8

KOREA

1950–1953

The Korean War was fought for three years, one month, and two days, from June 25, 1950, to July 27, 1953. Losses in the conflict were high. American dead numbered 36,616. Nearly twice that number were wounded. More than 5,000 Americans were declared missing. Korean losses were much higher. At least 1 million people died. Loss of life among the Chinese also was substantial, though difficult to estimate precisely.

How the war began can be traced to the defeat of Japan in 1945. Throughout its history the island nation had coveted its neighbor, finally annexing Korea as a colony in 1910. With the end of World War II the peninsula was divided arbitrarily along the 38th Parallel. To the north lay the Communist regime of Kim Il Sung, a totalitarian state established and supported by the Soviet Union. This Democratic People’s Republic of Korea was a disciplined, efficient society in which devotion to the nation and its leader outranked individual choice. To the south lay the Republic of Korea (RoK), a country recognized by the United Nations and led by Syngman Rhee, a fiery Korean nationalist educated in the United States. America backed Rhee’s regime as a bulwark against Communism, hoping that he might eventually improve the economic conditions of a people still suffering from years of harsh Japanese occupation.

Kim Il Sung was ruthless, cruel, and ambitious. Syngman Rhee was corrupt, devious, and intolerant. Both men saw themselves as the legitimate ruler of the entire Korean peninsula. Each was intent on destroying the other.

Kim Il Sung struck first. Early on Sunday morning, June 25, 1950, after a thunderous barrage of artillery, the North Korean army—some ninety thousand troops—crossed the border. Kim’s goal was a quick victory before assistance to Rhee could be rendered. A worker’s paradise would be imposed on a largely agrarian south. Well trained and well equipped, especially with Russian T-34 tanks, the North Koreans overwhelmed their outnumbered RoK counterparts, who, in most instances, fought poorly. What began as an assault soon became a rout. Seoul, South Korea’s capital, was captured in three days. Rhee’s army lacked competent generals. It also lacked heavy artillery and tanks, purposely so, for the United States feared that a well-armed Syngman Rhee would start World War III by attacking Stalin’s puppet regime in the north. To the contrary, as the North Koreans pushed farther south, Kim’s goal seemed within reach.

By June 27, the Americans in Seoul had been evacuated. Most left by ship via Inchon, a port city just south of the capital, on the western coast of Korea. They sailed to Japan, from where U.S. Air Force planes soon flew missions in support of the disintegrating South Korean army. Leaders in Washington saw the North Korean attack as an assault on Western democracy orchestrated by the Soviet Union. The object, they believed, was either to test American resolve or to stretch American military resources, thereby making conquest in Europe much easier. So, as President Harry S. Truman was reviewing options, consideration was given to nuclear strikes on Soviet air bases in the northeast, where the border of Korea met that of Russia. The president chose a less drastic approach. He ordered U.S. ground troops into Korea.

Truman’s decision was made easier by a United Nations resolution authorizing member states to provide military assistance to the Republic of Korea. This passed the same day the Americans left Seoul and was made possible by the absence of the Soviet Union in the Security Council. Stalin’s regime was protesting the exclusion of the Chinese Communists from the U.N. Most Americans supported the presidential decision. Those that did saw the need to confront Communism when challenged. Those that did not thought that Korea simply did not matter. After all, had not Secretary of State Dean Acheson in a speech on January 12, 1950, excluded Korea from areas vital to American interests?

The first American ground troops in Korea were a small combat team of 450 men. Named Task Force Smith, after its commander, the team arrived on the peninsula on July 1, 1950, and soon engaged the enemy. Task Force Smith has since become legendary, but for unhappy reasons. To the shock of many, the North Koreans quickly disposed of the Americans. Smith’s bazookas could not stop T-34 tanks. More important, his soldiers were not the equal of Kim Il Sung’s. With many casualties, the team withdrew, joining the RoK forces in full retreat. For the Americans the news would get worse before it got better. Additional U.S. troops were thrown into battle. These too failed to do well. One unit in particular, the army’s 24th Division, performed miserably, with its commander, a major general, allowing himself to be captured. The reality was that in 1950 the U.S. Army was hardly the armed force that had defeated Hitler’s army. American soldiers in the Far East were occupational troops, ill-suited for combat.

