Despite the fact that the Bolivian government itself had fabricated excerpts of Che’s diary and used it out of context, when the complete Bolivian Diary was published in Cuba, Bolivian President René Barrientos claimed it had been falsified. Fidel Castro responded by saying that the Cuban government was willing to provide reproductions of the microfilm of the diary’s pages to the international press so they could be checked against the original, if the Bolivian government would permit that to be done. The following speech was delivered on Cuban television on July 4, 1968.
As you all know the publication of Che’s Bolivian Diary has aroused extraordinary interest all over the world.
Among those affected by the publication is, of course, the Bolivian government. What was Barrientos’s reaction to news of the diary’s publication? In order to explain this matter it is necessary to read several reports from different news agencies, some of which you may have already read.
We have here, for example, an Associated Press (AP) dispatch of July 1 from La Paz:
President René Barrientos stated that, “The publication of a fictitious diary, falsified and conveniently presented, might perhaps raise the morale of a people so long subjected to so many privations.
“I do not believe that Che Guevara has continued to write his diary from the great beyond. I am sure that the whole thing is a scheme of the Castro hierarchy to exalt Che Guevara… They must have produced a ‘diary’ only a few pages long… According to the news agencies, in Cuba it is only possible to read by daylight. They don’t even have matches to read by at night.”
“According to news agencies!” He [Barrientos] informs himself by what the news agencies report. Another statement:
General Juan J. Torres, chief of staff of the Bolivian army, for a considerable time—so it says here—in charge of negotiations—the text is illegible; this presumably refers to the negotiations to publish or sell the diary—stated that the Cuban edition, “is nothing but an attempt at sensationalism by Fidel Castro, since at no time have we made Che’s diary available to anyone.”
This was from the same AP dispatch. The same day an ANSA dispatch read:
La Paz. The Bolivian military chief of staff maintains that Che Guevara’s campaign diary, whose publication and free distribution has been announced by Fidel Castro’s regime, is falsified.
Torres asserted that the aforementioned diary has been kept in a safe, secret place since those—illegible—the guerrillas (October 1967) ended in failure.
[Torres] said that only high-ranking military officers (approximately seven) have access to or knowledge of the contents of the documents; that at no time was permission given for their publication either within the country or abroad, despite the numerous offers received.
He insisted that the document to be published in Cuba is falsified.
He also emphasized that the version of Che’s diary being published in Cuba will be compared with the original in the hands of the Bolivian army, and that in case of similarity, an immediate and exhaustive investigation will be carried out to discover out how the Cubans obtained photocopies of it.
So the first contradiction appears: no one was given permission; the diary is falsified; yet, immediately following, this member of the army’s staff reveals doubts, saying that, in any case, the diary will be compared and that “in case of similarity an immediate and exhaustive investigation will be carried out to discover how the Cubans obtained photocopies of it!”
The kind of doubt now revealed by the chief of staff, together with a certain caution—caution not in the least displayed by Barrientos—leaves the door of possibility open. The AP agency itself, in the dispatch I read earlier, further stated:
Despite emphatic statements made by the president and other high-ranking military officers, the Havana publication appears to be at least a serious threat to Bolivian army’s plans to sell Che’s diary at a high price—the original of which, written in two notebooks, is in the hands of the high command.
Many observers did not dismiss the possibility that at least a substantial part of the diary may have been taken out of the country in the form of photocopies somehow obtained from the army. It is recalled that during Régis Debray’s trial, the military prosecutor exhibited photocopies of several pages of the diary as state evidence.
On July 3, in answer to the doubts expressed by AP, Barrientos issued a new statement. Here is an ANSA news dispatch from La Paz, dated July 3, which reads:
President Barrientos considered it would have been impossible for microfilm of Che Guevara’s diary to be removed from the army high command.
Barrientos expressed the opinion that fragments of the—the text is illegible—of Pombo—this could possibly mean fragments of Pombo’s diary—who was Guevara’s aide in the Bolivian guerrilla force, plus knowledge of several pages of the diary which were published by the press both nationally and abroad, made it possible to put together the diary announced for publication in Havana. The chief executive insisted that the Havana diary is spurious.
Some curious doubts can be observed—including doubts of the chief of staff himself—which in a certain sense contradict Barrientos’s statements. These are also the doubts of a US news agency.
Here, for example, we have a cable which reads:
Washington, July 3 (CTK). The current literary and political sensation in the United States is the publication of the diary of Cuban revolutionary Ernesto Che Guevara.
