Although the Athenian Empire lay to the north and east, Athens was not altogether uninterested in the west. As we have seen,1 there were rumors that Themistocles had ambitions of western expansion, and it is not too much to believe that at the height of their success the more sanguine Athenians may have cast covetous eyes on the wheat fields, harbors, and precious metals of the Greek cities of Sicily and southern Italy. In the year 458/7, at any rate, when the victorious Athenians had not yet been sobered by the Egyptian disaster, they concluded a treaty with Egesta in western Sicily.2 It is possible that similar alliances were made about the same time with Rhegium on the toe of Italy and Leontini, a Sicilian town to the northwest of Syracuse.3 If these dates are correct, they may give evidence of Athenian ambition during this most ambitious period in Athenian history, but even then it is not clear that Pericles was in favor of this policy. We have seen that he was by no means in full control of Athens in the fifties and that he was unable, on occasion, to restrain the more aggressive Athenians. There is a long standing suggestion that these alliances were, in fact, made by the radicals.4 Such a suggestion cannot be confirmed, but it seems no less likely than any other.
However one judges these cases, they cannot be understood as anything but isolated instances of Athenian involvement in the west. There is no reliable evidence for a pattern of continued active Athenian political interest in Italy and Sicily. Certainly there is not a shred of evidence to connect Pericles with an ambitious western policy.
The first clear instance of a serious Athenian interest in western affairs is its leading role in founding a colony in southern Italy. Sybaris had been destroyed by its neighbor Croton late in the sixth century and again in the middle of the fifth. Shortly after this second destruction, dated by Diodorus five years after the second founding of 453/2, the surviving Sybarites sought help in rebuilding their city.5 From this appeal there ultimately resulted the foundation of the city on a new site, which was called Thurii. We have no contemporary source for its foundation. We must rely chiefly on Diodorus and a few reports from scattered late authors, which often seem to contradict his version of the events. The result is a rather confused picture in which the chronology is far from clear and from which many very different interpretations have arisen. In spite of the difficulties, and although it is impossible to reach absolutely certain conclusions, we must try to understand what happened at Thurii and what it meant, for its foundation was an event of the greatest importance in the history of the relations of the Greek states in the critical years between the two Peloponnesian wars.
Diodorus places all the events connected with the foundation in the year 446/5,6 but there is another strong tradition which places the foundation in 444/3.7 Most scholars accept the later date, but the fact is that both dates seem relevant.8 It is likely that it was in 446/5 that the Sybarite survivors sent ambassadors to Sparta and Athens asking help in resettling their city and inviting the Spartans and Athenians to join in the colony. Probably the request was made after the conclusion of the Thirty Years’ Peace, for it is highly unlikely that such a request could be made while Sparta and Athens were at war with one another, but it was natural to apply for help to the two hegemonal states of Greece after the peace. The Spartans characteristically refused, but the Athenians agreed to take part.9 This is as much as we may say about the first part of the Athenian involvement. Although Diodorus continues on to give details of the foundation, most of them clearly belong to the later date and the second phase of Athenian participation, and none can be confidently assigned to 446/5.10 All we know, then, is that when the Sybarites asked the Athenians to provide settlers for re-establishing their city, Athens complied.
