Notes

I    The epistemic backdrop for locating consciousness in a naturalist ontology

1    Leibniz, ‘‘Monadology’’ 17, in Leibniz Selections, ed. Philip Weiner (N. Y.: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1951), 536.

2    Geoffrey Madell, Mind and Materialism (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1988), 141.

3    Colin McGinn, The Mysterious Flame (N.Y.: Basic Books, 1999), 13-14. See G. K. Chesterton’s claim that the regular correlation between diverse entities in the world is magic that requires a Magician to explain it. See Orthodoxy (John Lane Company, 1908; repr., San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1950), chapter five.

4    Crispin Wright, “The Conceivability of Naturalism,” in Conceivability and Possibility, ed. by Tamar Szabo Gendler and John Hawthorne (Oxford: Clarendon, 2002), 401 (the article is from 401-39).

5    William Lyons, ‘‘Introduction,’’ in Modern Philosophy of Mind, ed. by William Lyons, (London: Everyman, 1995), lv. In context, Lyons remark is specifically about the identity thesis, but he clearly intends it to cover physicalism in general. Similarly, while he explicitly mentions an entity in the category of indivi-dual—the soul—the context of his remark makes clear that he includes mental properties and events among the entities out of step with scientific materialism.

6    Cf. Alex Rosenberg, “A Field Guide to Recent Species of Naturalism,’’ British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 47 (1996): 1-29; J. P. Moreland, ‘The Argument from Consciousness,’’ in The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Religion, ed. by Paul Copan, Chad Meister (London: Routledge, 2006), 204-20; J. P. Moreland and William Lane Craig, eds, Naturalism: A Critical Analysis (London: Routledge, 2000); Steven Wagner and Richard Warner, eds, Naturalism: A Critical Appraisal (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1993); Michael Rea, World Without Design (Oxford: Clarendon, 2002).

7    David Papineau, Philosophical Naturalism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), 3.

8    Wilfrid Sellars, Science, Perception, and Reality (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963), 173.

9    Steven J. Wagner and Richard Warner, Naturalism: A Critical Appraisal (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1993), 1.

10 Roy Bhaskar, The Possibility of Naturalism (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1979), 3.

II    John Searle, The Rediscovery of the Mind (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1992), 11.

12 I am assuming here a realist construal of explanation according to which we seek explanations that carve the world at the joints, that quantify over real entities, and/or that provide at least approximately true causal accounts of phenomena. I set aside anti-realist notions of explanation, e.g. adopting an intentional stance whose function merely is to provide accurate predictions of behavior.

13    David Papineau, Philosophical Naturalism, 3.

14    Paul Churchland, Matter and Consciousness (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1984), 67-81, especially 71.

15    Keith Campbell, “Abstract Particulars and the Philosophy of Mind,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (1983): 129-41; Abstract Particulars (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990), 43-45.

16    Papineau, Philosophical Naturalism, 1-5; 29-32.

17    Colin McGinn, The Mysterious Flame, 55-56. Cf. 54-62, 90, 95.

18    John Searle, The Rediscovery of the Mind, 83-93.

19    I will continue to talk in terms of particles and not fields because much of the literature in philosophy of mind does so, e.g. debates about atomic simples and constitution, but I do not think anything important hangs on this. Cf. Robert Clifton and Hans Halverson, ‘‘No place for particles in relativistic quantum theories?” Philosophy of Science 69 (2002): 1-28.

20    Bruce Aune, Metaphysics: The Elements (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1985), 35.

21    D. M. Armstrong, “Naturalism, Materialism, and First Philosophy,” Philosophia 8 (1978): 263. Cf. Universals and Scientific Realism Volume I: Nominalism & Realism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 126-35. Subsequently, Armstrong has modified and weakened this formulation of his criterion of being: “Everything that exists makes a difference to the causal powers of something.” See A World of States of Affairs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 41-43.

22    Daniel Dennett, Elbow Room (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1984), 76.

23    Keith Campbell, Abstract Particulars (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990), 172.

24    Jaegwon Kim, ‘‘Mental Causation and Two Conceptions of Mental Properties,'' unpublished paper delivered at the American Philosophical Association Eastern Division Meeting, Atlanta, Georgia, December 27-30, 1993, 23.

25    See J. P. Moreland, ‘‘Naturalism and the Ontological Status of Properties,'' in Naturalism: A Critical Analysis, edited by J. P. Moreland and William Lane Craig (London: Routledge, 2000), 67-109; J. P. Moreland, Universals (Canada: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2001), 121-29.

26    Frank Jackson, From Metaphysics to Ethics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), 1-5.

27    Ibid., 13.

28    Ibid., 14.

29    Ibid., 25.

30    For a treatment of and bibliography for Brentano's treatment of parts and wholes, see R. M. Chisholm, Brentano and Intrinsic Value (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); for a treatment of and bibliography for Husserl’s treatment of parts and wholes, see Barry Smith, ed., Parts and Moments: Studies in Logic and Formal Ontology (Munchen: Philosophia Verlag, 1982); J. P. Moreland, ‘‘Naturalism, Nominalism, and Husserlian Moments,'' The Modern Schoolman 79 (January/March 2002): 199-216.

31    See Peter van Inwagen, Material Beings (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990); Trenton Merricks, Objects and Persons (N. Y.: Oxford: Clarendon, 2001).

32    J. P. Moreland, Universals (Bucks, Great Britain: Acumen Press; Canada: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2001); “Theories of Individuation: A Reconsideration of Bare Particulars,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 79 (1998): 25163; ‘‘Issues and Options in Individuation,'' Grazer Philosophische Studien 60 (Winter 2000): 31-54.

33    Boundaries or surfaces also provide a way of avoiding Aristotelian universalism. Not all ‘‘collections’’ of objects standing in various relations have surfaces or boundaries and, thus, are not genuine wholes.

34 Jackson, From Metaphysics to Ethics, 18.

35    Jaegwon Kim, Mind in a Physical World (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1998), 40.

36    See John Haldane, “The Mystery of Emergence,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96 (1996): 263.

37    See Kim, Mind in a Physical World, 29-56; Physicalism, or Something Near Enough (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 2005), 8-22, 32-69; Philosophy of Mind (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 2nd. ed., 2006), 173-204.

38    Cf. Theodore Sider, “What’s So Bad About Overdetermination?” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (November 2003): 719-26. Sider’s target is the part/whole overdetermination that figures into Trenton Merricks book Objects and Persons (Oxford: Clarendon, 2001). But Sider does include other sorts of overdetermination in his discussion among which is (alleged) mental/ physical overdetermination. In my view, however effective his critique is against Merricks’ form of overdetermination, it fails as a rebuttal to those who eschew mental/physical overdetermination. Two areas of Sider’s discussion are what he calls the metaphysical and coincidence objections. A central aspect of the former amounts to the claim that overdetermination is metaphysically incoherent because it is precluded by the correct theory of causation. Sider attempts to rebut this claim with respect to various theories of causation. For example, he claims that on a counterfactual analysis of causation, the shattering of the glass is counterfactually dependent on the baseball and its parts and an effect could counterfactually depend on the instantiation of mental and physical properties. But if mental properties are contingently related to physical ones, such dependence is too bizarre to count as an analysis of causation: It does not range throughout possible worlds where the effect is produced by the physical cause alone (worlds without mental states), the mental cause alone (worlds without physical antecedents to physical actions), or inverted worlds with mental/physi-cal properties instantiated but in which the mental is unrelated to the physical cause or the effect. Moreover, the counterfactual analysis would violate the (admittedly controversial) principle of the conditional excluded middle from mental states to either brain states or physical actions. Nor could one count on the generation of stabilizing nested counterfactuals across relevantly close worlds. And Sider begs the question and merely asserts that on a primitive causal analysis, an effect can be primitively related to both a mental and physical cause. Perhaps he believes his assertion is prima facie justified because he also asserts that it does not seem wrong to say that human actions have both physical and mental causes. On the contrary, this does seem wrong. Rather, what seems to be true is that human actions have both physical and mental causal conditions that are jointly sufficient. Regarding the coincidence objection (overdetermination is tantamount to postulating unexplained coincidences on a massive scale—one might as well postulate that every person killed by a bullet is really killed by two bullets that just happen to hit at the same time), Sider replies that (1) the joint causal activity of mental and physical events is a function of the realization relation connecting them and, thus, no coincidence and (2) there are necessary truths that govern the correlation between mental and physical events. Regarding (1) the realization relation applies only if we functionalize the mental event, and we are assuming that mental events are genuinely emergent (and contingently related to physical events) in which case the exemplification and not the realization relation is relevant. Further, we could create a thought experiment in which a shadow (functionally) realizes its associated object, but it would be the object’s impact on a second object that was causally responsible for the second object and its shadow moving, not the first object’s shadow. Regarding (2), the connection between the mental and physical is contingent, so there are no such necessary truths.

39    Roger Sperry, “In Defense of Mentalism and Emergent Interaction,” Journal of Mind and Behaviour 12 (Spring 1991): 221-45.

40    Ibid, 230; emphasis is Sperry’s.

41    See Kim, Mind in a Physical World, chapter 3.

42    See J. P. Moreland, Universals.

43    Nick Herbert, Quantum Reality (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, 1985), 15-29.

44    Cf. J. P. Moreland, “Should a Naturalist Be a Supervenient Physicalist?” Metaphilosophy 29 (January/April 1998): 35-57.

45    D. M. Armstrong, Universals and Scientific Realism Volume I: Nominalism & Realism, (1978), 130.

46    D. M. Armstrong, “Naturalism: Materialism and First Philosophy,” Philosophia 8 (1978): 262.

47    D. M. Armstrong, The Mind-Body Problem: An Opinionated Introduction (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1999), 2-5, 10-11, 47-48.

