The following is part of a 1987 interview with Fidel Castro by Italian journalist Gianni Minà at the time of the 20th anniversary of Che’s death. The entire interview was published as An Encounter with Fidel (Ocean Press, 1990).
Gianni Minà: President Castro, you are a witness to contemporary history like few others in our time. This interview is proof of that. I would like to move on to your most intimate recollections of some comrades in struggle, in particular Che Guevara and Camilo Cienfuegos. For example, Che represents a symbol, an ideal, for at least three generations in Europe and the world. When you think of your friend Che, what is the first thought that comes to your mind?
Fidel Castro: For me, as well, it has been hard to accept the thought that Che is dead. I have dreamed many times—you sometimes tell people the things you dream—I dreamed I spoke with him, that he was alive. It’s a very special thing, a person whose death it is hard to resign yourself to. What’s the reason? In my opinion, it is because he has a permanent presence in everything.
His death occurred far away, many miles from our country. The idea that Che was dead was something very difficult to get used to. It hit me differently from the death of other comrades, for we have lost comrades in the struggle many times. We have seen comrades die. One has the impression Che is still present because of what he symbolizes, because of his character, his conduct, his principles. He had a great number of truly exceptional qualities. I knew him very well, from the time he made contact with us in Mexico until he left Cuba the final time. I really think, with sorrow, that with Che’s death a great mind was lost. He was a person who still had much to contribute to the theory and practice of building socialism.
Gianni Minà: In the letter to you that Che wrote before leaving he seems almost bitter for not having earlier recognized your quality as a leader, for the time it took him to fully recognize that.
Fidel Castro: What might be the reason for that? First, Che was a very quiet man. He was not expressive. He didn’t communicate these things. He felt things but he did not say them. By the way, some very warm-hearted verses he wrote about me have come to light; someone saved them.
He was naturally a little skeptical about Latin America, about Latin American politicians. He may have thought our revolution might end the way other revolutions have ended. But in reality he never gave me the slightest impression of having such doubts. He was always extraordinarily fraternal and respectful with me. He may have been a little mistrustful of the [July 26] Movement. He may have observed that our movement was heterogeneous, that it included people from many different sectors.
He already had an excellent revolutionary education, a Marxist education. He was very studious. He had graduated from medical school, conducted research, and was very rigorous in studying the questions of Marxism. So for this reason he was a little skeptical. I think if he wrote what he did it must have been from an excess of integrity, because in reality I had to coordinate many factors and to promote unity over the reservations demonstrated by one or another comrade; I had to have patience in my relations with them.
For Che, who was impulsive, very courageous, very daring, at times even reckless, I always had special regard. On more than one occasion he would step forward as a volunteer. Whatever the mission, the first volunteer was always Che. He volunteered for the most difficult actions and suggested them in the midst of combat. He was totally selfless and altruistic. Cuba wasn’t his homeland, yet he had joined us and every day he was ready to give his life for the revolution.
I would, of course, use cadres according to the importance of a mission. When a cadre had acquired more skills, more experience, we would send out new cadres so they too could could learn and develop. In war you can’t continually use a cadre in dangerous situations, because at one moment or another you will lose them. We really had to protect the cadres, preserve them, because they wanted to do things. And I took on the task of preserving them as much as possible and using them in the most important missions.
I often rotated the men in this type of task, but as for him… Well, I truly believe if we hadn’t followed this policy, Che, because of those character traits of his, would not have come out of the war alive. But Che was exceedingly straightforward. If at any moment he thought there was some doubt about something, he felt obligated to speak up about it. That’s the way he was.
Gianni Minà: The Cuban Revolution is incredible. It united an intellectual like Che, an intellectual like you, and a simple man of the people like Camilo—men of different backgrounds and educational levels, who functioned together in harmony. There was clearly a common dream.
Fidel Castro: They were three people of three different origins, different characteristics.
What is extraordinary about Che is that he wasn’t Cuban, he was Argentine. When we met in Mexico, he had been working in Guatemala as a doctor. He was filled with enthusiasm by the political process in Guatemala, by the agrarian reform. He witnessed the intervention of the United States and suffered very much over all that. It was something he carried within him. He joined us right away. As he relates, he joined us the first time we had a conversation. He envisioned an anti-imperialist revolution, a revolution of national liberation. He did not yet see the socialist revolution—he envisioned that to be a little bit down the road—but he committed himself totally.