Let us be clear that this action did not amount to the establishment of an Athenian colony or cleruchy. We cannot be sure what was the purpose of Pericles, who was surely in command in 446/5, in agreeing to this migration, but we should not lose sight of the fact that in the previous year Athens had sent cleruchies to Imbros, the Chersonese, Chalcis, and Eretria. In 446/5 colonies were sent to Colophon, Erythrae, and Hestiaea, and new cleruchies were sent to Chalcis and Eretria after their rebellions were put down.11 To be sure, these settlements were aimed, in part, at making the empire more secure, but they also reflect the need to rid Athens of excess population. The burden of providing a living for the poor placed a great strain on the Athenian treasury, particularly when the future of imperial tribute was in doubt. It is not necessary to see great imperial or commercial ambitions in this agreement to send supernumerary citizens to a city that was not an Athenian colony and that the Athenian settlers could not control.12
Athenian participation did not put an end to the troubles of the Sybarites. After a while, they “were destroyed by the Athenians and other Greeks, who, although they had come to live with them, despised them so much that they not only killed them but moved the city to another place and called it Thurii.”13 Diodorus provides some additional details. The old Sybarites, it seems, claimed special rights for themselves: political, social, and economic. This enraged the other settlers and led to the slaughter and expulsion of the Sybarites.14 These events took place after the signing of the Thirty Years’ Peace in the spring of 445. We must allow at least a year for the development of the strife and the final clash, so that by the spring or summer of 444, possibly a bit later, the word of what had happened must have reached Athens. It is generally agreed that some time in the year 444/3 the Athenians organized a colonizing expedition under the leadership of Lampon and Xenocritus to found a city on a new site near Sybaris. They sent messengers to the cities of the Peloponnese as well as other parts of Greece, many of whom accepted; this was to be not an Athenian, but a Panhellenic colony. The site was chosen in accordance with the instructions of the Delphic oracle. The land was divided equally among the settlers, regardless of their place of origin. A democratic constitution was established, and the Thurians were divided into ten tribes, organized into three groups. There was a Peloponnesian group made up of a tribe each for the Arcadians, the Achaeans, and the Eleians. Another, made up of extra Peloponnesian Dorians, consisted of tribes called Boeotia, Amphictyonis, and Doris. Finally, there were four other tribes, one each for Ionia, Athens, Euboea, and the Islands. The lawgivers and founding fathers of the constitution were Charondas and Protagoras, and among the illustrious colonists were Hippodamus of Miletus, the famous city-planner, and Herodotus, the father of history.15
So much is generally accepted, but the interpretation of these facts has led to much disagreement. Since the meaning of the foundation of Thurii is of the greatest importance to our understanding of Athenian policy, we must look carefully at the more important interpretations before suggesting our own. It has often been assumed that the Athenian establishment of Thurii on a Panhellenic basis was a conciliatory gesture towards Corinth, the state most suspicious of Athenian ambitions in the west.16 Wade-Gery agrees that such was at least part of the purpose, but asks why the Athenians made such a gesture. To his mind, Pericles never abandoned a policy of aggressive imperialism. “Perikles meant the Sparta-Athens dualism to be provisional. The years 445–431 were not, nor were meant to be, a milennium: Athens had recoiled to jump better.”17 The period between the peace of 446/5 and 431 was one of “relentless pressure westwards…aimed directly at Korinth, indirectly at Sparta: Korinth was to be forced out of the Spartan League or, if necessary, ruined.” Thus, since the establishment of Thurii on a Panhellenic basis was not an aggressive action but quite the reverse, Pericles could not have supported it. To be sure, he had proposed the settlement of Thurii and employed his friends Lampon and Xenocritus as founders, but he intended it purely as an imperial undertaking.
In 444/3, says Wade-Gery, Pericles was not elected general, and the planning of the expedition fell to Thucydides, son of Melesias, the archfoe of Pericles. A member of the international aristocracy of Greece, “he was the true Panhellenist: and…Perikles, in the Congress Decree, stole his thunder. To Perikles, Panhellenism was a thing which could be made to serve Athens: to Thucydides, it meant equality of all Greek states, the renouncement of Athenian domination.”18 It was Thucydides who invited the Peloponnesians to share in the colony and set it on its Panhellenic path. Unfortunately, Thucydides was ostracized in the spring of 443, and the result was a “mongrel policy” for Thurii. With the return to power of Pericles, Athens turned its back on peaceful Panhellenism and resumed its imperial ambitions. The tightening of Athenian control of the empire, the treaties with Rhegium and Leontini, which Wade-Gery thinks may belong to this year, possibly the alliance that Phormio concluded with Acarnania, were all stages in an uninterrupted process leading to Athens’ treaty with Corcyra in 433 and the Peloponnesian War.