48    Ibid., 124.

49    D. M. Armstrong, “Can A Naturalist Believe in Universals?” in Science in Reflection, ed. by Edna Ullmann-Margalit (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1988), 111-12; Universals & Scientific Realism Volume II: A Theory of Universals (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 84-88.

50    Cf. Roderick Chisholm, Theory of Knowledge (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice Hall, 3rd. ed., 1989); On Metaphysics (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989), especially 162-68.

51    Kim, Philosophy of Mind, 2nd edition (2006), 91. Cf. 89.

52    See Jaegwon Kim, Physicalism or Something Near Enough (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 2005), especially chapter six. Cf. his Mind in a Physical World, chapter four.

53    See Jackson, From Metaphysics to Ethics, 24-27. By ‘‘entails'' here Jackson means the ordinary truth-functional connective. Jackson actually thinks physic-alism a priori entails the psychological and that this is a necessary truth. If physicalism φ is true, then of necessity the psychological truths ψ follow a priori. Jackson employs a version of two-dimensional semantics to defend the claim that instances of φ!ψ are priori necessary. But this is a stronger claim and many naturalists, e.g. those of a Kripkean persuasion, would not follow him in this, so I shall employ the weaker truth-functional version in what follows. I am indebted to Shaun McNaughton for pointing this out to me.

54    Roderick Chisholm, Theory of Knowledge (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 3rd. ed., 1989), 16.

55    Timothy O’Connor, Persons & Causes (N. Y.: Oxford University Press, 2000), 112.

56    Ibid., 70-71, fn. 8.

2 The argument from consciousness

1 For example, suppose theory S explains phenomena in terms of discrete corpuscles and actions by contact, while R uses continuous waves to explain phenomena. If some phenomenon x was best explained in corpuscularian categories, it would be ad hoc and question-begging for advocates of R simply to adjust their entities to take on particle properties in the case of x. Such properties would not bear a relevant similarity to other entities in R and would be more natural and at home in S.

2    For example, suppose that R is Neo-Darwinism and S is a version of punctuated equilibrium theory. Simply for the sake of illustration, suppose further, that R depicts evolutionary transitions from one species to another to involve running through a series of incrementally different transitional forms except for some specific transition e which is taken as a basic phenomenon, say, the discrete jump from amphibians to reptiles. S pictures evolutionary transitions in general, including e, as evolutionary jumps to be explained in certain ways that constitute S. In this case, given the presence of S, it would be hard for advocates of R to claim that their treatment of e is adequate against S. Phenomenon e clearly counts in favor of S over against R.

3    Evan Fales, Naturalism and Physicalism, in The Cambridge Companion to Atheism, ed. by Michael Martin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 120. In presenting alternative naturalist ontologies ranging from what he calls sparse to liberal, Fales does not do an adequate job of relating the naturalist epistemology and Grand Story to the role they should play in placing constraints on a naturalist ontology for those naturalists who claim to have a worldview with explanatory superiority to theism. As a result, besides being ad hoc and begging the question against theism, some of the (more liberal) ontologies presented by Fales run amuck in light of considerations noted in chapter one.

4    Jaegwon Kim, The Philosophy of Mind (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 2006), 233.

5    Angus Menuge, Agents Under Fire (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004).

6    See Robert Adams, “Flavors, Colors, and God,” reprinted in Contemporary Perspectives on Religious Epistemology, ed. by R. Douglas Geivett, Brendan Sweetman (N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 1992), 225-40.

7    Richard Swinburne, The Existence of God (Oxford: Clarendon, 1979), chapter 9; The Evolution of the Soul (Oxford: Clarendon, 1986), 183-96; Is there a God? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 69-94; “The Origin of Consciousness,”” in Cosmic Beginnings and Human Ends, ed. by Clifford N. Matthews, Roy Abraham Varghese (Chicago and La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 1995), 355-78.

8    See Richard Swinburne, The Existence of God (Oxford: Clarendon, 1979), 6-8, 16-19.

9    In chapters six and seven, we will examine, respectively, panpsychism and pluralistic emergentist monism. I will conclude that each is not, in fact, a version of but, rather, a rival to naturalism. To simplify our present discussion, let us disregard this claim until chapters six and seven and consider panpsychism and pluralistic emergentist monism as versions of naturalism.

10    Quentin Smith, ‘‘The Metaphilosophy of Naturalism,” Philo (2001).

11    Timothy O’Connor and Hong Yu Wong, ‘‘The Metaphysics of Emergence,” Nous 39 (2005): 665-66.

12    I am indebted to Thomas Crisp for pointing this out to me.

13    David Papineau, Philosophical Naturalism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), 119, 120.

14    Cf. D. M. Armstrong, ‘‘Naturalism: Materialism and First Philosophy,'' Philo-sophia 8 (1978): 262.

15    Cf. Paul Churchland, Matter and Consciousness (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, rev. ed., 1988), 21-22.

16    Cf. Terence Horgan, ‘‘Nonreductive Materialism and the Explanatory Autonomy of Psychology,'' in Naturalism, ed. by Steven J. Wagner, Richard Warner (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1993), 313-14.

17    Richard Swinburne, The Evolution of the Soul, revised edition (Oxford: Clarendon, 1997), 183-96.

18    Ibid.

19    John Bishop, Natural Agency (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 36-44, 74-76. Selmer Bringsjord rejects Swinburne’s version of AC because it focuses on the regular correlations of specific types of mental and physical events. But Bringsjord thinks that a version of AC that starts with agent causation is likely to be successful. See ‘‘Swinburne’s Argument from Consciousness,” Philosophy of Religion 19 (1986): 140-41.

20    See Alvin Plantinga, Warrant and Proper Function (N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 1993), 194-237. Cf. James Beilby, ed., Naturalism Defeated? Essays on Plantinga’s Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 2002).

21    Swinburne, Evolution of the Soul, 191-95.

22    See Roderick Chisholm, Theory of Knowledge (Englewood Cliff, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 2d. ed., 1977), 20-22; Theory of Knowledge (Englewood Cliff, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 3d. ed., 1989), 18-25; The First Person (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1981), 79-83.

23    Chisholm, Theory of Knowledge (Englewood Cliff, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 3d. ed., 1989), 19.

24    See Roderick Chisholm, On Metaphysics (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989), 143-45; cf. A Realist Theory of Categories (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 11-21.

25    Elsewhere, I have argued that propositions of this sort cannot be reduced to or replaced by sentences that do not employ ‘‘red,'' ‘‘color,'' ‘‘green,'' and ‘‘yellow'' as abstract singular terms. See J. P. Moreland, Universals (Great Britain: Acumen Press; Canada: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2001), 40-49, 71-73; ‘‘Nominalism And Abstract Reference,’’ American Philosophical Quarterly 27 (October 1990): 325-34.

26    Cf. Peter Ludlow, Yujin Nagasawa, and Daniel Stoljar, eds., There’s Something About Mary (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2004).

27    Searle makes a similar point but it is in the context of phenomenal consciousness. See his The Mystery of Consciousness (N.Y: The New York Review of Books, 1997), 30-31.

28    Howard Robinson has argued persuasively that attempts by Arthur Peacocke and Donald Davidson to embrace physicalism but avoid reductionism actually fail because of a confusion about the nature of reduction. See Howard Robinson, Matter and Sense (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 22-34. Such accounts do avoid analytic reduction, claims Robinson, but they entail a topic neutral reduction of persons to complexly organized physical entities combined with a token physical analysis of mental events. For an argument that shows that the holism of the mental does not entail a denial of strong psycho-physical laws, see John Foster, ‘‘A Defense of Dualism,'' in The Case For Dualism, ed. by John R. Smythies, John Beloff (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1989), 15-17.

29    For a careful naturalist defense of this claim, see David Papineau, Philosophical Naturalism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), 9-51, especially 36-43.

30    Bishop, Natural Agency, 58, 72, 69, 95-96, 103-4, 110-11, 114, 126-27, 14041, 144. Bishop also admits that a causal analysis of agency requires a physic-alist view of the mental if the account is to satisfy the constraints that are part of a naturalist theory of agency. See 8, 43, 103.

31    John Bishop, Natural Agency, 8, 43, 103.

32    See J.P. Moreland and Scott Rae, Body & Soul (Downers Grove, Illinois: InterVarsity Press, 2000), 122-46, especially 135-44.

33    Samuel Alexander, Space, Time and Deity: The Gifford Lectures at Glasgow, 1916-1918, vol. 2 (New York: Dover Publications, 1920, 1966), 47.

34    Jaegwon Kim, Philosophy of Mind (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1996), 54.

35    Thomas Nagel, The View From Nowhere (N. Y.: Oxford, 1986), 49-53.

36    For a critique of panpsychism in the process of defending AC, see Stephen R. L. Clark, From Athens to Jerusalem (Oxford: Clarendon, 1984), 121-57.

37    Geoffrey Madell, Mind and Materialism (Edinburgh, The University Press, 1988), 3.

38    Nagel, View from Nowhere, 49. Note that Nagel claims that this argument is “given more fully” in chapter 13 of his Mortal Questions (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979, 1991).

39    Nagel, View from Nowhere, 110-37.

40    There is some debate about whether each of these basic actions requires its own intending. Richard Swinburne argues that in performing actions which take a long time (writing a chapter), we do not exercise a separate volition for each intentional action (e.g. willing to write the first sentence) that is part of the long term act. Rather, we just intend to bring about the long term effect by bringing about a generally conceived series of events and the body unconsciously selects a particular routine to accomplish that effect. See Richard Swinburne, The Evolution of the Soul (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), 94-95. I leave the matter open except to note that to the degree that a non-basic action contains sub-acts of a discontinuous nature (picking up keys, getting into a car vs. a series of steps in taking an hour long walk), then it is more likely that subintentions are required to characterize adequately those sub-acts.

