Charles Horman versus Henry Kissinger: US Intervention in 1970s Chile and the Case for Prosecutions
Mario I. Aguilar
This chapter explores the role of Henry Kissinger and the US Government in the destruction of democracy in Chile. It analyses primary sources from the US National Security Archive Documents on Chile, along with Civil Action 77–1748, Joyce Horman et al. v. Henry Kissinger et al., which clearly implicate Kissinger in fostering large-scale human rights violations.
Following the argument of Christopher Hitchens in The Trial of Henry Kissinger (Hitchens, 2001), I argue that the extensive killing of socialists and communists in Chile followed a policy, pushed by Kissinger in the name of democracy, under which not even US citizens were spared. In conclusion, I suggest that there is a case for international prosecution even though the US has not yet ratified the United Nations Convention on Torture.
The late twentieth century witnessed several events of international significance that changed our understanding of diplomacy as an interventionist policy and that catalyzed important legal investigations related to Chile. Prior to these events, the International Conventions on Human Rights and Torture were applied solely to those who had committed a material deed that was considered genocidal, as in the case of the Nazis tried in Nuremberg for crimes against humanity. The events in question were:
1.The arrest of Augusto Pinochet, the former Chilean dictator, in October 1998 in London, which brought to the forefront a number of issues pertaining to international law and the possible arrest of those accused of crimes against humanity by countries other than their own. Pinochet’s arrest was followed by lengthy debates in the British Courts, the House of Commons, and the House of Lords, regarding individual complicity in larger political conflicts, international law, and national state sovereignty, and the legal responsibility of those who did not prevent human rights abuses, such as kidnapping and torture, when they had the political power to do so.
2.The decision by the US government to declassify secret documents relating to Chile during the Pinochet regime in December 1998, followed by the subsequent declassification of thousands of other documents in the following years.1
3.The constitution of ad hoc International Tribunals in The Hague and Tanzania that received information, issued arrest warrants, and tried criminals involved in the mass extermination of ethnic groups in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.
Further investigations followed these developments, led by Spanish Judge Baltasar Garzón and related to the cooperation among several Latin American governments during the 1970s in arresting, torturing, killing, and disposing of the bodies of political opponents – the so-called Operation Condor. These legal investigations made it clear that the US State Department and the CIA had inside knowledge about Chilean events, and in some cases had been directly involved in undercover operations during the 1970s. Such knowledge and operations coincided with the years in which Henry Kissinger served as President Nixon’s Assistant for National Security and as President Nixon’s and President Ford’s Secretary of State. This period in US foreign policy saw the US intervene in Vietnam and Indochina, Bangladesh, Chile, Cyprus, East Timor, as well as other regions of the world. Moreover, the release of declassified US security documents revealed Kissinger’s role as a direct instigator of some of the human rights abuses perpetrated in other countries, including Chile.
In the wake of the publication of Hitchens’s book, and the final delivery of declassified US documents in November 2001, this chapter considers Kissinger’s involvement, and that of the US more generally, in the following events in Chile:
•The killing of army commander-in-chief René Schneider in 1970 in order to prevent President Salvador Allende from taking office.
•The generalised boycott of Chilean democracy by direct internal interference in the affairs of a foreign nation.
•The fostering of a military coup in September 1973.
•The killing of US citizens at the National Stadium in 1973.
•US involvement in supporting acts of kidnapping, torture and disappearance in cooperation with the security forces of Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, and Bolivia.
The election of Salvador Allende
On 4 September 1970, Salvador Allende, a Chilean senator and founding member of the Chilean Socialist Party,2 received the majority of votes in a presidential election contested by other two candidates: Jorge Alessandri, representing the right-wing coalition, and Radomiro Tomic, representing the Christian Democratic Party (PDC).
Allende did not achieve a majority of over 50 per cent of the votes, which would have sufficed to confirm him as the new president-elect. However, he won more votes than any other party – 36.2 per cent of the total. Following agreed-upon electoral procedures, the Chilean parliament confirmed Allende as President of Chile on 24 October 1970, as the Christian Democrat parliamentarians followed Chilean democratic tradition and supported the winner of an election plurality.3 Allende took office on 4 November, and proceeded to implement what he called ‘the Chilean road to socialism.’