Now this is as forceful a statement as we have of the proposition that Pericles and Athens were undeviatingly committed to an aggressive and expansionist policy not only in the north and east, but in the west as well, from the very moment that the Thirty Years’ Peace was made. If it is correct, it renders absurd any claim that the Peloponnesian War could have been averted, for Sparta and Corinth could certainly not stand idly by forever while Athens increased its power at their expense. The fact is, however, that the entire theory is gossamer and disintegrates at the first touch.19
The argument for Thucydides as the sponsor of the Panhellenic colony rests in the first place on two paragraphs (6–7) in the anonymous Life of Thucydides, which comes down to us in the manuscripts. This purports to be a life of the historian, not the son of Melesias. It tells a highly confused story of Thucydides going to Sybaris before he was condemned and ostracized. The source is universally regarded as altogether untrustworthy, and this particular tale is absurd and incoherent even by its low standard.20 The second basis for Wade-Gery’s interpretation is the argument that Pericles was out of power in 444/3 and could not have initiated the plan for a Panhellenic colony in that year. This argument rests on a passage in Plutarch’s Life of Pericles (16.3): “After the overthrow and ostracism of Thucydides, Pericles for no less than fifteen years acquired a position of authority and domination that was continuous and unbroken because of his election as general each year.”21 Wade-Gery takes this to mean that from 443/2, the year after the ostracism, to 429/8, the year of his death, Pericles held the generalship without interruption. In the first place, as Wade-Gery recognizes, Pericles was removed from office in 430/29 and died in the midst of his term in 429/8, so that the terms continuous (διηνεκῆ) and unbroken (μίαν οὐσαν) hardly seem applicable. If we interpret the passage strictly, we should have to begin the series of elections in 445/4.22 But the fact is that we have no warrant to take these figures seriously at all. It is perfectly clear that Plutarch is talking in very general terms and that his figures are round, to say the least. Earlier in the very same sentence he says, “For forty years Pericles stood first among such men as Ephialtes, Leocrates, Myronides, Cimon, Tolmides, and Thucydides….” If we take this claim seriously, we must believe that Pericles was paramount in 469, when he was no more than twenty-five years old. That is absurd, and no one does take it seriously, yet we are asked to believe in the accuracy of the figure of fifteen years that appears in the same context.
Scholars have pointed out yet another flaw in the argument: the assumption that if Pericles was not general he was out of power.23 It is clear that a continuous run of generalships was the exception rather than the rule in fifth-century Athens. “If Perikles was strategos 6 or 7 times between 460 and 443, that was remarkable…. If he was not reelected in 445–444 and 444–443, that was normal, and we must not infer from it any change or upset in Athenian policy.”24 Finally, we should recognize that the notion that Pericles was out of power in 444/3 rests on a fundamental misunderstanding of the institution of ostracism at Athens. We have seen that the vote on ostracism was introduced by Pericles, not his opponent. No politician ever did such a thing without full confidence in the support of a comfortable majority. Whether or not he was general in 444/3, Pericles was in command of the political situation and must bear full responsibility for the dispatch of a colony to Thurii and the form that it took.
Ehrenberg rejects the notion that Thucydides was responsible for the Panhellenic nature of Thurii, yet he seems to believe in a modified version of the “relentless pressure” theory. For him the foundation of Thurii is a continuation of that peaceful imperialism of the Congress Decree which would have supported Athenian political imperialism with religious hegemony. In the case of Thurii, “The aims were both more modest and more realistic. But the spirit was the same. Pericles founded a colony on a Panhellenic basis, a colony led by an Athenian οἰκιστής and intended as a stronghold of Athenian influence in the West.”25 This view has a good deal of support and deserves careful consideration. In the first place, it is well to clear the ground by eliminating unfounded suppositions. There is absolutely no reliable evidence for Athenian involvement in the west between 445 and 435 except for the colonization of Thurii.26 If we are to believe that Athens meant to extend her influence to the west in the years between the Peloponnesian Wars, we must confine our search for proof to that event.
At Thurii, Ehrenberg has tried to find such proof. His most important argument is that the colony was not really Panhellenic, that its Panhellenism was merely a cloak to hide the truth, that Thurii was founded by Athenian friends of Pericles and dominated by Athenians and their allies in the “well-founded expectation of Athenian leadership.” It was given a democratic constitution and filled with the friends of Pericles. The whole policy was Periclean, “that is to say, democratic and imperialistic.”27 An investigation of the ten Thurian tribes shows that Athens was the only single city represented by a tribe. It is further plain that with the tribes Eubois, Nesiotis, and las, Athens and her allies controlled four of the ten tribes. All the Dorians, including Corinthians and Spartans, were placed in a single tribe, so they could have been neither numerous nor influential. Ehrenberg takes this as evidence for Athenian machinations to control and dominate the colony. But surely this is to read too much into the tribal names or perhaps to read their significance too simply. If the constitution of Thurii was like that of Athens, then the tribes, like the original tribes of Cleisthenes, had to be roughly equal, for in Athens, at least, they provided regiments for the army and could not be too different in size. Thus, the Athenians could not have decided in advance how the Thurian tribes would be organized and named; first they had to discover who would come to join their colony.
