8

RENEWING THE OFFENSIVE: 27 SEPTEMBER – 13 OCTOBER 1915

The Battle of Loos is primarily remembered for the dramatic events of the first two days when almost all the British gains were made and when the vast majority of the casualties were incurred. That the battle continued for a further three weeks has been largely forgotten or ignored.¹ Apart from Sir James Edmonds, historians have made little attempt to see the events at Loos between 27 September and 13 October as a coherent whole. Perhaps this is understandable. The attacks conducted by the British in this period were not decisive; they were generally small in scale and had little result other than increasing the number of casualties and reducing First Army’s stocks of ammunition still further. Nevertheless, this later period of the battle is notable for several reasons and merits some reassessment because many of the factors, both operational and tactical, that had hindered British battlefield performance on 25–6 September were again encountered, such as the friction between Sir John French and Sir Douglas Haig, the difficulties of command and control, poor weather and the lack of adequate infantry fire support.

The abject failure of the British attacks on 26 September left the prospect of any further large-scale advances distinctly bleak. The headquarters of the German Sixth Army confidently informed OHL that it did not harbour any doubts about to its ability to prevent a British breakthrough.² A steady flow of German reinforcements were already making their way into the lines south of the La Bassée canal. The Guard Corps, which had recently been employed on the Eastern Front, was sent to Artois with 2^nd Guard Division joining General Sixt von Armin’s IV Corps.³ Nevertheless, pressure from the French Army meant that once the offensive had been started, it could not be terminated easily. At the request of their ally, therefore, the British kept pushing forward, but because of the fundamental disagreement between Sir John French and Sir Douglas Haig over the extent of the attack, the poor communication between the two and their deteriorating relationship, the operations of First Army continued with a momentum of their own and without proper, thorough discussion and detailed planning. This was to have important repercussions for British operations in this period, particularly the final effort to secure Fosse 8 on 13 October 1915.

Fighting continued to rage in Artois and Champagne, but it was becomingly increasingly clear that Joffre’s war-winning offensive was bogging down.⁴ Although the French in Champagne had managed to break the German first line and take approximately 14,000 prisoners, as had happened to the British, they were unable to get through the second line, which was heavily wired and well supported by artillery. In Artois, the French Tenth Army had suffered so badly on 25 September that by the following morning it had been forced to suspend its operations until the attacking troops could be relieved and further artillery preparation made. Renewed attacks were pressed during the afternoon, with the village of Souchez finally falling to French infantry, but the situation was so confused that the French Commander-in-Chief, General Joseph Joffre, was forced to direct General Foch (Commander Groupe d’Armées du Nord) to close down the operations of Tenth Army later that day, albeit taking care ‘to avoid giving the British the impression that we are leaving them to attack alone’.⁵

Pressure from Joffre may have meant that British operations had to continue, but French and Haig were still keen to keep pressing the enemy. For Sir Douglas Haig, he was well aware that the failure to break the German second line meant that his troops were now pinned into the breaches they had made on 25 September. Now more than ever, the dominating feature of the battlefield became Hill 70 and if the British and French were to make further gains, it had to be taken. Sir John French was equally concerned, rather melodramatically explaining to Foch that if he had been the Commander-in-Chief of the ‘whole western Allied front’, he would have ‘put every available man in just north of Hill 70 and “rush” a gap in the enemy’s line’.⁶ Owing to the failures of 21^st and 24^th Divisions the only troops immediately available belonged to Major-General the Earl of Cavan’s Guards Division,⁷ which was finally placed under First Army control at 1.45p.m. on 26 September. It spent the rest of the day marching towards the sound of the guns and arrived on the battlefield around midnight.⁸ At 11.30p.m. Lieutenant-General Richard Haking (GOC XI Corps) received orders to submit plans for the capture of Hill 70 to be conducted the following afternoon.

Considering the heavy shellfire and the almost total confusion on the battlefield by the evening of 26 September, the preparations for the attack on Hill 70 were inevitably rushed. As one young officer later recalled,‘I do not think that I or any of my fellow subalterns ever received any information as to what was expected of us’.⁹ Little could be done during the night and the morning was spent in feverish discussions and frantic communication. To aggravate matters the orders of the attack were changed later in the afternoon to take account of the deteriorating situation around Fosse 8. Haig had originally wanted to call the attack off, but Haking doubted whether it would be possible to do so in time. Haig did, however, insist that the troops go no further than the line Chalk Pit–Puits 14–Hill 70.¹⁰ XI Corps’ orders also stated that if 2 (Guards) Brigade failed to secure its objective of Bois Hugo, the attack of 3 (Guards) Brigade against Hill 70 should not take place. Unfortunately, news to this effect only reached 3 (Guards) Brigade after its troops had begun moving out.

When the attack finally got underway some progress was achieved but Hill 70 and Bois Hugo remained in enemy hands. A smoke discharge was successful in screening the approach of 2 (Guards) Brigade to the environs of Chalk Pit Wood,¹¹ but as had occurred on 25 September, while smoke would allow infantry to close with their objective, it would not allow them to take it if the Germans chose to resist.¹² As 1/Scots Guards and elements of 2/Irish Guards attempted to cross the open ground towards Puits 14 bis, they were met with ‘terrific fire from the enemy’s maxim guns’ and the attack stalled.¹³ The attack of 3 (Guards) Brigade was also unsuccessful. After an epic march through ‘considerable and growing shellfire’ across open ground, the brigade began filtering into Loos.¹⁴ Once inside the rubble-strewn village, however, the brigade became disorganised. Because 4/Grenadier Guards had been caught in a bombardment of gas shells as it entered the village from the north-west, 1/Welsh Guards were hurriedly ordered to lead the attack instead. It began at 5.30p.m. and as soon as the lines of infantry crested the summit and became visible to the German defenders, devastating swathes of machine gun fire swept through their ranks and the advance rapidly faltered.¹⁵ Senior officers on the spot decided that further progress was impossible and that a withdrawal to about 100 yards below the crest of Hill 70 should be conducted.¹⁶

The attack of the Guards Division was fatally undermined by poor artillery support. One gunner officer, Major Hon. R.G.A. Hamilton (CO CVIII Brigade RFA, 24^th Division), who had floundered around the battlefield on the night of 25/26 September trying to find Brigadier-General B.R. Mitford (GOC 72 Brigade), spent the following night in depressingly similar circumstances. He was supposed to find Brigadier-General G.P.T. Feilding (GOC 1 (Guards) Brigade) to brief him on the situation but, as might have been expected, this proved virtually impossible.¹⁷ After working his way down the old German front line ‘with great difficulty’ Hamilton eventually found Feilding at 3p.m. Others were not so fortunate, however. Major J.D. Anderson (CO XCVII Brigade RFA, 24^th Division) went into Loos to consult with Brigadier-General F.J. Heyworth (GOC 3 (Guards) Brigade) ‘as regards how the guns could best assist’ but because the village was under heavy shellfire, which cut all the telephone wires, he could not communicate with his batteries and returned, dejected, at 6.30p.m.¹⁸

