PREFACE
1. D. Ariely, Predictably Irrational (New York: HarperCollins, 2009).
2. D. Kahneman, Thinking Fast and Slow (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2011).
CHAPTER 1: WHAT IS THE POINT OF GETTING ANNOYED?
1. M. Tamir, “What Do People Want to Feel and Why? Pleasure and Utility in Emotion Regulation,” Current Directions in Psychological Science 18 (2009): 101–105.
CHAPTER 3: EMOTIONAL IMPOSTORS, EMPATHY, AND UNCLE EZRA’S POKER FACE
1. M. Meshulam, E. Winter, G. Ben Shahar, and Y. Aharaon, “Rational Emotions in the Lab,” Social Neuroscience 7, no. 1 (2012): 11–17.
2. G. McCarthy, A. Puce, J. C. Gore, and T. Allison, “Face-Specific Processing in the Human Fusiform Gyrus,” Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 9 (1997): 605–610.
3. A. Kalay, “Friends or Foes? Empirical Test of a Simple One-Period Division Game Having a Unique Nash Equilibrium,” mimeo, 2003.
4. G. Rizzolatti and L. Craighero, “The Mirror-Neuron System,” Annual Review of Neuroscience 27 (2004): 169–192.
CHAPTER 4: GAME THEORY, EMOTIONS, AND THE GOLDEN RULE OF ETHICS
1. B. Aumann and M. Maschler, Repeated Games with Incomplete Information (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995).
2. E. Winter, I. García-Jurado, and L. Méndez Naya, “Mental Equilibrium and Rational Emotions,” Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, 2009.
CHAPTER 6: ON DECENCY, INSULT, AND REVENGE
1. W. Güth, R. Schmittberger, and B. Schwarze, “An Experimental Analysis of Ultimatum Bargaining,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 3, no. 4 (1982): 367–388.
2. Max Planck Institute, “Chimpanzees, Unlike Humans, Apply Economic Principles to Ultimatum Game,” ScienceDaily, October 7, 2007.
3. A. E. Roth, V. Prasnikar, M. Okuno-Fujiwara, S. Zamir, “Bargaining and Market Behavior in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, Pittsburgh, and Tokyo: An Experimental Study,” American Economic Review 81, no. 5 (1991): 1068–1095.
4. E. Winter and S. Zamir, “An Experiment with Ultimatum Bargaining in a Changing Environment,” Japanese Economic Review 56 no. 3 (2005): 363–385.
5. A. G. Sanfey, J. K. Rilling, J. A. Aronson, L. E. Nystrom, J. D. Cohen, “The Neural Basis of Economic Decision-Making in the Ultimatum Game,” Science 300, no. 5626 (2003): 1755–1758.
CHAPTER 7: ON STIGMAS AND GAMES OF TRUST
1. S. Knack and P. Keefer, “Does Social Capital Have an Economic Payoff? A Cross-Country Comparison,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 112 (1997): 1251–1288.
2. GDP is a country’s gross domestic product, the main index used to measure the economic development of nations.
3. J. Berg, J. Dickhaut, and K. McCabe, “Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History,” Games and Economic Behavior 10 (1995): 122–142.
4. C. Fershtman and U. Gneezy, “Discrimination in a Segmented Society: An Experimental Approach,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 116, no. 1 (2001): 351–376.
CHAPTER 8: SELF-FULFILLING MISTRUST
1. F. Bornhorst, A. Ichino, O. Kirchkamp, K. Schlag, and E. Winter, “Similarities and Differences when Building Trust: The Role of Culture,” Experimental Economics 13, no. 3 (2010): 260–283.
CHAPTER 10: COLLECTIVE EMOTIONS AND UNCLE WALTER’S TRAUMA
1. G. Bornstein, E. Winter, and H. Goren, “An Experimental Study of Repeated Team Games,” European Journal of Political Economy 12 (1996): 629–639.
2. G. Bornstein, E. Winter, and H. Goren, “Cooperation in Inter-group and Single-group Prisoner’s Dilemma Games,” in Understanding Strategic Interaction—Essays in Honor of Reinhard Selten, edited by W. Albers, E. van Damme, W. Güth, P. Hammerstein, and B. Moldovanu (Berlin and New York: Springer-Verlag, 1997), 418–429.
CHAPTER 11: THE HANDICAP PRINCIPLE, THE TEN COMMANDMENTS, AND OTHER MECHANISMS FOR ENSURING COLLECTIVE SURVIVAL
1. A. Zahavi, “Mate Selection—A Selection for a Handicap,” Journal of Theoretical Biology 53 (1975): 205–214.
2. R. Orzach, and Y. Tauman, “Strategic Dropouts,” Games and Economic Behavior 50 (2005): 79–88.
3. J. Andreoni, A. Payne, J. D. Smith, and D. Karp, “Diversity and Donations: The Effect of Religious and Ethnic Diversity on Charitable Giving,” NBER Working Paper 17618, November 2011.