41    Thus, we see that there are at least three kinds of intentional actions: Basic actions with a basic intent (simply intentionally moving my finger), basic actions with non-basic intents (ultimate intents that have other intents as means, e.g. intentionally squeezing my finger to fire a gun to kill Smith), and non-basic actions (those that contain sub-acts—sub endeavorings and intendings—as parts, e.g., going to the store to buy bread).

42    Cf. Michael Martin, Atheism: A Philosophical Justification (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990), 220.

43    Roderick Chisholm, Theory of Knowledge (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 3d. ed., 1989), 10-17.

3 John Searle and contingent correlation

1    John Searle, The Mystery of Consciousness (N.Y.: The New York Review of Books, 1997), 195-201. Cf. J. P. Moreland, ‘‘Searle’s Biological Naturalism and the Argument from Consciousness,” Faith and Philosophy 15 (January 1998): 68-91.

2    John Searle, The Rediscovery of the Mind (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1992), 89, 100-104.

3    Searle, The Mystery of Consciousness, 197-98.

4    Searle, The Rediscovery of the Mind, 100-104.

5    Searle, The Rediscovery of the Mind, chapters 1 and 2. Cf. Tyler Burge, ''Philosophy of Language and Mind: 1950-90,” The Philosophical Review 101 (January 1992): 3-51, especially 29-5. Since the publication of The Rediscovery of the Mind Searle has restated his views on these topics, but he continues to cite this earlier work as his most thorough treatment on the topic from which he has not deviated. See his The Mystery of Consciousness, 194; Mind: A Brief Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 2. Thus, I will rely on The Rediscovery of the Mind in explicating Searle's views and supplement them when needed. Cf. J. P. Moreland, ‘‘Searle's Biological Naturalism and the Argument from Consciousness,” Faith and Philosophy 15 (January 1998): 68-91.

6    Searle, The Rediscovery of the Mind, 3-4. Cf..31.

7    Ibid. 28.

8    Ibid. 85-91.

9    Ibid. 3, 13-16.

10 Ibid. 90-91.

11    Ibid. xii, 13-19, 25-28, 85-93.

12    Ibid. 13, 16. See also Searle’s “Why I am not a Property Dualist,” Journal of Consciousness Studies 9:12 (2002), 57-64.

13    Ibid. 13, 126.

14    Ibid. 2-4, 13-16.

15    Cf. J. P. Moreland, ‘Humanness, Personhood, and the Right to Die,’’ Faith and Philosophy 12 (January 1995): 95-112; J. P. Moreland and Stan Wallace, ‘‘Aquinas vs. Descartes and Locke on the Human Person and End-of-Life Ethics,’’ International Philosophical Quarterly 35 (September 1995): 319-30; J. P. Moreland and Scott Rae, Body & Soul (Downers Grove, Illinois: InterVarsity Press, 2000), chapter six.

16    Cf. Richard Swinburne, The Evolution of the Soul (Oxford: Clarendon, 1986), especially chapter 8.

17    Jaegwon Kim, “Mental Causation and Two Conceptions of Mental Properties,” unpublished paper delivered at the American Philosophical Association Eastern Division Meeting, Atlanta, Georgia, December 27-30, 1993, 21.

18    Ibid. 23.

19    David Papineau, Philosophical Naturalism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), 9-32.

20    Searle, The Rediscovery of the Mind, 55. Cf. 32, 56-57 where Searle considers and rejects as incoherent a closely related question formulated in terms of intelligence and intelligent behavior and not consciousness. If intelligence and intelligent behavior are interpreted from a third-person perspective in behavioristic terms (e.g. as regular and predictable behavior), then it is false that bits of matter are not intelligent. If first-person subjective criteria are formulated for intelligence, then the question reduces to the one asked in terms of consciousness. So this is the correct question to ask on Searle’s view.

21    Ibid. 95.

22    Cf. Peter van Inwagen, Metaphysics (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 2nd ed., 2002), 176-78.

23    Ibid. 118-24.

24    Ibid. 89, 100-104.

25    Ibid. 101-4.

26    Terence Horgan, “Nonreductive Materialism and the Explanatory Autonomy of Psychology,” in Naturalism, ed. by Steven J. Wagner, Richard Warner (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1993), 313-14.

27    D. M. Armstrong, “Naturalism: Materialism, and First Philosophy,’ Philosophia 8 (1978): 262.

28    Searle, The Rediscovery of the Mind, 93.

29    D. M. Armstrong, A Materialist Theory of Mind (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1968), 30.

30    Paul Churchland, Matter and Consciousness, revised edition (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1988), 21. Cf. Arthur Peacocke and Grant Gillett, eds., Persons and Personality (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987), 55.

31    Searle, The Rediscovery of the Mind, 104-5.

32    See E.J. Lowe, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 9-10; 13-21.

33    Searle, The Rediscovery of the Mind, 96-97, 143-44, 149.

34    Ibid., 98.

35    J. L. Mackie, The Miracle of Theism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), 120-21. See also, Clifford Williams, ‘‘Christian Materialism and the Parity Thesis,'' International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 39 (February 1996): 1-14. Cf. J. P. Moreland, ‘‘Locke's Parity Thesis about Thinking Matter: A Response to Williams,'' Religious Studies 34 (September 1998): 253-59; ‘‘Christian Materialism and the Parity Thesis Revisited,’ International Philosophical Quarterly 40 (December 2000): 423-40; “Topic Neutrality and the Parity Thesis: A Surrejoinder to Williams,” Religious Studies 37 (March 2001): 93-101.

36    J. L. Mackie, The Miracle of Theism., 121.

37    Locke’s point about God superadding thinking to matter can be understood as an argument against substance dualism. So understood, Locke is not claiming that thinkings themselves are material or that God is not required to explain their correlation with material states. Rather, he is asserting that there is a parity between material and spiritual substances as fitting candidates to contain the faculty of thought. For an exposition of this understanding of Locke, see Williams, “Christian materialism and the Parity Thesis.” I do not agree with this rendition of the parity thesis. For it seems to require a topic neutral account of consciousness and thinking. Moreover, it fails to take into account the fact that the immateriality of the self is known both by first-person acquaintance and by reasoning to the precise type of immateriality that constitutes the essence of a substantial soul from the immaterial effects that express its capacities. Fortunately, this rendition is not relevant to AC per se since property/event dualism is all AC needs to make its case.

38    John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 4.10.10-17 (313-19 of the 1959 Dover edition).

39    Papineau, Philosophical Naturalism, 29-32.

40    John W. Yolton, Thinking Matter: Materialism in Eighteenth-Century Britain (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983), 4-13, especially 6-7.

41    Jaegwon Kim, Philosophy of Mind (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1996), 214-15. See G. K. Chesterton’s claim that the regular correlation between diverse entities in the world is magic that requires a Magician to explain it. See Orthodoxy (John Lane Company, 1908; repr., San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1950), chapter five.

42    Searle, The Rediscovery of the Mind, 102-3.

43    J. L. Mackie, The Miracle of Theism, 115. Cf. J. P. Moreland and Kai Nielsen, Does God Exist? (Buffalo, N. Y.: Prometheus, 1993), chapters 8-10. Mackie found it easy to deny the objectivity of moral properties and opted for a form of moral subjectivism. But he could not bring himself to deny the mental nature of qualia. So he adopted a solution for qualia similar to Searle's. I shall not look at Mackie's case because Searle's is more forceful and better developed.

44    It could be argued that the supervenience of moral properties does not imply theism and, thus, they are of no help to AC. I offer two responses to this claim. First, the supervenience of such properties (as depicted by Mackie) would at least entail some form of ethical non-naturalism, e. g. Platonism, and this would count against naturalism. Given that non-theistic and theistic versions of nonnaturalism are the remaining live options, each would receive some degree of confirmation from the falsity of a rival paradigm (naturalism), and the debate would be moved to what I take to be an intramural discussion between the other paradigms. Elsewhere, I have argued that theistic non-naturalism gets the better of this dialog. See J. P. Moreland, Kai Nielsen, Does God Exist? 123. Second, in the reference just cited, I use the existence of moral properties as part of an inference to the best explanation, so even if their existence does not entail theism, they may still lend support to it, especially vis-a-vis naturalism.

45 B. F. Skinner, “Can Psychology Be A Science of Mind?” American Psychologist 45 (November 1990): 1207.

4 Timothy O’Connor and emergent necessitation

1 John Bishop, Natural Agency (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 1. Bishop's own solution eschews libertarian agency in favor of a compatibilist version of the causal theory of action.

John Bishop, Natural Agency, 40.

Robert Kane, The Significance of Free Will (N. Y.: Oxford University Press, 1996), 118. Kane himself develops a particular version of libertarian indeterminism that he takes to avoid the need for substance dualism. By contrast, Stewart Goetz argues that even non-agent-causal accounts of libertarian freedom require substance dualism. See his ‘Naturalism and Libertarian Agency,’’ in Naturalism: A Critical Analysis, ed. by William Lane Craig and J. P. Moreland (London: Routledge, 2000), 156-86. Central to Goetz’s case is the claim that reasons function as irreducibly teleological ends and this is inconsistent with a material agent.

Timothy O’Connor, Persons & Causes (N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 2000), 108. Hereafter, for O’Connor citations I will be mainly using Persons & Causes. Cf. J. P. Moreland, ‘Naturalism and Libertarian Agency,’ Philosophy and Theology 10 (1997): 351-81; ‘‘Timothy O’Connor and the Harmony Thesis: A Critique,” Metaphysica 3 No. 2 (2002): 5-40.

O’Connor, Persons & Causes, xv, 108.

Ibid., 107.

Ibid., 108.

Ibid., xv, 121.

Ibid., 109-10.

Ibid.

Ibid., 125.

In Natural Agency, John Bishop accepts L, but claims to develop a compatibilist view of agency that (1) is “at home’’ in N and (2) adequate to fall under a libertarian concept of agency. If Bishop is correct, then L, indeed, is a minimalist thesis that allows for compatibilism to satisfy it.

