By Jove! They are our men
By dawn, Cox was still not yet in a position to attack. With the exception of 4 (Australian) Brigade, his other units remained scattered or, in the case of 39 Brigade, still missing. His own staff only consisted of a brigade-major and a staff captain. He attempted to organize his troops into four columns, which would be the responsibility of the column commanders to gather and position themselves ready for the assault at 4.15 am. The battalions were now organised in a ‘column’ according to where Cox believed them to be located. Confused and tired already, this reshuffle was a risky decision that would have dire consequences later.
Lieutenant Colonel F.G.H. Sutton and No. 1 Column would attack the northern slopes of Chunuk Bair. This column comprised 6/South Lancs (38 Brigade), 9/Warwicks (39 Brigade) and Sutton’s own 10/Gurkhas (Indian Brigade). Lieutenant Colonel T.A. Andrus would command No. 2 Column with the objective of the southern peak of Hill Q. It comprised 7/North Staffs (39 Brigade), 9/Worcesters (39 Brigade) and 6/Gurkhas (Indian Brigade). Lieutenant Colonel P.C. Palin would command No. 3 Column and attack the northern peak of Hill Q, leading 14/Sikhs and 5/Gurkhas (Indian Brigade). Lastly, Brigadier General Monash would lead No. 4 Column, with the objective of Abdul Rahman Spur and Hill 971. His forces comprised his Australian brigade and the attached 6/King’s Own (38 Brigade). Brigadier General Cayley would not command in the assault, but would be in command of the ridge as soon as it had been captured.
Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Andrus ordered his men forward just after dark, bringing 7/North Staffs and 9/Worcesters up towards 6/Gurkhas on the slopes below Hill Q. Unfortunately, the two New Army battalions struggled to get onto the scrubby high ground and become fragmented in the twisting gullies below. By dawn, when they should have been advancing on Hill Q, they were still strung out deep below, in Aghyl Dere. Major Allanson’s 6/Gurkhas were still very much on their own, having climbed to the lower slopes of Chamchak Punar the previous day, lodging themselves about 450 metres below the crest of Hill Q. Allanson had waited all day and night for signs of the other battalions, so on 8 August he decided to advance without them. The Gurkhas continued their climb, but this time encountered increasing opposition and suffered more casualties. They eventually reached a spot on Chamchak Punar, within 180 metres of Hill Q’s crest. In a deep nullah below his position Allanson spotted parties of men from the 6/South Lancs and 7/North Staffs. After dark he gathered a company of the South Lancs and forced his way up another fifty metres despite the enemy fire and thick scrub. Here he called a halt until dusk.