As the situation in Korea deteriorated, the United States sent in more troops. Among the arrivals were U.S. marines and soldiers willing to fight. These were joined by a brigade of British troops. As other nations provided small, symbolic contingents, the U.S. effort became, and called itself, a United Nations command. Still, the bulk of the forces opposing the North Koreans were American, specifically the United States Eighth Army, led by Lieutenant General Walton Walker. He was an experienced combat commander, having been one of George Patton’s senior officers during World War II. By early August, Walker’s men had been pushed back to a small perimeter surrounding Pusan, a port at the southeastern top of the peninsula. Expulsion from Korea was a distinct possibility. For six weeks fierce fighting took place. Mindful of Walker’s call to “stand or die,” the Americans repulsed determined North Korean attacks. The perimeter held. Pounded by U.S. aircraft and U.S. artillery, the Communists were unable to reach the sea. There would be no Dunkirk in Korea.

Despite the successful defense of the Pusan perimeter, the reputation of the American military had suffered. North Korea had defeated the U.S. Eighth Army though not destroyed it. Yet at the moment of greatest danger to Walton and his troops, the United States would conduct an audacious maneuver that would shatter the overextended North Korean forces, reminding the world of how capable America’s military was.

The maneuver was an amphibious landing at Inchon, well up the western coast of Korea, deep behind enemy lines. Conceived by General Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Commander of U.N. and U.S. troops, the operation was considered risky by the American Chiefs of Staff in Washington, D.C. Indeed, as British historian Max Hastings has pointed out, among U.S. amphibious specialists opposition to the venture was widespread. Yet the general prevailed. His reputation was such that the operation took place as planned. On September 15, 1950, U.S. marines and the army’s 7th Division landed at Inchon, carried there by an armada of 260 ships. Together, they constituted X Corps, a force MacArthur kept independent of Walker’s Eighth Army. The Inchon operation was a complete success. Hastings called the landings “MacArthur’s master stroke.” By September 27, Seoul had been retaken. In the south, the day after the landing, Walker’s army attacked. Now outnumbered, the North Koreans gave way. The Eighth Army advanced, linking up with the Inchon forces on September 26. Badly beaten, though still intact, Kim Il Sung’s army retreated, crossing back over the 38th Parallel, from where, four months before, it had started the war.

Now came a decisive moment. Would the U.N. forces cross the parallel seeking to destroy Kim’s army and with it his regime? The original purpose of the largely American effort had been met. The Republic of South Korea had been saved. Crossing the 38th meant expanding the war.

MacArthur wanted to proceed north. He argued that if the North Korean forces were not destroyed they would be in a position to attack once again. Moreover, he believed the war to be a part of a Soviet-led Communist conspiracy to destroy the West, an assault on democracy that must be stopped.

Syngman Rhee also wanted U.N. forces to cross the parallel. He viewed the conquest of North Korea as a means to unify the country under his control. Many people believed that Korea should be a single entity, though not everyone thought Rhee should be its ruler.

America’s allies were torn. They worried about further casualties, but they worried more about the reaction of the Chinese government in Peking (now called Beijing), which had warned against an American “invasion” of North Korea. But the allies wanted to show support of the United States. In Europe and in the Pacific, they were dependent on America in countering the political and military threats posed by the Soviet Union. Abandoning the Americans in Korea was hardly the way to secure American backing elsewhere.

At the time, MacArthur, his troops, the allies, Syngman Rhee, and the leaders in Washington were caught up in the euphoria occasioned by the success at Inchon. A great victory had been achieved. The North Koreans were in disarray. The war would soon be brought to a successful and definitive conclusion. The troops would be home by Christmas.

Late in September, MacArthur received permission from Washington to cross the 38th Parallel and to continue with the destruction of the North Korean army. Pointedly, he was told to watch for evidence of Chinese or Russian intervention. Under no circumstances was he to advance beyond the Yalu River into Manchuria or the Soviet Union. Having vast influence at the United Nations in 1950, the United States was able to secure passage of a resolution supporting what MacArthur wished to do, in effect approving a military advance into North Korea.

On October 9, 1950, the Eighth Army moved north. That it had been preceded by RoK troops mattered little. The United Nations was now committed to the liberation of North Korea. A momentous chapter in the history of Korea was about to be written. And the U.S. Army would soon receive a most unpleasant surprise.