Moreover, Che was our doctor. No one thought of Che as being a great soldier. He liked sports. He tried to climb Popocatépetl almost every week; he never reached the top, but tried every week. He suffered from asthma; he had that handicap, but he made a heroic effort to climb that volcano. Although he never made it to the top, he never stopped trying to climb it once more. That also shows what kind of character he had. He was our doctor, he went as our doctor because he had that handicap. No one imagined him as a soldier. But he wasn’t only an intellectual; he was also to become a great soldier.
Camilo was a man of the people. At first no one could have guessed his qualities. Later he really distinguished himself. I am sure many more would have done so, because in our group of 82 men—I later gave this quite a bit of thought—there were some 40 who were suited to become leaders. Out of those few who survived, several brilliant leaders emerged: Camilo, Che, and other comrades, including one outstanding leader not mentioned so much—Raúl.
Gianni Minà: How were Camilo and Che different?
Fidel Castro: They had two different personalities, even though they loved and respected each other very much. Camilo liked to joke a lot, he always had a sense of humor.
Gianni Minà: Cuban.
Fidel Castro: He had a Cuban sense of humor, always laughing, very daring, very intelligent, less intellectual than Che but also an excellent leader, one who never gave the enemy an opportunity. He was very courageous, but wasn’t as reckless as Che. Che seemed to be a man who sought death. Camilo defied death; he wasn’t afraid of it, but he wasn’t reckless. Those are two differences between them. They had great affection for each other.
Gianni Minà: And your brother, Raúl?
Fidel Castro: Another leader who, as I said, is not mentioned so much in this connection. Raúl is capable, responsible, and brilliant. He also played a very important role.
Of the group that survived, several very good leaders emerged. That’s why I think there were many young men who, had they survived the initial expedition, were well suited to become leaders. At least 15 or 20 outstanding leaders could have emerged from our group—because someone needs both the opportunity and responsibilities to distinguish themselves.
Gianni Minà: More than 20 years ago Che left Cuba to fight in Bolivia. Can you tell me where he went from the time he left Havana until he arrived in Bolivia?
Fidel Castro: Che very much wanted to go to South America. This was an old idea of his, and when he joined us in Mexico—although it is not that he made it a condition—he did ask one thing, “The only thing I want after the victory of the revolution is to go fight in Argentina”—his country—“that you don’t keep me from doing so, that no reasons of state will stand in the way.” And I promised him that. It was a long way off, after all. Firstly, no one knew if we would win the war or who was going to be alive at the end—and he surely, because of his impetuousness, had little chance of coming out alive—but this is what he asked. Once in a while, in the Sierra and afterward, he would remind me of this plan and promise. He was certainly farsighted in this.
After gaining experience in the Sierra Maestra, he grew more enthusiastic about the idea of making a revolution in South America, in his own country. Che knew firsthand our exceptional experience, beginning with the difficult conditions in which we rebuilt our army and carried through the struggle, and he developed a great faith in the possibilities of the revolutionary movement in South America. When I speak of South America, I am actually speaking of the southern part of South America. The promise had been given and I always told him, “Don’t worry, we will keep our word.” He raised it perhaps two or three times.
With the triumph of the revolution there were many tasks to carry out and problems of all kinds to be resolved. We had political problems, problems with the unification of our forces, state problems, economic problems, all such things. Now no one knew what a great soldier Che would turn out to be. He was, as I said, our doctor, who began to distinguish himself in the first battles and was to become a great military leader. Both he and Camilo carried out a very important task in the war—the invasion of the central part of the country, under difficult conditions. Much more could be said about that, but this is not the time.
We had to confront all the tasks of a victorious revolution, where nothing remained of the former state, the old armed forces, or the administrative apparatus. The various revolutionary organizations—although ours carried the principal weight—had the support of the immense majority of the population, and we used our influence to bring about unity. We always fought sectarianism. We experienced a process of unity of the revolutionary forces. Camilo took part in all this but his death was very premature; it occurred in October [1959] in connection with the events in Camgüey and the problem of Huber Matos.
Che was later assigned to head the Ministry of Industry. He worked very methodically. He also had several other responsibilities. Every time a serious comrade was needed for an important post, Che would offer to do it. He was named president of the National Bank in the days when technicians, specialists in banking but politically inconsistent, were abandoning the country. Jokes and anecdotes followed. People would say that we had asked for an economist and Che volunteered. And we asked him, “You’re an economist?” “No,” he answered, “I’m a communist.” The struggle inside the country was just beginning, and right-wing elements were accusing Che of being a communist and all kinds of things such as that.
