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1896–1918: FROM COUNTRY ROADS TO MAIN STREET AND THE DISCOVERY OF FILM BY POLITICAL INTEREST GROUPS

During the first ten years of its development, German cinema was characterized by the Wanderkino (traveling theater).¹ Theater owners purchased films directly from a producer and showed them in tents to small audiences in numerous cities, until the films literally fell apart. The viewing time was about twenty minutes, and the films were little more than a novelty. At first the new medium attracted all social classes. After the initial curiosity subsided, the middle and upper classes generally rejected film, condemning it as artistically inferior to literature and theater. Cinema’s early success was due chiefly to the sustained interest of the working class in an inexpensive form of entertainment.

Between 1906 and 1914 German cinema gradually developed a foundation. The desire to maximize profit motivated much of the development, as filmmakers strove to produce more efficiently and increase the medium’s appeal. Wealthier entrepreneurs built permanent theaters with larger seating capacities and ornate decor. Instead of selling their films, producers organized distribution companies and rented films for presentation within a limited area and for a limited time. More successful companies became active in production, distribution, and theater ownership. They also began exporting their films.

The most successful companies prospered by producing films with a mass appeal. To sustain the interest of the working class, they made some films focusing on the lives and problems of workers. By producing film versions of popular plays, the industry hoped to attract the skeptical middle and upper classes.² In addition to adaptations of plays, film versions of popular novels, legends, and fairy tales also appeared, including Der Student von Prag (The Student of Prague, 1913).

The developing industry reinforced and prolonged artistic and social trends by institutionalizing other changes. Producers began paying large salaries to actors who had already won public acclaim, especially in the theater, and marketed them as film “stars.”³ By nurturing a cinematic elite, film companies enabled a select number of actors to become role models for moviegoers. The wealth and prestige granted to film stars, although at first conceived only as a means to attract larger audiences, motivated spectators to think, act, and even dress like their heroes and heroines did on the screen. Producers also repeated popular themes. In addition to choosing attractive stories from other narrative forms, they quickly learned that by repeating the plots of successful films, with slight variations, they could reduce the risk of commercial failure. Once The Student of Prague succeeded, films with a similar thematic orientation, including Der Golem (1915) and Homunculus (1916), soon followed. The stars could play almost the same role in many such films and thus increased their potential influence on movie audiences.

As the German institution of cinema took shape, so top did the campaign to control its social impact. Between 1896 and 1906 several civic and religious groups tried to boycott film theaters because of what they described as film’s damaging effect on moral standards. By 1908 most critics had abandoned attempts to discourage visits to movie theaters. Instead, they organized cinema reform movements and demanded higher moral and artistic standards.⁴ The reformers cited religious and aesthetic concepts of morality, focusing on metaphysical ideals of the Good and Beautiful. They argued that films generally portrayed secular themes and, consequently, were unable to communicate anything about metaphysical ideals. Most critics agreed that film would never be an art form. Given the medium’s ability to present what they perceived as an accurate image of everyday reality, reformers concluded that film would be best suited for use in the classroom, for example in natural science courses.

In perhaps the most concise summary of cinema’s use by public interest groups prior to World War I, Social Democrat Dr. Samuel Drucker suggested that conservative politics often motivated demands for higher moral and artistic standards, as well as attempts to restrict cinema to the classroom. Drucker’s article “Das Kinoproblem und unsere politischen Gegner” (“The Cinema Problem and Our Political Opponents”) was the first to document the use of film by religious groups, government offices, and other interest groups. He argued convincingly that they all supported (some subtly and others blatantly) the Reich’s nationalist and imperialist policies.

Drucker began with comments on the Catholic church’s use of the film medium, referring specifically to the association between the Lichtbilderei film company in Mönchen-Gladbach and the Volksverein für das Katholische Deutschland (People’s Association for a Catholic Germany). The association, whose purpose was to combat subversion and to defend the Christian order, had used film in its programs for some time. Drucker asserted that although no official ties existed, the association agitated directly for the Catholic Center party. In most cases the Catholic Center defended the political and social status quo and condemned social democracy.

Drucker also noted the Evangelical church’s ideologically conservative film activity, highlighting the work of Pastor Walter Conradt. As leader of the Evangelical theater reform movement, Pastor Conradt had revealed his intentions in a book entitled Kirche und Kinematograph (Church and Cinematographer, 1910). Conradt proposed that cinema serve the Church in its missionary work, while at the same time filling Germans with enthusiasm for their kaiser and fatherland.

Government offices also employed film to strengthen social stability at the beginning of the century. According to Drucker, a commission of representatives from local governments in Westphalia, which convened in Münster to organize its own theater movement in 1912, promoted German nationalism: “It recommends, among other things, the use of movie theaters to serve national interests, and if the establishment of such theaters on the local level is impossible, then it recommends that all patriotic and/or religious organizations unite to establish them.”⁵ Drucker also cited the activity of the Magdeburg Teacher’s Association and its cinema commission as a clear example of film’s exploitation for conservative political purposes. The commission organized celebrations of the Battle of Sedan and the kaiser’s birthday, including short films about the army and navy. Drucker explained that the celebrations stressed to students the importance of loyalty to the Reich and the necessity of defending the fatherland against potential foreign aggressors.