We must keep in mind that the several Greek states did not appoint contingents of settlers to leave home and join the colony. The colonists were individuals who were attracted by the Athenian invitation. Until they gathered in Italy, no one could be sure how many there would be or what would be the number of settlers from each region. That there were few Spartans and Corinthians is hardly surprising. Sparta had no population to spare and had not sent off a colony for centuries. Corinth was a rich, exciting, and flourishing city with a mixed economy and many sources of entertainment. So far as we know she was not troubled by overpopulation in this period. Arcadia, Elis, Achaea, the Aegean Islands, Euboea, and many parts of Ionia and Boeotia, on the other hand, were far from prosperous and generally had more people than they could support. Athens, as we have seen, had a rapidly expanding population. The assignment of settlers to tribes thus seems less a part of an Athenian plan of domination than a reflection of the nature of the new body of citizens.
Perhaps it is also a bit naive to believe that the presence of three tribes of settlers from states in the Athenian Empire guaranteed the Athenians’ control. There was enough resentment towards Athens in the empire to make it equally likely that the Euboeans, Islanders, and Ionians might be very touchy and resentful of any Athenian attempt to assert superiority in any way. This is only conjecture, but so is the suggestion that the tribal organization makes a mockery of the notion that Thurii was a Panhellenic colony. The hard fact is that Athenians seem to have made up only about one-tenth of the population and to have been confined to a single tribe. If the Panhellenism of Thurii was a fraud, we need other evidence.
But the argument over Panhellenism is only a minor issue in comparison with the basic question: Did Athens use, or intend to use, Thurii as a base for her western ambitions? The best answer to this question can be found by examining the history of the colony. Very soon after its establishment, the new city became involved in a war with the old Spartan colony of Taras. Diodorus assigns the fighting to the year 444/3, but we have seen that his chronology is not reliable at this point. Perhaps we should understand him to mean that it took place two years after the foundation of the city, which he places in 446/5. If so we may guess that 442/1 is the proper date, but in any case some date in the forties is appropriate.
Diodorus gives us a rather vague account of continuous fighting on land and sea with mutual plunderings but no clear result.28 Once again Strabo has a clearer, fuller, and more reliable account. He is following Antiochus of Syracuse, a fifth-century writer who composed a history with one book devoted to southern Italy. We have reason to believe Strabo when he gives the following account:
Antiochus says that when the Tarantines were at war with the Thurians over who should possess Siris, and Cleandridas, who was in exile from Sparta, was their general, they agreed to establish a joint colony in common, but the colony was judged to belong to the Tarantines….29
It is not hard to put the two accounts together. For Diodorus the war is indecisive because neither side annihilates the other. Both our authors are describing the same event with different degrees of detail. Finally, we have the evidence of a dedication inscribed at Olympia in old Laconic letters, which reads: “The Tarantines offered a tenth of the spoils they took from the Thurians to Olympian Zeus.”30 The main point is indisputable: only a short time after its foundation Thurii fought a war with a nearby Spartan colony and lost.
It is at this point that the believers in the theory that Thurii was an outpost of Athenian imperialism must contend with the curious behavior of the Athenians. Athens took no action. Is it possible that so soon after the foundation of the colony, after going to such unusual lengths to set it up, that an imperialistic Pericles should make no move to support it? The defeat at Siris was the beginning of a decline of Athenian prestige in southern Italy that was never checked, yet Pericles permitted it without so much as a gesture or a word. Such behavior ill accords with a policy of aggressive imperialism or “relentless pressure.” One of the first things the new colony of Thurii had done was to make peace with the traditional enemy of Sybaris, Croton.31 Is it too daring to see in this and the refusal of Pericles to intervene in the war between Thurii and Taras, a contrary policy of peaceful Panhellenism and nonintervention?