But Che always had great authority. Every assignment he was given he would fulfill strictly and brilliantly. He worked hard and acquired his first experiences in building socialism in the sector of nationalized industry. He worked hard in organizing production, in checking production, in voluntary work. He was one of the pioneers of voluntary work. He participated in almost every activity. He was very consistent in everything he did; he set an example in everything he did.
That is how he spent the first years of the revolution. He later evidently began to feel impatient about carrying out his old plans and ideas. I believe he was influenced in part by the fact that time was passing. He knew that special physical conditions were required for this. He felt he was capable of doing it and, in reality, he was at the peak of his mental and physical capacities. He had many ideas, based on the experience he had gained in Cuba, of what could be done in his native country. He was primarily thinking of his country, but didn’t think only of Argentina. He thought of all the Americas, of South America in general.
He was impatient. From our own experience, I knew the difficulty of the initial phase of a process like the one he wanted to carry out. I thought better conditions could be created for what he was thinking of doing. We attempted to persuade him not to be impatient, to convince him that more time was needed. He wanted to go out from the very first day and do it all, while we wanted other, less well-known cadres to carry out the initial steps.
Che was also very interested in international questions, in the problems faced by Africa. At the time, mercenaries had intervened in the former Belgian Congo, now Zaire. Lumumba had been killed, a neocolonial regime was established, and a movement of armed struggle emerged in Zaire. We never made this public, but the revolutionary movement asked us for help and we sent instructors and combatants on an internationalist mission.
Gianni Minà: And Lumumba’s movement?
Fidel Castro: At that time Soumialot was its leader. It was the same movement, but Lumumba was dead.
I myself suggested an idea to Che. He had time on his hands, he had to wait. At the same time he wanted to train cadres, to develop their experience. So we put him in charge of the group that was going to help the revolutionaries in what is today Zaire. They went in by way of Tanzania, crossing Lake Tanganyika. In all, about 100 Cubans went and stayed there several months.
He followed the approach of teaching Zairians how to fight. Cubans and Zairian patriots fought white mercenaries and forces sent by the government. They fought many battles against the mercenaries. The idea was not to fight the war in place of the Zairians but rather to help them, to teach them how to fight.
But that movement was just beginning. It didn’t have sufficient strength or unity. In the end the revolutionary leaders of the former Belgian colony decided to halt the struggle, and our personnel were withdrawn. That decision was quite correct. It had become clear that conditions did not exist at the time for developing the struggle. The Zairians analyzed the situation along with the Cuban contingent, and we were in agreement with their assessment. Consequently the unit was withdrawn, and the Cuban personnel returned home.
Having now spent about six months in Zaire, Che stayed for a while in Tanzania, assessing the experience he had just lived through. His conduct on the mission was, as always, exemplary to the highest degree. His stay in Africa was temporary, awaiting the creation of conditions for traveling to South America.
During this whole period the situation became highly awkward for us, as Che had already said goodbye. He had written the letter before he left, and he left quietly of course—you might even say clandestinely. We kept the letter quiet and this gave rise to many rumors as well as some slander. Some said that Che had been made to disappear, others that Che was dead, or that there were differences—all sorts of stories. We took that deluge of rumors and intrigues silently, so as not to endanger the mission he wanted to accomplish and the personnel he intended to take to his final destination—South America.
So after finishing the phase in Zaire he went to Tanzania, marking time. He spent some months in Tanzania and then went to a socialist country in Eastern Europe. In fact… Well, I’m not going to say more, because I haven’t checked with the country in question to see if it can be told. He stayed there. He didn’t want to return to Cuba because it would have been an embarrassment to come back after the publication of the letter.
Eventually, publication of the letter became unavoidable. It was becoming very harmful to allow the campaign of slander to continue without an answer, an explanation to world public opinion. The only alternative was to publish the letter. The letter, of course, said nothing specific about his mission. He spoke only of fighting in other parts of the world.
Once the letter had been made public—politically, it had become unavoidable to publish it—Che, with his particular character, felt very awkward about returning to Cuba after having said farewell. But in the end I persuaded him to return, because it was the best move given all the practical matters he wanted to take care of. So he secretly returned to Cuba. He stayed several months, training in a remote mountainous region. He spent months in training with those who were to accompany him.