CHAPTER 12: KNOWING HOW TO GIVE, KNOWING HOW TO RECEIVE
1. U. Gneezy and A. Rustichini, “Pay Enough or Don’t Pay at All,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 115, no. 3 (2000): 791–810.
CHAPTER 13: THE SPRAY THAT WILL GIVE US LOVE
1. E. Hart, S. Israel, and E. Winter, “Accuracy in the Perception of Social Deception Is Modified by Oxytocin,” Psychological Science 25 (2013): 293–295.
CHAPTER 14: ON MEN, WOMEN, AND EVOLUTION
1. D. Kahneman, A. B. Kruger, D. Schkade, N. Schwartz, and A. A. Stone, “Would You Be Happier If You Were Richer? A Focusing Illusion,” Science 312, no. 5782 (2006): 1908–1910.
2. M. Francesconi, C. Ghiglino, and M. Perry, “On the Origin of the Family,” discussion paper, University of Warwick, 2011.
3. M. Whitty and L. Quigley, “Emotional and Sexual Infidelity Offline and in Cyberspace,” Journal of Marital and Family Therapy 34, no. 4 (2008): 461–468.
4. M. C. Neale, B. M. Neale, and P. F. Sullivan, (2002). “Nonpaternity in Linkage Studies of Extremely Discordant Sib Pairs,” American Journal of Human Genetics 70, no. 2 (2002): 526–529.
5. U. Gneezy and A. Rustichini, “Gender and Competition at a Young Age,” American Economic Review 94, no. 2 (2004): 377–381.
6. M. Niederle and L. Vesterlund, “Do Women Shy Away from Competition? Do Men Compete Too Much?,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 122, no. 3 (2007): 1067–1101.
7. E. P. Lazear and S. Rosen, “Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts,” Journal of Political Economy 89, no. 5 (October 1981): 841–864.
8. J. M. Coates, M. Gurnell, and A. Rustichini, “Second-to-Fourth Digit Ratio Predicts Success Among High-Frequency Financial Traders,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Science 106, no. 2 (2009): 623–628.
9. D. Biello, “What Is the Best Age Difference for Husband and Wife?,” Scientific American, December 5, 2007.
10. L. Brizendine, The Female Brain (New York: Morgan Road Books, 2006).
11. M. R. Mehl, S. Vazire, N. Ramirez-Esparza, R. B. Slatcher, and J. W. Pennebaker, “Are Women Really More Talkative Than Men?,” Science 317 (2007): 82.
12. A. Christensen and C. L. Heavey, “Gender and Social Structure in the Demand/Withdraw Pattern of Marital Conflict,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 59 (1990): 73–81.
13. L. M. Papp, C. D. Kouros, and E. M. Cummings, “Demand-Withdraw Patterns in Marital Conflict in the Home,” Personal Relationships 16, no. 2 (2009): 285–300.
14. S. R. Holley, V. E. Sturm, and R. W. Levenson, “Exploring the Basis for Gender Differences in the Demand-Withdraw Pattern,” Journal of Homosexuality 57, no. 5 (2010): 666–684.
15. U. S. Rehman and A. Holtzworth-Munroe, “A Cross-Cultural Analysis of the Demand-Withdraw Marital Interaction: Observing Couples from a Developing Country,” Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology 74, no. 4 (2006): 755–766.
16. A. F. Bogaert, “Biological Versus Nonbiological Older Brothers and Men’s Sexual Orientation,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 103, no. 28 (2006): 10771–10774.
CHAPTER 15: MAKE ME A MATCH MADE IN HEAVEN
1. M. Perry, P. J. Reny, and A. J. Robson, “Why Sex? And Why Only in Pairs?,” discussion paper, Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, 2009.
2. E. Illouz, Consuming the Romantic Utopia: Love and the Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997).
3. G. Becker, “A Theory of Marriage Part 1,” Journal of Political Economy 81, no. 4 (1973): 813–846.
4. G. Becker, “A Theory of Marriage Part 2,” Journal of Political Economy 82, no. 2 (1974): 11–26.
5. D. Gale and L. S. Shapley, “College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage,” American Mathematical Monthly 69 (1962): 9–14.
CHAPTER 17: WHY ARE WE SO NEGATIVE?
1. J. von Neumann and O. Morgenstern, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1944).
2. R C. Battalio, J. Kagel, and D. MacDonald, “Animals’ Choices over Uncertain Outcomes: Some Initial Experimental Results,” American Economic Review 75 (1985): 597–613.
CHAPTER 18: ON ARROGANCE AND HUMILITY
1. A. M. Spence, “Job Market Signaling,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 87, no. 3 (1973): 355–374.
2. A. Tversky and D. Kahneman, “Extensional versus Intuitive Reasoning,” Psychological Review 91 (1984): 293–315.
CHAPTER 19: OVERCONFIDENCE AND RISK
1. B. Barber and T. Odean, “Trading Is Hazardous to Your Wealth: The Common Stock Investment Performance of Individual Investors,” Journal of Finance 55, no. 2 (April 2000): 773–806.
