INTRODUCTION
1.1 HOURS FOR WHAT WE WILL
Many people, including in the contemporary United States, have little free time. They must spend long hours in paid work, household labor, personal care, and caregiving. They have little time to devote to any ends beyond meeting the necessities of life. This book argues that in the just society all citizens would have their fair shares of free time, time they could devote to the pursuit of their own projects and commitments.
As a matter of liberal egalitarian justice, all citizens are entitled to a fair share of free time—time not consumed by meeting the necessities of life, time that one can devote to one’s chosen ends. Free time is a resource that citizens generally require to pursue their conceptions of the good, whatever those may be. Without the resource of free time, citizens lack the means to exercise their formal liberties and opportunities. In order to ensure that citizens can exercise their freedoms, a central commitment of liberal egalitarian theories of justice, citizens must be guaranteed their fair shares of free time.
This argument is absent from contemporary political philosophy, but it can be found in the origins of liberal egalitarian ideas, among nineteenth-century labor reformers. Early American journeymen argued that they had a “just right” to the time necessary to exercise their political liberties. In order to exercise their rights as enfranchised citizens, they argued that they required free time to acquire information and study the interests of their country. Unrelenting work diminished the value of their liberties, as it rendered “the benefits of our liberal institutions to us inaccessible and useless.”1 Over the course of the nineteenth century, as labor’s call went from ten hours of work to eight hours with a day of rest, workers drew on this argument more broadly to claim time to exercise their full set of liberties, for education, family, association, and religion.2 As trade union leader William Sylvis argued, “It is true that churches are erected, school houses are built, mechanics’ institutes are founded and libraries ready to receive us … but alas! We lack the time to use them—time.”3 To enjoy their rights to “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness,” they must have the “means” to make use of them.4 The final extension of this line of argument was that workers were entitled to free time not only for the exercise of a set of specific and fundamental liberties, but to do anything they wished. Workers argued that they were entitled to “eight hours for work, eight hours for rest, and eight hours for what we will.”5
This book defends that idea: we have a just claim to “hours for what we will.” Citizens are entitled to time that is not consumed by meeting the necessities of life, so they can have time to devote to any other pursuits they might choose—whether familial, religious, associational, recreational, political, creative, productive, or of any other sort. They are entitled to time to find and follow their own projects and commitments. They are entitled to a fair share of free time.
Contemporary liberal egalitarian theories of justice have given little attention to the demand for more “hours for what we will.” They have instead implicitly assumed that how much leisure time citizens have is not an appropriate concern of a liberal theory of justice. They have understood leisure to be part, to varying extents, of some ideas of the good life, and not a part of others. Because it is not the proper role of a politically liberal state to promote some conceptions of the good life over others, it is presumptively impermissible for the state to act with the aim of providing or promoting leisure time.6
Instead, in accordance with the standard liberal egalitarian approach to distributive justice, liberal proceduralism, it is held that so long as just background conditions—that is, a just distribution of liberties, opportunities, and resources like income and wealth—obtain, citizens can choose their leisure patterns based on their own ideas of the good life, and whatever distribution of leisure results is presumptively just. Some citizens will want to work long hours and have little leisure, while others will want to work few hours and have more leisure. The resulting distribution of leisure will be unequal, true, but on this approach that in itself is not a cause for concern. On the contrary, for the state to aim at some particular distribution of leisure, absent some special justification, would be objectionable, for it would be impermissibly paternalistic, perfectionist, or otherwise partial to one conception of the good over another. Instead of attending to the distribution of leisure, the state should ensure that just background conditions under which citizens can fairly choose to pursue work or leisure, obtain.
The liberal proceduralist approach to distributive justice is to ensure that all citizens have fair access to specific goods, the particular components of one’s particular conception of the good, by ensuring a fair distribution of resources, the all-purpose means that are generally required to pursue any conception of the good. Leisure has been understood, on the basis of both its philosophical and economic treatments, as a specific good. Leisure is variously defined as time engaged in intrinsically valuable activities, or as time in play and recreation, or as time not engaged in paid work, and on each understanding, as a specific good.