The authenticity of some material is doubtful, to say the least, and gives rise to questions regarding which is the “true” Guevara.
The first to publish Guevara’s notes on the guerrilla war in Bolivia was the radical monthly Ramparts of California. It is pointed out in that edition that Ramparts obtained exclusive publication rights from the prime minister of the Cuban government, Fidel Castro. Ramparts, with Guevara’s diary, is already on sale at all news stands and will soon be sold out.
And so on and so forth.
The fact remains that this agency, a news agency of Czechoslovakia, a socialist country, states, “The authenticity of some material is doubtful, to say the least, and gives rise to questions regarding which is the ‘true’ Guevara.” This is truly paradoxical, leading one to wonder where we stand, where each news agency stands.
It is truly paradoxical when a US news agency, not in the least known for being sympathetic to revolutionaries, admits the possibility that the diary may have found its way here; while a socialist agency… Well, I wanted to make sure, so I asked, “CTK? Are you sure? Could there have been some interference? Did the report come over the CTK teletype?”
“Yes, on the CTK teletype.” This agency expresses doubts about the diary’s authenticity.
Well, there is great freedom of the press in Czechoslovakia at this time, and—naturally—we do not question the Czech agency’s right to have doubts.
Still, that report was filed in Washington DC and it is highly likely that it was strongly influenced by the atmosphere there of doubts concerning the diary’s authenticity; it came out sounding almost exactly like Barrientos, and, of course, like imperialism.
Here’s our analysis of these doubts, and our proof.
The first thing we notice is the fact—somewhat incomprehensible, though it has an explanation—that the Bolivian government has jumped to the conclusion that the diary is falsified, without having seen a copy of it; without taking the basic precaution of waiting to get its hands on a copy. Firstly, this reveals its lack of caution. It also reveals that the gentleman [Barrientos] who relies on the news agencies—I don’t know what agency, it might be any of them: “they don’t even have matches to read by at night…”—perhaps judging others by his own moral standards, thinks that such a thing could actually be done. It is an act of unbelievable irresponsibility.
Secondly, simple logic reveals how absurd such an allegation is. They have the original, and they could have tried to publish a falsified diary. It would have been very difficult to prove that it was falsified.
Of course, we have now been completely convinced. When we had to break the tragic news [of Che’s death] here, we analyzed the first pages that had been published, and we were left without the slightest doubt that the pages were written by Che. We were capable of immediately recognizing even the slightest alteration in the diary. Nevertheless, they had the original and would have been able to publish a falsified edition.
No one in their right mind would conceive of publishing a false copy of a document whose original is in someone else’s hands, especially the hands of an enemy. The very idea that we would make such a mistake is unthinkable, and besides being a mistake, it would be immoral, completely alien to the Cuban Revolution.
We received the photocopies and studied them carefully. Considering every possibility that they might contain changes, errors, things that did not ring true, we studied them very carefully. But a simple reading of the document assured us of its authenticity—just as it has everyone in this country—because we knew Che so well, his way of writing, his style, his thoughts, his temperament, his personal traits. Yet we did not go by this alone; we exhausted all means of investigation and were absolutely convinced it was Che’s diary.
We might have made a mistake—not, of course, by inventing a diary—but we might have made a mistake in judgment. We don’t, however, believe this to be the case, and we are prepared to stand by our verdict. Frankly, we do not have the slightest doubt that it is the authentic diary. This can be proven.
When we reached this conclusion, in view of the historic significance of the document, we decided to publish the diary.
The Bolivian leaders—leaders by the grace of US imperialism, of course—are lying. In the first place, they lie when they say that no copy of Che’s diary left Bolivia. They pretend to be unaware of a series of events. For example, they pretend not to know that a Dr. González—a CIA agent who operated widely in Bolivia—photographed all of Che’s documents and naturally sent them immediately to his CIA bosses, promising to send Colonel Zenteno Anaya a copy. And, indeed, he did send a copy to Colonel Zenteno Anaya through the US embassy in La Paz, a copy which fell into General Ovando’s hands.
They pretend to be unaware of the fact that the high command of the Bolivian army itself ordered the trial—presided over by General Reyes Villa—of Colonels Joaquín Zenteno Anaya and Luis Antonio Reque Terán, for having sold documents seized from the guerrillas.
They pretend not to know that the New York Times reporter Juan de Onís had access to Che’s documents, although there is no proof that he took complete copies of them.
