A variety of interwoven and interdependent economic and technological factors, aesthetic models and perceptions, sociopsychological tendencies, and ideological competition between interest groups shaped the contours of the emerging cinematic institution in the Weimar era. At the beginning of the period, the culminating transitions from mercantile and agrarian capitalism to modern industrial capitalism, from monarchism to parliamentary democracy, and from idealist to materialist concepts of religion, science, and art provided the framework for the film industry’s rapid growth and the initial challenges to it from a variety of aesthetic, philosophical, and political perspectives. Within the context of a swiftly changing German society, first expressionism, then New Objectivity, and ultimately even socialist realism and the Proletkult movement influenced the development of mainstream as well as alternative models for film production and reception. In addition, the experience of World War I, the postwar crisis, Germany’s position between the Western Allies and the Soviet Union, and the challenge to and reassertion of patriarchal principles of social, familial, and interpersonal relationships contributed to the quality of each aesthetic trend and its effect on Weimar cinema.
At the same time, competition between Weimar’s most powerful interest groups played an especially significant role in the development of mainstream and alternative models of film production and reception. Representatives of fixed-asset capital, who aligned themselves with conservative and reactionary political parties and were led by individuals such as Alfred Hugenberg, invested heavily in film and other media. By 1933 they exerted what was approaching a monopolistic influence on mass communication in German society. The representatives of liquid-asset capital, who split their allegiance for the most part between the DNVP, DVP, and the Catholic Center and were led by wealthy speculators in the electronics, chemical, and (to some extent) publishing industries, either founded film companies or invested, albeit less energetically than the fixed-asset capitalists, in the film industry.
While the members of Germany’s most powerful interest groups recognized the ideological and commercial potential of film, groups within the German left struggled with the political right and with themselves for political control of Weimar society. Only in the wake of the crisis that ended in 1924 did the SPD, KPD, and other leftist organizations and individuals begin to develop serious programs for an alternative to the emerging cinematic institution.
The development of mainstream cinema in the Weimar Republic and the ineffectiveness of the German left’s attempts to compete commercially and ideologically with the major producers, distributors, and theater owners to a large extent confirms the concept of modern culture outlined by Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno in Dialectic of Enlightenment.1 Various trends indicate that capitalism maximized the influence of a small economic and political elite on the quality of cinema. The high degree of speculation within the industry between 1919 and 1924, the formation of horizontal and vertical cartels throughout the Weimar era, administrative influence on production, and the efforts of producers to market their products by influencing criticism, orchestrating publicity campaigns, and developing standardized production techniques—all provide good examples.2 The standardization of specific subjects, including sexual promiscuity, upward social mobility, and adventures or exotic/ luxurious life-styles, and the emerging paradigms of narrative cohesion reinforce Horkheimer’s and Adorno’s assertions about the entertainment quality of commercial cinema and its ideological significance.3
Films such as Das Spielzeug von Paris (The Plaything from Paris, 1919), The Three from the Gas Station (1930), and Die Gräfin von Monte Christo (The Duchess of Monte Cristo, 1932) offered many working-class, lower-middle-class, and middle-class Germans an escape from everyday anxiety and frustration. At the same time, developing film genres, including the Fridericus films and many World War I films, presented a positive image of Prussian history and appealed to Germans who struggled with guilt and shame about their national heritage and insecurity about the existing economic and political system. As Horkheimer and Adorno suggest,4 in the process the mainstream cinema often nurtured unambiguous oppositions between the familiar and the foreign, the socially acceptable and unacceptable, and even between the various social classes in Weimar society. By entertaining and encouraging audiences to affirm uncritically their inadequately differentiated portrayals and uniform models of behavior, major film producers simultaneously diffused public dissatisfaction with the existing social system and inhibited the development of the critical skills necessary to initiate subversive cultural activity.
Despite the relative correspondence between the concept of a culture industry and the development of mainstream cinema in Weimar Germany, that concept requires further refinement. Adorno and Horkheimer overemphasize the influence of economic factors on the quality of mass media production. In addition to the desire to maximize profit, the desire to influence public opinion stimulated the interest of decision makers in the film industry during the Weimar era. When, for example, Alfred Hugenberg’s Economic Association for the Promotion of the Intellectual Forces of Reconstruction invested, first in the print media and then in film, political motivations significantly influenced the decision. In 1914 the group strove to counteract the growing influence of Social Democracy, and in 1927 it hoped to inhibit the spread of what it perceived as a Bolshevist force in Weimar cinema. During the Weimar era, the political and economic interests of those who were significantly influencing the development of mainstream cinema frequently coincided. By appealing to the regressive psychological needs of filmgoers with standardized cinematic entertainment that advocated a nationalistic, militaristic, racist, and antirepublican ideological orientation, through content and form, Germany’s wealthiest and most conservative interest groups were able to follow their economic and political agenda simultaneously.