He asked for the collaboration of a group of comrades—some were veteran guerrilla fighters, some were new men who had been in Zaire with him. He asked for their help. He selected the group and spoke with each one of them. We authorized the selection of a group of highly experienced comrades to accompany him, because the task he intended to carry out really required a group of experienced volunteers. He trained with them for several months while groundwork was undertaken to arrange for transporting him and his group to Bolivia.
Che chose the territory and worked out the plan of struggle. We gave him cooperation and support in carrying out the project, although naturally we were concerned about the inherent risks. We would have preferred a movement that was already much more developed, a movement Che could join; but he wanted to get there almost at the very beginning. We managed to hold him until at least some preliminary work had been carried out, so he could go there with a little more safety. The initial stages are the most difficult.
In fact, all this was organized perfectly, down to the last detail. Che and the other comrades were transported to a camp in the area selected. They had to overcome difficult obstacles, pass through complicated places. It wasn’t easy, but it was accomplished thanks to the methods used. They managed to join with a group of comrades in the area of Ñacahuazú, I believe it’s called, in the part of Bolivia he chose.
That was more or less the itinerary: a stay in Africa, leaving via Tanzania; eastern Zaire; a return to Tanzania; a socialist country in Europe; Cuba again and, finally, the trip to the area he had selected in Bolivia.
Gianni Minà: Was it a mistake to have chosen Bolivia, where the people were probably not yet ready for a revolution? Was it a romantic error determined by a geographic choice that was neither tactically nor strategically justified?
Fidel Castro: I wouldn’t say that. He was interested in Argentina, he was genuinely inspired by the idea of making a revolution in Argentina. But at that time we had no relations with any country in South America—all those governments had joined with the United States against Cuba. In the early days Che had recruited a group of Argentines, including Jorge Ricardo Masetti, who worked with us in the Sierra Maestra as a journalist and who later founded Prensa Latina. Che had recruited him to his ideas of struggle in Argentina. Masetti, in agreement with Che, attempted to establish a front in northern Argentina, in the Salta area. Masetti died on that mission.
Che was always a very sensitive man, highly committed to his comrades. The mere fact that he had initiated the effort, the struggle, in which some comrades had already given their lives was without doubt a factor that greatly influenced his impatience to carry out his plans. He had already studied the area in question. And the importance of the area he selected seems to have been its proximity to the Argentine border.
Che knew the Bolivian peasants were very quiet, reserved, and mistrustful. He knew they were very different from Cuban peasants. After graduating from medical school, he had traveled through South America on a motorbike. He visited a number of places, and even got as far as the Amazon. He had extensive contact with the people there and knew the tragedy of the Indians, their characteristics. He knew this very well and felt it deeply. More than once he explained to me, told me what they were like, how you had to work with them, how this took time, that it wasn’t easy. He was conscious of the difficulties of the task ahead.
So what happened? He had witnessed our experience, our almost incredible experience. After the initial setbacks, he saw how a very small group could reorganize and carry out a struggle under very difficult conditions. He had blind faith in this type of struggle and its possibilities, even more so now that he had enormous experience in it.
So Che chose the territory, the place. And essentially, I would say he made no mistake in his choice. No mistake was made. He tried to gain the support of organized political forces. He assumed he could count on the support of the Bolivian Communist Party and other forces. It turned out that other forces joined him, because there were divisions at that time within the left, within the communist movement.
Gianni Minà: In this regard, Che’s father has said publicly that the Bolivian Communist Party is responsible for Che’s death: that if they did not betray him, they surely left him to die. And is it true, as Régis Debray has said, that Che could have been saved if an expedition of young Bolivian communists had set out from Cochabamba?
Fidel Castro: I share none of these views. And I believe I am very well informed on these questions.
The Bolivian Communist Party had various leaders. The general secretary, Mario Monje, had already been spoken with, and an agreement of sorts had been reached. But other leaders were involved as well. It was that, really, that led to the conflict with Monje. That is well known, it’s part of history. A conflict arose between Che and Monje over certain of Monje’s positions, perhaps over pretensions of his concerning leadership, pretensions Che did not accept.
I believe that formal factors prevailed in Monje’s thinking, along the lines that it was his country where action was to begin, that he was the general secretary of the party. But in reality there was no one, no cadre, better prepared than Che to lead an action that transcended the borders of Bolivia. This gave rise to misunderstandings, and they were not able to reach agreement. Monje withdrew his support.