The attitude of Athens towards Thurii was put to an even sharper and more direct test. In 434/3 factional strife broke out at Thurii.32 The date is of some importance for an understanding of the situation, for it is after the outbreak of hostilities between Corinth and Corcyra, but before the Athenian alliance with Corcyra. It is fair to say that at that moment a conflict between Athens and Sparta seemed possible, and to some even inevitable. It was in these circumstances that the Thurians split on the question of whose colony Thurii was and the related question of who was its οἰκιστής. There can be little doubt that the question arose as a result of the tense international situation, which soon led almost all Greeks and some barbarians to choose one side or the other in the impending struggle. The Athenians asserted that the colony was Athenian, alleging that “the greatest number of citizens had come from Athens.”33 The Peloponnesians countered that since a “great many” (οὐκ ὀλίγους) of them had been among the founding fathers, the colony should be regarded as Peloponnesian.
Unfortunately we do not have anything from Antiochus of Syracuse to clarify the nature of the dispute, but we shall not be far from the truth if we summarize the argument in the following terms: The dispute was important because its outcome might determine the attitude of the state in the forthcoming war. The Athenians argued that Thurii was Athenian because the single city with the greatest number of original colonists was Athens. The Peloponnesians argued that the colony was Peloponnesian because there were more Peloponnesians than Athenians, or indeed than any other geographical group. The upshot of the affair was that the Thurians sent to Delphi to ask, “Who shall be called the founder of the city?” The god replied that he himself should be considered the founder. That settled the matter. Thereafter Apollo was declared the founder of Thurii, and peace was restored. “The Panhellenic character of the colony was made clear, but the way was paved for the dissolution of the connection with Athens.”34
Once again Athens did absolutely nothing. But this time her silence is even stranger, for now there was a very good chance that war would come, and if it did, a colony in the west would be helpful, while a hostile state could be dangerous. Yet Pericles did not intervene, even though Delphic Apollo was a friend of Sparta, and his acceptance as founder of Thurii meant that it would be more likely to side with the Peloponnesians if war came. It appears that in 434/3, Pericles still hoped to avoid war and was reluctant to take any steps in the west that might frighten or anger Corinth or Sparta. There seems to be no reason to believe that Thurii was anything other than what it seemed to be, a Panhellenic and not an Athenian colony. There should be no doubt, furthermore, that it was a project supported by Pericles from the beginning, or that he remained firm in his determination to leave it independent down to and into the Peloponnesian War.
If all this is true, we need to explain why Pericles pursued the policies he did, when he did, and precisely in the way that he did. Our sources, of course, do not provide us with much information as to Pericles’ thinking, but the interpretation of his political situation that we have offered makes the following reconstruction not altogether unlikely. Some time in the year 444/3 the Athenians received word of the civil war in Sybaris by which the Athenian and allied settlers had ejected the Sybarites. Their situation was perilous, for a certain number of citizens was necessary, not only for the ordinary functioning of a city-state, but for its defense. The settlers had either to receive reinforcements or come home. Now, in the circumstances it must have been no easy task to persuade Athenians to go off to Thurii. Southern Italy was very far from home, and the average Athenian knew very little about that part of the world, as the Sicilian expedition would later show. Even in 446/5 there could not have been too many who went, for Athenians only made up about 10 per cent of the population. By 444/3 the attraction was less and the supply of Athenians smaller. The troubles of the first contingent did not serve to encourage further settlement. At the same time, the great number of Athenians who had gone overseas in colonies or cleruchies since the foundation must have come close to draining the city of potential emigrants. If Pericles wished to reinforce Thurii, he would be hard pressed to find enough Athenians for the job.