The US State Department had supported the Christian Democrats during Eduardo Frei’s administration, allegedly in order to prevent Soviet involvement in Chilean affairs during a historical period characterized both by Cold War tensions and by the US Alliance for Progress, which predicated aid upon support for the American way of life and US national security. William Colby, CIA Director (1973–75), denied providing any support for the National Party (PN) and the Christian Democrats in the elections. He wrote in a confidential memo to Kissinger that ‘our role in the election was limited to an effort to denigrate Allende and his Popular Unity (UP) coalition during the campaign.’4
Even if this assertion were believable, by the time President Eduardo Frei had finished his stint in office and passed the presidential sash to Allende, the United States had grown enormously worried about the new Chilean government – the first democratically elected socialist government in the western hemisphere. The right-wing Chilean parties, international corporations such as the ITT, Pepsi-Cola, the Chase Manhattan Bank, and the CIA, were also deeply concerned.
Kissinger, who was at the center of US national-security policymaking, stated famously that he saw no reason why a country should be allowed to go Marxist simply because its people are irresponsible. The US ambassador to Chile, Edward Korry, reported in the following words the general feeling of the Nixon administration:
It is a sad fact that Chile has taken the path to communism with only a little more than a third (36 per cent) of the nation approving this choice, but it is an immutable fact. It will have the most profound effect on Latin America and beyond; we have suffered a grievous defeat; the consequences will be domestic and international; the repercussions will have immediate impact in some lands and delayed effect in others. (Korry quoted in Kissinger, 1979: 653)
Ambassador Korry was convinced that the Chilean military would not entertain the idea of a military coup, and he made his opinion clear to the US administration in a cable from Santiago, dated 7 September 1970. The following day, members of the so-called ‘40 Committee’ met in Washington. In assessing Allende’s victory, they realized that very little could be done from afar; Richard Helms, then director of the CIA, suggested that if a military coup were considered as an option, it would have little chance of success unless it was undertaken very rapidly. While other members had reservations about such a modus operandi, due to the risk of civil war in Chile, the chairman directed the US Embassy to produce an assessment on ‘the pros and cons and problems and prospects involved should a Chilean military coup be organised now with US assistance, and the pros and cons and prospects involved in organizing an effective future Chilean opposition to Allende.’5 A further meeting was scheduled for 14 September 1970.
The Chairman of the 40 Committee from 1969 to 1976 was Henry Kissinger. During that period, the 40 Committee supervised US covert operations abroad, and in some cases surveillance within the United States.6
Kissinger was unhappy with the idea of Allende taking over the Chilean presidency, and, after a series of meetings that took place in Washington eleven days after Allende’s victory, it became clear that Nixon shared the same immediate concerns. Kissinger had briefed Nixon through a memorandum dated 17 September 1970, in which he shared his doubts about Korry’s objectivity and analysis of the Chilean situation. He further suggested that the US administration was only reacting to events, rather than developing a clear plan of action. Kissinger advised Nixon to form a special task force that would meet daily and supervise the sending of a professional expert to take over the operation.7
The following day, Kissinger met with Donald Kendall (president of Pepsi-Cola) and with David Rockefeller of Chase Manhattan.8 Later, he met with CIA director Richard Helms and President Nixon in the Oval Office. Ten million dollars was mustered for a secret operation built around a two-track strategy: a diplomatic track, and a covert operation that sought to encourage and catalyze a military coup, unbeknownst to the State Department, Congress, or Ambassador Korry in Santiago. A strategic group that met in Langley, Virginia, was to develop the two-track plan using the best men available; their immediate order was ‘to make the [Chilean] economy scream.’ The two-track policy as it emerged involved the following groups:
(a) A group in-charge of economic policies related to US investments, renegotiation of foreign debt, and economic aid to Chile; and,
(b) A group of CIA personnel, experts on covert operations, that without the knowledge of the US Congress and the US Ambassador in Chile was to make contact with those within the military and other sectors opposed to the election of Allende in Chile, with the aim of preventing his accession to power.
Group (b) proceeded to contact Chilean military that were open to the idea of a military coup. The instructions came from Kissinger as National Security Advisor, and were issued without the approval of the US Congress or the direct knowledge of the US ambassador in Chile.