At first the campaign went well. While meeting resistance, the Eighth Army nonetheless readily advanced along the western side of the peninsula. By October 19 the army captured Pyongyang, the capital of North Korea. Earlier, Kim Il Sung had fled to Sinuiju, a city on the Yalu River, across from the Chinese city of Antung. By November 1, Americans were eighteen miles south of the river. In the east, U.S. X Corps also proceeded north. Additionally, U.S. marines landed at Wonsan and, with army troops, proceeded north to the Chosin Reservoir. The army’s 7th Division reached the Yalu itself, from where it could peer into Manchuria.

However, Chinese troops in large numbers had deployed into North Korea. The regime in Peking was alarmed by the approaching “imperialist” forces. Four field armies had been sent across the Yalu and were in position, soon to be joined by two additional armies. Remarkably, approximately two hundred thousand Chinese soldiers went undetected. MacArthur and his officers did not believe the Chinese would enter the war. The evidence that they had was ignored. Moreover, the Americans believed that if the Chinese were to join the battle, the United States easily would defeat them.

On October 25, 1950, the Chinese struck. At first they attacked RoK troops. Six days later they hit the U.S. troops. Both the South Koreans and the Americans were vanquished, and easily so. Loss of territory, though, was limited. Surprisingly, the Chinese soldiers did not follow up these initial victories. Instead they withdrew to the hills and waited.

Why did the Chinese not continue? Were they sending a message to General MacArthur and President Truman? Were they warning the United States not to remain up north, near to the Yalu? If so, the Americans did not listen. They chose an alternate message. MacArthur believed the Chinese had made a face-saving gesture. He expected them to withdraw. He thought they had done their best and no longer were a threat. Rarely has an American commander been so out of touch with reality.

On Thanksgiving Day 1950, Americans throughout Korea enjoyed their traditional turkey dinner. The next day General Walker, in command of troops in the west, launched an offensive he and others believed would soon end the war. The Eighth Army moved out expecting to finish off the North Koreans and any Chinese they encountered. However, the Chinese were the better soldiers. In late November and early December, they inflicted a humiliating defeat on Walker and his men. A few units fought well. Most did not. The U.S. Army’s 2nd Division failed totally. Only the marines at the Chosin Reservoir upheld the honor of American arms. They retreated, but the formation brought their dead with them and were evacuated by the navy at Hungnam.

By December 5, the Chinese had recaptured the North Korean capital. A month later, they had retaken Seoul. North Korea no longer was in U.N. hands. Both the Eighth Army and X Corps had been routed. American soldiers, to use the phrase of the day, had bugged out. One American officer called the army’s performance against the Chinese “a moment of complete disgrace and shame.” But the Chinese advance, extensive as it was, began to run out of steam, hampered by now lengthy supply lines. It came to a halt just south of the Han River, roughly along the 37th parallel.

Two days before Christmas Walton Walker was killed in an automobile accident, his jeep colliding with a truck. His replacement was Lieutenant General Matthew Ridgway, a soldier with a distinguished combat record in World War II. Ridgway energized the U.N. command. He rebuilt the Eighth Army. He commanded all troops in Korea, which Walker had not. American troops in the east, X Corps, had been commanded by Major General Edward Almond, a favorite of MacArthur. Most important, Ridgway brought to Korea skill and leadership, attributes that in Almond and Walker had been lacking.

When Ridgway’s forces attacked late in January 1951, they were well prepared. The troops soon pushed the Chinese back across the Han. In the east, the Chinese themselves launched an attack. But this time, the Americans held, with the reconstituted 2nd Division redeeming itself. Supported by massive airpower, the U.S. soldiers shattered four Chinese divisions.

All across Korea Chinese commanders held a low opinion of the American soldier. In the months of January and February 1951, this began to change. Under Ridgway U.S. troops fought well. And they fought successfully. By mid-March, Seoul, by now a city in ruins, was again in U.S. hands. Thirteen days later, American forces had crossed the 38th Parallel. Reaching the Imjin River, some thirty miles north of the city, they dug in.

So did the British brigade. Composed of Gloucester and Northumberland fusiliers (plus a Belgian unit), the brigade was deployed south of the river, some thirty miles north of Seoul, but in the middle of the route traditionally taken by those intent on capturing the capital. What followed, once the Chinese attacked, was a heroic but futile effort to halt the massive enemy advance. One company of Gloucesters, according to Michael Hickey (who had fought in Korea), was “on the verge of extinction . . . when there was a final radio call from the defenders: ‘We’ve had it. Cheerio,’ before the radio went dead.”