O'Connor, Persons & Causes, xii.

Ibid., xii.

Ibid., 116.

Ibid., 115.

Ibid., 121.

Ibid., 109.

See David Papineau, Philosophical Naturalism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), 113; Paul Churchland, Matter and Consciousness (Cambridge, Massachusetts, rev. ed., 1988), 18-21; John Bishop, Natural Agency, 10-48; Jaegwon Kim, Mind in a Physical World Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1998). O'Connor, Persons & Causes, 110.

Cf. Timothy O’Connor, ‘‘Causality, Mind, and Free Will,’’ in Soul, Body and Survival, ed. by Kevin Corcoran (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 2001), 56-58.

O'Connor does not explicitly address the question of whether the Harmony Thesis should be assessed by, among other things, weighing its plausibility against a rival hypothesis such as substance dualism. But for three reasons, I believe that this is implicit in his account and, in any case, it is what he must do to justify the Harmony Thesis. I have been at pains to show the first reason: Given that the Harmony Thesis is an hypothesis with the epistemic status I have described, its acceptance or rejection should be adopted by viewing the Harmony Thesis as an inference to the best explanation. When a hypothesis is justified by way of an inference to the best explanation, one crucial factor for assessing it is how it compares with its chief rivals, and substance dualism is the chief rival to the Harmony Thesis as O’Connor himself admits. Even if O’Connor's explicit project is the attempt to show that AGC could emerge in a naturalistic universe or that, given the right physical conditions, active power must emerge in a naturalistic universe, since he takes the Harmony Thesis to be an hypothesis, it should be assessed in light of its chief rival, irrespective of the modal status of the Harmony Thesis itself. My second reason will be developed more fully in section six. There I will try to show that the precise role of prephilosophical intuitions in O’Connor’s case for AGC makes it difficult for him to reject the same role of pre-philosophical intuitions in justifying substance dualism. If I am right about this, then his attempt to justify the Harmony Thesis without explicitly assessing substance dualism as a rival viewpoint is, at best, seriously incomplete. In this case, my chapter may be understood, minimally, as an attempt to challenge O’Connor to fill out his account of the Harmony Thesis by explicitly addressing issues that I claim are already implicit in his account. Third, O’Connor states that he is not interested in merely defending a libertarian conception of free agency; rather, he is after a true account of free agency. This goal is important for O’Connor’s project of developing an account of agency. Why? Because it deflects a compatibilist rebuttal to his case, viz., that while our notion of free agency may be libertarian, there is no inconsistency in thinking that actual agents merely possess compatibilist freedom of a sort sufficiently developed to count as falling under the libertarian concept, at least throughout those possible worlds that are minimal physical duplicates of the actual world. O’Connor rightly thinks that such an approach is deflationary, and by developing an account of agency in keeping with pre-philosophical intuitions, O’Connor takes himself to be providing an account of agency as it really is. Now this same point can be said about the Harmony Thesis. It is relatively uninteresting to develop the notion of an agent that is merely consistent with N. We should want a true account of ourselves as libertarian agents. In section six, I will show the role that pre-philosophical intuitions play in developing that account. The reader may not agree with that role, but consistency would seem to imply that O’Connor should.

There are two desiderata for an adequate theory of human action: (1) explain agent control and (2) account for the role of reasons in human action. I set aside (2) because it is beyond the scope of my present concern. O’Connor’s account employs a strategy which avoids an irreducible teleological role for reasons in free action by incorporating reasons into complex hyphenated action-triggering-intentions. See Persons and Causes chapter five, especially 85-86, 98-99. Stewart Goetz has argued, correctly in my view, that reasons are, in fact, irreducibly teleological ends and not efficient causal components of action, and therefore, that irrespective of the presence or absence of emergent properties, a physical particular—including an agent—cannot exhibit libertarian freedom because it does not behave in irreducibly teleological ways. See his ‘Naturalism and Libertarian Agency.’’

O’Connor, Persons and Causes, 49.

Ibid., xiv, 75.

Ibid., 67.

Ibid., 73.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid., 95.

Ibid., 97-98.

Ibid., 45-46.

Ibid., 122.

Ibid., 72.

Ibid.

Ibid., xiv, 85-86.

Ibid., 107.

Ibid., 79.

Ibid., 95, 109, 111, 118.

Ibid., 73.

Ibid., 121.

Cf. Timothy O’Connor, “Emergent Properties,’’ American Philosophical Quarterly 31 (April 1994): 91-104.

O’Connor, Persons & Causes, 70, 110-15, 117-18.

Ibid., 70-71, 117-18.

Ibid., 115-23.

Ibid., 108-10.

See O’Connor, “Causality, Mind, and Free Will,” 51.

Galen Strawson, Freedom and Belief (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), 161-62; cf. 146-69, 323-29.

See John W. Yolton, Thinking Matter: Materialism in Eighteenth-Century Britain (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983). For more on this in the context of Locke’s claims about thinking matter, see Clifford Williams, “Christian Materialism and the Parity Thesis,’’ International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 39 (February 1996): 1-14; J. P. Moreland, ‘‘Locke’s Parity Thesis about Thinking Matter: A Response to Williams,” Religious Studies 34 (September 1998): 253-59; Clifford Williams, “Topic Neutrality and the Mind-Body Problem,” Religious Studies 36 (2000): 203-7; J. P. Moreland, “Christian Materialism and the Parity Thesis Revisited,’’ International Philosophical Quarterly 40 (December 2000): 423-40; and idem, “Topic Neutrality and the Parity Thesis: A Surrejoinder to Williams,” Religious Studies 37 (March 2001): 93-101.

In order to establish that human persons are essentially mental substances, or at least mental/physical substances, I would need the premise that human persons are essentially entities with at least the ultimate potentiality for agency. If, solely for the sake of argument, we accept some sort of emergence requirement for our account, it would seem that the emergence of active power would require the emergence of an agent (or human person essentially possessing the potentiality for agency) that was a mental or mental/physical substance. Thus, my argument (granting emergence) provides grounds for preferring an account such as the one offered by William Hasker over O’Connor’s. See William Hasker, The Emergent Self (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1999).

Timothy O’Connor and Jonathan D. Jacobs, ‘‘Emergent Individuals,’’ The Philosophical Quarterly 53 (October 2003): 540-55; Timothy O’Connor and Hong Yu Wong, ““The Metaphysics of Emergence,” Nous 39:4 (2005): 659-79.

This is not quite accurate. O'Connor considers four ontological approaches to properties: transcendent universals, kind-Aristotelianism, immanent universals and tropes. He rejects the first two, allows for the possibility of a very specific version of trope nominalism, but clearly favors immanent universals which is the only framework in which he really develops his doctrine of emergence. I have subjected trope nominalism to severe criticism elsewhere and I believe it is not only false but unintelligible. So I shall not consider it further. See J. P. Moreland, ‘‘Keith Campbell and the Trope View of Predication,’’ Australasian Journal of Philosophy 67 (December 1989): 379-93; “A Critique of Campbell’s Refurbished Nominalism,” The Southern Journal of Philosophy 35 (Summer 1997): 225-46. I agree with O’Connor’s rejection of kind-Aristotelianism, including his main argument against it—that there is no second relatum to which to connect the nexus of exemplification besides the kind-universal. However, O’Connor fails to see that kind-universals are not really universals, but totalities like sets absent extensional identity conditions, and he fails to see that the problem of the absent second relatum follows from the blob ontology of kind-instances, a problem that undermines trope nominalism and, if noticed, would have saved O’Connor from having to consider the trope view. See J. P. Moreland, “How to Be a Nominalist in Realist Clothing,” Grazer Philosophische Studien 39 (Summer, 1991): 75-101. Finally, O’Connor’s treatment of transcendent universals is seriously misleading. Setting aside questions about the historical Plato and Aristotle, the debate about transcendent universals is often framed as a debate between Platonists and Aristotelians. So understood, the debate is about three questions: (1) Are there uninstantiated universals—universals not exemplified by a particular—or does the existence of a universal depend on at least one particular instantiating it? (2) Do universals remain outside or are they in the being of the things that have them? (3) Do universals remain outside the things that have them in some spatial location, a Platonic heaven, or are they spatially in the being of the things that have them? He fails to treat adequately a view widely held today that embraces uninstantiated universals but also holds that when instantiated, they are non-spatially in their instances in keeping with a constituent ontology and not a relational one. His main objection to a view close to this (which he calls the ‘participation’’ position) rests on an equivocation regarding the nature of an internal relation. A relation that does not leave the universal outside the being of its instance but, rather, locates the universal in the very being of its instances vs. a relation that holds in virtue of the intrinsic features of the relata. The second characterization is part of a classic treatment of an internal relation and it is the version O’Connor criticizes—there must be something in the concrete particular that is logically prior to its instantiation of a property and this moves the transcendent view towards immanent universals. But this criticism misses the nature of an internal relation classically construed. O’Connor seems to think that this logically prior “something” pushes the view towards immanent universals in that it requires an individuator to be this something. But it has always been held that it is a property or properties of the “something’’ that is logically prior to an internal relation, not an individuator. More importantly, this second sense of ‘‘internal relation” is irrelevant to transcendent universals as I and many others employ that notion. On this view, transcendent universals commits one to internal relations in O’Connor’s first sense and not the second one, so the latter’s inadequacy is irrelevant as a criticism of transcendent universals. See J. P. Moreland, Universals (Canada: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2001), 129-34.

53    See Hasker, The Emergent Self.

54    O’Connor rejects this move because, among other things, it suffers from the causal pairing problem and the most plausible solution to that problem—singular causation—is bogus. O’Connor seems quite unfamiliar with Thomistic dualist solutions to this problem. See J. P. Moreland and Stanley Wallace, “Aquinas vs. Descartes and Locke on the Human Person and End-of-Life Ethics,” International Philosophical Quarterly 35 (September 1995): 319-30.