In this way necessity compelled Pericles to broaden the base of the new colony and seek settlers outside of Attica. But it was by no means necessary for him to extend his invitation throughout the Greek world, including the Peloponnese, and to create a Panhellenic colony. In 437/6 he undertook to found the colony of Amphipolis at the site of Ennea Hodoi in Thrace. On that occasion, too, there were not enough Athenians available, so he was compelled to turn to foreigners. To begin with, these additional settlers were collected from the neighborhood of Amphipolis without any Panhellenic fanfare. Beyond that, even though the Athenians were only a fraction of the populace, there was never any question that Amphipolis was an Athenian colony.35 The comparison is very illuminating. There were several reasons why the two colonies were treated so differently. If we have understood the Periclean policy rightly, geography was one consideration. Amphipolis was located within the Athenian sphere of influence, in the neighborhood of Athenian allies, subjects, and colonies. In that location there was no reason to display unusual modesty and restraint. Thurii was a unique Athenian settlement in Italy, in a region foreign and not vital to Athenian interests, but an area of great sensitivity for the Corinthians and even the Spartans. The very appearance of undue ambition in that part of the world might destroy the policy of disengagement with the great Peloponnesian powers that Pericles was trying to follow.
But foreign relations alone do not explain the nature of the Thurian colony. In 444/3 the political threat that the son of Melesias posed to Pericles was at its height, and the rhetorical weapon that was doing the most damage was the combination of anti-imperialism and Panhellenism that was the overt program of the oligoi. We may suppose that Pericles saw this at least as clearly as we do and seized upon the opportunity of the appeal of the Athenians at Sybaris to steal his opponents’ thunder. It is likely that some time in 444, before the decision to hold an ostracism, Pericles announced his intentions for the new colony and sent out his invitations to the Greek world, including the Peloponnese. In one stroke he had taken the wind out of his opponents’ sails. He had demonstrated his moderation, his lack of imperial ambition, and his Panhellenic sentiments. Perhaps this strategem turned the political tide and gave Pericles the confidence to bring on the ostracism that finally rid him of Thucydides.
His choice of the leadership of the expedition showed the same acumen and the same response to the political realities of the moment that would characterize his selection of Sophocles as chairman of the board of Hellenotamiae in the next year. The leading founding father was Lampon. He is referred to sometimes as a seer (μάντις), sometimes as an interpreter of oracles (ἐξηγητής or χρησμολόγος).36 Plutarch tells the story of his association with Pericles: a unicorn was brought to Pericles. Anaxagoras dissected the skull and explained the phenomenon rationally and scientifically. Lampon, however, interpreted it as a cosmic message that showed that the split between the parties of Pericles and Thucydides would be resolved by the victory of Pericles and the consequent unification of the state.37 We may deduce from this tale that Lampon was favorably disposed to Pericles and his cause, but it is also clear that Pericles, himself a coldly rational and highly educated man, understood the importance of religious orthodoxy for the masses. Ehrenberg has clearly seen the significance of Lampon for the colony at Thurii:
It is evident that the activities of prophets such as Lampon were essential for the whole enterprise. This is not surprising, for our sources give us many examples of the genuine and fervent belief of the Greeks, the Athenians as well as others, in oracles, prophecies and mantic evidence…. Every leading politician, whether he himself believed in these things or not, had to make use of them, and so had Pericles.38
The allegiance of Lampon brought more than religious orthodoxy to the Periclean cause. It also provided an aura of political and social respectability for the Thurian undertaking. In later years Lampon headed the list of the signers of the Peace of Nicias. He alone prepared recommendations for the regulation of the first fruits of the olive crop offered at Eleusis. “The man came obviously from one of the eupatrid families which dominated the political life of the period and which with the help of adoptions and adlections dominated the religious life throughout the whole history of Athens to the fifth century after Christ.”39 In the political crisis of 444/3, it must have been very useful to Pericles that the expedition to Thurii gave public prominence to such a supporter of his policy. He was living evidence, as was Sophocles, that a man could be kalos kagathos without joining the oligoi.
Whatever the domestic considerations surrounding the foundation of Thurii, its later development carried forward its initial intention in the realm of foreign policy without deviation. No doubt Pericles was disappointed when Thurii seemed to turn away from Athens, but it is wrong to say, “The foundation of Thurii reflects and confirms the greatness of his mind and the failure of his policy.”40 The policy was a great success at home, where it helped Pericles achieve political supremacy. It can be considered a failure in foreign policy only if we assume that he intended the colony as a spearhead for western imperialism, but we have seen that there is no basis for such an assumption. If, on the other hand, it was intended to sooth and conciliate Athens’ recent enemies, the events of the next few years proved it altogether successful.