This narrow understanding of leisure time is, however, incomplete. Though “leisure” does correspond to goods that are appropriately regarded as specific goods (contemplation, play, time not working), it also refers to an idea that is best understood as a resource. This is the idea that the slogan “hours for what we will” captures—it is the time one can spend at one’s discretion, pursuing one’s own ends. It is, in a word, free time. Citizens require such time—time not committed to meeting the necessities of life—to pursue their conceptions of the good, whatever those may be.
When one redescribes the specific good of leisure as the resource of free time, the liberal’s neglect of time loses its foundation. If free time is a resource, then its just distribution is no longer something that results from just background conditions. Rather, the just distribution of free time instead must be recognized as a component of just background conditions.
Specifically, I argue that justice requires that all citizens have a fair share of free time. Citizens have legitimate claims to free time on the basis of the effective freedoms principle, a foundational tenet of liberal egalitarian justice, which holds that citizens have legitimate claims to a fair share of the resources that are generally required to exercise their formal liberties and opportunities. In the same way that citizens generally require the resources of income and wealth to exercise their freedoms, so too do they generally require the resource of free time. To have their fair shares of free time, citizens must have time not committed to the necessities of life, time they can predictably use for their own ends, and time they can share with other citizens. Ensuring a just distribution of income and wealth is insufficient to guarantee such a just distribution of free time, and so our theories of justice and our public policies must treat free time as a distinct object of distributive concern to guarantee citizens “hours for what we will.”
1.3 OVERVIEW
The argument begins, in Chapter 2, with the analytical framework, that of liberal proceduralism, and its distinction between specific goods and resources. Surveying the neglect of leisure or free time in contemporary theories of justice, I argue that this neglect owes to the way that political philosophers in general, and liberal egalitarians in particular, have conceptualized leisure as a specific good. Generally, leisure has been understood as either time engaged in philosophical contemplation or recreational activities, or time not engaged in paid work. As a specific good, leisure is presumptively not an appropriate object of concern for a liberal theory of justice. This understanding of leisure time is, however, unjustifiably limited, for it neglects the way in which time is also a resource. (To distinguish these ideas, I refer to leisure when understood as a specific good and free time when understood as a resource.)
Chapter 3 constructs this conception of free time as a resource. To be a resource, and thus an appropriate concern of a liberal theory of justice, free time must, first, be a necessary input for the pursuit of a wide range of individual ends and, second, be measurable in a way that meets the constraints of a public and feasible theory of justice. I argue for a particular conception that meets these criteria and is properly a resource: free time, understood as time not committed to meeting one’s own, or one’s dependents’, basic needs, whether with necessary paid work, household labor, or personal care. Citizens generally require free time, so understood, to pursue their conceptions of the good, whatever they may be.
In Chapter 4, the book’s normative core, I argue that all citizens are entitled to a fair share of free time on the basis of the effective freedoms principle. Without the means to make use of them, citizens’ freedoms are of little value. As I show, citizens generally require free time to exercise their formal freedoms, whether to participate in politics, practice their religions, or do almost anything they are legally free to do. Thus, on the basis of the effective freedoms principle, citizens have legitimate claims to free time.
Furthermore, I argue that, in order to ensure that citizens have their fair shares of free time, our theories of justice and public policies must treat time as a distinct object of distributive concern. Contrary to a widely held assumption, the time-money substitutability claim, realizing a just distribution of income and wealth is not sufficient to ensure a just distribution of free time. Neither of the assumptions on which this claim depends, the perfect divisibility of labor demand and the perfect substitutability of money and basic needs satisfaction, obtains, as a consequence of both empirical and ethical limitations of economic markets. As such, how much free time citizens have must be separately assessed, and a just distribution of free time must be realized through specifically targeted interventions.
Chapters 5 and 6 extend the arguments of the preceding chapters to two areas, freedom of association and gender and caregiving. Chapter 5 shows that, on the basis of the effective freedoms principle, citizens are also entitled to periods of shared free time because such time is generally required to have effective freedom of association. The central exercises of freedom of association, whether civic, religious, or intimate, depend on sharing time together. As such, potential associates face a temporal coordination problem. I consider three possible solutions—a universal basic income, mandated work hours flexibility, and a common period of free time—and I argue that the third may be the most effective and feasible for circumstances proximate to our own. Drawing on the arguments of the justices of the U.S. Supreme Court in McGowan v. Maryland (1961), I argue that Sunday closing laws, in a modified form consistent with economic and religious freedom, are a means of realizing effective freedom of association.