As well as the logistical difficulties of getting artillery batteries into the correct locations, matters were not helped by a disagreement within XI Corps about what type of artillery preparation should precede the attack. Haking eventually decided that between 12.30 and 3p.m. Puits 14 would be bombarded by all the available heavy batteries before the guns of the Guards Division subjected the German lines to intensive shelling between 3.40 and 4p.m. The infantry would then attack.¹⁹ Haking’s idea of lifting the heavy artillery from the German front line at 3p.m., when it would then begin shelling more distant targets, seems to have been somewhat controversial. Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Rawlinson (GOC IV Corps), who met Haking at 10a.m., seems to have wanted a different approach. ‘I think this was a mistake,’ he noted, adding that ‘if I had been doing it I should have kept every available gun on the objective for the attack up to the very last moment.’²⁰ Unfortunately, Rawlinson kept his concerns to himself and Haking’s poor handling of artillery gave his troops even less chance of securing their objectives. The repulse of the Guards Division from Hill 70, combined with the alarming loss of Fosse 8, meant that further attempts to breakthrough the German lines would have to wait, at least until First Army could be reorganised and resupplied.²¹

Following the failure of the Guards Division’s operations around Hill 70, the focus of British efforts began to drift northwards. Although Fosse 8 had been lost after a fierce German counter-attack on 27 September,²² 73 Brigade (24^th Division) had managed to improvise a front line position on the east face of the Hohenzollern Redoubt.²³ Fighting continued over the next week as First Army desperately pushed reinforcements into the line in a frantic attempt to stem enemy progress and recapture the lost ground. Unfortunately, the confusion over objectives, the lack of proper planning and the poor artillery support that had been characteristic of British operations between 26 and 27 September were again encountered. Between 27 September and 5 October, 28^th Division was deployed in this sector and was ordered to recapture Fosse 8. It efforts were unsuccessful. The experience was undoubtedly a difficult one and was also notable for the palpable bad feeling, controversy and bitter argument that the battle engendered between the officers of 28^th Division and GOC I Corps, Lieutenant-General Hubert Gough. Curiously the entire episode only occupies a handful of pages in the usually concise British Official History, perhaps a reflection of the confusion that existed on the battlefield as well as the controversy of the action.²⁴

Major-General E.S. Bulfm (GOC 28^th Division) had bad memories of the battle. He later wrote to Sir James Edmonds that I have a very confused memory of Loos – a sort of horrid nightmare. I was under Hugh [sic] Gough – and I never want to serve under him again. I remember he ordered me to attack a Fosse – of course the whole thing was hopeless.’²⁵ On 20 October, shortly before he was to return to England on two months’ sick leave, Bulfin met Brigadier-General C.E. Pereira (GOC 85 Brigade). According to Pereira, as well as suffering from poor eyesight, Bulfin ‘could not get on with General Gough who accused the Division of being slow and who was always pressing for attacks without what General Bulfin considered sufficient artillery preparation’.²⁶ Tension and frustration was also evident from Gough’s account. He did not have a high opinion of Bulfìn. In The Fifth Army (1931), Bulfin appears as ‘a bluff, red-faced man’ who ‘at once on entering the room commenced to explain [to Gough] that infantry were not cavalry’.²⁷ Gough subsequently added that ‘it seemed to me that he was more intent on instructing me how to command a corps than he was to deal with the serious problem before his division and to help the troops already in great difficulties round Fosse 8’.

Was there any truth behind these accusations? Bulfin’s argument that his division had been placed under unnecessary pressure is difficult to deny. As 85 Brigade moved up to the front on 27 September, Brigadier-General Pereira was continually bombarded with messages from both corps and division not only to relieve 73 Brigade and elements of 9^th (Scottish) Division, but also to recapture Fosse 8. At 4.15p.m. Pereira even received a message direct from the corps commander ‘ordering an immediate counter attack across the open’, something which was clearly impossible.²⁸ What subsequently occurred does not rebound to the credit of I Corps. Pereira was wounded, with command thus devolving on Lieutenant-Colonel A.C. Roberts (CO 3/Royal Fusiliers). Roberts was immediately visited by Lieutenant-Colonel R.H. Hare (GSOI 28^th Division) and told that he must now make the attack on Fosse 8. Owing to the abysmal situation on the ground, Roberts reported at 6a.m. the following day that the attack was ‘impossible to carry out’ because his battalions were still not in position. At 7.15a.m. on 28 September, Lieutenant-Colonel C.A. Worthington (CO 2/Buffs) and Lieutenant-Colonel G.H. Neale (CO 3/Middlesex), had managed to reach the front line and carry out a brief reconnaissance. They reported that it was impossible to carry out the attack and requested permission to conduct it that evening. Rather predictably this did not go down well with either 28^th Division or I Corps. Lieutenant-Colonel Hare visited 85 Brigade headquarters again at 8a.m. and told Roberts that he had definite orders for the attack and was ‘to assist in having them carried out’.²⁹ Roberts’s orders stated that ‘The attack must take place at once with the utmost resolution, there must be no cause for delay until the fosse is taken’.³⁰ Despite these desperate appeals, the attack of 85 Brigade on the morning of 28 September was a predictable disaster. 2/Buffs only managed to reach their prescribed jumping-off position at 10a.m., long after the preparatory bombardment had ceased, and as soon as the leading company went ‘over the top’ it was greeted by hails of bullets from the enemy gunners occupying Slag Alley.³¹ By 11a.m. 2/Buffs were back in their original trenches and 3/Middlesex, after bombing up Dump Trench and getting involved in a fierce grenade contest with the enemy, had to disengage because of lack of ammunition.

If anyone had expected that this failure would have shaken Gough out of his preoccupation with recapturing Fosse 8, they would have been disappointed. On 29 September 84 Brigade entered the line and over the next few days it conducted a number of poorly supported and generally unsuccessful attacks against the German positions of Little Willie and the Chord. As might have been expected, 84 Brigade’s attacks were generally rushed, without adequate preparation or artillery support and tended to be on a small-scale, often with just two or three companies being involved. They were also largely devoid of lasting gain.³² A similar situation faced 83 Brigade, which relieved 84 Brigade on 3 October. Once again its commanding officer was repeatedly ordered to make premature and ill-prepared attacks against hardening German positions. Labouring under the immense difficulties of relieving mixed-up troops that were under constant enemy bombing attacks while also planning his own counterstroke, Brigadier-General H.S.L. Ravenshaw eventually organised an attack against Little Willie on the morning of 4 October by two battalions (2/East Yorkshire and 1 /KOYLI). This also achieved little; the expected preliminary bombardment never arrived and the attacking companies were ‘practically wiped out’ by hostile machine gun and rifle fire.³³

28^th Division’s failure to regain Fosse 8, or even secure its position around the Hohenzollern Redoubt, did not go down well with British High Command. As Andy Simpson has noted, 28^th Division suffered a ‘stinging rebuke’ from I Corps on 6 October for the way it had framed orders for its brigades.³⁴ A brief paper on the problems with staff work and command in 28^th Division’s papers listed twelve points for consideration including misleading and inaccurate reports; improper distribution of staff work; lack of contact with the divisional engineers;‘want of discipline and soldierly bearing’ in 3/Middlesex (85 Brigade); and the ‘disgraceful’ retreat of 2/Cheshire (84 Brigade) from the Hohenzollern Redoubt. The list also noted the ‘great slackness and a complete want of co-ordination and cohesion in the Division’, and ‘Too much “laisser faire [sic]”’.³⁵ Brigadier-General T.H.F. Pearse (GOC 84 Brigade) was also accused of lacking ‘energy’ and ‘discipline’. There was also ‘insufficient energy in the command’. Amazingly the report also noted that ‘it is not the business of the Corps to command Division – that is the business of the Division’.