The main obstacle for US plans for military intervention was the chief of the Chilean General Staff, René Schneider, who was completely opposed to any military intervention in the democratic process. In a 40 Committee meeting on 18 September 1970, it was decided that Schneider would have to be removed. The original plan was to convince some Chilean officers, with the help of interested civilians, to kidnap him before the meeting of the Chilean Congress on 24 October that was scheduled to decide on the confirmation of the new Chilean President.
The task of finding such officers was a difficult one. Chile had a tradition of military non-involvement in civilian matters – or such, at least, was the perception of political analysts at the time.9 Richard Helms and his director of covert operations, Thomas Karamessines, warned Kissinger of the difficulties that confronted the plan. Nonetheless, Kissinger decided to push ahead. A sum of $50,000 was offered to any officer willing to kidnap Schneider in order to create chaos and panic and therefore impede Allende’s confirmation as President.
Ambassador Korry had suggested to the US administration that it avoid any contact with members of Patria y Libertad (Fatherland and Freedom), a right-wing group with paramilitary members. However, General Roberto Viaux, a right-wing sympathizer of the movement, along with other members of Patria y Libertad, were approached and invited to kidnap Schneider. Kissinger’s track-two group agreed to provide the guns and tear-gas grenades to be used in the operation. Meetings took place in Santiago from 16 to 18 October 1970, while Kissinger’s group was dispatching the arms via special courier.
General Camilo Valenzuela, chief of the Santiago garrison, was also approached, and formed a separate group of sympathizers willing to kidnap Schneider. It was clear that Viaux, who had already attempted military action against President Frei in 1969, was not fully trusted by members of Kissinger’s committees, and was perceived as an officer with little support among other Chilean officers.
Attempts to kidnap Schneider failed on 19–20 October; but Schneider was finally intercepted and killed on 2 October. Five cars blocked his Mercedes as he was being driven from the house of the army commander-in-chief to his offices at the Ministry of Defense. Schneider tried to resist by drawing a gun from his briefcase, and was shot several times. His death on 25 October at the Military Hospital produced a political uproar. President Frei declared a full national alert, with the army standing by, and three days of national mourning followed. At Schneider’s requiem mass, former presidents of Chile and the newly elected president accompanied his coffin (see Alexander, 1978: 126–7; Nunn, 1976: 266–8; del Pozo, 1992: 362; Sigmund, 1977: 120–23; Valenzuela, 1978: 48–9). The day before, the Chilean Congress had ratified Allende’s election by a substantial majority: 153 votes in favor and 35 against, with 7 abstentions.
Obstructing Allende’s road to socialism
The failure of the covert operation to provoke a reaction by the Chilean military via the kidnapping or killing of Schneider, followed by the ratification by the Chilean Congress of Allende as President of Chile, prompted the United States administration to intensify the work of group (a), based in Virginia. As early as 6 November 1970, the National Security Council met at the White House to discuss the Chilean situation. CIA director Helms emphasized that the composition of Allende’s first cabinet was clearly tilted in favor of Marxists, and Kissinger expressed his conviction that Allende was trying to turn Chile into a socialist state (Kissinger, 1979: 653–83).