We received this information and immediately arranged meetings here with other important and prestigious leaders of the party, with Kolle and with Simón Reyes, a well-known and very good workers’ leader. I asked them to come to Cuba, spoke with them, and told them, “A crisis has emerged, and it’s a very delicate situation. I have asked you to come meet with us because it is essential that you give Che some help.”
They promised to help, they were ready to provide assistance and collaboration. They did everything possible, although in disagreement with the party secretary. What happened is that the pace of events quickened, and there was no chance for them to help. But they had an excellent attitude and understood everything in the meeting I had with them. Kolle later became leader of the party, replacing Monje. Simón Reyes also took on important responsibilities in the party leadership. They were part of the Bolivian Communist Party and they made a commitment.
When we received information about this sort of situation, that is the kind of solution we sought. We managed to gain the support of other movements and also of a few Latin Americans. This was the stage the work was at when events became complicated and, in fact, their presence was discovered. For one reason or another, a combination of factors, the detachment was spotted while it was still in the stage of organization. I believe they needed a little bit more time.
Monje bears a certain responsibility, but historically it would be unjust to blame the Bolivian Communist Party as a whole. A number of communists joined Che. These included the Peredo brothers, excellent people who proved to be very fine cadres. They joined and supported Che, gave him a great deal of help. And important cadres in the party leadership differed with Monje and wanted to help Che. So when responsibility is assigned, it should be given to Monje; but you cannot accuse the entire Bolivian Communist Party or blame it for the way events developed.
Gianni Minà: In Europe it is also said…
Fidel Castro: As for Debray, I didn’t even respond to that because it belongs to the realm of fantasy. Yes, it is only fantasy, because not even the most minimal conditions existed to organize a column that could have helped Che. There were no weapons, no trained combatants, and no trainees. It’s a theory, it can only be spoken of as a theory; it’s a fantasy. You have to understand this is not regular war, it’s guerrilla war, irregular war, and this kind of war has its own laws. It wasn’t that way. You can’t solve things so easily.
Gianni Minà: In Europe it’s also said the publisher Feltrinelli contributed—without intending to, of course—to leading the CIA to the traces of Che’s little group in the woods near Vallegrande. Is there any truth in that?
Fidel Castro: This is the first time, in fact, I have heard that; the first time I’ve heard that rumor, that version. There isn’t the slightest possibility Feltrinelli did anything that affected the situation. Today the whole history of the matter is known. Many books have been written about it, and I have read them. First of all, there’s Che’s diary, which I have studied carefully, very carefully. I knew Che very well, and through the diary I was able to see each of his states of mind, each thing, because I knew him so well.
Then there are all the documents written by the Bolivian army, detailing the information they were receiving: when, at what point, how they interpreted it, what they did. This whole story has been written, and not just by revolutionaries. In addition, there are the diaries of other comrades who survived, of those who were with Che until the final moments, diaries that fell into the hands of the Bolivian army. We know the testimony, we know step by step what occurred. There were a few lapses in discipline, some acts of poor judgment that gave the enemy indications something was going on, although they didn’t know the magnitude. But this had nothing to do with Feltrinelli or with anybody, really. These facts are known in minute detail.
There is one thing. They already had camps set up, they had created all the conditions; these are facts that have been told before. The army managed to determine there was something strange going on, but this coincided with other circumstances. Che began an incursion with a large detachment to explore the terrain and make a broad sweep through the area. They left the newest people in camp, those who had just arrived. But the trip lasted several weeks; it turned into a veritable odyssey. Che’s diary describes in detail how they confronted high mountains, harsh terrain, swollen rivers. They also suffered some losses on the trip—some drownings, one or two casualties.
The troops returned completely exhausted after several weeks on the march. When they returned to the camp they discovered there had been some problems in Che’s absence—some infractions of discipline, some difficulties. But the worst was that although the troops were worn out, with a few men ill, they had no time to recover. In a few short days the army began to carry out some explorations and the first fighting took place. Because of their experience, Che’s men suffered no losses. In fact, ambushes they set with a few men captured weapons and dealt the adversary a hard blow.
But I would say all this happened prematurely. They made another incursion, again leaving a force behind in the camp. This produced a division into two groups that were never to make contact with one another again. Moreover, Che didn’t have enough medicine for his asthma. It was the same thing that had happened on the Granma, where there was no medicine. In the Sierra Maestra we really had to make an exceptional effort to get Che medicine at any cost, because the terrible asthma attacks paralyzed him. He was in great need of the medicine, but during this whole period he went without it.