Was such a damning report justified? On 20 October Brigadier-General Pereira complained that the whole of 28^th Division was ‘under a cloud’,³⁶ and given Gough’s low opinion of Bulfin and his understandable desire to excuse the failure to secure Fosse 8, this was not entirely surprising. 28^th Division admittedly suffered numerous problems with its staff work and command, but many of these were generally inherent in the BEF at this period in the war and were not unique to Bulfin s division. Although Haig believed that 28^th Division had ‘not proved equal to the task’,³⁷ after reviewing the numerous personal accounts, war diaries and after-action reports for this period it will be seen that although inexperienced, 28^th Division suffered from no lack of courage or conviction. Indeed the war diaries of the division detail a considerable number of epic actions, heroic attacks and gallant leadership, which resulted in the later award of two Victoria Crosses.³⁸ But the division was hampered by a number of serious factors: the weather was wet; enemy pressure was constant and unyielding; artillery support was poor; basic supplies of water, food and ammunition often did not arrive on time; and on a number of occasions its battalions were ordered to conduct operations without sufficient preparation and against the opinions of those officers on the ground.

It is worth noting how appalling was the situation that faced 28^th Division during this period. According to Brigadier-General Pereira, when he advanced up the Central Boyau on the afternoon of 27 September, he had to contend with ‘constant delays’, particularly when moving past the troops he was supposed to relieve. With ‘infinite difficulty’, he managed to ‘get the trench clear for the brigade’, but ‘The trench was very deep and narrow, wounded men were trying to come down it, further on there were dead bodies and equipment blocking the way’.³⁹ Moving through this muddy labyrinth was incredibly trying. The German Official History recorded that the Bavarian units detailed to retake the Hohenzollern Redoubt on 27 September sank ‘up to their calves in thick slime’.⁴⁰ When 1/Suffolk (84 Brigade) attempted to march to the British positions opposite Little Willie on the afternoon of 2 October, it took over seven hours and then only one company had reached its intended destination.⁴¹ Maps were another problem. Even if they were available, and in many cases they were not, the heavy shelling, poor weather, constant movement of troops and incessant digging meant that within a few days even the most up-to-date maps were virtually useless.⁴² In this morass guides were often little help. 83 Brigade did receive a number of guides from 9^th Division but none ‘knew the way and were quite useless stating that they had never been there before’.⁴³ The trenches were also highly dangerous, those at Big Willie for example being shallow and vulnerable to fire from the Dump.⁴⁴

When operations were pressed in this lethal environment it was essential that British troops were able to count upon the support of their own artillery and the firepower of their rifles and grenades. Unfortunately, all seemed to have worked poorly under the difficult conditions. The factors that had hindered British artillery fire between 25 and 27 September were still much in evidence, particularly the difficulty of observing and locating enemy concentrations, and the perennial complaints about worn guns, inexperienced crews, poor ammunition and lack of communication. One of 9^th Division’s field artillery brigades voiced a common concern on 27 September. It was:

Extremely hard to know or hear of how things stand, one minute in possession of HOHENZOLLERN REDOUBT and the next not, the same remark applies to the DUMP.⁴⁵

According to a German regimental history, British artillery fire on 28 September was ‘almost all far off target’,⁴⁶ and because the opposing lines were often close together and regularly changed hands, British gunners were sometimes reluctant to shell trenches for fear of hitting their own troops.

British troops also suffered from a lack of organic fire support. Rifles were prone to jamming in the muddy trenches and grenades were little help. Whereas the German Army had long appreciated the value of such weapons, the British had only one type in service by 1914.⁴⁷ During the opening months of 1915, however, the British rapidly learnt the value of the grenade. A grenade company was formed in each brigade early in the year by taking thirty men from each battalion and training them in the use of grenades.⁴⁸ But the effectiveness of these groups depended largely upon the quality of the bombs they were using and by September 1915 British bombs came in several varieties including the infamous ‘hairbrush’, jam-pot’ and ‘cricket-ball’ designs.⁴⁹ These infamous weapons were notoriously unreliable and the personal memoirs and battalion war diaries for Loos are littered with references to these faulty or useless grenades.⁵⁰ Indeed, according to Hubert Gough, the bomb ‘played an especially great and decisive part’ in failure on the battlefield, particularly concerning the actions of 73 Brigade and 28^th Division.⁵¹ It would not be until the arrival of large numbers of the Mills grenades, with its standardised time fuse, that British troops would be able to hold their own in bombing fights with the enemy. Over 11,000 Mills bombs had arrived in France by the time Loos was fought, but owing to poor planning most had been given to the Guards Division, which did not see action until 27 September.⁵²

After the failure of the renewed British efforts to secure Hill 70 and Fosse 8, life south of the La Bassée canal gradually settled down into a routine of trench reliefs and working-parties. Nevertheless this did not ease the strain on the troops.⁵³ As the British gradually built up their new trenches, constructed dugouts and brought up supplies – all whilst in bad weather – they had to contend with heavy and continuous shellfire. Because Hill 70 and the Dump remained in enemy hands, German artillery observers were able to keep a constant watch over the British lines and direct shellfire where required. The British could make little reply. The aircraft of the RFC were unable to spot German guns because of the low cloud and mist.⁵⁴ So heavy was the shellfire that it was found virtually impossible to bring artillery forward to support the renewed offensive without it being subjected to devastating counter-battery fire.⁵⁵ According to one officer, it was ‘almost suicide to drive guns into the open by daylight’.⁵⁶

The British front line and battery positions south of the La Bassée canal were ‘heavily shelled’ on 2 October, ‘very hostile shelling’ was recorded again on 4 October and likewise on the following day the front and support line trenches were ‘shelled continuously’.⁵⁷ Such heavy shellfire inevitably took its toll. On 29 September the headquarters of 2 (Guards) Brigade in Loos was ‘very badly bombarded all day by 8" shells’.⁵⁸ At 11 a. m. a shell buried several senior officers including Lieutenant-Colonel A.G.E. Egerton (CO 1/Coldstream Guards), who was killed.⁵⁹ A similar episode mortally wounded Lieutenant-Colonel G.H.C. Madden (CO 1/Irish Guards, 1 (Guards) Brigade) on 11 October.⁶⁰ On 2 October Major-General F.D.V. Wing (GOC 12^th Division) was killed by shellfire at his advanced reporting centre near the front, ⁶¹ and the following day, as elements of 5 (Cavalry) Brigade cleared the battlefield around Vermelles, a shrapnel shell killed Brigadier-General F. Wormald, the brigade commander.⁶² Even after the main fighting had ended, the Loos battlefield was still an unhealthy place to linger.