Different options were explored and strong opinions voiced. Nixon expressed his belief that the Latin American military, in particular the Chilean army, should be strongly supported throughout the coming period of Chilean socialism, stating:
I will never agree with the policy of downgrading the military in Latin America. They are power centers subject to our influence. We want to give them some help. Brazil and Argentina particularly. Build them up with consultation. I want Defense to move on this. We’ll go for more in the budget if necessary.10
Moreover, it was clear that harsh economic policies were to be followed in order to isolate Allende’s government and render him unpopular with voters and even his own supporters. George A. Lincoln, Director of Emergency Preparedness, emphasized the possibility of manipulating the market for copper, Chile’s main natural resource, in order to weaken the Allende regime. In the end, Nixon’s proposed strategy became the basis for a consensus, when he told his advisors: ‘On the economic side we want to give him [Allende] cold turkey. Make sure that EXIM [the Export–Import Bank] and the international organizations toughen up. If Allende can make it with Russian and Chinese help, so be it – but we do not want it to be with our help, either real or apparent.’11
Such economic policies resulted in a sharp downturn in US organizational involvement in Chile. One need only consult figures showing the marked disparity in US financial aid to the administrations of Frei, Allende and Pinochet. From 1964 to 1970, Frei received $1,176.8 million; Allende from 1971 to 1973, just $67.3 million; and Pinochet from 1974 to 1976, $628.1 million.12
Allende, meanwhile, pursued a program that stood in marked opposition to the US Alliance for Progress, which his government depicted as an unjust and neocolonial arrangement. In the words of the program of Allende’s Popular Unity Coalition:
Imperialist exploitation of backward economies takes many forms: it can take the form of investment in mines (copper, iron, etc.) and in industrial activities, both in banking and in commerce; it can mean technological control that forces us to pay the highest prices for equipment, licences and patents, or North American loans which stipulate that we must buy in the United States, and with the additional clause that the purchased goods are to be transported in American boats, etc.
Let us quote a single instance: between 1952 and today the North Americans have invested $7,473,000,000 in Latin America. In the same period, they have taken $16,000,000,000 worth of profits away. (Allende 1973: 23)13
The alternative proposed by the Allende government became clearer in 1971, when the Chilean Congress approved the nationalization of the copper mines owned by US corporations.14 Further policy initiatives established state ownership of banks,15 promoted agrarian reform, and furthered cooperation with Cuba16 and the Soviet Union.17 All of these measures confirmed the initial worries of the US administration. The nationalization program extended to the Chilean branches of US corporations such as RCA Victor, Bethlehem Steel, US banks, Ford and ITT. In the case of Ford, the company was accused of boycotting the import of spare parts, while ITT became notorious for its support of the US economic boycott and attempted to enlist US intelligence in order to spy on Allende’s supporters (Quimantú, 1972).18
President Nixon conveyed his concerns in writing to Allende, while nonetheless stressing that ‘we are prepared to maintain the kind of relations with the Chilean government which they are inclined to maintain with us’ (Allende, 1973: 104). Allende’s response, in a public speech, suggested that Chile would follow the example of Mexico in maintaining links with all countries, and that his government could not equate the policies of the Organization of American States with the wishes of the US government.19
From 1971 to 1973, the CIA continued its covert operations in Chile, encouraging Allende’s opponents with economic assistance and fomenting military distrust of governmental policies. By September 1972, Chile’s trucker unions, an important sector given Chile’s dramatic geographical length, staged a strike against the government that symbolized the concerns of Allende’s opponents. The US administration helped to sustain the strike, which paralyzed Chile in an unprecedented fashion. This was a crucial moment in Chilean politics. Prior to the truckers’ strike, all opposition to Allende’s government had been channeled and expressed through the political parties. Instead, the truckers’ strike triggered the ‘direct mobilization by both big and small businessmen seeking to protect their stakes in the system’ (Valenzuela, 1978: 78).
From 1971 onward, the CIA also conducted surveillance operations against liberal US citizens living and working in Chile. One of those citizens, Frank Teruggi, was later to be killed, along with Charles Horman, at Santiago’s National Stadium following the military coup (see below). Throughout 1972, the CIA continued its efforts to foment discontent among the Chilean military. Some officers were seriously considering a military coup at the time of the truckers’ strike; they were enthusiastically supported by CIA agents operating in Santiago.
The first signs of a possible military coup came on 29 June 1973, when a group of tanks from the Tacna Regiment made their way to the presidential palace, La Moneda, and installed themselves across from the building. By the time the mutiny had been brought under control by the military under the command of Augusto Pinochet, it was clear to political analysts and members of Allende’s own government that a massive intervention could be forthcoming.
The US diplomatic failure
The military coup took place on Tuesday, 11 September 1973. From key locations in Santiago, the commanders-in-chief of the armed forces directed the takeover of radio stations, factories, government buildings, and the presidential palace (Verdugo, 1997).