1 See above, Chap. 4, p. 58.
2 The date is established by the name of the archon on the very fragmentary inscription IG, I2, 20. It was formerly read as Ariston and dated to 454/3. Most epigraphers now read it as Habron and so date it to the year 458/7, but W. K. Pritchett has pointed out that there is reason for caution (CP, XLVII [1952], 263 and AJA, LIX [1955], 58–59). It is his judgment that the stone does not justify any reading of the archon’s name. “Wear on the surface has obliterated the name of the archon, and the epigraphist and the historian must accept this fact” (AJA, LIX [1955], 59). I have accepted the majority opinion for the date of the treaty, in part because it seems to me to make good historical sense, but I am fully aware it is not much more than an educated guess. No important interpretation should be made to rest on it.
For a brief discussion of the problem and a full and up-to-date bibliography, see Hermann Bengtson, Die Staatsverträge der griechisch-römischen Welt von 700 bis 338 v. Chr., II (Munich and Berlin, 1962), No. 139, 41–42. See also SEG, X, 7; XII, 6; XIV, 1; XXI, 10; XXII, 3.
3 The evidence for the date of these alliances is even worse than that for the treaty with Egesta. It is to be found on two stelae carrying inscriptions of the treaties IG, I2, 51, 52 = Tod, 57–58. In each case the heading has been inscribed on a part of the stone where a previous heading had been erased. These are plainly instances of renewals in which an old treaty is being reaffirmed. The date of the renewal is firmly fixed by the archon’s name to 433/2. The problem is to decide when the original treaties were made. Suggestions have ranged from about 460 (S. Accame, Riv. di Fil., N.S., XXX [1952], 127ff.) to 439 (H. Wentker, Sizilien und Athen [Heidelberg, 1956], 70–71; 89ff.) Bengtson once again provides a full bibliography (Staatsverträge, 82) as well as a simple and accurate description of the historian’s plight: “Wann dieser geschlossen wurde, ist unbekannt.” For additional remarks, see SEG, X, 48; XII, 20; XXI, 35. I have ventured to date them in the early fifties because they seem to me to fit the adventurous mood that prevailed in Athens between the ostracism of Cimon and the Egyptian disaster. Once again, no great weight should be placed upon any date for these treaties.
4 H. Droysen, Athen und der Westen vox d. sizil. Expedition (1882), 17ff., cited by Ehrenberg, AJP, LXIX (1948), 159, n. 27. I have been unable to see the book. Ehrenberg says, “It seems no longer necessary to refute” this view. It seems to me impossible to refute, just as it is impossible to prove.
5 The text of Diodorus reads πέντε ἔτεσιν ὕστερον τοῦ δευτέρου συνοικισμοῦ. F. Vogel, the editor of the Teubner edition, brackets this passage, saying only delevi. He is followed by C. H. Oldfather in the Loeb edition, where it has been dropped to a footnote. There seems no satisfactory reason for rejecting the text of the manuscripts.
6 12. 7; 10, 3.
7 Plut. Mor. 835c; see also Ehrenberg, AJP, LXIX (1948), 150, and n. 6.
8 For good discussions of the chronological problems, see Busolt, GG, III: 1, 523 n. 3 and Ehrenberg, loc. cit.
9 Diod. 12. 10. 3–4.
10 Ehrenberg thinks that the Athenian invitation to the Peloponnesians to join them in founding the colony belongs to 446/5, but he admits that this is not certain (AJP, LXIX [1948], 153 and note 18).
11 ATL, III, 299–300.
12 See Appendix F.
13 Strabo p. 263, 6. 1. 13.
14 12. 11. 1–2. Diodorus places these events after the foundation of Thurii, but his chronology throughout is muddled. Strabo’s account speaks only of Sybaris and Sybarites. He tells a clear and simple story that is preferable.
15 This common ground is established by putting together the account of Diodorus 12. 10–11 with the article of Ehrenberg cited above and that of P. Cloché, “Périclès et la Politique Extérieure d’Athènes entre la Paix de 446–445 et les Préludes de la Guerre du Péloponèse,” AC, XIV (1945), 95–103.