On the evening of 27 September Sir John French bluntly informed General Joffre that unless the French Tenth Army ‘attacked with energy and quickly’, he would be forced to suspend his operations.⁶³ In response it was arranged that while the British continue their efforts to reach Pont à Vendin, the French IX Corps (17^th, 18^th and 152^nd Divisions) would move up and take over the positions currently held by 47^th (London) Division on the extreme right of the British line. It was hoped that the deployments would be completed between 28 and 30 September. However, owing to the bad weather and traffic congestion, it was the morning of 2 October before the French were finally in position.⁶⁴ In line with these reliefs, a reorganisation of the British front line began on 28 September and was completed in the following week. 3^rd (Cavalry) Division, which had been hurriedly moved up to hold the village of Loos on the night of 26/27 September,⁶⁵ was relieved by elements of 1^st Division. The front of IV Corps now ran from the Béthune–Lens road to the Loos–Puits 14 track. XI Corps now consisted of 12^th (Eastern), 46^th (North Midland) and the Guards Division and was in the line parallel to the Lens-La Bassée road to a point west of Hulluch where it joined I Corps.

As 28^th Division struggled in the ruins of the Hohenzollern Redoubt, discussions regarding the renewed offensive continued apace. On the evening of 30 September First Army issued orders regarding the resumption of the attack.⁶⁶ Now scheduled for 3 October, it was arranged that XI Corps would secure the Lens-La Bassée road and finally capture the woods of Bois Hugo in conjunction with the French IX Corps, which would then be in position on its right. On the northern sector of the battlefield, I Corps would continue its efforts to retake Fosse 8, while preparing for a gas attack south of the La Bassée canal.⁶⁷ The commanders of I and XI Corps were invited to ‘submit their projects as soon as possible’.⁶⁸ This renewed offensive did not take place, however, on 3 October. Much to Sir John French’s chagrin, the date of the offensive was continually postponed and only took place on 13 October. On 30 September Foch wanted to delay any attack until 4 October,⁶⁹ and by 3 October, the attack had been rearranged to take place on 5 October. But the worrying developments around Fosse 8 and the Hohenzollern Redoubt conspired to thwart these plans. Under the heading of‘Secret & Pressing’, Haig wrote to GHQ on 4 October:

Owing to the heavy fighting that had taken place continuously during the last three days and to the large amount of work which has been necessary in order to secure the positions gained against further attacks by the enemy, it will not be possible to undertake the attack on FOSSE No. 8 and the QUARRIES until the troops are rested. Also, in spite of our attempts to keep the enemy fully engaged and to prevent his working on his entrenchments and wire, aerial photographs and observations show that considerable work has been done and that it will be necessary to prepare a regular plan of attack on similar lines to the preparation for previous attacks.⁷⁰

Haig proposed to postpone the offensive until plans had been completed and full arrangements made.

The attitude of GHQ to this request (and the requests for further postponements that came in the coming days) was recorded in the diary of Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Wilson (Chief Liaison Officer to GQG). On 4 October Wilson noted that this was ‘the second time Haig has done this. We agreed with the French to attack on the 4^th, then Haig changed to the 5^th, and now Haig has changed again to the 10^th.’⁷¹ While Wilson had a low opinion of Haig – his diary for this period is littered with snide references to the commander of First Army⁷² – Sir John French was also unimpressed. His reply to Haig highlighted the growing gulf between the two men.

Chief approves of postponement but he is surprised and regrets it is necessary as he has not before heard of continuous heavy fighting except at HOHENZOLLERN. It is understood that postponement is only for two or three days and it is necessary that attack should be made as early as possible.⁷³

Somewhat chastened by Sir John’s ‘surprise and regret’, Haig sent a collection of reports to GHQ later in the day explaining the reasons for the postponement. ‘The attached reports show clearly,’ Haig wrote, ‘that the fighting on the front of the Quarries, FOSSE No. 8 and the HOHENZOLLERN Redoubt has been continuous and heavy, that the enemy on this front has made incessant counter attacks, and that the shelling, rifle and machine gun fire on the whole of the front south of the canal has been abnormal.’⁷⁴ Haig also noted that 1^st, 2^nd, 7^th, 15^th and 47^th Divisions had been ‘much knocked about’ and 28^th Division had not ‘proved… equal to the task’. Haig hoped that arrangements would be ‘sufficiently advanced’ for the attack on Fosse 8 to be conducted on 10 October. ‘If any further explanation is required,’ Haig added, with perhaps a touch of exasperation, then ‘I shall be glad to come to Headquarters and give it.’

Sir John’s position was a difficult one. Even Wilson, hardly his biggest admirer, admitted on 9 October that he felt sorry for him ‘because he is in Haig’s hands over this business’.⁷⁵ Pressure from General Joffre, who had ‘represented to the Commander-in-Chief the disadvantage to the allied operations… entailed by the postponement’,⁷⁶ only added to Sir John’s predicament. Perhaps he was still unaware of the magnitude of the ‘all-out’ attack that I, IV and XI Corps had conducted on 25 and 26 September and could not understand how Haig had managed to ‘knock about’ five full-strength British divisions in a matter of days. And once again the two differing conceptions of the battle held by the two officers produced friction. For Haig, the man who had been the author of the ambitious ‘all-out’ attack, he was aware very early on that, in his opinion at least, a great victory had been lost. As he confided to his diary on 27 September, further progress had not been achieved largely because of ‘the initial mistake of the C-in-C in refusing to move up the Reserve Divisions close to the rear of the attacking troops before the commencement of operations’.⁷⁷ In his diary entry for the following day, Haig lamented the renewed construction of enemy defences at Pont à Vendin and recorded that when the Commander-in-Chief ‘remains blind to the lessons of the war in this important matter (handling of reserves) we hardly deserve to win’.⁷⁸

Conversely, the Commander-in-Chief found it difficult to understand why Haig could not continue to support the French with steady continuous attacks as he had been ordered to. Again there seems to have been a curious lack of communication between GHQ and First Army because while Sir John continually stressed to Haig that the ‘general international situation… imperatively demand[ed] an early resumption of the offensive’,⁷⁹ Haig had to tell him that without adequate reinforcements and proper planning, an ‘early resumption’ to the offensive was impracticable.