The US government welcomed the change of government, and quickly recognized the military junta as Chile’s new legitimate authority. The Chilean navy, which had recently undertaken joint maneuvers with US ships, left the port of Valparaíso early in the morning of 11 September, and subsequently the marines and special naval forces took over the port and the main government buildings. What followed was the complete suppression of opposition forces and the formation of a centralized government in the hands of the Chilean armed forces. The US involvement in these events, which was sanctioned by Kissinger himself, became clearer with the arrest and murder of Charles Horman and Frank Teruggi at the National Stadium; other US citizens suspected of pro-Allende tendencies managed to go into hiding and flee the country (see, e.g., Cooper, 2001). While Horman and Teruggi were assassinated around the same time in the National Stadium, it was the case of Charles Horman that achieved the greatest prominence in subsequent years, becoming the subject of the book (Hauser, 1982) and film Missing and of a legal suit by the Horman family against Henry Kissinger and all those held responsible for his death.20
Charles and his wife Joyce had arrived in Chile in 1972 after touring other Latin American countries.21 Together with other Americans, they formed the North American News Sources (FIN), a group that translated and disseminated pro-Allende articles in US newspapers. In April 1973, Horman joined others in a protest, in front of the US Consulate in Santiago, against the bombardment of Cambodia.22
When the military coup occurred, Horman was in Valparaíso, together with a US visitor, Terry Simon. Joyce remained in Santiago. Horman and Simon found it difficult to return to Santiago, and did so only because of an encounter at their hotel with a US Marine, Lieutenant Colonel Patrick Ryan. Ryan was at that time head of a five-man US Naval Group in Valparaíso, and held the title of Acting Chief of Navy Selection, US Military Group in Chile. Ryan had filed a situation report to the US administration stating that ‘Chile’s coup d’état was close to perfect.’23 He was meeting at the hotel with another American, Arthur Creter, who identified himself as a retired naval engineer based in Panama. Creter told them that he had come to do a job, and the job had been done.24
On 15 September 1973, Navy Captain Ray Davis drove Horman and Simon back to Santiago in a car with Chilean navy identification. They stayed at the Carrera Hotel, as they could not reach Joyce by phone. The following day, they moved to the Horman home. After the decision was taken that they should all leave Chile, Horman and Simon went to the Braniff Airlines office on 17 September to buy tickets for the return to the United States. Braniff personnel told them to contact the US Consulate, as a list of Americans scheduled to leave Chile was being drawn up.
At the US Consulate, Marion Tipton, the vice-consul, told Horman and Simon that such a list did not exist. Tipton further commented to Simon that ‘they never come in to visit us at normal times, but at times like this they come crawling out of the walls.’25 It was clear that some young Americans had failed to register their names and addresses at the US Consulate because they perceived the US Embassy as being the enemy of Allende’s government.26 In turn, the US Embassy and the State Department perceived such young Americans as being far too intimate in their relationship with enemies of the United States.27
On 17 September, shortly after he arrived home, Charles Horman was picked up by Chilean military personnel and taken to the National Stadium.28 Only on 17 October did Horman’s parents, Ed and Joyce, learn that Charles had been executed at the National Stadium (either on 18 or 20 September) and that his body had been found at the General Cemetery.29 And only on 31 March was Horman’s body released and flown to New York. By then, an autopsy was impossible. The Chileans had negotiated a deal with the US administration to return Horman’s body in exchange for the sale of American-made missiles to the Pinochet administration.30
It is still unclear whether American personnel were present at Horman’s execution or during his preceding torture sessions. What is clear, however, is that the US Embassy failed to provide protection for US citizens in Chile – their core diplomatic responsibility. Moreover, some Embassy officials, in direct communication with the US government, provided the new military authorities with information on US citizens living in Chile, apparently in the knowledge that the military would arrest and torture them. Investigations by US officials in 1976 indicated that ‘US intelligence was aware the Government of Chile saw Horman in a rather serious light and US officials did nothing to discourage the logical outcome of the Government of Chile paranoia.’31 It is possible, then, to argue that Kissinger and those following his directives in Santiago conspired to kidnap, torture, and murder US citizens in violation of Geneva Convention protections extended to civilians in time of ‘war’ (this was the term used by Pinochet to describe the military coup and its aftermath).
Conclusion: The never-ending story
In 2001, the actions of Henry Kissinger and other US officials came under scrutiny yet again. Earlier, the US Senate had investigated covert operations related to Chile in the 1970s; while Kissinger’s role had been questioned, he justified his overall actions on the grounds of the Cold War and US national security, and was not pressed further by the Senate committees.