They pretend not to know that another newsman, Andrew St. George—closely linked to the CIA—took advantage of his ties with that organization and used bribery to obtain copies of Che’s documents. Andrew St. George dreamed of making a fortune out of these documents, and as his first step he contacted various publishing houses. Among those he contacted was the important US publishing house McGraw-Hill, to arrange for a large print-run of an edition of the diary using these documents.
It so happened that McGraw-Hill, not wanting to risk its own reputation, was not willing to assume responsibility for publishing the diary. It did try to get some type of legal authorization and sent representatives to obtain permission to publish the diary from Che’s family, since they are the legal heirs to Che’s property. Naturally, they replied that they were not interested in the proposal, which is obvious, because for one thing we already had the diary, and for another, it was impossible to participate in or consent to a printing or an edition promoted by an individual linked to the CIA.
Naturally, we did not tell McGraw-Hill that we had the diary, but we did tell them flatly that we were not interested in their proposed edition.
We must recognize that this US publishing house acted honestly and decently. They could have published the diary, but decided against it. The knew they had no right to publish a document of this nature, since those who had obtained the document got it directly from the murderers of the author. They also knew that, in a strictly legal sense, they had no moral or any other kind of right to claim ownership, or worse, to act as vulgar peddlers of the document. Of course, it must be understood that McGraw-Hill would not have had time to publish it, but it is a fact that they did not make any effort to do so.
This led Andrew St. George to seek other publishing houses and try to do business with them.
Now several news items are appearing to the effect that the Bolivian government will publish the document, edited by an expert on Latin American and anticommunist affairs. Others are reportedly going to publish the diary or articles on the diary.
The first question that comes to mind is why, in the past eight months, has the Bolivian government not published the documents? The reasons are obvious, and those who have read the documents can understand it.
The fact of the matter is that the publication of the diary has upset a few apple carts. In the first place, the imperialists and the Bolivian militarists were most interested in keeping the contents of the document secret. In the second place, its publication ruined a number of shady and grossly mercenary business deals in connection with the document.
Andrew St. George and others like him counted their chickens before they hatched, dreaming of fat profits, but their dreams never materialized. Now they are desperately trying to see what they can still do and whether they can salvage something from their investment in those shady deals.
Their efforts are certainly belated, because the diary is about to be published [internationally]. In the next few days it will appear in several languages, published by honest publishing houses devoted to this type of publication, publishing houses who know what they are dealing with. The Cuban Book Institute is also receiving offers for the publication of the diary from dozens of countries.
So logically, their belated and desperate efforts will be futile. Is there any way of proving who is right? The answer is extremely easy.
There is a proverb that says it is easier to spot a liar than a lame man. In this case, the liar will be spotted before the invalid.
At this moment, there is not one copy of Che’s diary outside Bolivia, there is more than one copy of Che’s diary outside Bolivia. Considering all these interlocking interests, with all these desperate profit-seekers intervening, there is now no possibility that anyone could attempt to write or alter this diary and have their false version accepted.
Naturally, none of this explanation is necessary for our own people. The Cuban people knew Che well, and they know the revolution’s methods well; even our enemies, in many cases, admit this. But this explanation is necessary in case some people should harbor any doubt and because, naturally, the imperialists and their sycophants—stunned by the blow—will try to cast doubt, as if it were possible, on Che’s diary…
It so happens that we did not receive a typewritten copy of the diary. If we had received typewritten copies, we would still have been able to analyze them and even reach a conclusion. But if we were to be asked, “What do you base yourselves on?” we would have had to reply, “We have based ourselves on this.”
Yet here we have all the photocopies of the pages of Che’s diary that have been published. Any month, December, for example: here are the photocopies. All the photocopies corresponding to the Cuban Book Institute edition are here, for any month, from the first to the last page.
We have still more documents. For example, we have here 36 additional photocopies of documents written by Che that are not part of the diary but are documents such as war communiqués, messages, and declarations, the content of which Che discusses in his diary. So here we have 36 photocopies of documents that are kept over there in that safe [in Bolivia], that very strong safe, so strong that those who are most highly informed assert it is secured by a locked steel door with three padlocks. But it seems to have quite a few leaks.
We knew that something so absurd as questioning the authenticity of the documents could occur—perhaps it was their only way out—and consequently we took the appropriate measures. We have still more photocopies of other documents written by Che in Bolivia. Any attempt, therefore, to falsify the diary, any attempt at fraud would be very difficult.