55    See O’Connor and Wong, “The Metaphysics of Emergence’’: 665-69.

56    Colin McGinn, The Mysterious Flame (N. Y.: Basic Books, 1999), 95-101. As McGinn shows, a view such as O’Connor’s is a version of weak panpsychism and not of naturalism precisely because it accords to matter irreducibly mental potentialities. Thus, it will not do simply to assert that O’Connor’s agent is a unique kind of physical particular, e.g. a composite physical particular with ontologically emergent mental properties, that is properly called a physical particular and plausibly located within N. If an emergent mental property is an actualization of an irreducibly mental potentiality that characterizes some particular, then that potentiality is part of what gives the particular its ontological character. I believe that part of the confusion about this point comes from conflating metaphysics as a descriptive discipline with metaphysics as an explanatory discipline. For a good example of this confusion, see Frank Jackson, From Metaphysics to Ethics (Oxford: Clarendon, 1998), 1-27. As a descriptive discipline, one task of metaphysics is to give an ontological analysis of the parts, properties (actual and potential), and relations that constitute an entity so the nature and ontological classification of the entity can be vouchsafed. Explanatory metaphysics attempts to show how the presence of one feature of an entity may be explained in terms of other features of the entity. Usually, the latter is irrelevant to the former. For example, necessarily, some particular is colored only if it is extended, so an analysis of the factors necessary to account for a particular’s being colored would include its being extended. But this is not relevant if the question is to give an ontological description of the sorts of properties that constitute that particular. Our question is what sort of thing is an agent with essentially mental potentialities, it is not what are the explanatory conditions under which mental potentialities are actualized.

O’Connor, “Causality, Mind, and Free Will,” 58.

Timothy O’Connor and Hong Yu Wong, ‘‘The Metaphysics of Emergence”: 665. Timothy O’Connor and Jonathan D. Jacobs, “Emergent Individuals”: 541.

It could be argued that on O’Connor’s picture, everything that occurs at the macro level rests on the total potentialities of the microphysical properties, including the potentiality to produce mental properties. But this will not do. Descriptively, a mental potentiality is a mental, not a physical potentiality. Strictly physical properties do not have the power to produce mental properties if the particular in question does not have a mental potentiality. At best, physical properties may have the power to actualize an already present mental potentiality that is not itself physical.

Frank Jackson, From Metaphysics to Ethics, 1-27.

O’Connor, Persons & Causes, 111-12.

Ibid., 70-71.

Ibid., 70-71, 117-18.

Ibid., 73.

See Timothy O’Connor, “Emergent Properties.’

O’Connor, Persons & Causes, 112.

If I am correct about this, then O'Connor cannot simply argue that the emergence of active power is merely metaphysically co-possible with N. Rather, the existence of active power would seem to require N. Thus, the existence of substance dualism as a rival position is a crucial aspect of evaluating the Harmony Thesis since the presence of substance dualism as a coherent rival counts against this stronger claim.

Cf. Jaegwon Kim, Philosophy of Mind (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1996), 9-13.

O’Connor, Persons & Causes, 116.

Ibid., 120.

The contingency of the link is part of the thought experiments themselves, e.g. inverted qualia thought experiments. While I admit this is anecdotal, I have taught philosophy of mind to hundreds of college students and lay people, and there is almost unanimous agreement that these thought experiments are coherent and the states of affairs involved are possible. For more on the asymmetry between emergent mental properties and paradigm cases of emergence (e.g. solidity), see chapter three.

O’Connor, Persons & Causes, 114.

Ibid., 115.

Ibid., 116.

Consider clause (b) of Jackson’s depiction of a minimal physical duplicate of the actual world. It may well be that empirical evidence could be provided for the presence of non-physical particulars (e.g. from miracles), but it is hard to see how empirical evidence could justify the claim that there are no such non-physical particulars. Thus, (b) is not entailed by the Grand Story and should be eliminated.

77    O’Connor, Persons & Causes, 118.

78    John Searle, The Rediscovery of the Mind (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1992), 111-12.

79    O’Connor, Persons and Causes, 114.

80    Timothy O’Connor and Hong Yu Wong, “The Metaphysics of Emergence,” 674.

81    Jackson, 1998, 3-4.

82    O’Connor and Hong Yu Wong, “The Metaphysics of Emergence,”: 661.

83    O’Connor, Persons & Causes, xii-xiii, 3-5, 42.

84    O’Connor, Persons & Causes, 4-5. For statements of this sort, see John Foster, The Immaterial Self (London: Routledge, 1991), 267; Robert Kane, The Significance of Free Will (N. Y.: Oxford, 1996), 4; J. A. Cover and John O’Leary-Hawthorne, “Free Agency and Materialism,” in Faith, Freedom, and Rationality, ed. by Jeff Jordon and Daniel Howard-Snyder (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1996), 51.

85    See Bishop, Natural Agency, 58, 69, 72, 95-97, 103-4, 114, 120, 126-27, 137, 140-41, 144, 177-80.

86    Jaegwon Kim, ‘‘Lonely Souls: Causality and Substance Dualism,'' in Soul, Body and Survival ed. by Kevin Corcoran (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 2001), 30.

87    Jackson, From Metaphysics to Ethics, 45.

88    It could be objected that these intuitions do not entail substance dualism or other claims that entail substance dualism. But even if this objection is correct, it does not undercut my argument. The evidence that water is de re necessarily H20 does not entail this conclusion, and the pre-philosophical intuitions O'Connor employs to argue for agent causation do not entail that conclusion. Still, in both cases, the respective evidence does ground the conclusion and contributes to a burden of proof on dissenters, and that is all I am claiming for pre-philosophical dualist intuitions.

89    O’Connor, Persons & Causes, 4.

90    Ibid., 124.

91    See Stewart Goetz, “Modal Dualism: A Critique,’ in Soul, Body and Survival, ed. by Kevin Corcoran (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 2001), 89-104.

92    O’Connor, Persons & Causes, 123-24.

93    Ibid., 124.

5 Colin McGinn and mysterian “naturalism”

1    Colin McGinn, The Mysterious Flame (N.Y.: Basic Books, 1999). Unless otherwise noted, my description of McGinn's position is taken from this source. McGinn first thought of his mysterian naturalism in the late 1980s [see his The Problem of Consciousness (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), vii; cf. chapters 1-4], and his view has remained largely unchanged until the present [see his Consciousness and its Objects (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004, reprinted unchanged in 2006), 1]. I focus on The Mysterious Flame because it is the clearest exposition of McGinn's position relevant to developing AC.

2    John Perry, Knowledge, Possibility, and Consciousness (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2001), 71-92.

3    Cf. William Lane Craig Reasonable Faith (Wheaton, Illinois: Crossway Books, 1994); William Lane Craig and Quentin Smith Theism, Atheism, and Big Bang Cosmology (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993). See also, J. P. Moreland, “A Response to a Platonistic and Set-theoretic Objection to the Kalam Cosmological Argument,” Religious Studies 39 (2004): 373-90; “Agent Causation and the

Craig/Griinbaum Debate about Theistic Explanation of the Initial Singularity,” American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, 71 (Autumn 1997), 539-54; “Resemblance Extreme Nominalism and Infinite Regress Arguments,” The Modern Schoolman 80 (January 2003): 85-98.

4    Roderick Chisholm, A Realistic Theory of the Categories (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 53.

5    D. M. Armstrong, Universals & Scientific Realism Vol. I: Nominalism & Realism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 19-21.

6    Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica I, 1981, Q. 46, Art. 2, Reply Obj. 7; cf. Summa Contra Gentiles I, Chapter xiii. See Patterson Brown, “Infinite Causal Regression,” in Aquinas: A Collection of Essays edited by Anthony Kenny (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1976), 214-36.

7    For an overview of Scotus’ treatment of causality and regresses, including a list of primary sources, see Richard Cross, Duns Scotus on God (Hants, England: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2005), 17-28).

8    Nicholas Rescher, The Limits of Science (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 22.

9    Colin McGinn, Mental Content (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989), 13. Cf. Jeffrey Poland, Physicalism (Oxford: Clarendon, 1994), especially 10-44, 226-32, 307-12.

10    See J. P. Moreland, ‘‘Naturalism and the Ontological Status of Properties,'' in Naturalism: A Critical Analysis, edited by William Lane Craig and J. P. Moreland (London: Routledge, 2000), 67-109; J. P. Moreland, Universals (Canada: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2001), 121-29.

11    Wilfrid Sellars, Naturalism and Ontology (Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview Pub. Co., 1979), 109.

12    Sellars, Naturalism and Ontology, 47. Cf. Wilfrid Sellars, ‘‘Towards a Theory of Predication,'' in How Things Are, ed. by James Bogen, James E. McGuire (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1985), 285-322.

13    See the sources cited in note 10.

14    For a discussion of this topic along with a bibliography, see J. P. Moreland, ‘‘Naturalism, Nominalism, and Husserlian Moments,'' The Modern Schoolman 79 (January/March 2002): 199-216.

15    See Hugh Ross, Beyond the Cosmos (Colorado Springs, CO: NavPress, 1996).

6 David Skrbina and panpsychism

1    See references to Timothy O'Connor's panpsychist tendencies in chapter four. Cf. Thomas Nagel, The View From Nowhere (N. Y.: Oxford, 1986), 49-53. David J. Chalmers, The Conscious Mind (N. Y.: Oxford, 1997), 293-301.

2    David Skrbina, Panpsychism in the West (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2005), 2.

3    Ibid. 37.

4    Ibid. 16.

5    For an exposition and critique of Mormon panpsychism, see J. P. Moreland, ‘‘The Absurdities of Mormon Materialism: A Reply to the Neglected Orson Pratt,'' in The New Mormon Challenge ed. by Francis Beckwith, Carl Mosser, and Paul Owen (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2002), 243-70.