Chapter 6 turns to gender and caregiving, and shows how recognizing citizens’ claims to free time contributes to a liberal egalitarian theory of gender justice. I argue that gender justice requires that men and women not only have free choices from among equal options, but also choose from among just background conditions. One of those conditions is that all citizens must have their fair shares of free time, with caregiving for children and other dependents treated as a necessary activity like necessary paid work. I show how this entails that citizens must be able to choose to engage in paid work and caregiving and still have free time, as realized through a set of workplace accommodations for parents and other caregivers. Gender justice requires, apart from the conditions for free choice and equal options, that men and women choose their household responsibilities from among these just background conditions.
The final chapter addresses how to provide free time. For citizens to possess their fair shares of free time, they must both have their fair amount of free time, and have it under fair conditions to make effective use of it, with access to generally usable periods of free time on a predictable schedule. Addressing the question of how to provide free time demonstrates how recognizing citizens’ claims to free time provides grounds, first, to support both a range of contested welfare and employment policies and distinctive labor regulations and, second, to challenge the presumption in favor of unceasing economic growth as a social goal.
Several features of the argument warrant emphasis at the outset. First, the core argument—that citizens are entitled to a fair share of free time—applies to any theory that is committed to ensuring that citizens possess the means to exercise their freedoms. All liberal egalitarian theories share this commitment, and the argument is developed within this approach. Liberal egalitarianism, however, encompasses a broad family of views, which combine the dual values of liberty and equality in a variety of ways. So that the core argument applies broadly to any theory that holds this commitment, it is constructed to not depend on taking a particular position on a range of contested issues within this family of views. (These points of divergence notably include the scope and site of justice, the significance of individual responsibility, and the appropriate distributive principle and metric.) After establishing the core argument, in extending the argument in later chapters, I do take positions on some of these issues, but one who takes different positions could develop the argument in ways other than I do here. Indeed, once recognized as an all-purpose resource, free time ought to be incorporated in various ways across different theories of justice.
Second, to the extent that liberals have attended to the distribution of leisure, they have generally done so on the grounds of some special justification. Work-hours regulations, for instance, are variously defended on the grounds that they are necessary to protect workers from coercion and exploitation, to prevent unhealthy and unsafe working conditions, to reduce unemployment, and to address gender inequality, among others.7 While these may be sound arguments, they are of limited force and scope. My aim is to show that citizens’ claims to free time do not depend on such exceptional or contingent justifications. Instead, without relying on these special justifications, citizens are entitled to free time on the grounds of a foundational principle of liberal egalitarian justice.
Third, the argument assumes and is consistent with the commitments to anti-paternalism, non-perfectionism, and neutrality underlying the liberal proceduralist approach. It holds that citizens are entitled to free time to devote to their own pursuits, whatever those may be. Within the bounds of the law, one’s free time is one’s to use as one sees fit. Citizens’ claims to free time are not conditional on how they spend it.
For some, this may raise the worry that citizens will squander their free time on unproductive or unfulfilling activities—consistent with headlines like “Americans Are Spending More Time Watching TV and Sleeping”—and the objection that citizens should be constrained or induced to make meaningful use of their free time.8 In response to this objection, first to the empirical claim, it cannot be assumed that people would use their free time as they presently do if all had their fair share under just conditions. The fact that someone spends her little free time watching television when she is exhausted by long hours of work or when her friends and family are all working does not give us reliable information about how she would use her free time under other conditions. Moreover, it is possible for the argument to be paired, consistent with liberal neutrality, with state support for free time infrastructure—parks, recreation facilities, the arts—as underprovided public goods. More generally, I argue for citizens’ entitlement to free time within demanding anti-paternalist and non-perfectionist constraints in part to establish that even if one holds to these demanding liberal constraints, citizens still have claims to free time. In extending the argument, one could modify it with paternalist or perfectionist conditions to constrain or encourage people to use their free time in certain ways. Nonetheless, my position remains that citizens are entitled to free time to devote to their own ends, whatever those may be.