Some people will say, “Yes, indeed, here are the photocopies; the handwriting is just like Che’s; his style, all that is so distinctive of his personality is reflected here. Even so, wouldn’t it be possible to make a true-to-life copy, invent it all, find someone more brilliant than Cervantes who could write with such exactness, who could imitate a figure as distinctive as Che? Is there sufficient proof?” To that we would say, “No, there is not sufficient proof.” But there is a conclusive test that can be carried out.
The Cuban Book Institute has published this diary. It is a historic document, and those affected have to cast doubt on it; yet world opinion has the right to know the full truth.
Someone is lying, and it is necessary to clear up who that is, who is capable of duping world public opinion so cynically and shamelessly.
There is a very simple test. We invite any journalist from any country of the world to come to Cuba to receive a complete collection of the photocopies of the diary, and then go to Bolivia to check it against the original diary. We will submit to that test. Tomorrow morning, or tonight, if they wish, in any part of the world where there is a Cuban embassy, any journalist—no matter what newspaper they represent, friend or foe—only has to go to a Cuban embassy, which have been instructed to give them their visa immediately so they can come here to receive their copy. Naturally, they can also begin making their requests for visas from the Bolivian government.
Because this is the definitive test and because world public opinion has the right to know the truth, we challenge the Bolivian government to accept this test and to authorize journalists to go there and see. We are not saying they should turn over a copy, or even let the journalists photograph it—although I don’t see why the journalists shouldn’t photograph it at this stage, especially if the photographs confirm that these copies correspond to the original—but we do say they should authorize this test immediately without any kind evasion. If not, there is nothing more to be said and they will have been completely unmasked before world public opinion.
We are working intensively to this effect—using, incidentally, a great deal of scarce paper to make the pertinent copies. This very night, following this appearance, we will have film made with negatives of the photocopies of Che’s diary, ready to deliver to the foreign press in Cuba.
They are now speaking of the “Cuban version,” and this is only acceptable if in the strictest sense the “Cuban version” is identified as true and authentic, not a “version” in fact but rather a faithful copy of the diary.
This very night, if representatives of the foreign news agencies in Cuba wish to be the first to request their visas for Bolivia they will be given film containing all the photocopies we have available of Che’s diary. Furthermore, we will provide them with film containing the negatives of these 36 additional photocopies. And, I repeat, in our little cardboard “safe,” without any key, we have still more photocopies of other documents. There are all kinds of things here, including this photograph taken in Vallegrande—if Vallegrande is of any great interest—of one of the CIA agents who was operating in Bolivia, a native Cuban [Félix Rodríguez].
And here is a photo of General Ovando and others drinking, celebrating the assassination of Che. Here we see that same CIA agent, the same Ramos, helping to apply formaldehyde to Che’s body.
Some documents are possibly not even in the safe, such as this document discussing the turning over to the army of a wounded guerrilla who was later murdered, Jorge Vázquez Viaña (he is referred to by different names in the diary). He was taken out of the hospital and murdered; his body was placed in a helicopter and thrown into the jungle.
We believe that, when all is said and done, they will have no choice but to accept the complete authenticity of the diary and the other documents. We carried out no espionage work in Bolivia. It is simply that every just cause has sympathizers everywhere. Although it cannot yet be told, some day what happened will be made known.
And we reiterate what we stated in the “Necessary Introduction” [to the diary, see chapter four]. Absolutely no money changed hands in our obtaining the diary.
It is now General Torres’s turn to speak; it is René Barrientos’s turn to speak; it is the journalists’ turn to speak. It so happens that any day now—July 4, if I remember correctly—Barrientos is due to arrive in the United States at the invitation of the governor of Texas (nowadays not even his own masters pay much attention to him and he is not even granted the status of an official guest of the US government). He will travel to the United States as a guest of the governor of Texas, and there, on a ranch, that other Texan, Mr. [Lyndon B.] Johnson, will receive him.
Journalists can go there and ask him questions; pin him down. This is the definitive test, the only conclusive test, and it is what we propose.
Now it is up to the journalists, those who doubt the authenticity of this diary, to speak out and substantiate their doubts with solid evidence or dispel them completely. Our people have no doubts, but there may be many people in the world who lack the evidence on which to base a decision, who lack the evidence to reach a definite conclusion. This is the only response. If this can’t be done, it won’t be our fault. We can submit to this test without batting an eyelid.
As I said, at this very moment journalists will begin to receive the negatives I mentioned.
We believe this will serve to dispel any possible doubts concerning the authenticity of this diary.