All this is described in Che’s diary with great rigor, precision, and narrative quality. Each event is described very clearly. This was quite a feat, because they spent months evading and fighting the army. These were not the circumstances for discussing the idea of a support column. Nobody knew where they were. All communications had been cut by the enemy. In the cities the contact points were under constant observation.
At that moment the fate of the guerrilla unit depended on what they themselves did. Che believed his guerrilla unit of 20 men could survive if they relocated, as he proposed, to a place with a social base, where Inti and Coco Peredo were known. That is where they were headed in this final stage. Che knew this was their best chance.
From the description of everything that took place—not only from his diary but also the accounts of the Bolivian army—the feat they did accomplish is impressive, including the number of battles they waged against the army. What they accomplished was of epic proportions. All this is well known.
What could have influenced him? I have an opinion. I think he was deeply affected by the deaths of those in the other group. We had news of their death from wire service dispatches. They described how it happened. From our own experience we concluded at once that the news was exact, correct, and truthful. Tamara [Tania], Joaquín, the whole unit had been killed. But Che resisted believing it. You can see from his diary he resisted believing it for months. He thought it was another lie by the army, because they had put out a number of false reports. For our part, however, when we saw the dispatches we were immediately convinced it was true.
When he was really convinced—because nearly all his efforts and many of their marches were aimed at trying to make contact with the other unit—when he was really persuaded they no longer existed and he was not going to meet up with them, that is when he began the march toward an area with a social base. By this time he already had some good Bolivian cadres who had distinguished themselves. It was the correct decision; he did have a chance to survive.
How much did the death of the other comrades affect his state of mind? I believe at the end he acted with a certain recklessness. They were walking along a road and at one point he stopped on high ground and said, “Radio Bemba [word of mouth] has been here ahead of us, everyone is expecting us.” That’s more or less what he said. You can read it in his diary. They were walking along a road toward the area, a public road, when he reached a ridge and wrote in his diary, “Our arrival is being announced by Radio Bemba.” That is, everyone was waiting for them.
I think the certainty that Joaquín’s unit had been killed influenced his state of mind. I knew him well, I knew how strongly he felt things, and I think in that moment he was acting in conformity with his nature, with a certain degree of recklessness.
He continued to advance, entered the town in daylight, and found it empty. An empty town is a sign that something is up. The people sense a battle is going to take place. Any army—any army in the world!—under those circumstances has only to wait somewhere along the road and set an ambush. And on one of those barren hills, in full light of day, the advance guard began to march as though the army didn’t exist. It fell into an ambush in broad daylight, and several men were killed. It was a very serious blow.
The group was also carrying some sick men, including a sick doctor. Che insisted on carrying them even though it held up their movement. Sometimes we ourselves, in similar situations, sought a place where we could leave a sick person—someone who could no longer march—with someone who could take care of them. Che must have been looking for such a possibility. But he had already lost his advance guard. They had been spotted and trapped in a valley, and the dead included some of the good people among the Bolivians. Among the dead was one of the two Peredo brothers who had distinguished themselves so much as Bolivian cadres.
The attack left Che in a very difficult situation in difficult terrain. He had managed to evade the army for months while fighting constantly. He had carried out a feat of epic proportions. But he now found himself in an extremely critical situation. He had been spotted, attacked, and wounded. His rifle had been destroyed. He was taken prisoner and moved to a nearby place.
I would say that even when he was marching with 20 men, including a few Bolivian cadres, if they made it to the area they sought, they would have had possibilities not just of surviving but of developing the guerrilla movement. Up until that time, judging by all Che knew and the experience we had, that possibility existed. The moment in which things really changed was when they advanced in broad daylight along a public road in those barren hills where the advance guard was ambushed.
So he must have been greatly influenced by something: his scorn for death—sometimes it seemed as though he went looking for death, at least at certain moments. In such circumstances he really should have advanced more cautiously, gotten off the road, looked for other places. And they should have traveled by night. The ambush, had it been carried out at night, would not have inflicted such great damage. The enemy would have been shooting in the dark, and they might have been spotted by a light or some other indication. I believe that at that moment certain elements in Che’s character influenced events.
I knew him very well, and I have read his diary carefully, more than once.
Gianni Minà: At this stage was there anything you could have done to assist him? I mean, in this final stage of his epic struggle?