2. U. Gneezy, M. Niederle, and A. Rustichini, “Performance in Competitive Environments: Gender Differences,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 188, no. 3 (August 2003): 1049–1074.
3. K. Dobson and R. L. Franche, “A Conceptual and Empirical Review of the Depressive Realism Hypothesis,” Canadian Journal of Behavioural Science 21 (1989): 419–433.
4. M. Niederle and L. Vesterlund, “Do Women Shy Away from Competition? Do Men Compete Too Much?,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 122, no. 3 (2007): 1067–1101.
CHAPTER 20: THE VOICE IS HERD
1. S. Bikhchandani, D. Hirshleifer, and I. Welch, “A Theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom, and Cultural Change as Informational Cascades,” Journal of Political Economy 100, no. 5 (1992): 992–1026.
2. J. Bracht, F. Koessler, E. Winter, and A. Ziegelmeier, (2010) “Fragility of Information Cascades: An Experimental Study Using Elicited Beliefs,” Experimental Economics 13, no. 2 (2010): 121–145.
3. B. Sacerdote, “Peer Effects with Random Assignment: Results for Dartmouth Roommates,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 116, no. 2 (2001): 681–704.
4. S. Nieuwenhuis, B. U. Forstmann, and E. Wagenmakers, “Erroneous Analyses of Interactions in Neuroscience: A Problem of Significance,” Nature Neuroscience 14 (2011): 1105–1107.
5. A. Tversky and D. Kahneman, “The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice,” Science 211, no. 4481 (1981): 453–458.
CHAPTER 21: TEAM SPIRIT
1. M. Knez and D. Simester, “Firm-Wide Incentives and Mutual Monitoring at Continental Airlines,” Journal of Labor Economics 19, no. 4 (October 2001): 743–772.
2. E. Winter, “Incentive Reversal,” American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 1, no. 2 (2009)133–147.
3. E. Klor, S. Kube, E. Winter, and R. Zultan, “Can Higher Bonuses Lead to Less Effort? Incentive Reversal in Teams,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 97 (2014): 72–83.
4. E. Winter, “Incentives and Discrimination,” American Economic Review 94, no. 3 (2004): 764–773.
5. S. Goerg, S. Kube, and R. Zultan, “Treating Equals Unequally: Incentives in Teams, Workers’ Motivation and Production Technology,” Journal of Labor Economics 28 (2010): 747–772.
6. A. Cabrales, R. Miniaci, M. Piovesan, and G. Ponti, “Social Preferences and Strategic Uncertainty: An Experiment on Markets and Contracts,” American Economic Review 100, no. 5 (December 2010): 2261–2278.
7. A. Ichino and G. Maggi, “Work Environment and Individual Background: Explaining Regional Shirking Differentials in a Large Italian Firm,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 115 (2000): 1057–1090.
8. A. Falk and A. Ichino, “Clean Evidence on Peer Effects,” Journal of Labor Economics 24, no. 1 (2006): 39–58.
9. A. Mas and E. Moretti, “Peers at Work,” American Economic Review 99, no. 1 (2009): 112–145.
CHAPTER 22: IRRATIONAL EMOTIONS
1. P. D. Drummond, L. Camacho, N. Formentin, T. D. Heffernan, F. Williams, and T. E. Zekas, “The Impact of Verbal Feedback about Blushing on Social Discomfort and Facial Blood Flow During Embarrassing Tasks,” Behavior Research and Therapy 41, no. 4 (2003): 413–425.
2. B. Ware, The Top Five Regrets of the Dying: A Life Transformed by the Dearly Departing (Carlsbad, CA: Hay House, 2012).
3. N. Camille, G. Coricelli, J. Sallet, P. Pradat, J. R. Duhamel, and A. Sirigu, “The Involvement of the Orbitofrontal Cortex in the Experience of Regret,” Science 304, no. 5674, (May 2004): 1167–1170.
4. M. R. Delgado, A. Schotter, E. Y. Ozbay, and E. A. Phelps, “Understanding Overbidding: Using the Neural Circuitry of Reward to Design Economic Auctions,” Science 321, no. 5897 (2008): 1849–1852.
CHAPTER 23: NATURE OR NURTURE
1. A. Knafo, S. Israel, A. Darvasi, R. Bachner-Melman, F. Uzefovsky, L. Cohen, E. Feldman, E. Lerer, E. Laiba, Y. Raz, L. Nemanov, I. Gritsenko, C. Dina, G. Agam, B. Dean, G. Bornstein, and R. P. Ebstein, “Individual Differences in Allocation of Funds in the Dictator Game Associated with Length of the Arginine Vasopressin 1a Receptor RS3 Promoter Region and Correlation Between RS3 Length and Hippocampal mRNA,” Gene and Brain Behavior 7, no. 3 (2008): 266–275.
2. R. Ebstein, S. Israel, S. H. Chew, S. Zhong, and A. Knafo, “Genetics of Human Social Behavior,” Neuron 65 (March 2010): 831–844.