6    Skrbina, Panpsychism in the West, 2, 11, 15-17, 249.

7    Ibid., 18, 37, 209, 237-38.

8    Ibid., 39, 209, 166.

9    Ibid., 250-52.

10    Ibid., 26, 107.

11    John Yolton, Thinking Matter: Materialism in Eighteenth-Century Britain (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983).

12    Skrbina, Panpsychism in the West, 13, 102, 106-7.

13    For a summary of the case for Christian theism, see Paul Copan and Paul Moser, eds, Rationality of Theism (London: Routledge, 2003); William Lane Craig, ed., Philosophy of Religion: A Contemporary Reader, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press; N. Y.: Rutgers University Press, 2002); J. P. Moreland and Kai Nielsen, Does God Exist?: The Debate Between Atheists and Theists (Buffalo: Prometheus Books, 1993); J. P. Moreland and Michael Wilkins, eds, Jesus Under Fire: Modern Scholarship Reinvents the Historical Jesus (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1995); Larry W. Hurtado, Lord Jesus Christ (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans, 2003); N. T. Wright, The Resurrection of the Son of God (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2003). See also, Richard Casdorph, Real Miracles (Gainesville, Florida: Bridge-Logos, 2003).

14    See Hud Hudson, A Materialist Metaphysics of the Human Person. (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2001), chapter three. Cf. J. P. Moreland, “Hud Hudson’s 4DPartism and Human Persons,” Philosophia Christi 5 (2003): 545-54.

15    Skrbina, Panpsychism in the West, 126.

16    Ibid., 16; cf. 108-08, 211.

17    See the work cited in note five above.

18    Skrbina, Panpsychism in the West, 153-54.

19    Ibid., 154.

20    Ibid., 211-13.

21    For a Cartesian response, see See Mark Bedau, ‘‘Cartesian Interactionism,’’ in Midwest Studies in Philosophy X: Studies in the Philosophy of Mind, ed. by Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling, Jr., and Howard K. Wettstein (Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 1986), 483-502; see also, John Foster, “In Defense of Dualism,’’ in The Case For Dualism, ed. by John R. Smythies and John Beloff (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1989), 1-25; Keith Yandell, “A Defense of Dualism,’’ Faith and Philosophy 12 (1995). Skrbina’s chapter four in Panpsychism in the West provides a non-Cartesian response. Also see J. P. Moreland and Stan Wallace, “Aquinas vs. Descartes and Locke on the Human Person and End-of-Life Ethics,’’ International Philosophical Quarterly 35 (September 1995): 319-30.

22    See Jaegwon Kim, Physicalism, or Something Near Enough (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), chapter three; J. P. Moreland, “If You Can’t Reduce, You Must Eliminate: Why Kim’s Version of Physicalism Isn’t Close Enough,” Philosophia Christi 7 (Spring 2005): 463-73; Timothy O’Connor, “Causality, Mind, and Free Will,” in Soul, Body, and Survival (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 2001), 44-58.

23    Geoffrey Madell, Mind and Materialism Mind and Materialism (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1988), 3.

24    See note five above.

25    For an exposition of independent specifiability, see William Dembski, Intelligent Design (Downers Grove, Illinois: InterVarsity Press, 1999). For an exposition of irreducible complexity, see Michael Behe, Darwin’s Black Box (N. Y.: The Free Press, 1996).

26    Skrbina, Panpsychism in the West, 264-65.

27    See references to Pratt’s work and a response in the book cited in note five above.

28    Skrbina, Panpsychism in the West, 243.

29    See the sources in note eight above.

30    See William Lane Craig, Reasonable Faith (Wheaton, Illinois: Crossway, 1994), chapter three; J. P. Moreland, Scaling the Secular City (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker, 1986), chapter one; “A Response to a Platonistic and Set-theoretic

Objection to the Kalam Cosmological Argument,” Religious Studies 39 (2004): 373-90.

31 Skrbina, Panpsychism in the West, 4.

7 Philip Clayton and pluralistic emergentist monism

1    The most extensive statement of Clayton’s position is his Mind & Emergence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). Therefore, most Clayton page citations in chapter seven refer to this text.

2    Ibid., vi.

3    Ibid.

4    Ibid., 128.

5    Ibid., 4, 11.

6    Ibid., 4.

7    Ibid., 158.

8    Ibid., 4.

9    Ibid., 65, 158, 201.

10    Ibid., 58.

11    Ibid., v, 1, 49, 50, 53.

12    Ibid., 4, 123-24, 130, 201.

13    Ibid., 56.

14    Ibid., 124-28.

15    Ibid., 4; cf. 60.

16    Ibid., 54.

17    Ibid., 198.

18    Ibid., 9.

19    Ibid., 31-32.

20    Ibid., 31.

21    Ibid., 49.

22    Ibid.

23    Ibid., 4.

24    Ibid., 61.

25    Ibid.

26    Ibid., 156.

27    Ibid., vi.

28    Ibid., 9.

29    Ibid., 49.

30    Ibid., 107; cf. 158.

31    Ibid., 127.

32    Ibid., cf. 28-29.

33    Ibid., 59-60.

34    Ibid., 166-69.

35    Ibid., 169.

36    Ibid., 172.

37    Ibid., 205.

38    Ibid., 172-79.

39    Ibid., 184-87.

40    Ibid., 3, 42, 44, 45, 108, 112, 156, 171-74, 193.

41    Ibid., 30, 62, 107-8, 111, 123.

42    Ibid., vi.

43    Ibid., 65.

44    Ibid., 66.

45    Ibid., 156.

46    Ibid., 163.

Ibid., cf. 120.

Ibid., 9.

Ibid., 107; cf. 158.

For an analysis of a number of aspects of human beings that are outside the limits of evolutionary explanation, see Anthony O’Hear, Beyond Evolution: Human Nature and the limits of Evolutionary Explanation (Oxford: Clarendon, 1997). Curiously, O’Hear offers no plausible account of how human beings could have appeared with these constitutional features. And he does not interact with theistic explanations, yet the thesis of his book is precisely what one would predict, given Christian theism and the doctrine of the image of God, viz., that several aspects of human beings would be recalcitrant facts for alternative worldviews, especially for naturalism.

Clayton, Mind & Emergence, 84; cf. 89.

Ibid., vi, 50, 53, 60, 107, 111, 128-29, 164.

Frank Jackson, From Metaphysics to Ethics (Oxford: Clarendon, 1998). Clayton, Mind & Emergence, 120.

Ibid., 157, 171-72.

Ibid., v, 10, 12, 40, 49-50, 53, 60, 98, 107, 111, 128, 129, 158, 164.

Dennis Des Chene, Life’s Form: Late Aristotelian Conceptions of the Soul (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 2000). Cf. J. P. Moreland and Scott Rae, Body & Soul (Downers Grove, Illinois: InterVarsity Press, 2000).

Clayton, Mind & Emergence, 164.

William Hasker, The Emergent Self (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1999). Melvin Morse, MD, with Paul Perry, Closer to the Light: Learning from the Near-Death Experiences of Children (N.Y.: Random House [Villard Books],

1990), 3-9.

I am indebted to Gary R. Habermas for providing these insights to me. For more of his research on NDE’s see Gary R. Habermas and J. P. Moreland, Beyond Death (Wheaton, Illinois: Crossway, 1998), chapters 7-9. See also, Peter Shockey, Reflections of Heaven (N. Y.: Doubleday, 1999).

See C. Fred Dickason, Demon Possession & the Christian (Wheaton, Illinois: Crossway, 1987); Felicitas D. Goodman, How About Demons? (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1988); Charles Kraft, Defeating Dark Angels (Ann Arbor, Michigan: Servant, 1992); Francis McNutt, Deliverance from Evil Spirits (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker, 1995); George Otis, Jr., The Twilight Labyrinth (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker, 1997); Scott Peck, People of the Lie (New York, New York: Touchtone, 2nd. ed., 1998); Jane Rumph, Signs and Wonders in America Today (Ann Arbor, Michigan: Servant, 2003); Peter S. Williams, The Case for Angels (Carlisle, UK: Paternoster Press, 2002); Colin Wilson, The Occult (London: Watkins Publishing, 2003).

Holly Pivec, ‘‘Exorcizing Our Demons,’’ Biola Connections (Winter 2006): 10-17. Clayton, Mind & Emergence, v.

Ibid., 4.

Ibid., vi.

Jaegwon Kim, Mind in a Physical World (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1998), 9-15

See J. P. Moreland, ‘‘Christian Materialism and the Parity Thesis Revisited,’’ International Philosophical Quarterly 40 (December 2000): 423-40.

Clayton, Mind & Emergence, 52-53, 57.

Ibid., 50.

Ibid., 51.

Ibid., 51.

Richard Connell, Substance and Modern Science (Houston, Texas: Center for Thomistic Studies, 1988); cf. Enrico Cantori, Atomic Order (Cambridge, Mass.:

MIT Press, 1969). Cantori’s work should be read in light of the careful metaphysical distinctions made by Connell.

74    Clayton, Mind & Emergence, 95; cf. 84-96.

75    Ibid., 6.

76    Ibid., 16.

77    Ibid.

78    Ibid., 16-17.

79    Ibid., 182.

80    Ibid., 186-87.

81    Ibid., 140-42.

82    Ibid., 142, 175.

83    Ibid., see 174, 176-79.

84 J. P. Moreland, Scott Rae, Body and Soul, chapters two and three.

85    Clayton, Mind & Emergence, 47.

86    Howard J. van Till, ‘‘Basil and Augustine Revisited: The Survival of Functional Integrity,” Origins & Design 19:1 (Summer 1998): 1-12; “Special Creationism in Designer Clothing: A Response to The Creation Hypothesis,” Perspectives on Science and Christian Faith (June 1995): 124-27; “Basil, Augustine, and the Doctrine of Creation’s Functional Integrity,” Science and Christian Belief, Vol. 8, No. 1 (April 1996): 21-38.