Ridgway expected a new Chinese offensive. This he received. Before the attack materialized, the general was given a promotion he had not expected. On April 11, Douglas MacArthur was fired and Matthew Ridgway became supreme commander of all U.N. forces in Korea.

MacArthur had issued several statements on the war that were contrary to U.S. policy. President Truman, Secretary of State Dean Acheson, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff all wanted to limit the conflict to the peninsula. General MacArthur sought a wider war. With support from influential Republicans in Washington, he advocated attacks on China and saw no reason not to employ nuclear weapons. Moreover, he felt that as Supreme Commander in the field, he, not Mr. Truman, should determine the course of action. Truman, whose standing in the public was as low as MacArthur’s was high, reacted to the general’s insubordination and sacked him. MacArthur left Tokyo and returned to America, receiving a hero’s welcome. He then sought the Republican nomination for president in 1952, but failed. The GOP delegates chose instead another general, one by the name of Eisenhower.

On April 22, 1951, the Chinese launched yet another major offensive, throwing 250,000 men at the Eighth Army, now commanded by Lieutenant General James Van Fleet (as a colonel Van Fleet had led troops onto Utah Beach in Normandy on June 6, 1944). The goal of the offensive and that of another one in May was, once and for all, to evict the Americans and their allies from Korea. The Communists, in what is called their Spring Offensive, were aiming for a decisive victory. They were willing to expend thousands of lives to achieve it. They achieved the loss of life, but not their goal. U.N. soldiers fought tenaciously, retreated a few miles, and held. Then they themselves attacked and pushed the Chinese back several miles.

There, for the next two years, the battle line was drawn. The war in Korea continued, with heavy casualties but little exchange of territory. Peace talks first began in July 1951. They concluded only in July 1953. During that time, the front lines, with trenches and fortified bunkers, resembled those of the First World War. Fighting was extensive. Individual hills were contested. Names such as Pork Chop Hill became legendary. But military gains and losses in any strategic sense were minimal. The Chinese could not drive the Americans into the sea. The United States was unwilling to accept the casualties necessary to push the Chinese back across the Yalu. Nevertheless, American forces suffered. Forty-five percent of U.S. casualties occurred after the peace talks began.

And so the war ended as it had started. Korea was cut in two, roughly along the 38th Parallel. In the north, Kim Il Sung remained in charge of a totalitarian state that still exists today. Then and now its citizens lack material comforts and are deprived of political freedom. In the south, the Republic of Korea continues. However, it is today economically prosperous and a democratic society. Nevertheless, sixty years after the Korean War, armies confront one another halfway down the peninsula. One of them is the United States Eighth Army. This time it is well trained and well equipped. It serves as a deterrent to war and a reminder of a bloody conflict now largely forgotten.

Why did the North Koreans attack across the 38th Parallel?

Kim Il Sung sent his army south in order to place the entire Korean peninsula under his control. Historically, Korea was a single entity, not two separate countries. Kim believed his destiny was to reestablish a unified Korean nation, this time as a Communist state. Moreover, he believed that most South Koreans would welcome the arrival of their northern brethren and that the Americans either would not contest the invasion or, if they did, would be easily defeated. On all three counts Kim was wrong.

Before launching the attack, Kim Il Sung secured Stalin’s approval for his action. Indeed, Russian generals helped plan the invasion and provided much of the equipment used by the North Koreans.

The Soviet leader assumed the Americans would not respond militarily to Kim’s invasion. The Americans he knew were not prepared for war and were interested in Japan, not Korea. Moreover, like Kim, Stalin had noticed that America’s secretary of state had not included Korea when listing territories of importance to the United States.

Why did the Chinese intervene?

The Chinese entered the war in late November 1950, just five months after the conflict began. They did so because an American army was advancing toward their border (the Yalu River being the boundary between North Korea and Manchuria, a part of China). This army was led by a general, Douglas MacArthur, who espoused extreme hostility toward the new rulers of China and their political ideology, and who seemed to have no qualms about employing nuclear weapons. Quite rightly, the Chinese Communists were concerned. They decided to take steps necessary to protect their country.

For several reasons, the Chinese leaders, including but not limited to Mao, saw the Americans as sworn enemies of the state. After all, it was the Americans who had supported their rival Chiang Kai-shek in the bloody contest for control of China. It was the Americans who, with their fleet off Formosa, prevented the Chinese from “liberating” the final piece of Chinese territory over which the Communists did not rule. And it was the Americans who prevented the Chinese in Peking from representing China in the United Nations. With good reason the rulers of China viewed the Americans with distrust and alarm.