This dichotomy was never resolved and the tensions between French and Haig only widened as the days went by, with Sir John recording on 5 October that Haig seemed ‘unable to grasp the situation as a whole’, ⁸⁰ and Haig noting (of French) that it ‘seems impossible to discuss military problems with an unreasoning brain of this kind’. ⁸¹ It is also evident that Sir John no longer felt able to interfere too greatly in Haig’s operations. In late September General D’Urbal (GOC French Tenth Army) had complained to Wilson about the ‘rude and discourteous’ manner of Haig and his Chief of Staff, Richard Butler. Sir John had apparently promised to speak to Haig about this matter, but it seems nothing came of it. French was,Wilson recalled,‘infatuated with Haig so he wouldn’t say much’.⁸²

Sir John’s emotional and physical state deteriorated further during this period. While he was encouraged by the great number of telegrams he received on 28 September congratulating him on his sixty-third birthday, these could not dispel the gathering gloom in his headquarters,⁸³ and he was clearly depressed by the results of the Allied offensive, occasionally even slipping into defeatism. After a visit to French’s headquarters on 28 September, Haig recorded that Sir John ‘seemed tired of the war, and said that in his opinion we ought to take the first opportunity of concluding peace otherwise England would be ruined’.⁸⁴ Yet, typically, he also suffered a number of mood swings. On 8 October Sir John met Haig at St Omer. According to Haig’s account, Sir John was ‘in a chastened mood!’ and was ‘evidently anxious to make amends for the fiery letters which had been sent to me by his orders’.⁸⁵

As well as the need to conduct the necessary reconnaissance, rest the infantry and bring up the gas cylinders and smoke candles, the renewed offensive was delayed by a heavy German counter-attack on 8 October. Although this attack did not result in any major loss of ground, it interfered with the programme for bringing the gas cylinders into the trenches during the night of 8/9 October.⁸⁶ Because Haig planned to use gas and smoke for the renewed offensive, the same delicate process of negotiation, over what would happen if the weather conditions were unsuitable, which had consumed the days before the main assault, were again encountered. They were almost identical to the arguments and discussions in the weeks before the main attacks on 25 September and again revealed the fractured communication that existed between GHQ and First Army. Between 5 and 12 October a flurry of letters passed between the two headquarters about the date for the renewed attack, with Haig continually asking for flexibility when to strike and GHQ always pressing that the attacks should go in on the date arranged with the French. At no stage does there seem to have been a thorough and open discussion about what the requirements of gas entailed and how this would naturally dictate the date of the attack. Instead French and Haig muddled on, arguing from completely different standpoints and, unsurprisingly, being unable to move from them. A brief insight into this lack of communication can be gained from a private letter to Haig from Sir William Robertson (CGS GHQ) on 6 October.⁸⁷ Because Sir John felt that he was ‘liable to be misunderstood’, Robertson confirmed (on Sir John’s behalf) that 10 October was ‘definitely to be the day of the attack’. But clearly having little idea about what Haig was actually intending to do, Robertson also asked whether First Army was making a feint north of the La Bassée canal, when the preliminary bombardment was scheduled to begin, and would Haig ‘kindly let me have a brief outline of your proposals’.

GHQ had officially informed Haig earlier that day that the Commander-in-Chief approved 10 October as the date of the attack.⁸⁸ But because the weather might be unfavourable and the Germans better prepared, Sir John requested that Haig assure him that ‘the success of your plan is not dependent on the use of gas’. This was a rather odd statement because the primary reason why Haig had requested a postponement to 10 October was to allow time for the gas cylinders to be detrained and moved up to the front trenches. Haig had even sent GHQ a programme of events on 5 October detailing his proposed plans for the following days. The units around Fosse 8 would be relieved on the night of 5/6 October, and during the following two nights, the trenches would be prepared for the arrival of the gas and smoke equipment. Final reliefs would be made on the night of 8/9 October before conducting a thorough reconnaissance of the ground on 9 October. The attack would then take place the following day.⁸⁹

These plans seem to have either been misunderstood or ignored by Sir John French, probably because of his reluctance to incur the wrath of Joffre and Foch. GHQ’s letter of 6 October also went on to state that ‘your large superiority in guns and the good supply of ammunition available… should be capable of producing such an effect upon the enemy and his defences as to justify us in anticipating success, without undue loss, even if gas cannot be used.’⁹⁰ Haig replied on 8 October. He fully agreed with Sir Johns opinions. The ‘prospects of success’, Haig wrote, ‘will be much enhanced by waiting until the preparations are complete’.⁹¹ Haig now wanted the attack to take place on 13 October or the nearest date after with favourable weather conditions. Although this postponement was approved, Haig was warned that ‘every possible effort’ should be made to carry it on 12 October.⁹² GHQ also informed Haig that he should be prepared to make his attack without the use of gas, so that ‘it may in any case be carried out no later’ than 13 October.

As these frantic, sometimes confused, discussions between GHQ and First Army continued, the rationale behind the whole operation began to weaken. Sir John may have fretted over Haig’s continual delays and postponements, and feared the wrath of Joffre and Foch, but ironically, on the eve of the renewed offensive, he began to have severe doubts over whether to conduct an operation at all. GHQ contacted Haig on 12 October and informed him that because the French X Corps had failed to progress and that General D’Urbal was ‘at present at a standstill’,⁹³ the British offensive would, therefore, be fought for local tactical reasons. After securing Fosse 8, Haig was directed to capture those positions that would allow him to maintain his troops ‘without difficulty in the salient which you have created in the enemy’s lines’.⁹⁴ As had occurred before 25 September, the issues over the timing of the assault were never satisfactorily resolved and Haig was again left anxiously waiting for the wind. His final letter before the attack, written on 12 October, confirmed that all the arrangements had been made, and the operation could go ahead on 13 October. He did, however, point out that he was ‘strongly of opinion’ that if the weather was unfavourable it should be delayed until the first suitable opportunity.⁹⁵ Fortunately for Haig he was spared the horrific dilemma that he had faced on the morning of 25 September, with wind conditions that bordered on the unsuitable, because on the afternoon of 13 October there was an ideal south-westerly wind blowing across the battlefield with a strength of about five miles per hour.⁹⁶ Accordingly, the attack went ahead. But how was it planned and conducted?

The attacks on 13 October marked the final stage of the Battle of Loos. Although spasmodic bombing sorties continued in and around the Hohenzollern Redoubt throughout October and into the following month, this was the last large-scale attempt to recapture the Quarries and Fosse 8 by the British during 1915. Its repulse effectively brought the battle to an end. On 15 October Sir John French informed Haig that owing to the failures of the French operations in Champagne and Artois, and in view of recent setbacks, First Army should now confine itself only to those operations necessary to secure its left flank around Auchy and Haisnes.⁹⁷ The grand plans for an advance up to the Haute Deule canal had now to be given up. Haig met his corps commanders on 16 October and told them that the offensive was now over and that they should ‘settle down for the winter’.⁹⁸

The final stages of the Battle of Loos may have been overshadowed by the events of 25 and 26 September, but they were the subject of much acrimony and bitter debate in the years after. Despite being present on 1 July 1916,46^th Division (the formation that had been tasked with retaking Fosse 8) underwent its worst day of the entire war on 13 October, suffering over 3,500 casualties. Even Edmonds was moved to write that the attack ‘had not improved the general situation in any way and had brought nothing but useless slaughter of infantry’.⁹⁹ In many ways the attack on 13 October typified much that was wrong with the BEF in this period. It will be recalled that a number of important elements of the plan were never satisfactorily settled, a consequence of the poor communication between GHQ and First Army. First Army’s operational plans were also faulty, containing that familiar dose of over-optimism, muddled thinking and an inability to learn seemingly obvious lessons from previous failures that had so contributed to the disappointments of the preceding three weeks.

