In chapters one and two we have examined the naturalist ontology and AC as a rival to naturalism in explaining the appearance of consciousness or its law-like correlations with physical states. We have seen reasons that follow from the nature of naturalism itself and from the presence of AC as a rival for why a naturalist ought to be a strong physicalist. Unfortunately, strong physicalism is a tough sell and a growing number of philosophers are dissatisfied with it. Perhaps our conclusion that a naturalist ought to be a strong physicalist is premature. Maybe there are adequate naturalist accounts of the mental.
In chapters three through five we will look at representative samples of the major strategies employed to provide such an account in increasing order of strength. In chapter three we will examine a view expressed by Searle to the effect that all a naturalist needs to do is to provide contingent correlations between mental and physical states. In chapter four, we will investigate a view proffered by Timothy O’Connor to the effect that naturalists must go beyond contingent correlations and justify the claim that physical states necessitate in some appropriate modal sense the mental ones. In chapter five, we shall turn to a view advocated by Colin McGinn who asserts that all previous naturalist attempts to explain consciousness fail due to in-principle considerations about the phenomena to be explained and the evolutionary limitations on our noetic equipment. McGinn proffers a mysterian solution he claims to be consistent with naturalism. I will take Searle’s, O’Connor’s and McGinn’s to be canonical representations of contingent emergent-correlation, necessary emergent and mysterian forms of naturalism.
In chapter six, we shall look at a position—panpsychism as proffered by its most able advocate, David Skrbina—that is most likely an alternative to and not a version of naturalism, but that is less extreme from a naturalist standpoint than a theistic solution. In chapter seven, we will look at Philip Clayton’s pluralistic emergentist monism. Of all the positions we shall consider, I believe that Clayton’s is the most plausible. But I hope to show that it is not an option for a naturalist who claims explanatory superiority for his/her worldview, nor is it preferable to classic theism and AC.
I will conclude that none of these solutions is adequate and that AC is to be preferred. If I am right about this, then the existence of finite mental
states provides good evidence that God exists. The best thing for a naturalist to do in this case it to opt for a strong form of physicalism. In chapter eight, I will show that the main naturalist argument for physical-ism, namely, an appeal to the hard sciences, is an abject and obvious failure. This will raise the question as to why physicalism enjoys the status it does in the academy today in spite of the lack of significant evidence for it. I try to answer this question in chapter nine.