Did the Chinese win the Korean War?

They certainly believe they did. From late November 1950 through January 1951 the Chinese army crushed the Americans in battle, causing both the U.S. Eighth Army and X Corps to retreat in humiliating fashion. This victory brought the Chinese great prestige abroad and, at home, remains a source of pride. That the Chinese army suffered enormously high casualties in the effort seems to have been forgotten, or is simply ignored. Nor does it register with the Chinese that, while they defeated the Americans in late 1950 and early 1951, they did not destroy the American forces, which, had their army been more capable, was an outcome within reach. Once Matthew Ridgway took command of the U.S. Army in Korea, the Chinese were unable to push the Americans off the peninsula, which, on several occasions, they attempted to do.

Nonetheless, the Chinese army had beaten the West’s most potent military. In doing so, it had kept the Americans away from the Yalu (for the Chinese, a decidedly positive accomplishment) and saved the regime of Kim Il Sung (a more dubious one). So they can claim a victory, although the eventual outcome of the war and the casualties the Chinese incurred suggest the win was far from complete.

The narrative refers to other nations providing symbolic contributions to the U.N. effort in Korea. Which countries were they and what did they provide?

Australia, Canada, Great Britain, the Philippines, Thailand, and Turkey all sent ground troops to Korea, although their numbers were small relative to those of the United States. So did Belgium, Ethiopia, France, Greece, and the Netherlands. As did New Zealand, which, in addition, deployed naval vessels, all frigates.

Canada also contributed to U.N. maritime forces, sending several destroyers to Korean waters. Australia sent an aircraft carrier, HMAS Sidney, along with escorts. However, the largest naval contingent, outside that of the United States, came from the United Kingdom. The Royal Navy kept one of three carriers on station throughout the conflict. One of these, HMS Triumph, on July 3, 1950, launched twenty-one aircraft that attacked a North Korean air base. This was the very first day of naval strikes against the enemy, strikes that continued throughout the war and constituted a major effort of the American-led coalition.

British and Commonwealth surface warships, primarily cruisers and destroyers, also bombarded North Korean coastal installations. One of the ships that did so, HMS Belfast, today remains afloat, moored in the Thames. There, as a museum, it reminds visitors to London of the conflict in Korea, which is now part of Britain’s maritime heritage.

Why did America’s army at first perform so badly?

In 1950 the United States Army was a shell of what it had been five years earlier. As a result of severe budgetary reductions mandated by President Truman and of the mistaken belief promoted by the newly established U.S. Air Force that airplanes with nuclear weapons were now the primary weapons of war, the army’s combat capabilities had become limited. The few troops it had were untrained, and its supplies, particularly ammunition, were inadequate. In Washington, Omar Bradley, then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is reported by David Halberstam to have said at the end of the Korean War that the U.S. Army could not fight its way out of a paper bag. That certainly was the case with Walton Walker’s Eighth Army. Despite efforts on his part to train the men in his command, Walker was unable to produce an army ready for combat. The results were a foregone conclusion. Both the North Koreans and the Chinese easily pushed aside Eighth Army (as well as Ned Almond’s X Corps). Only Walker’s pugnacious defense at Pusan saved his reputation. Yet even that was insufficient for him to retain command. MacArthur and the army brass in Washington were about to relieve General Walker. Only his unexpected death kept them from doing so.

What role did the U.S. Navy play in the Korean War?

Simply stated, a significant one. The American navy ferried troops to and from Korea. It bombarded enemy installations. It transported General MacArthur’s landing force to Inchon, and evacuated 105,000 men of General Almond’s X Corps from Hungnam. It also transported the air force’s F-86 fighter planes that were deployed to Korea. Moreover, U.S. Navy helicopters rescued scores of U.S. airmen who had been shot down.

One role the navy played, however, deserves special mention. This was the continuous series of attacks by naval aircraft against targets in both North and South Korea. From aircraft carriers such as the USS Valley Forge and the USS Boxer operating in the Sea of Japan, F4U Corsairs, AD Skyraiders, and F9F Panthers routinely delivered ordnance to the enemy. But at a not insignificant cost. A total of 564 naval and marine airplanes were lost in combat during the three years of conflict. Of these, sixty-four were Panthers, one of the U.S. Navy’s first jet fighters, which, it must be reported, were outclassed in aerial combat by Russian-built MiG-15s, the aircraft favored by North Korean, Chinese, and Russian pilots.