The article concluded with information about the use of film by blatantly patriotic and imperialist groups such as the Gesellschaft für die Verbreitung der Volksbildung (Society for the Cultivation of People’s Education) and the Navy League. The former, a National Liberal organization, led by Prince Heinrich zu Schönaich-Carolath, developed an extensive program for film production and distribution. It produced texts to accompany its films and distributed them to a wide variety of groups, including 144 military and veterans organizations. In 1912 it also began operating a traveling theater and established a film archive. According to Drucker, the society received financial support indirectly from the kaiser and supported his policies enthusiastically. The Navy League, which was financed by the navy and the weapons industry, primarily Krupp, incorporated films into its propaganda campaign to build up the navy.

The purpose of Drucker’s article was to stimulate the SPD’s interest in the film medium by demonstrating the widespread film activity of its political opponents. But the Social Democrats remained skeptical. The Berlin SPD newspaper, Vorwärts, often echoed the voice of the cinema reformers, complaining that film damaged the spiritual and moral education of the youth. (See Vorwärts, 28 September 1910, for example.) It was not until 1912 that the SPD began differentiating its position in its Winke und Ratschläge (Hints and Suggestions) and advocated the use of film in its educational programs.⁶ At the SPD Party Congress in 1913, the Zentralbildungsausschuß (Central Education Committee) restated its intention to use film, but it accomplished almost nothing before the war. In the spring of 1914 Drucker could document only sixty-two film events that had been organized by the SPD in twenty-seven towns.

THE SPD AND CINEMA PRIOR TO WORLD WAR I

The Social Democratic party’s slow recognition of film’s significance and its initial emphasis on pedagogical applications reflected its approach to culture in general. During the first decades of its existence, the SPD developed an extensive political apparatus while paying relatively little attention to cultural work.⁷ Despite its continued emphasis on political work at the end of the century, the SPD did develop a cultural program between 1890 and 1914. The program was to a large extent a response to the exclusion of the working class from the Reich’s educational and cultural institutions.⁸ The SPD reacted first and foremost by affirming the existing institution of art and striving to guarantee equal access to it for working-class constituents.

The Social Democrats established courses to introduce workers to the philosophical and literary heritage, and the party founded cultural organizations for workers to cultivate their artistic awareness and raise their intellectual level. In other words, much of the SPD’s cultural program concentrated on enabling workers to understand the existing institution of art and appreciate its products. It did far less to encourage workers to question aesthetic norms and establish their own.

The educational background of early SPD cultural activists offers one potential explanation for their conservative cultural policy. Most of them, in contrast to rank-and-file Social Democrats, did attend secondary schools. Many continued their studies at universities. Higher education introduced them to the dominant concept of autonomous art, and numerous young Social Democratic students accepted the concept uncritically.⁹

Journalists for Die Neue Zeit, such as Eduard Bernstein, Heinrich Stoebel, David Bach, Friedrich Stampfer, and Franz Diderich, together with numerous others who followed the strategy outlined above, relied for the most part on purely aesthetic criteria to evaluate art. They overlooked art’s ideological significance. Consequently, they were unable to reveal systematically the ways in which art could function to support the social structures of the Wilhelminian Reich.¹⁰

With this in mind, the SPD’s approach to the film medium becomes understandable. Most SPD journalists merely assimilated the concept of autonomous art and characterized film as artistically inferior to theater and literature. Fritz Eisner, another journalist for Die Neue Zeit, exemplified the tendency in “Das Kinodrama” (“The Film Drama,” June 1913:460–463). From his perspective, the dramatic illusion of reality was nothing more than a “poor carnival trick” in comparison to the attempt of art to “grasp the spirit of the universe” and give it physical shape. If that were not the case, Eisner suggested, then artists would be helpless to compete with the accomplishments of filmmakers such as Gaumont and Pathé. As it was, he argued, technology threatened to “suffocate” art by willingly fulfilling the public’s desire for the illusion of reality.

According to Eisner, the film medium’s weakness lay in its inability to do anything more than reproduce movements of everyday reality. To transcend the superficiality of that reality and to lend form to affirmed metaphysical concepts, he asserted, art required words. Cinema was forced to rely on gestures, “a kind of deaf and dumb language that was completely unable to express abstract concepts” (461).

If one accepts Eisner’s premise, it follows that workers, who visited movie theaters frequently, were abandoning the attempt to attain more than a superficial understanding of the world around them. According to him, the only way for workers to transcend such superficiality and gain insight into the metaphysical realm was to integrate themselves into the cultural fabric of the existing society: they should reject cinema and embrace the cultural heritage of literature and theater.

Although he rejected the claims of those who ascribed artistic quality to film, Eisner did perceive a significant use for the medium. Like some representatives of the cinema reform movement, he proposed that film be used to increase the human capacity to control nature and society. Precisely because the camera could fix reality in the cinematic image and present it for empirical observation, Eisner suggested that cinema could aid scientists and students in their attempt to understand and influence natural phenomena (462–463).