87    Ibid., 112.

88    See Russ Shafer-Landau, Moral Realism: A Defense (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005).

8 Science and strong physicalism

1    Daniel Dennett, Explaining Consciousness (Boston: Little, Brown and Co.,

1991), 37.

2    Jaegwon Kim, “Lonely Souls: Causality and Substance Dualism,” in Soul, Body and Survival ed. by Kevin Corcoran (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 2001), 30. Cf. J. P. Moreland, ‘‘A Christian Perspective on the Impact of Modern Science on Philosophy of Mind,” Perspectives on Science and Christian Faith 55 (March 2003): 2-12.

3    John Searle, The Rediscovery of the Mind (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1992), xii.

4    Ibid, 3-4.

5    Nancey Murphy, “Human Nature: Historical, Scientific, and Religious Issues,” in Warren S. Brown, Nancey Murphy and H. Newton Malony, Whatever Happened to the Soul? (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1998), 17. Cf. 13, 27, 139-43.

6    Ibid, 18.

7    Paul Churchland orders the first half of his book Matter and Consciousness (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, rev. ed., 1988) around these families of issues.

8    George Bealer, “On the Possibility of Philosophical Knowledge,” in Philosophical Perspectives 10: Metaphysics, 1996, ed. by James E. Tomberlin (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1996), 1.

9    M. R. Bennett and P. M. S. Hacker, Philosophical Foundations to Neuroscience (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003).

10    David Papineau, Philosophical Naturalism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), 3, 4.

11    Patricia Churchland, Neurophilosophy (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1986), 265.

12    Ibid.

13    Ibid, 270.

14    Ibid, 277.

15    Ibid, 248-49.

16    Paul Churchland, Matter and Consciousness (revised edition, 1988), chapters three and four.

17    Jaegwon Kim, Philosophy of Mind (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1996), chapter three.

18    The point is not limited to the hard sciences. The history of experimental psychology from the last third of the nineteenth century until the middle of the twentieth century is essentially the replacement of first-person introspection for third-person measurements as central to psychological method. See William Lyons, Matters of the Mind (N. Y.: Routledge, 2001), chapter one.

19    For more on criteria for property identity, see J. P. Moreland, Universals (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2001), 116-20.

20    Kim, Philosophy of Mind (1996), 49-53.

21    Roderick Chisholm, “Mind,” in Handbook of Metaphysics and Ontology, ed. by Hans Burkhardt and Barry Smith (Munich: Philosophia Verlag, 1991): II, 556.

22    For a recent discussion of the Knowledge Argument, see J. P. Moreland, “The Knowledge Argument Revisited,’ International Philosophical Quarterly 43 (2003): 219-228. For an exposition and defense of the Simple Argument, see Stewart Goetz, “Modal Dualism: A Critique,” in Soul, Body & Survival, ed. by Kevin Corcoran (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 2001), 89-104.

23    Searle, The Rediscovery of the Mind, 8-9.

24    David Papineau, Philosophical Naturalism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), 1-5.

25    Nancey Murphy, ‘‘Human Nature: Historical, Scientific, and Religious Issues,'' in Warren S. Brown, Nancey Murphy and H. Newton Malony, Whatever Happened to the Soul? (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1998), 17. Cf. 13, 27, 139-43.

26    Ibid, 18.

27    For example, see F. R. Tennant, Philosophical Theology I: The Soul and Its Faculties (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1956), 1-138, especially 33-43.

28    The Autonomy Thesis and the epistemic authority of first-person introspective knowledge relative to scientific claims is powerfully woven into Edmund Husserl's practice of bracketing the world and proffering phenomenological descriptions of various intentional objects as experienced and of the intrinsic features of the various mental acts directed upon those objects. For a detailed description of a paradigm case of Husserl in this regard, see J. P. Moreland, “Naturalism, Nominalism, and Husserlian Moments,” The Modern Schoolman 79 (January/March 2002): 199-216.

29    Nancey Murphy, ‘‘Nonreductive Physicalism: Philosophical Issues,'' in Whatever Happened to the Soul (1998):127-48.

30    See Jeffrey Schwartz and Sharon Begley, The Mind and The Brain (N.Y.: Har-perCollins, 2002).

31    Alvin Plantinga, ‘‘Methodological Naturalism,'' in Facets of Faith and Science Vol. 1: Historiography and Modes of Interaction, ed. by Jitse M. vander Meer (Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America, 1996), 177-221.

32    Ibid., 209-10.

33    Bas C. van Fraasen, The Scientific Image (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980); “To Save the Phenomena,’’ in Scientific Realism, ed. by Jarrett Leplin (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 250-59.

34    Francis Crick and Christof Koch, ‘‘Consciousness and Neuroscience,'' Cerebral Cortex 8 (1998): 97-107.

35    Cf. John Horgan, “Can Science Explain Consciousness?” Scientific American (July 1994): 91.

36    John Searle, ‘‘The Mystery of Consciousness: Part I,'' The New York Review of Books, November 1995, 60-66. The quote is from page 64.

37    See William Hasker, The Emergent Self (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1999), 122-46, 171-203.

38    John Tyndall, “Scientific Materialism,’’ in his Fragments of Science Vol. II (New York: P. F. Collier & Son, 1900), 95.

39    Francis Crick and Christof Koch, “Consciousness and Neuroscience,” 98.

40    Ibid, 104.

41    J. P. Moreland, “Reply to Fales,” Philosophia Christi NS 3, No. 1 (2001): 48-49.

9 AC, dualism and the fear of God

1    Barry Stroud, “The Charm of Naturalism,” Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, November 1996, 43-55. Reprinted in M. DeCaro and M. Macarthur (ed.), Naturalism in Question, Cambridge University Press, 2004, 21-35, The quote is from page 22. Cf. Michael Rea, World Without Design (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002), especially chapter three.

2    John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (Dover, 1959), Book II, Ch. XXIII, sec. 22, 308.

3    Ralph Cudworth and Johann Lorenz Mosheim, The True Intellectual System of the Universe: wherein all the reason and philosophy of atheism is confuted, and its impossibility demonstrated, John Harrison, trans. vol. 1 (London: Thomas Tegg, 1845), 200. For further discussion on Cudworth, see John Yolton, Thinking Matter: Materialism in Eighteenth-Century Britain (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983), 4-13, 64, 126, 191, 202, 204.

4    William Lyons, Introduction, in Modern Philosophy of Mind, ed. by William Lyons, (London: Everyman, 1995), lv.

5    John Searle, The Rediscovery of the Mind (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press,

1992), chapters 1 and 2. Cf. Tyler Burge, ‘‘Philosophy of Language and Mind: 1950-90,” The Philosophical Review 101 (January 1992): 3-51, especially 29-51.

6    Ibid., 3-4. Cf. 31.

7    Thomas Nagel, The Last Word (N. Y.: Oxford, 1997), 130-31. Nagel’s “solution'' concerning how there could be such a thing as universal, normative, objective reason is simply to say that it is self-defeating to seek a justification beyond reason for reason itself. Rather, reason is its own authority and its validity is universal, so reason is its own justification. To seek a further justification for it is a confusion. Unfortunately, Nagel fails to distinguish the first-order question when asked in the context of skepticism and subjectivism: ‘‘Is reason objective?” from the second-order question: “How could there be such a thing as objective reason?” Nagel”s “solution” works for the first but not for the second question. As it stands, Nagel”s “solution” is consistent with a Kantian transcendental stance according to which from within the rational point of view, we must act as if reason were objective and valid, but this does not entail that it actually is. There are two analogous areas of philosophical discourse that expose the inadequacy of Nagel's ‘‘solution.'' First, with respect to the question ‘‘Why should I be moral?'', there is a distinction of interpreting the question as a first-order one from within the moral point of view (in which case the question is pointless and may be answered only by the vacuous response ‘‘Because it is morally right to act and think morally rightly.'') vs. a second-order one from outside the moral point of view (“How could there be such a thing as the moral point of view? Why is it rational to accept the moral point of view?”). Admittedly, when one asks the second-order moral question, one is no longer operating from within morality but when one asks the second-order rational question, one is still within rationality. Still, the question ‘‘How could there be such a thing as a rational point of view?” is an intelligible question, and as Plantinga has shown and as Nagel acknowledges, naturalistic evolutionary answers to the

second-order question actually provide defeaters for rationality for which theism provides a defeater defeater. Second, advocates of the design argument sometimes cite as evidence for a Designer the occurrence of various factors necessary for the existence of life (e.g. various cosmic constants, the properties of water, etc.). Critics from Hume to the present have responded in this way: We should not be surprised by these data. If the world had been one in which intelligent life could not have arisen, then we should not be here to discuss the matter. The factors are necessary for people to be around to puzzle over them and, thus, we should not be surprised at their occurrence. This response is analogous to Nagel’s defense of reason. To see what is wrong with this objection, let us suppose that an advocate of the design argument cites a number of factors, a-g, that are part of the world and are necessary preconditions for the emergence of life. Hume and his followers interpret the design argument as follows: Theists are supposedly saying, ‘Isn’t it amazing that the factors necessary for life preceded us instead of some other factors that make life impossible preceding us!” In other words, theists are comparing these two different world courses: World Course #1: a through g obtain and human beings appear; World Course #2: alternate factors (say h through n) obtain and human beings appear. Note that worlds one and two differ only in the factors that obtain in them, but the presence of human beings is held constant. Now this is indeed a bad argument, because it is hard to see how humans could emerge in any world other than one in which the factors necessary for their emergence are actualized! But this is not the correct interpretation of the design argument. Advocates of the design argument are offering the following comparison: World Course #1: a through g obtain and human beings appear; World Course #2: alternate factors (say h through n) obtain and no human life appears. Advocates of the design argument are claiming that the emergence of any life, including human life, was incredibly unlikely and required the actualization of a delicately balanced set of preconditions, and the realization of these preconditions require explanation provided by the existence of a Designer. Even the atheist J. L. Mackie saw the flaw in Hume’s criticism: ‘There is only one actual universe, with a unique set of basic materials and physical constants, and it is therefore surprising that the elements of this unique set-up are just right for life when they might easily have been wrong. This is not made less surprising by the fact that if it had not been so, no one would have been here to be surprised. We can properly envisage and consider alternative possibilities which do not include our being there to experience them.’ See J. L. Mackie, The Miracle of Theism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), 141. Nagel confuses parallel cases of these two interpretations of the design argument by dismissing questions about rationality as though they were like the first interpretation. But questions about rationality are like the second interpretation and Nagel's ‘‘solution'' not only fails to address this question, it actually provides grounds that strengthen the force of it. For more on this, see J. P. Moreland, ‘The Twilight of Scientific Atheism: Responding to Nagel’s Last Stand,” in The Future of Atheism, ed. by Robert Stewart (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 2008).