16 E.g., O’Neill, Ancient Corinth (Baltimore, 1930), 196, and F. E. Adcock, CAH, V, 169.
17 Essays, 253.
18 Ibid., 256.
19 So far as I know it has won no adherents, though it seems to linger in the minds of those who share its general belief in unceasing Athenian imperialism on all fronts. In part this is no doubt due to a proper respect for the erudition and wisdom of its author and for the daring brilliance of the concept, which draws on a remarkably scattered and disparate body of evidence. Scholars who have written on Thurii since Wade-Gery, however, have not accepted his theory. See De Sanctis, Pericle, 169–170, Gomme, Hist. Comm., I, 386–387, Cloché AC, XIV (1945), 100, n. 1, Ehrenberg, AJP, LXIX (1948), 159–163, and Wentker, Sizilien und Athen, 86–87 for explicit rebuttals. The authors of ATL (III, 305, n. 20), of which Wade-Gery is one, had by 1950 come to the conclusion that the earlier view of Wade-Gery “needs certain modifications.” These include a complete rejection of the idea that Athens put “relentless pressure” on Corinth. They continue to believe “that the plan for Thouria [sic] was strongly coloured by the opposition to Perikles,” a view they alone hold, so far as I can see. With their main conclusion, however, I agree fully: “We think, then, that between 446 and 433 Athens avoided overt provocation of Korinth….”
20 Gomme, Hist. Comm., I, 386–387; Ehrenberg, AJP, LXIX (1948), 160–161.
21 μετὰ δέ τὴν Φουκυδίδου κατάλυσιν καὶ τὸν ὀστρακισμὸν οὐκ ἐλάττω τῶν πεντεκαίδεκα ἐτῶν διηνεκῆ καὶ μίαν οὖσαν ἐν ταῖς ἐνιαυίοις στρατηγίαις ἀρχὴν καὶ δυναστείαν κτησάμενος.
22 This is precisely what Beloch does (GG2, II: 1, 185 and n. 3).
23 Gomme, idem.; Ehrenberg, op. cit., 162–163.
24 Gomme, idem.
25 163.
26 See above, pp. 154–156, and Appendix G.
27 160.
28 Diod. 12. 23. 2.
29 Strabo 6. 1. 15, p. 264.
30 W. Dittenberger, SIG, Number 61. Σκῦλα ἀπὸ Θουρίον Tαραντῖνοι ἀνέθεκαν Διὶ ’Oλυμπίοι δεκάταν. Dittenberger dates it ca. 440, “non multo post Thurios conditos.”
31 Diod. 12. 11. 3.
32 The date is established by Diodorus (12. 35) and has not been challenged so far as I know. It is accepted both by the conservative Busolt (GG, III: 1, 537) and by the daring Beloch (GG2, II: 1, 202).
33 Diod. 12. 35. 2: ἀποφαινόμενοι πλείστους οἰκήτορας ἐξ ’Aθηνῶν ἐληλυθέναι.
34 Busolt, GG, III: 1, 537. He goes on to say that this was “eine Niederlage der athenischen Kolonialpolitik,” for he is of the school that believes Thurii to have been intended as a base of Athenian imperialism.
35 Thuc. 4. 106. 1; 4. 103. 3–4; Diod. 12. 32. 3; schol. Aeschines 2. 34; ATL, III, 308–309.
36 The references to Lampon in these religious capacities are contained in the following passages: Athenaeus 344e; Hesychius, s.v. ἀγερσιύβηλις; Eupolis, frg. 297 (Kock); Photius, Lexicon, s.v. Θουριομάντεις; Suidas (or The Suda) s.v. Θουριομάντεις; schol. Aristoph., Peace 1084; and Birds 521. In the fragment of Hesychius it is explained that Cratinus called Lampon a mountebank (ἀγύρτης). These passages have been collected with some comments as testimonia by James H. Oliver, The Athenian Expounders of the Sacred and Ancestral Law, (Baltimore, 1950), 124–125.
37 Per. 6. 2.
38 AJP, LXIX (1948), 164–165.
39 For Lampon as signer of the peace, see Thuc. 5. 19. 2 and 5. 24. 1. His role in the Eleusinian offerings is described in an official Athenian inscription, IG, I2, 76 = Tod, I, 74, line 60. The quotation is from Oliver, op. cit., 12. Ehrenberg (op. cit., 164–165) seems to underestimate or to be unaware of the social and political prominence of Lampon apart from his association with Pericles.
40 Ehrenberg, op. cit., 170.