its policies and ultimately crafting more effective strategies designed for the religious field abroad. The second purpose is less tangible, but just as significant: these resources are employed in the construction of a highly influential discourse that promotes the Diyanet’s claim to be the sole religious authority in the Turkish Muslim field abroad, based on its expertise and the ostensible neutrality of the state.
4 Conclusion
Sending delegations of imams and religious personnel to serve the diaspora represents a fundamental policy instrument at the heart of Turkish and Moroccan religious activities abroad. By examining the procedures by which religious bureaucrats select and supervise imams, and diplomats at both ends supervise both, I argue that sending and receiving state actors attempt to govern transnational religious fields through tenuous yet tenacious forms of interstate cooperation. These forms of cooperation depend on the strength of shared national interests and the ability of standard operating procedures to depoliticize religious affairs and present them as routine technical issues. Nevertheless, politics are never far behind: diplomats and state officials may use “political will” to overcome administrative obstacles due to dissimilar forms of religious governance just as much as they may politicize the entire process and create international tensions.
The perspective I employ does not deny the agency of the religious actors involved, but seeks to understand the ways by which the institutional state structures in which they find themselves delimit and define their capacity to act. At the same time, the goal of this chapter has been to provide a relatively atemporal portrait of a long-standing religious policy instrument: despite the changes that occur regarding the number of imams sent abroad, the countries to which they are sent, and the time that they spend abroad, there is a remarkable continuity concerning this policy in both the Turkish and Moroccan cases. Consequently, I have sought to demonstrate the weight of interstate relations in the structural development of transnational Muslim fields. The Moroccan and Turkish perception of religion as a public service—and the state institutions that make this perception a reality—has led to the rationalization of religious services within the general framework of interstate diplomacy. One result of this development is the expedited procedure for the issuing of visas and residency permits to imams; another is the assimilation of imams to teachers and other state employees who are sent abroad, visible in the official statuses, salaries, and treatment that they receive.
Analyses that focus solely on the politics on the religious field, that is to say the competition of “official Islam” with “unofficial” Islamic currents, or the self-interested interference of foreign states in the religious affairs of Muslims in Western Europe, run the risk of interpreting every new development in terms of a Machiavellian struggle for power. Aside from over-exaggerating potential differences, the reality of interstate cooperation is that there is actual cooperation: the German foreign ministry and the Diyanet split evenly the costs of language classes for Turkish imams; receptions are held with the ambassador; and visas are delivered without incident. French authorities meet in advance with Habous officials to smooth out any unresolved issues; the ministry issues its written guarantees; and hundreds of imams arrive to guide prayer services in France for Ramadan every year.
German and French authorities have accepted (to varying degrees) that those elements of Muslim religious affairs that go beyond what their partial governance can cover are to be resolved within the framework of foreign policy. In addition, promoting interstate cooperation with home states has provided French and German state actors with a surprisingly effective partner in watching over their own Muslim religious fields for them. The implications, however, are mixed: on the one hand, French and German authorities are tempted to bypass local religious actors and seek solutions more to their liking by exerting diplomatic pressure through Turkish and Moroccan state authorities. On the other hand, attempts by receiving states to “nationalize” Islam still hold the possibility of raising tensions with home states .
It would be a mistake to imagine that the French and German states have been naïve or overly indulgent; the following chapter will show that both succeed quite well in satisfying their own interests and that they continue to hold the capacity to limit home state involvement when they so desire. The greater debate is whether these patterns of interstate religious governance are in the interest of French and German Muslims , who must also live with the consequences of home state influence over local Muslim fields.
Notes
- 1.
For more on the Movement for Unification and Reform (MUR), the Justice and Development Party (PJD), and ʿAdl wal Iḥsan , see Chapter 3.
- 2.
I was given the opportunity to consult these documents during my first interview with the Habous ministry liaison official.
- 3.
The information for the following paragraphs comes from three interviews with social affairs counsellors: Interview, NRW Social Affairs Counsellor, 13 November 2010, Düsseldorf; Interview, Vice-Consul, 15 March 2012, Marseille; Interview, Paris Social Affairs Counsellor, 27 October 2010, Paris ; along with the information provided on consular websites.
- 4.
There are four different kinds of passports in Turkey: normal passports (umuma mahsus pasaport), which are navy blue; service passports (hizmet damgalı pasaport), which are grey; special passports (hususi damgalı pasaport), which are green; and diplomatic passports (diplomatik pasaport), which are red.