Following Pinochet’s 1998 arrest in London and revelations of US involvement in training Latin American officers accused of human rights abuses throughout Operation Condor, fingers were again pointed at Kissinger. It seemed scarcely credible that someone who was simultaneously chairman of the 40 Committee, National Security Advisor to the US President, and Secretary of State would be unaware of what had taken place in Chile and throughout the southern cone, or of the critical US role in the events. Kissinger’s own writings make it clear that he saw his role as that of an agent for American foreign policy. He occasionally warned foreign governments (including Pinochet’s) to preserve a good public image, but he fended off those who criticized human rights abuses in Chile and pressed for an end to military rule (see his report of a trip to Chile in June 1976: Kissinger, 1999: 749–60).
The accusations that can be levelled against Kissinger, based on the material presented in this chapter, are thus as follows:
1.He conspired with others to kidnap and to kill General Schneider in 1970, providing money and arms to facilitate the operation. He also conspired to deny the Chilean people the fruits of a fair and democratic election, intervening in the domestic political affairs of a sovereign state not at war with the United States, and in the case of an election where there was not even a hint of election fraud. In short, throughout 1970 he conspired to kidnap, to murder, and to suppress the functioning of democratic institutions.
2.Kissinger is responsible for conspiring to overthrow a democratic president and to assist security forces in kidnapping, torturing, and murdering political opponents. The direct agents of this conspiracy, on the US part, were US Navy personnel in Valparaíso and CIA agents at the National Stadium and possibly other detention centers.
3.Kissinger failed to instruct the US Ambassador in Chile to protect the lives of US citizens such as Charles Horman and Frank Teruggi, who were kidnapped, tortured and murdered while embassy staff offered assurances that they had no idea of these citizens’ whereabouts.
4.Kissinger, as ex-Secretary of State, is responsible for extending US aid and military cooperation that greatly facilitated Operation Condor throughout the southern cone, notably in the case of Chilean prisoners transported from neighboring countries, who subsequently ‘disappeared.’
As a result of the declassification of the secret US documents on Chile, parties involved in litigation against Kissinger have been able to file legal claims against him and others involved in the covert operations of the early 1970s. For example, on 11 September 2001, a criminal claim was filed before Judge Juan Guzmán Tapia in the Santiago courts, relating to Operation Condor (Ingreso Corte 2182–98). Those accused of involvement in kidnapping, torture and murder included Augusto Pinochet, Henry Kissinger, Richard Helms and Vernon Walters. Among those filing the case was Nobel prizewinner Rigoberta Menchú.
In addition, following the disclosure of the secret documents, the widow of General Schneider and his three children appeared on the US network CBS, together with Peter Kornbluh, a researcher and independent analyst at the National Security Archive. Kornbluh emphasized that this was the first time documentation had been procured relating to the Nixon administration’s direct interference in the democratic institutions of other countries.32
As part of the National Security Archive’s interest in Kissinger, the State Department announced on 9 August 2001 that Kissinger had turned over 10,000 pages of transcripts of his telephone conversations while in office from 1973 to January 1977. In December 1976 Kissinger had donated his telephone conversations transcripts to the Library of Congress, but with one proviso: that the transcripts were to be strictly controlled by himself and his lawyers until five years after his death.
In summary, the evidence for the prosecution in the Kissinger case is abundant, but Kissinger nonetheless remains a prominent and widely respected figure, a citizen above the law, both in the US and even in countries that suffered tremendously under his policies. For example, in February 2002, Brazilian President Fernando Henrique Cardoso proposed that the ‘Ordem do Cruzeiro do Sul’ be bestowed on Kissinger during his scheduled visit to Brazil the following month.
Against such traditional respect for the leading statesmen of friendly countries, we must set the evolution in international law towards the regulation of violent intervention in the affairs of sovereign states. Should this trend continue, and the effectiveness of such regulation increase, it is possible – and to be hoped – that political directives such as those issued by Kissinger and the administration he served will become anathema, and their criminal consequences in Latin America and throughout the world will be sharply reduced.
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