The object of the attack was to ‘secure a strong line of defence including FOSSE No. 8 and the QUARRIES, which is capable of resisting immediate and subsequent counter-strokes’.¹⁰⁰ 12^th Division would attack on a 2,000 yard front from the Vermelles–Hulluch road to a German trench known as The Window, while 46^th Division (again attacking a front of about 2,000 yards) would be deployed on the left of 12^th Division up to the Vermelles–Auchy road, aiming to capture the Hohenzollern Redoubt and Fosse 8. The operation was planned from the outset to be strictly limited, which meant that British artillery would not waste its shells on far-away targets. Haig admitted on 6 October that while the ‘ultimate objective’ remained Pont àVendin, before this could be achieved it would be necessary to secure the left flank. Haig also went on to state that:

The proposed operations were different to those just finished in so far as in the last operation there were reserve close behind ready to push through, whereas the operations proposed for the near future were more with the definite object of taking FOSSE No. 8 and the QUARRIES and securing sufficient ground to the N.E. to secure our left flank in the next offensive.¹⁰¹

In line with these directions the corps commander, Haking, made it clear that he ‘did not propose to go a yard further in the direction of AUCHY LEZ LA BASSÉE than the line specified’.¹⁰² While XI Corps captured Fosse 8 and the Quarries (with the support of‘every available gun’), IV Corps would be involved, with 1^st Division pushing forward to the Lens–La Bassée road. The attack would also be assisted by the use of smoke as a ‘barrier’ on its flanks to cover the infantry and confuse the enemy.¹⁰³

In some respects the plans for 13 October were a considerable improvement on what had gone before. At certain stages of the planning process it is clear that efforts were made to ascertain what had occurred earlier in the battle and what lessons could be learnt from them. In stark contrast to the orders before 25 September, Haking’s attack plans noted that the attacking brigades ‘must be given very clear and definite objectives, as regards the direction of their advance, the exact place they are to get to and the work to be done directly they get there’.¹⁰⁴ There was also an emphasis upon the transport of hand grenades to the firing line, the importance of keeping communication trenches clear, and the need for machine guns to be taken forward in the attack. In an echo of the tactics that had been used earlier in the year at Festubert, divisional commanders were instructed to place 18-pounders in the front trenches to help suppress enemy fire, while mountain guns were also to be made available to accompany the attacking troops.¹⁰⁵ At a First Army conference on 6 October it was agreed that ‘Every available gun would be at the disposal of XI Corps’, and smoke would also be dispersed over a wide front ‘so as to induce the enemy to distribute his fire’.¹⁰⁶

Efforts were also being made lower down the chain of command. On 7 October, Lieutenant-Colonel Hon. J.F. Gathorne-Hardy (GSOI 7^th Division) visited the headquarters of 46^th Division and shared with them his experiences of the recent operations.¹⁰⁷ Gathorne-Hardy highlighted nine points to consider for the forthcoming operation. Most were practical lessons revealed by the recent fighting, including the need to fill in trenches ‘so as to force the Germans to attack over the top’; having an adequate supply of bombs; the need to train British troops in the use of German grenades; the importance of depth in an attacking battalion; the value of smoke candles for consolidation; and the need to detail specific units to methodically clear captured enemy positions. 46^th Division also interviewed an unnamed officer who had taken part in the capture of Fosse 8 on 25 September and discussed with him a number of important matters, such as the nature of the ground, the layout of German trenches and the location of barbed wire.¹⁰⁸ 12^th Division laid out a full-size plan of the ground around the Quarries with sandbags and likewise 46^th Division built its own dummy trench system.¹⁰⁹ The brigades of 46^th Division were also involved in extensive bomb training, including the use of the new Mills bombs, which were available in considerable numbers for the attack.

While these activities were certainly encouraging and reflected a growing professionalism within the BEF, the old problems with command lingered. As usual, as the attack drew ever closer, over-optimism and a growing ambition began to make their presence felt. Although the attack was to be a limited operation, it still involved three divisions over a wide stretch of front and, as might have been expected, Rawlinson was worried. At Hinges on 6 October he ‘suggested that the attack on CITÉ ST ELIE and HULLUCH should be made a subsequent operation’,¹¹⁰ but these words seem to have fallen on deaf ears. Contrary to Rawlinson’s concerns, Haking believed that there were good grounds for optimism.

In spite of the short time available there is little doubt that with the assistance of smoke and of such gas cylinders as we can get into the trenches in the time, and with the very powerful artillery support placed at our disposal by 1^st Army, we have a better chance of gaining our limited objective ever [sic] than the troops who made the original attack on 25^th Septr [sic], partly because the enemy is now more shaken and disorganised and partly because we are in a position to produce a tremendous artillery bombardment against a very small portion of the enemy’s front. The enemy’s failure, with heavy losses, in his attack on 6^th will also be a great advantage to us.¹¹¹

While there was little evidence that the enemy were – in Haking’s words – ‘shaken and disorganised’, which was little more than wishful thinking, the real problem was artillery support. Because the attack on Fosse 8 would be preceded by a ‘tremendous’ bombardment with ‘every available gun’ against a relatively short stretch of front, it seems to have been assumed by First Army and XI Corps that it would completely suppress all resistance and allow the attacking troops to capture their objectives without heavy loss.

What artillery support was available for the attack? The attack of 12^th Division was to be supported by thirty batteries of field artillery (mostly 18-pounders and 4.5" howitzers) firing at the German positions between Hulluch and just north of the Quarries.¹¹² 46^th Divisions attack would be preceded by the fire of twenty-six batteries of field artillery directly against Fosse 8. Three groups of heavy artillery, No. 5 Group HAR (Brigadier-General T.A. Tancred), No. 1 Group HAR (Brigadier-General G. McK. Franks) and the Siege Group (Brigadier-General W.J. Napier), directly under Haking at XI Corps headquarters, would also support the attack by demolishing enemy trenches, targeting machine gun positions, stopping hostile counter-attacks and conducting counter-battery work. As usual counter-battery work was given a low priority and a considerable proportion of these heavy guns, which arguably should have been used to try and suppress enemy batteries, were concentrated against Fosse 8 during the intensive bombardment ‘when counter-battery work is not so important’.¹¹³

Artillery preparation was to be split into several clear sections.¹¹⁴ During 10 and 12 October divisional artillery would commence wire-cutting while the heavy guns searched out enemy trenches and strongpoints. This would continue into the morning of 13 October, when at 12 noon an intensive heavy bombardment would begin, lasting for one hour. At 1p.m. the gas and smoke would be released as the fire of the heavy artillery lifted upon Corons de Pekin, Corons de Maroc, Pentagon Redoubt and the Dump. Divisional artillery would remain sweeping the front trenches with shrapnel and at 2p.m. the infantry would go ‘over the top’. This tactic seems to have originated from Haking and echoed the earlier artillery preparation for the Guards Division on 27 September when concern had been expressed about lifting the heavy artillery from the German front line before Zero Hour. Haig had even telephoned Haking on 28 September, telling him that ‘He thinks it was a mistake not keeping the heavy howitzers on longer, and that was the reason of the failure.’¹¹⁵ But in spite of these misgivings Haig (characteristically) did little to influence XI Corps’ artillery plan for 13 October. Why did Haking order the heavy artillery to lift from the enemy trenches before Zero Hour? While there was an understandable concern that heavy shells would disperse the gas and smoke, which shrapnel would not do,¹¹⁶ Haking also ‘wanted to give the enemy a chance of running away and for this reason he thought it would be a good plan for his guns to start bombarding the front of the hostile defences and then gradually lift’.¹¹⁷