Fidel Castro: It was impossible. What could we have done? Sent a battalion, a company, a regular army? The laws of guerrilla warfare are different; everything depends on what the guerrilla unit itself does. They really did carry out an epic struggle. Some day their accomplishments will be recounted more objectively. The Bolivian army itself in its descriptions… There was one general, General Gary Prado, I read his book [How I Captured Che.] It reflects the official point of view, but he doesn’t conceal his admiration for his adversary.
Clashes with the army occurred a number of times. Che knew what to do just as we did. When we arrived in the Sierra we too were dispersed, we managed to gather together seven rifles. We began the struggle again in the Sierra Maestra, where we knew no one, with seven rifles. When we had reached 20 men, we were a force to be reckoned with. Che had confidence in the possibilities of irregular struggle, he knew how to do it.
In such circumstances the guerrilla unit depends on itself. It can neither expect nor receive help from abroad; such assistance is practically impossible. It wasn’t possible, and secret assistance wasn’t possible either: the entire network of support had been broken up. At that moment everything depended on their own actions. That’s why formulas of conventional warfare, speculation about columns that set out, that come and go, don’t apply here. All that belongs to the realm of fantasy.
Gianni Minà: President Castro, at the dramatic moment of Che’s death a story about you circulated in Europe. It speculated that after the summit meeting in Glassboro in New Jersey between Soviet Premier Kosygin and US President Johnson, the United States and the Soviet Union decided to reach a truce in Asia and Latin America. And that is why Cuba was unable to do anything more to help Che in Bolivia.
Fidel Castro: I am astounded at the number of rumors and fantasies that circulate in Europe. I’m going to begin believing Europe is the least informed area of the world.
Gianni Minà: That may be.
Fidel Castro: I really don’t even remember that meeting. The war in Vietnam was at its peak, and Che’s action was under way. Neither had anything to do with the other. There was no Soviet participation in this, there was no question of strategy that was being discussed. Really, what it amounted to was that with great loyalty we gave Che the assistance he asked for, the comrades he asked for, the collaboration he asked for, everything. We stood by our word.
What is it that we would have preferred? That Che wait. We would have preferred that he wait until a developed guerrilla front had been established, but we couldn’t impose such a decision on him.
We knew we might face political problems, state problems, denunciations, everything of that sort. But we accepted that type of inconvenience so as to fulfill our pledge to him. We respected that commitment. Not only did we respect it, we believed in what he was doing, and we believed he could carry out what he proposed.
I have always said that success or failure is not what indicates whether a line is correct. We all could have died during our struggle; we were on the verge of death many times. If we had died, many people would have said we were wrong. But I think if we had died, it would not have proved we were wrong. I think our road was correct. A series of elements, of imponderables, intervened—including luck—and we almost miraculously survived those difficult days. That would be another long story. But in such circumstances you can’t say success is the measure of whether or not a line is correct. Certain factors led to an adverse result, but I don’t question the correctness of Che’s line. What I say is that I would have preferred he avoid the initial highly dangerous stage, that he join the group as political and military leader, as strategist in a movement that had passed the early stage.
Because of Che’s courage, his qualities, his importance, in our war we gave him the most important missions. We didn’t give him this mission. The idea, the plan, everything, was his. We shared in it with him because we thought his ideas were correct. He could have done it. He could have done it! I am not going to conclude that because certain factors exerted influence, resulting in the elimination of the guerrilla unit and the death of Che—I am not going to conclude because of this that his course was wrong. You cannot measure the correctness of a line by success or failure. That, in my opinion, would be a mistaken criterion.
That’s not the only example. We have seen another case, that of [Francisco] Caamaño, also a man of the highest courage, who could not overcome his impatience to return to his country [the Dominican Republic] and did so. I talked with him a great deal, I knew him well.
I know then of two cases of great cadres whose impatience led them to their deaths. It’s not simply death that is at issue here, the sadness death brings. It is rather that two great cadres, two great revolutionaries, died in this way. And Caamaño with fewer possibilities than Che. Caamaño was a good soldier and well trained. But conditions were also difficult and the group was very small. We would have preferred that these valued cadres be preserved for a more opportune moment.
We did not impose our point of view on them, nor did we prohibit their courageous actions. We had excellent relations of friendship and trust. Che gave great attention to my point of view and to the opinions I expressed, because we maintained a deep and trusting friendship up until the end. It was his idea. Forbidding him to carry it out was outside the type of relationship we had. Not even for reasons of state would I impose an opinion on him. What we did was help him. We helped something we thought was possible. We would not have been able to help something we thought was impossible, something in which we did not believe, because it would have been our duty to tell him: it’s not possible, we can’t do that, we can’t sacrifice comrades on this mission. But he did what he did. I shared in it and I believed in it.