Finally, following the standard application of the effective freedoms principle, I argue that citizens have claims to free time as members of separate political societies (and I focus on the United States). There is no reason the argument could not be extended to establish an international or universal claim to free time, however, if consistent with one’s position on human rights or the boundaries of distributive justice.
1.4 FREE TIME IN THE CONTEMPORARY UNITED STATES
Before proceeding to the argument, it may be useful to briefly describe some relevant features of the distribution of free time in the contemporary United States. In contrast to widely cited figures on unemployment, material poverty, and income and wealth inequality, popular awareness of the extent to which many people must devote long hours to necessary tasks and have little free time is often limited to personal experience. Though existing empirical data on work hours and time use do not perfectly track the relevant sense of free time, understood as time not committed to necessary paid work, household labor, or personal care, they nonetheless still provide an illuminating indication of how many people have little free time.9
First, many Americans spend long hours in paid work. According to recent data, almost one-third of employed Americans work more than forty-five hours per week and about one-eighth more than fifty-five hours per week. While some portion of these workers want to work such hours, they are in the minority. Over 80 percent of those working more than fifty hours per week would prefer to work shorter hours, with those working fifty to sixty hours per week preferring on average to work thirteen hours less and those working more than sixty hours preferring to work twenty-five hours less.10
The preference to spend less time working is not limited to those with long hours. Among all employed Americans, 60 percent would prefer shorter work hours. These workers, however, face financial and institutional barriers to acting on their stated preferences, as I discuss in Chapter 4. Of those who would prefer to work less, over half report that they do not because they cannot afford to, and another substantial portion report that they do not because their employer would not allow them to reduce their hours. Apart from the problems of unemployment and underemployment, many workers are overemployed: they would prefer to work shorter hours even for a corresponding reduction in pay.11
Of course being employed itself carries many important benefits, and the problems of unemployment and underemployment are rightly central concerns. But among those who are employed, long work hours and overemployment have been linked to a range of possible negative impacts on well-being. Specifically, long hours of work are associated with a broad set of adverse physical and mental health outcomes, including cardiovascular and musculoskeletal disorders, diabetes, obesity, alcohol abuse, depression, fatigue, and reduced cognitive and executive function.12 Furthermore, being overemployed has a negative association with health and life satisfaction, with overemployed workers reporting worse health than those working the same number of hours.13
Long work hours occur across the occupational spectrum. The more educated and those who work in professional, technical, and managerial occupations are disproportionately represented among long-hours workers.14 Yet, significant portions of the less educated also work long hours. One-eighth of employed men with less than a high school degree work more than fifty hours and one-fifth of employed men with only a high school degree work more than fifty hours per week. Moreover, while in relative terms white-collar workers are more likely to work long hours, in absolute terms white-collar workers still constitute less than half of those working long hours. Over half of those working more than fifty hours per week are not professionals or managers and over half of those working more than fifty hours per week have less than a college degree.15 Furthermore, only 50 percent of those in the lowest wage quartile receive any paid vacation days or holidays, while 90 percent of those in the highest wage quartile do, with an average gap of ten vacation days between low-wage and high-wage workers.16
Apart from long work hours, many work outside the “standard” weekday daytime work schedule. Over one-third of employed Americans work on weekends, with 8 percent regularly working seven days a week. On a typical day, over one-quarter of American employees perform some work between ten in the evening and six in the morning. Of employees, 8 percent regularly work evenings, 4 percent regularly work night shifts, and 8 percent have variable or rotating work hours. Around one-quarter of employees face mandatory overtime work.17 Moreover, though those with more education and higher earnings disproportionately work long hours, they are more likely to work during standard hours. It is those with less education and lower earnings who disproportionately perform evening and night work, with lower-wage workers more likely to work evenings and nights even among managerial and clerical workers alone.18