This may have sounded well to the staff of First Army and XI Corps but Major-General Hon. E.J. Montagu-Stuart-Wortley (GOC 46^th Division) was distinctly unimpressed.¹¹⁸ He would later complain that his division had been ‘hurried into the trenches’ with barely enough time ‘to become acquainted with the actual position’,¹¹⁹ something that the officers of 28^th Division would have been very familiar with. After seeing the ground for himself, Stuart-Wortley was of the opinion that only a step-by-step advance using the power of artillery could succeed in wresting Fosse 8 from the Germans. Unfortunately, his concerns were overruled and in another example of the gross over-optimism that infected First Army headquarters, he was apparently told that because his attack was to be preceded by ‘the fire of 400 guns’, his men would probably ‘reach Fosse 8 without firing a shot’.¹²⁰ Haking seems to have been mesmerized by the power of the bombardment and honestly believed that under this fire German resistance would crumble. He gave a number of speeches to the attacking brigades in the days before the attack, which were strikingly reminiscent of those he had given to 21^st and 24^th Divisions before their ‘baptism of fire’.¹²¹ To say that Haking was being over-optimistic is an understatement; either he was guilty of seriously misleading the troops under his command, or he was simply ignorant of the severe limitations operating on British artillery in this period. The bombardment was not only littered with technical problems, but also did little damage to the German defences.¹²²

As well as artillery preparation, another element of the attack was the employment of gas and smoke.¹²³ Interestingly, gas does not seem to have been the central and dominating component of the attack plans that it had been on the first day; perhaps reflecting a growing disillusionment with cylinder discharge. Whereas on 25 September the British had staked everything on the devastating effect of gas, artillery was regarded as being the key weapon on 13 October, with gas being a useful accessory. In the days preceding the attack 3,170 gas cylinders were brought up from the rear and dug into sandbagged entrenchments in the British front line.¹²⁴ There seems to be some confusion about the effectiveness of the chlorine gas discharge on 13 October as there had been about 25 September. Edmonds believed that it ‘did not provide even the limited assistance which it had given on the 25^th September; in fact it chiefly served to give the enemy warning that an infantry assault was imminent’.¹²⁵ As might have been expected, Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Foulkes (CO Special Brigade) disagreed. Noting the ‘perfect’ weather, with a south-westerly breeze of five miles per hour, Foulkes wrote that the ‘enemy’s rifle and machine-gun fire stopped almost at once when the gas reached them, and the infantry of the 46^th Division reached the redoubt at 2p.m. with very little loss’.¹²⁶ Although the attacks on 13 October were a disappointment, Foulkes attributed this to the ‘superiority of the German hand-grenade’, and a delay in the assault against Hulluch, which allowed time for the Germans to recover. Foulkes also noted the ‘new form of apparatus’, which prevented much leakage and spillage in the British trenches. This positive interpretation was subsequently echoed by Donald Richter, who wrote that the gas attack on 13 October was ‘a far greater technical success than those of September’.¹²⁷

Technical improvements may have smoothed out a number of the difficulties that had been encountered on 25 September, but the discharge was still a lamentable failure. According to Brigadier-General G.C. Kemp (GOC 138 Brigade):

The gas attack was more disconcerting to the attack than to the defence, for some of it blew back onto our trenches and a good deal settled down into the shell holes and remains of trenches in the open between the Hohenzollern and the Dump and Corons, while mighty little reached the objective where most of the enemy were. It gave the enemy warning ofjust when the attack was to be expected and drew down an artillery bombardment before our men could leave the trenches.¹²⁸

Further to the south the gas seems to have drifted encouragingly towards the German lines but did little harm to the defenders. The smoke also filled no-man’s-land, but by the time the British attacked, it had begun to disperse, leaving the attackers exposed to German fire. According to 35 Brigade’s war diary,‘The smoke cloud was commenced, the wind was rather strong from the SW and the cloud was not entirely satisfactory, it varied very much in intensity.’¹²⁹ Similarly, on the front of 37 Brigade the smoke ‘did not last long enough to cover the attack’,¹³⁰ with the war diary of 6/Buffs recording that by 2p.m. ‘all the smoke had cleared’.¹³¹ Perhaps the most unfortunate aspect of the gas attack was that it attracted enemy artillery fire. On the front of 1/5^th Leicestershire (138 Brigade), shellfire burst cylinders in three places, which filled the trenches with gas.¹³² With the infantry on the northern sector of the attack ‘packed like sardines’ into the trenches, the result was horribly predictable; with one survivor recalling that many men were ‘unable to reach the protective cloths in their pockets’.¹³³ There are also worrying references to the state of drunkenness among some battalions before they went ‘over the top’. According to one survivor, ‘we were given as much rum as we liked, [and] everybody was nearly drunk after that’.¹³⁴ As might have been expected, when the infantry finally clambered out of their trenches and advanced towards the German trenches, little success was achieved.

The main attack was conducted by 46^th Division. 138 Brigade attacked on the left, achieving some initial success, but at heavy cost. The opening attack, conducted by 1/4^th Leicestershire and 1/5^th Lincolnshire, managed to break into the Hohenzollern Redoubt ‘with comparatively little loss’, but as the infantry attempted to push on further, they came under accurate German machine gun fire from Mad Point and the mining buildings around Fosse 8.¹³⁵ The advance came to a standstill about 100 yards short of Fosse Trench, with bombing parties meeting heavy German resistance. If Fosse 8 was still to be secured it was essential that 138 Brigade receive support on its right from Brigadier-General E. Feetham’s 137 Brigade. Unfortunately, in what was perhaps the most miserable episode of the entire day, Feetham’s attack rapidly collapsed under a devastating weight of fire. The left-hand battalion (1/5^th North Staffordshire) went ‘over the top’ into a ‘hail of bullets’ and against ‘very deadly machine gun and rifle fire’ could not progress.¹³⁶ The attack on the right fared similarly. Before the leading companies of 1/5^th South Staffordshire could reach the front line ‘all the officers and most of the men had fallen’.¹³⁷ The attack launched from Big Willie by the rest of the battalion was also completely unsuccessful.¹³⁸

To the right of 46^th Division lay Major-General A.B. Scott’s 12^th (Eastern) Division, deployed on a front of two brigades between the Quarries and the Vermelles-Hulluch road. It is evident that the artillery bombardment and the gas and smoke discharge were no more successful on this sector than they had been on the front of 46^th Division. The attack on the Quarries was conducted by 35 Brigade. On the left, two companies of 7/Suffolk managed to break into the north-western face of the Quarries, and after heavy fighting were able to link up with elements of 7/Norfolk, which had attacked on the right.¹³⁹ Further to the right lay Brigadier-General C.A. Fowler’s 37 Brigade, which was assigned the task of capturing Gun Trench. The attack was led by 7/East Surrey. Although suffering badly from heavy enfilade fire from the left, the battalion was able to secure Gun Trench. Reinforcements were gradually sent up during the afternoon, with elements of 6/Queen’s helping to prevent a hostile counter-attack. The rest of the brigade was less successful with the infantry of 6/Buffs being mown down by German machine guns.¹⁴⁰