8    See Richard Connell, Substance and Modern Science (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988) 89-100; Geoffrey Madell, The Identity of the Self (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1981), 49-77. Unfortunately, Madell claims that the I should be taken as the property of being a self and not as a substance. Consequently, the I is something that, like redness, can be exemplified. See Madell, 134-38. Cf. J. P. Moreland, ‘How To Be A Nominalist in Realist Clothing,” Grazer Philosophische Studien 39 (1991) 75-101.

9    Stewart Goetz, ‘‘Modal Dualism,'' delivered at the Midwestern Meeting of the Society of Christian Philosophers, March 9, 1996. Madell, The Identity of the Self; cf., Madell, Mind and Materialism (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press,

1988) 103-25. Cf. J. P. Moreland, “Madell’s Rejection of a Substantial, Immaterial Self,” Philosophia Christi 2:1 (1999): 111-14.

10    Richard Swinburne, The Evolution of the Soul (Oxford: Clarendon, 1986) 145-73.

11    I omit temporal indexicals like ‘now’’ and “then” because on my view, they are two primitive indexicals that cannot be reduced to or eliminated in favor of the other: “I” and “now’’. “Now’’ expresses an irreducible fact about temporal rea-lity—presentness—and it implies an A-series view of time. The fact that ‘‘I’ and ‘‘now’ are both primitive may have something to do with the fact that finite, conscious beings are intrinsically temporal entities.

12    See Madell, Mind and Materialism 103-25.

13    See Madell, The Identity of the Self; Hywel David Lewis, The Elusive Self (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1982).

14    See John Foster, The Immaterial Self (London: Routledge, 1991) 266-80; Grant Gillett, “Actions, Causes, and Mental Ascriptions,’ in Objections to Physical-ism, ed. by Howard Robinson (Oxford: Clarendon, 1993) 81-100; J. P. Moreland, ‘‘Naturalism and Libertarian Agency,'' Philosophy and Theology 10 (1997) 351-81. But cf. Timothy O’Connor, “Agent Causation,’ in Agents, Causes, & Events (N. Y.: Oxford, 1995) 178-80.

15    Foster, The Immaterial Self, 266-80.

16    Paul Tidman, “Conceivability as a Test for Possibility,’’ American Philosophical Quarterly 31 (October 1994) 297-309.

17    See James van Cleve, ‘‘Conceivability and the Cartesian Argument for Dualism,'' Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 64 (1983) 35-45; Charles Taliaferro, Consciousness and the Mind of God (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994) 134-39,

18    A. D. Smith points out that if we sever our beliefs in possibility entirely from conceivability, we shall land in extreme Megareanism where the possible and the necessary collapse into the actual. Se A. D. Smith, ‘‘Non-Reductive Physic-alism,’ in Objections to Physicalism, ed. by Howard Robinson (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993) 243.

19    Cf. Keith Yandell, “A Defense of Dualism,’ Faith and Philosophy 12 (1995) 548-66; Charles Taliaferro, ‘‘Animals, Brains, and Spirits,'' Faith and Philosophy 12 (1995) 567-81.

20    Paul Churchland, Matter and Consciousness (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, rev. ed., 1988)

21    Paul Churchland, Matter and Consciousness (1988), 10.

22    See J. P. Moreland and Stanley Wallace, “Aquinas vs. Descartes and Locke on the Human Person and End-of-Life Ethics,’’ International Philosophical Quarterly 35 (September 1995): 319-30. In the article we address and offer a Tho-mistic solution to causal pairing. Kim may be forgiven for missing a specific journal article since we all do that regularly. But our solution is not unusual among Thomistic dualists, and it is difficult to see how Kim could fail to interact with this view if he knew of it.

23    Anthony O’Hear, Beyond Evolution: Human Nature and the limits of Evolutionary Explanation (Oxford: Clarendon, 1997).

24    Searle, Rediscovery of the Mind, 9,

25    Ibid., 9.

26    Ibid., 4.

27    Ibid., 4-5.

28    Ibid., 5.

29    Ibid., xii.

30    Ibid, 27.

31    Richard Swinburne clearly distinguishes substance dualism and immortality. He claims to provide a compelling case for the former independent of Christian revelation, but not for the latter. See Swinburne, The Evolution of the Soul, introduction and chapter fifteen. Searle’s comments occur six years after Swin-bume’s, and it is either dishonest or ignorant for Searle to use his rhetoric in light of a clear, powerful counterexample in the literature, a counterexample that is typical of substance dualists and not idiosyncratic to Swinburne.

32    Searle, Rediscovery of the Mind, 90-91.

33    Quentin Smith, ‘‘The Metaphilosophy of Naturalism,’’ Philo (2001).

34    Ibid.

35    Ibid.

36    Richard Gale, On the Nature and Existence of God (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 387.

37    Quentin Smith, ‘‘The Metaphilosophy of Naturalism.’’

38    John Searle, “An Interview with John Searle,’’ Free Inquiry 18:4 (Fall 1998): 39. See the equally puzzling summary of Peter Watson’s hernia-enducing eight-hundred page tome Ideas: A History of Thought and Invention, from Fire to Freud (N. Y.: HarperCollins, 2005), 746.

39    J. P. Moreland and Kai Nielsen, Does God Exist? The Debate between Theists & Atheists (Buffalo, N. Y.: Prometheus, 1993).

40    Ibid, 79-86.

41    See P. C. Vitz, Faith of the Fatherless: The Psychology of Atheism (Dallas, Texas: Spence Publishing, 1999). Cf. Benjamin Beit-Hallahmi, “Atheists: A Psychological Profile,’’ in The Cambridge Companion to Atheism ed. by Michael Martin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 300-317.

42 Jaegwon Kim, “Lonely Souls: Causality and Substance Dualism,” in Soul, Body and Survival, ed. Kevin Corcoran (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 2001), 30.

43    Frank Jackson, From Metaphysics to Ethics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), 45.

44    Joshua Hoffman and Gary S. Rosenkrantz, Substance: Its Nature and Existence (London: Routledge, 1997), 7. Cf. 77-79. Unfortunately, Hoffman and Rosenkrantz fail to follow their own advice, or so it seems to me. For they claim that, while souls are intelligible and, thus, possibly exist, there is no sufficient reason to postulate their existence, given the natural scientific view of living organisms and their place in the natural world. Cf. 6-7. But this judgment reverses the epistemic order between science and “folk” ontology and removes the burden of proof about the soul that science has not, and perhaps cannot meet, given the nature of the issue.

45    Ned Block ‘Consciousness’’ in A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, ed. Samuel Guttenplan (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1994), 211.

46    John Searle, ‘‘The Mystery of Consciousness: Part II,’’ New York Review of Books (16 November 1995), 61.

47    Colin McGinn, The Mysterious Flame: Consciousness Minds in a Material World (New York: Basic Books, 1999). 14.

48    Colin McGinn, The Problem of Consciousness (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991), 10-11.

49    David Chalmers, The Conscious Mind (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 93.

50    David Papineau, Philosophical Naturalism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), 119.

51    Ibid., 106, 114-18, 120, 121, 126.

52    Leibniz, Monadology 17, in Leibniz Selections, ed. Philip Weiner (N. Y.: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1951), 536.

53    Jackson, From Metaphysics to Ethics, 6 n. 5.

54    Jeffrey Schwartz and Sharon Begley, The Mind and the Brain (N.Y., N.Y.: Harper-Collins, 2002), 37; Cf. 28, 30-31, 43, 44, 46 48-49, 142, 143, 148.

55    Jaegwon Kim, “Mind, Problems of the Philosophy of,” s.v. The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, ed. Ted Honderich (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 578.

56    Jaegwon Kim, Mind in a Physical World, 96.

57    Ibid., chapter 4, especially pages 118-20. Curiously, Kim has become an emergent epiphenomenal dualist regarding phenomenal conscious. See his Physical-ism or Something Near Enough (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 2005). This is curious because Kim has always been sensitive to emergentist questions (Why does pain instead of itchiness emerge on certain brain states? Why does consciousness emerge at all?) and, as far as I can tell, he does not believe there is a clear naturalistic answer to these questions. In this case, it is likely that his ontology has lots and lots of brute facts, a curious admission for a philosopher who accepts ontological simplicity as a guide for doing ontology. Cf. J. P. Moreland, “If You Can’t Reduce, You Must Eliminate: Why Kim’s Version of Physicalism Isn’t Close Enough,’’ Philosophia Christi 7 (Spring 2005): 463-73; “The Argument from Consciousness,” in Rationality of Theism, ed. by Paul Copan and Paul Moser (London: Routledge, 2003), 204-20.