Of course, people also spend many hours on unpaid household and caregiving labor, maintaining their homes and caring for children, parents, relatives, and other members of their communities. The American Time Use Survey, which measures the amount of time people spend engaged in various activities, shows that Americans spend on average around twenty hours per week on household production (cooking, cleaning, grocery shopping, vehicle and home maintenance, etc.).19 In addition, over one-fifth of American households have children under age twelve and one-eighth have children under age six, and those who live with children under age six spend on average two hours per day providing primary child care and an additional five hours per day providing supervisory child care.20 Furthermore, one-sixth of adults, or forty million people, provide unpaid elder care, and almost half of these caregivers are also employed full-time.21
While the total workloads of men and women—combining paid work, unpaid household labor, and family care, and averaging across employment, marital, and parental categories—are similar, they still significantly vary by gender.22 Mothers, on average, do about half as much paid work as fathers do, while fathers do about half as much unpaid household labor and family care as mothers do.23 Moreover, the overall parity in the total workloads obscures significant inequalities across comparable groups of men and women. Full-time employed married mothers of young children, for instance, do more total work than comparable fathers. Though these mothers do somewhat less paid work than full-time employed married fathers of young children, they do an offsettingly greater amount of unpaid household labor and child care, to the effect that they do an additional five hours of work per week. While this does not constitute a full “second shift,” it remains a considerable disparity.24
When time-use studies incorporate respondents’ affective experiences of various activities, they find that paid work, housework, and caring for children and adults are among the activities people find least enjoyable and interesting. By contrast, the activities people most enjoy include socializing, relaxing, playing sports and exercising, and praying.25 Not surprisingly, when asked if they could change the way they spend their time, over two-thirds of Americans report that they would prefer to spend more time in leisure activities, with about two-thirds preferring more time with friends, and about four-fifths preferring more time with family.26
Moreover, these disparities in how much free time people have matter for political participation: those who have more free time are more likely to vote and to engage in more time-consuming political acts (contacting government officials, working on a campaign, serving on local governing boards, and attending board meetings), and among those most active in politics, more free time is associated with more political participation.27
Though I focus on the United States, these phenomena are not uniquely American. American employees are more likely to work long hours than workers in parts of Western Europe (including France, Germany, and the Netherlands), but the rates of long work hours are similar in other Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development countries (including the United Kingdom, Switzerland, Israel, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Korea, and Mexico). Globally, it is estimated that 22 percent of workers around the world work more than forty-eight hours per week.28 Moreover, comparing the United States only to Western Europe, the rates of weekend and night work are, though lower, still high, the disparities in total workloads between comparable men and women the same, and the proportions of those who report a preference for more time in leisure activities and with family and friends similar.29
Before I turn from the empirical to the normative, one final point to make is that, though this book is a work of political theory, the extent to which many people today have little free time is its motivation, and the arguments to follow aim to provide normative guidance and principled grounds to address this lack of free time in policy and practice.
1 “Journeymen Carpenters’ Ten-Hour Demand,” Democratic Press, June 14, 1827, and “Preamble of the Mechanics’ Union of Trade Associations,” Mechanics’ Free Press, April 19, 1828, quoted in David R. Roediger and Philip S. Foner, Our Own Time: A History of American Labor and the Working Day (London: Verso, 1989), 14, 15.
2 See Alex Gourevitch, From Slavery to the Cooperative Commonwealth: Labor and Republican Liberty in the Nineteenth Century (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 126–32, 144–45.
3 William Sylvis, “Address Delivered at Boston, January 1867,” in The Life, Speeches, Labors and Essays of William H. Sylvis, ed. James C. Sylvis (1872; repr., New York: Augustus M. Kelley, 1968), 199, emphasis original, quoted in Roediger and Foner, Our Own Time, 99.
4 “The Working Men’s Declaration of Independence,” December 1829, in We, the Other People, ed. Philip S. Foner (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1976), 49, emphasis original. The claim that citizens are entitled to the means to exercise their freedoms is regularly repeated in labor’s alternative declarations.
5 Roy Rosenzweig, Eight Hours for What We Will: Workers and Leisure in an Industrial City, 1870–1920 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983). See also Benjamin Kline Hunnicutt, Free Time: The Forgotten American Dream (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2013), 1–94.