The Central Education Committee, with its gradual recognition of film’s significance, demonstrated that Eisner’s belief in instrumental reason and cinema’s role in its acquisition was widespread within the SPD. Without questioning dominant standards of education, it considered how cinema could be integrated into the educational program. In addition to aiding workers in learning to appreciate classical drama, film could assist in providing workers with the technical knowledge necessary to find employment in Germany’s growing industrial sector. Only after four years of war, fought with the deadly new weapons developed by modern technology, did anyone in the SPD begin to question the zeal with which humanity strove to instrumentalize nature and manipulate social development.

GERMAN CINEMA DURING WORLD WAR I

World War I contributed dramatically to the development of German cinema. At the end of 1914 the popularity of French and English films diminished, and in 1917 the Allied blockade cut U.S. access to the German market. At the same time, the war’s burden on soldiers and civilians increased their need for entertainment. Film studios sprang up everywhere. Initially the industry emphasized the production of patriotic films to capitalize on the sentiment created by the various propaganda campaigns and by the government’s explanation of the war effort as national defense. Until 1915, such films experienced great success. Once the trenches were dug and the reality of attrition warfare struck home, patriotic films quickly gave way to others—chiefly, detective and criminal films.

During the final years of World War I, economic and political forces became involved directly with the German film industry. Industrial and government leaders created new film organizations to influence public opinion. The activity began in 1916 when the director of Krupp Industries, Alfred Hugenberg, and shipping magnate Ludwig Klitzsch organized Deulig (Deutsche Lichtbildgesellschaft, German Motion Picture Company). They intended to promote Germany’s economy, culture, and tourist industry, at home and abroad. Deulig’s films defended the war effort, while the military made increasing demands on the economy and required even greater sacrifices from the populace. The films simultaneously challenged French and English propaganda by presenting a favorable image of Germany abroad.

At the end of 1916 direct ideological involvement in German cinema increased. As the war dragged on, the German High Command decided to form Bufa (Bild-und-Filmamt, Photo and Film Office). According to the Military Press Agency’s pamphlet Das Bild- und Film-Amt und seine Aufgaben (The Film and Photo Office and Its Tasks), the office’s purpose was to serve the national interest, i.e., promote the war effort.¹¹

The author of the pamphlet, a Dr. Wagner, attempted to legitimize Bufa’s activity by referring to the enemy’s film propaganda. Just as conservatives had focused on the threat of foreign aggressors to convince the Germans of the need to enter the war, the pamphlet mentioned neither German film propaganda before the war nor the early commercial patriotic films. Instead, it cited over a dozen cases of foreign film propaganda, arguing that Bufa’s goal must be to defend Germany against any damaging effect. The presentation drew the public’s attention from Germany’s own nationalist and imperialist interests by creating uncritical black-and-white images of the relationship between Germany and its enemies.

The proposed method for influencing public opinion included a new element. Cinema’s early critics had almost unanimously condemned its tendency to stimulate emotion because of its potentially negative effect on moral behavior. Although aware of such criticism, the Military Press Agency argued that under the prevailing circumstances the ends justified the means. If the film’s emotional impact created an irrational hatred for the enemy and equally irrational loyalty to the fatherland, it deserved praise.

Bufa’s activity included the collection and distribution of feature, military, and educational films. It relied on commercial cinema as a source for feature and educational films, but employed seven film crews to work on the front collecting film footage for its own military films. It also established an office to monitor foreign propaganda and to control German film imports and exports.

The government’s involvement with cinema accelerated further in 1917. As the war continued and dissatisfaction increased, the Supreme High Command, under the leadership of Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg and General Erich Ludendorff, slowly transformed Germany into a military dictatorship. Ludendorff also took steps to gain control of the film industry. In a letter to the Imperial War Ministry dated 4 July 1917, Ludendorff argued that Germany must act to influence public opinion at home and to diminish the effect of its enemies’ film propaganda abroad.¹²

Following meetings in October with various government institutions, the Deutsche Bank, and Bufa, the Supreme High Command moved to consolidate the film industry under its control on 18 December 1917. A single large film company emerged, the Universum Film A.G., or Ufa. According to Ludendorff’s propaganda and press officer Major Grau, Ufa was to accomplish three goals: to aid the High Command in carrying out its military goals; to be an instrument for political influence abroad; and to provide a defense against the propaganda work of the enemy within Germany.

The military’s efforts created Germany’s largest, most powerful film conglomerate. Ufa subsumed the leading companies in every branch of the industry, including Nordisk, the Messter conglomerate, and Davidson’s Produktion A.G. Union. Major investors included the Deutsche Bank and the German Reich. The board of directors was comprised of representatives from the shipping industry, the electronics industry, the banking community, the aristocracy, and the military. Although Ufa was organized too late to influence the outcome of World War I, it brought together leaders of the most conservative circles of German society. The company remained intact as a private enterprise following the war and served as a powerful ideological instrument during the first years of the Weimar Republic.