On one such mission, according to historian Richard P. Hallion, a Panther jet attacked enemy trucks near Wonson, and was sent spinning downward after being hit by flak. The pilot, new to naval aviation, nevertheless regained control of the aircraft although the jet’s right wing then struck a telephone pole. Somehow, the pilot kept his craft in the air. He flew to more friendly territory and ejected from his damaged jet. Soon picked up, the pilot was returned to his carrier. His name was Neil Armstrong.

How well did America’s air force do in the Korean War?

For the United States Air Force, the war in Korea was no small affair. During three years of conflict, it flew 720,000 sorties and lost more than 1,400 aircraft. Moreover, the full array of combat missions were flown. Employing a variety of aircraft, air force pilots flew close air support, interdiction, reconnaissance, strategic bombing, antisubmarine, and air combat missions. Hardly a day went by when the air force was not engaged in the skies above Korea.

The war also brought new developments in air warfare. Helicopters saw their first employment in combat, as did American and Russian jet-powered aircraft. Air-to-air refueling had its wartime introduction. Each of these developments pointed toward the future.

Nearly half the missions flown in Korea were for the purpose of interdiction. This meant the disruption and destruction of enemy supplies and troops well behind the battle line. Having just gained independence from the army, the air force had little interest in focusing on close air support. As strategic bombing targets were limited, the air force concentrated on interdicting the flow of men and matériel. In this, it achieved considerable success. Yet, given the manpower available to the North Koreans and the Chinese, as well as their willingness to accept casualties, interdiction did not achieve its goal of collapsing the enemy’s ability to wage war.

Where the air force performed extremely well was in air-to-air combat against Russian-built MiG-15 fighters. The MiGs were first-rate aircraft. Against them, America’s best fighter, the F-86 Sabre, nevertheless excelled. Sabre pilots claimed the destruction of 792 MiGs, a number now generally accepted as too high. But only seventy-eight Sabres were shot down by MiGs. Success of the F-86s was due largely to their pilots, who were experienced and well trained. Sound tactics and a superior gunsight made the difference as well. Most of the time, MiG pilots were outmatched. A few did well, particularly a number of Russians, but the majority of those who flew from Antung and the other bases in Manchuria crossed the Yalu at their peril. When, in July 1953, an armistice was signed at Panmunjom, one fact was indisputable: above North Korea Sabres owned the sky.

What, other than the invasion in June 1950 by the North Koreans, were the key turning points of the Korean War?

There were several. The first was Walton Walker’s successful defense of the Pusan Perimeter. This meant that Kim Il Sung’s army did not achieve its goal of unifying Korea.

The second turning point was MacArthur’s successful landing at Inchon. This led to the defeat of the North Koreans and, as important, boosted the morale of the American army and of the American public, neither of whom had much to cheer about as U.S. soldiers retreated down the peninsula.

The next turning point, one of the most significant in the entire conflict, was the move north by the Americans across the 38th parallel. For the United States, this military operation changed the purpose of the war, from repulsing the North Koreans’ invasion, to eliminating the regime of Kim Il Sung. Crossing the parallel into North Korea also meant that the Chinese would enter the conflict, thereby changing the nature and outcome of the war.

The Chinese attack of November 1950 constituted the fourth turning point. Chinese involvement led to the defeat in battle of an American army. Their involvement also meant that the U.S. would not unify the peninsula under the rule of Syngman Rhee. Moreover, it ensured that the war would not be limited in duration or in casualties.

The fifth turning point was the dismissal of General MacArthur. The general had overstepped the boundaries of U.S. military field commanders. So Truman’s action was entirely appropriate. Nonetheless, MacArthur’s removal was a shock to the American political system and a reminder to the American military that in the United States, generals (and admirals) do not outrank presidents.

The final turning point of the Korean War was the arrival in Korea of Lieutenant General Matthew Ridgway as commander of all ground forces. Ridgway took a dispirited American army and transformed it into an effective combat organization. Under his leadership, the Americans stopped several Chinese offensives, depriving them of control over the entire peninsula, but also advanced north against the Chinese, thus establishing what would become the Demilitarized Zone, close to where the conflict had started, at the 38th Parallel. Rarely has an American commander done a better or more important job. Little wonder then that Matthew Ridgway ranks as one of the country’s most capable military leaders.