6 Political theorists writing in other traditions have devoted greater attention to leisure time. For recent approaches from the Marxist and feminist traditions, see Nichole Marie Shippen, Decolonizing Time: Work, Leisure, and Freedom (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014) and Kathi Weeks, The Problem with Work: Feminism, Marxism, Antiwork Politics, and Postwork Imaginaries (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2011). These issues have also received attention in the popular press, including the recent contribution of Brigid Schulte, Overwhelmed: How to Work, Love, and Play When No One Has the Time (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2014). The current discussion and awareness is heavily indebted to Juliet B. Schor’s The Overworked American: The Unexpected Decline of Leisure (New York: Basic Books, 1992).
7 See, for instance, Jon C. Messenger, “Towards Decent Working Time,” in Decent Working Time: New Trends, New Issues, ed. Jean-Yves Boulin, Michel Lallement, Jon C. Messenger, and François Michon (Geneva: International Labour Office, 2006), 419–41 and Allard E. Dembe, “Ethical Issues Relating to the Health Effects of Long Working Hours,” Journal of Business Ethics 84 (2009): 195–208.
8 Justin Lahart and Emmeline Zhao, “What Would You Do With an Extra Hour? Americans Are Spending More Time Watching TV and Sleeping as Unemployment Rises, Survey Finds,” Wall Street Journal, eastern ed., June 23, 2010.
9 The existing time-use data do not perfectly correspond to the distinction between free time and necessary time, as I discuss in Chapter 3, because they generally measure how much time one spends overall in a particular activity, without specifying what portion of time engaged in an activity is necessary to meet one’s own, or one’s dependents’, basic needs.
10 Daniel S. Hamermesh and Elena Stancanelli, “Long Workweeks and Strange Hours,” ILR Review 68 (2015): 1009; Jerry A. Jacobs and Kathleen Gerson, The Time Divide: Work, Family, and Gender Inequality (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004), 64–67. As with all such survey data measuring stated preferences, these data, and the other survey results cited in this section, have limitations, but are still highly informative, especially given the institutional and methodological barriers to measuring revealed preferences on these subjects (for instance, on the inability of workers to actually select their preferred work hours, see 4.4).
11 Jacobs and Gerson, Time Divide, 64, 74–75; Lonnie Golden and Tesfayi Gebreselassie, “Overemployment Mismatches: The Preference for Fewer Hours of Work,” Monthly Labor Review 130 (2007): 18–37.
12 Sibyl Kleiner and Eliza K. Pavalko, “Clocking In: The Organization of Work Time and Health in the United States,” Social Forces 88 (2010): 1463–86; Claire C. Caruso, “Possible Broad Impacts of Long Work Hours,” Industrial Health 44 (2006): 531–36; Kate Sparks, Cary Cooper, Yitzhak Fried, and Arie Shirom, “The Effects of Hours of Work on Health: A Meta-analytic Review,” Journal of Occupational and Organizational Psychology 70 (1997): 391–408. As with all such associational claims based on observational data, the degree to which causation can reasonably be inferred varies across studies.
13 Cem Baslevent and Hasan Kirmanoglu, “The Impact of Deviations from Desired Hours of Work on the Life Satisfaction of Employees,” Social Indicators Research 118 (2014): 33–43; David Bell, Steffen Otterbach, and Alfonso Sousa-Poza, “Work Hours Constraints and Health,” Annals of Economics and Statistics 105/106 (2012): 35–54.
14 It is worth revisiting Thorstein Veblen’s famous depiction of the leisure class, in light of present circumstances. Thorstein Veblen, The Theory of the Leisure Class (1899; repr., New York: Penguin, 1979); see Jonathan Gershuny, “Veblen in Reverse: Evidence from the Multinational Time-Use Archive,” Social Indicators Research 93 (2009): 37–45.
15 Jacobs and Gerson, Time Divide, 34–36.
16 Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Employee Benefits in the United States—March 2015” (news release, July 24, 2015), 15; Rebecca Ray, Milla Sanes, and John Schmitt, “No-Vacation Nation Revisited” (Center for Economic and Policy Research, 2013), 1.