The disappointing results of the British offensive were to be repeated on the rest of the attacking frontage. The task of securing the Lens-La Bassée road between the Chalk Pit and Hulluch was entrusted to Brigadier-General A.J. Reddie’s 1 Brigade (1^st Division, IV Corps). Reddie was given the unenviable ‘short straw’ of conducting what was essentially a holding operation, which was undertaken with little hope of success.¹⁴¹ It was also unusual in that there was to be very little depth in the attack. Reddie’s entire brigade was to operate on a front of 1,400 yards: 1/Cameron Highlanders were deployed on the left, directly opposite Hulluch; with 10/Gloucestershire on their left; followed by 1/Black Watch; 8/Royal Berkshire and 1/14^th London (Scottish). The experience of 1/Cameron Highlanders was typical of what happened that afternoon. According to the war diary, ‘The Company attacking over the open suffered severe losses from machine gun and rifle fire from the northerly and north-easterly flanks and was unable to gain the German position’.¹⁴² 10/Gloucestershire made little headway against heavy shell and rifle fire; the attack of 1/Black Watch was devastated by two German machine guns firing from the flanks, which ‘did much execution’; 8/Royal Berkshire was halted within 75 yards of its own line; and the two attacking companies of 1/14^th London (Scottish) went to ground in no-man’s-land.¹⁴³ Robin Prior and Trevor Wilson have aptly summarised the attack of 1 Brigade as a‘complete failure’ and it is difficult to disagree with them.¹⁴⁴

The later stages of the Battle of Loos may not have seen fighting on the same scale and intensity as the first two days, but combat was still severe, with nine Victoria Crosses being won in actions south of the La Bassée canal during this period.¹⁴⁵ The operations were also far from cheap. British casualties had been continuous and heavy with 46^th Division being hit particularly hard. Suffering casualties of 180 officers and 3,583 other ranks, as Edmonds later wrote, ‘it was long before the division recovered from the effects’ of 13 October.¹⁴⁶ Although they were not sustained in a single engagement, the casualties of 12^th Division were almost as high, totalling 117 officers and 3,237 other ranks between 30 September and 21 October.¹⁴⁷ The Guards Division recorded a total of 2,041 casualties at Loos.¹⁴⁸ And again senior officer casualties continued to mount. Between 27 September and 15 October, at least twenty-five senior officers were killed, wounded, gassed or invalided home.¹⁴⁹

One of the most notable aspects of the later stages of the Battle of Loos was the deteriorating level of staff work and planning. The attack on 13 October was particularly bad in this respect, being riddled with errors, omissions and lack of detail. As 21^st and 24^th Divisions had already found to their cost, the lack of adequate maps of the battlefield proved disastrous. According to Captain G.J. Worthington (1/5^th North Staffordshire, 137 Brigade), adequate reconnaissance of the ground was ‘a difficult matter’ because the maps supplied to him were ‘in many respects incomplete[,] inaccurate and the trenches themselves had been considerably damaged in the recent fighting’.¹⁵⁰ Guides could offer little help. When the senior officers of 1/5^th Lincolnshire visited the trenches opposite the Hohenzollern Redoubt on 8 October,‘No guides appeared to be available and the occupants of the trenches, including officers, seemed to know very little about them. Most of them had no idea of the number of the trench they were occupying. Very little information was gleaned from this visit, except what could be seen through periscopes.’¹⁵¹ It is doubtful whether these problems could have been overcome in the short space of time available to plan for the renewed offensive, but certain aspects of the operation were simply careless. For example, according to the war diary of 7/Norfolk (35 Brigade), the smoke cloud that had been produced for its attack on 13 October had cleared from no-man’s-land by 2p.m. and the enemy could be seen manning the parapet, apparently because the smoke discharge had ended at 1.40p.m., instead of continuing (as arranged) for another twenty minutes.¹⁵² Grenades were another source of anxiety. As British troops desperately tried to hold their fragile gains in the Hohenzollern Redoubt and the Quarries, it was found with horror that ‘many of the bags and boxes of bombs sent up during the afternoon were found to contain bombs without detonators’.¹⁵³ Similarly, during 35 Brigade’s attack on the Quarries, when the supplies of Mills grenades ran out, recourse had to be made to the infamous ‘cricket-ball’ varieties, but because the men had not been issued with the correct striking equipment even these could not be used.¹⁵⁴

Problems were not confined to poor staff work lower down the chain of command and many of those senior officers in charge of the renewed offensive did not perform terribly well. Indeed the high casualties and lack of success on 13 October prompted one of the fiercest attacks on British High Command during the entire war, when Lieutenant-Colonel J.C. Wedgwood, a Staffordshire MP and notorious radical, compiled a report on the attack of 137 Brigade (against Big Willie) and sent it to the Prime Minister, Herbert Asquith.¹⁵⁵ Although nothing was done with Wedgwood’s report, his criticisms about the poor planning and over-optimism of the attack were valid and there were a number of problems with British High Command during these operations. At the highest level Sir John French was largely irrelevant. He had virtually abdicated responsibility to Haig before the battle and at no time did he show any real determination to get to grips with the situation, find out what Haig was planning and make sure his wishes were acceded to. Haig, on the other hand, continued to direct operations in a calm and confident manner, albeit realising that the chances of a real breakthrough had slipped through his fingers on the afternoon of 25 September. But once again Haig’s performance was marred by his persistent over-optimism and his seeming inability to keep his subordinate commanders in check. The command decisions of Richard Haking were again poor and he was guilty of making the same mistake twice. His insistence on ordering the heavy artillery to lift from the German front trenches before Zero Hour during the attacks on 27 September and again on 13 October, despite warnings from Rawlinson and Haig that this would cause more problems than it solved, does not reflect well on his capabilities.

Reviewing the events at Loos between 27 September and 13 October it will be seen that the performance of the BEF was mixed. While there were certain improvements in tactical ability, such as the growing supply of Mills bombs and the impressive repulse of the German counterattack on 8 October, the later stages of Loos revealed a number of persistent problems. Effective command and control on such a difficult battlefield, especially with German observers on Fosse 8 and Hill 70, was found to be virtually impossible. All British operations in this period were affected, in varying degrees, by the failure of orders to arrive, the lack of adequate supplies, and the difficulty of finding direction among the mass of trenches, particularly around the Hohenzollern Redoubt. Enemy shelling was persistent, often demoralising and devastating. British artillery support was weak and the RFC could do little in the poor weather. British attacks were undoubtedly pressed with courage and determination, but because there had been little time to make clearly understood and well-thought-out plans, and combined with poor artillery support, the gallantry of the infantry was to be in vain.