There is only one thing I would have done differently. He should have waited until a strong movement had developed before a cadre of his quality and strategic importance joined the struggle. He should not have gone through the initial stage. This is the most difficult and dangerous phase, as the facts showed, and it resulted in his death.
Gianni Minà: Why didn’t the Bolivian authorities ever return Che’s body? Did he still scare them even following his death?
Fidel Castro: They wanted to get rid of Che’s body to prevent the establishment of a site that would be venerated and visited by people.
We still don’t know what they did with Che’s body, or where it is. This has never been clarified. Many of his things, belongings, have surfaced. We know everything that happened, from the accounts of both sides, which agree on most points. What we still don’t know is where Che was buried. They wanted him to disappear. The United States also wanted him to disappear.
Nonetheless, Che has become a great symbol for the entire world, the perfect example of the heroic and revolutionary person. He became, I would add, one of the most outstanding examples of a combatant and revolutionary in the Third World, and perhaps in the industrialized world as well. And this idea, this image of Che, is not without justification.
Gianni Minà: There’s a striking coincidence linked to Che’s death. Sixteen or 17 persons directly or indirectly responsible for his murder in Bolivia have died, not always in the clearest of circumstances.
Fidel Castro: It does seem there have been people who played a part in his murder who have died this way. The likelihood is that no one organized it, that it’s simply the people’s spontaneous action, bringing to justice those who acted in a contemptible way. I’m not referring to the soldiers who fought against him, but rather to people who served as informers, traitors, and henchmen.
Gianni Minà: Down to the peasant who…
Fidel Castro: I think his name was Honorato.
Gianni Minà: Honorato Rojas.
Fidel Castro: I read about that in the book written by the Bolivian general, Gary Prado, a man who has become something of an invalid. I understand he is now in Washington as military attaché. He wrote a very objective and respectful book, although of course it also has high praise for the Bolivian army. But I’m not going to deny him, a Bolivian soldier, this sentiment toward his institution. The Bolivian army was poorly trained. It was acquiring more experience during that period, this is indisputable. The United States made a considerable effort, they intensified their training plans, because they wanted to destroy Che.
Gianni Minà: Two people as reserved as you and Che, how did you greet each other the last time you saw each other? With the hug of old friends, or with a handshake?
Fidel Castro: We saw each other many times. Very warmly and with much affection. No, a hug, without much effusiveness, because we are not very effusive. He wasn’t; I’m not. But we feel things deeply. And with great trust. We talked many times. I went to see him several times while he was training the group. They spent months in the province of Pinar del Río.
Gianni Minà: And the day he left?
Fidel Castro: The day he left I went so far as to play a joke. The day he left for good I invited a number of members of the party leadership, the most trusted comrades, to lunch with a visitor. The visitor was Che, disguised. Absolutely no one recognized him in the disguise that had been created. Che had lunch with a few others at a house here in Havana the day before he left—and none of those comrades recognized him either. We had to tell the comrades who came for lunch that it was Che. So as you can see he was very well prepared when he left; nobody recognized him. It was really perfect. Nobody recognized him, not even his closest comrades, who were talking with him the way they would talk with a guest. So we went so far as to play jokes such as this on the comrades the day before he left.
Gianni Minà: I thank you for all you have told me. I believe I had the pleasure of hearing in your words some of the history of our times, of what we are living, thinking, or have hoped. This is something I want to thank you for.
Fidel Castro: We have the obligation to be just. There is no reason to make accusations. We all have things we’re sufficiently responsible for, but Monje’s responsibility, the other… Well, that’s why I explained the story to you in detail.
And that is why I wrote the introduction, what I called “a necessary introduction,” when we published Che’s [Bolivian] diary. I explained everything, with much more detail, and the role of everyone involved. I wrote the introduction to explain a range of things, and we published it widely. Later the diary circulated throughout the world. We have such a duty to be objective.
I think I know quite well everything that happened. I have thought a great deal about it, analyzed all the documents, and I think I knew Che quite well; I knew him very, very well. I am very sure about the facts, how they occurred, and what factors may have influenced the course of events.
This is something I have never spoken of before. There are still many chapters of history to be written. What is missing is someone to write them, because those who can write them don’t have the time to do so.