17 Hamermesh and Stancanelli, “Long Workweeks and Strange Hours,” 1009–10; Harriet B. Presser, Working in a 24/7 Economy: Challenges for American Families (New York: Russell Sage, 2003), 15–17; Lonnie Golden and Barbara Wiens-Tuers, “Mandatory Overtime Work in the United States: Who, Where, What?,” Labor Studies Journal 30 (2005): 9.
18 Daniel S. Hamermesh, “Changing Inequality in Work Injuries and Work Timing,” Monthly Labor Review 122 (1999): 23–27.
19 J. Steven Landefeld, Barbara M. Fraumeni, and Cindy M. Vojtech, “Accounting for Household Production: A Prototype Satellite Account Using the American Time Use Survey,” Review of Income and Wealth 55 (2009): 209.
20 Jonathan Vespa, Jamie M. Lewis, and Rose M. Kreider, “America’s Families and Living Arrangements: 2012” (Current Population Reports, P20-570; Washington, DC: U.S. Census Bureau, 2013), 4; Bureau of Labor Statistics, “American Time Use Survey—2014 Results” (news release, June 24, 2015).
21 Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Unpaid Eldercare in the United States” (news release, September 23, 2015).
22 Kimberly Fisher, Muriel Egerton, Jonathan I. Gershuny, and John P. Robinson, “Gender Convergence in the American Heritage Time Use Study (AHTUS),” Social Indicators Research 82 (2007): 1–33. See also Marybeth J. Mattingly and Suzanne M. Bianchi, “Gender Differences in the Quantity and Quality of Free Time: The U.S. Experience,” Social Forces 81 (2003): 999–1030 and Mark Aguiar and Erik Hurst, “Measuring Trends in Leisure: The Allocation of Time over Five Decades,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 122 (2007): 969–1006.
23 Suzanne M. Bianchi, “Family Change and Time Allocation in American Families,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 638 (2011): 27, 29.
24 Melissa A. Milkie, Sara B. Raley, and Suzanne M. Bianchi, “Taking on the Second Shift: Time Allocations and Time Pressures of U.S. Parents with Preschoolers,” Social Forces 88 (2009): 499. Cf. Arlie Russell Hochschild, The Second Shift (New York: Avon Books, 1989).
25 Alan B. Krueger, Daniel Kahneman, David Schkade, Norbert Schwarz, and Arthur A. Stone, “National Time Accounting: The Currency of Life,” in Measuring the Subjective Well-Being of Nations: National Accounts of Time Use and Well-Being, ed. Alan B. Krueger (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009), 42–47; Daniel Kahneman and Alan B. Krueger, “Developments in the Measurement of Subjective Well-Being,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 20 (2006): 13.
26 Tom W. Smith, “A Cross-National Comparison on Attitudes towards Work by Age and Labor Force Status” (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, December 2000), 17–18.
27 Henry E. Brady, Sidney Verba, and Kay Lehman Schlozman, “Beyond SES: A Resource Model of Political Participation,” American Political Science Review 89 (1995): 283–84.
28 Hamermesh and Stancanelli, “Long Workweeks and Strange Hours,” 1009; Sangheon Lee, Deirdre McCann, and Jon C. Messenger, Working Time around the World: Trends in Working Hours, Laws, and Policies in a Global Comparative Perspective (New York: Routledge, 2007), 46–51, 53. For an account of how work hours in the United States and Western Europe were similar up until 1970, and why they have diverged since, see Alberto Alesina, Edward Glaeser, and Bruce Sacerdote, “Work and Leisure in the United States and Europe: Why So Different?,” in NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2005, ed. Mark Gertler and Kenneth Rogoff (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006), 1–64. I address how the argument applies to societies at varying levels of development in 7.2.
29 Hamermesh and Stancanelli, “Long Workweeks and Strange Hours,” 1009; Jose Ignacio Gimenez-Nadal and Almudena Sevilla-Sanz, “The Time-Crunch Paradox,” Social Indicators Research 102 (2011): 189; Smith, “Cross-National Comparison on Attitudes towards Work,” 17–18.