Although the influence of the culture industry did increase significantly between 1919 and 1933, reaching more and more Germans with its expanding network of print media, film, and radio, Adorno and Horkheimer overemphasize its capacity to inhibit the development of subversive alternatives. The activity of the German left indicates that the culture industry did not completely stifle efforts to subvert mainstream cinema. Leftist film activity also suggests that, in addition to the impact of mass media, a variety of other factors contributed to its relative failure. The SPD, KPD, and other organizations of the German left recognized film’s ideological potential only after the foundation for a German cinematic institution had been established. At the beginning of the 1920s, the SPD concentrated above all on stabilizing the new political system and asserting its leadership within that system. At the same time, the party continued to emphasize prewar principles of cultural equity without evaluating the ideological significance of its orientation. Within the KPD the advocates of militant revolutionary activity and radically democratic cultural activity refused to cooperate in formulating a strategy for social change based on the interdependence of “material” and “ideological” activity. Instead, the KPD accepted the leadership of the Comintern and followed an unsuccessful course of violent revolutionary action.
When the major political parties of the German left finally did initiate programs to combat its emerging influence, the cinematic institution was strong enough to withstand the challenge. However, there are other reasons for the ineffectiveness of leftist alternatives. As a consequence of their relatively late reaction to developments in cinema and their respective ideological orientations, the SPD and the KPD to a large extent challenged only the content of mainstream films. The SPD’s dedication to parliamentary democracy, its affirmation of traditional aesthetic models, and a lack of experience with film production led the Social Democrats to assimilate uncritically the dominant trends in production and reception. Their major concern was to increase the base of support for the party’s leaders and policies. According to them, the techniques employed by the film industry to influence public opinion were the most effective. With this in mind, the program of the Film und Lichtbilddienst and independent Social Democratic film production encouraged party members and sympathizers to support Social Democracy with cinematic codes of narrative cohesion that did little to stimulate collective critical thought and grass-roots initiatives. Consequently, the SPD’s film program reinforced the German public’s susceptibility to authoritarian structures more than it fostered a democratic alternative.
For different reasons the KPD, in cooperation with the IAH, the Soviet film industry, and independent leftist intellectuals and artists, followed a similar course. When the Communist left initiated its challenge to mainstream cinema, beginning seriously in 1926, the KPD’s allegiance to the Stalinist Comintern and reliance on concepts of scientific Marxism, democratic centralism, and later socialist realism played a significant role. Like the Social Democrats, those who contributed to the Communist press, cooperated in the film production of Prometheus and Weltfilm, and participated in the Volksfilmverband generally challenged mainstream film content while adopting the existing codes of narrative cohesion. Alfred Durus, Hermann Duncker, Kurt Bernhardt, Phil Jutzi, and others relied in part on what they perceived as effective techniques of cinematic narration. The belief in the principles of dialectical materialism and in the necessity for party leaders to use culture as a medium for communicating their insight to unorganized working masses also influenced their models of production and reception. The Communist left also strove to educate its audiences from above, instead of stimulating the critical interest of working-class individuals by encouraging them to participate cooperatively in formulating an ideological orientation and strategy for social change.
In addition to the culture industry’s influence on public opinion, it seems likely that the disregard for more radically democratic alternatives contributed significantly to the ineffectiveness of the German left’s challenge to it.5 Only at the end of the Weimar era, when it became apparent to the leaders of the SPD and the KPD that their political and cultural programs were failing and that the National Socialists had become a formidable opponent, did they begin to listen to the advocates of grass-roots alternatives. Although leftist intellectuals and artists, including Anna Siemsen, Heinz Lüdecke, Erwin Piscator, Franz Jung, Hanns Eisler, and Bertolt Brecht, had promoted and experimented with such alternatives at various times throughout the period, they received little support and were often criticized by the political parties of the left. For the most part they developed and practiced their models of artistic production and reception independent of the SPD’s and KPD’s cultural programs. The major political parties of the German left, therefore, shared responsibility for the ineffectiveness of their alternatives to the culture industry and specifically to mainstream cinema. With this in mind, the evaluation of the radically democratic experiments with production and reception that were initiated at the end of the Weimar era should be differentiated further. While it is necessary to acknowledge their relative lack of success, it is also important for all who wish to nurture democratic forms of social interaction to perceive the potentially model character of such experiments as the discussion about the impact of mass media on the development of public opinion continues today.