The invasion threat facing Taiwan is something which has many sides to it and can be little understood without concentrated study. It is a complex problem. The immense numbers of variables involved in the equation defy quick and easy comprehension. Making matters worse, some of the variables, like weather and people, for example, are themselves ever changing. Other variables are less prone to change. The location of Taiwan’s capital city, Taipei, and the surrounding mountains and coastline are unmoving. Major pieces of infrastructure that are in place today on both sides of the Taiwan Strait (like ports, airfields, highways, rail lines, tunnels, and bridges) will all be in the exact same place tomorrow. But the capabilities and compositions of forces and machines positioned in or on or under them, or moving over or through them, will change over time. War would take its destructive toll on everything as well, keeping the situation fluid and chaotic.
There are simply too many shifting pieces in the overall picture for accurate prediction to occur. It therefore makes sense to talk about the unknown future in abstract terms and to push forward various possibilities about what the situation might look like, if it was to occur. When dealing with abstractions there often exists a basic human need to fix concrete points on the map and on the clock, even if they are just assumed and imagined. Scenarios can help us think through problems. They take piles of data and turn them into a storyline, much in the way a digital camera fuses pixels of light into a snapshot.
No single image, whatever its brilliance, can illuminate the entire string of events and capture every angle. So too with scenarios. Our minds rarely allow us to see far into the vast expanse of the unknown future, filled as it is with limitless possibilities. We are constrained by our programmed patterns of thought and limited imaginations. For this very reason, scenarios are great to have when facing the future. They feed the mind pictures of scenes that might occur, but also might not, depending on the contextual peculiarities at play and the actions and counteractions taken. Some scenarios are, or may seem, more “realistic” than others, but that is not their purpose. The most important thing they do is allow the mind’s eye to see potential problems before they occur. Having seen problems, one can then prepare solutions, or plans, as a hedge against them.
The studies conducted by the PLA suggest to us the questions that would be the most important to explore. Once identified, they will be the basic building blocks for our scenarios. Chinese war planners will certainly take certain essentials into account and use them to construct the answers to their problems. They will just as certainly not share their final designs and conclusions. Rather, they will make every attempt to obscure their intentions behind an impenetrable wall of deception. Internal PLA documents and other writings which may be indicative of doctrine are nonetheless revealing. They provide a good foundation for understanding how the armed wing of the Communist Party might see various options. These should not be confused for the official invasion plan―available materials do not give away vital details―but they are helpful in deciding what to guess at.
To further get a sense of the possibilities open to the PLA’s operational planning community, it is essential for us to put ourselves in the other guys’ shoes (or boots) and envision different scenarios. We will explore five notional scenarios as they might imagine them. Our five scenarios will, for the most part, stick closely to the fixed assumptions seen in Chinese military writings. These assumptions have been described elsewhere in this book, but have not been melded together in any form. Some of them may seem strange and foreign, but it is important they be recognized.
We are interested in the question of invasion. However unlikely it may seem at the current time, the invasion of Taiwan must be allowed for, thought about, and studied. What follows are five scenarios which walk through variations of it. They should not be considered predictive or realistic. This is merely a thought exercise.
The PRC economy is in deep trouble and the desperate central leadership sees an opportunity to distract public outrage, replacing it with nationalistic fervor. The decision is made to take advantage of Taiwan’s presidential election season to launch an invasion and “liberate” the wayward province. None of Taiwan’s three presidential candidates is offensive to the rest of the world, or to the Taiwanese electorate, so Beijing plans to employ misinformation to create diplomatic discord, driving a wedge between Taiwan and America, while weakening social unity in Taiwan. Two of the stronger candidates are labeled as “pro-independence” radicals, and pitted against the third, who is seen as more “pro-China”.
The PLA’s campaign plan calls for invading Taiwan during the spring. Z-Day is set for the first week of April, just after the presidential elections, but before the May 20th inauguration day. Strategic psychological warfare operations are organized and undertaken to ensure that the post-election transition period is racked with social discord and scandal. Pre-invasion air strikes are to start on Z-8. Naval actions are to start on Z-6. In late February, the PLA begins forming up three invasion forces.
The Northern Force assembles around Wenzhou, some 210 miles north of Taiwan. The Northern Force is comprised of major elements of the PLA’s 1st Group Army and the 12th Group Army, including an air assault (helicopter) brigade, and two airborne (parachute) divisions from the 15th Airborne Corps. On Z-Day the objective of this force will be to capture and build up the main landing zone at Taoyuan.
The Central Force assembles around Xiamen, 220 miles west of Taipei. It is comprised of the 31st Group Army, including its amphibious armored brigade, and several army aviation (helicopter) regiments, and one Marine brigade. Other division and brigade-sized units from across China, and major portions of the 54th and 20th Group Armies, also move toward the area. The objective of the Central Force is to storm the Kinmen Islands on Z-6, and then to capture a secondary landing zone at Hsinchu on Z-Day. Central Force will also provide second echelon forces after Z-Day to reinforce forces ashore.
The Southern Force assembles around Shantou, 325 miles southwest of Taipei, but only 180 miles from the Penghu Islands and 225 miles from Tainan. It is comprised of major elements of the PLA’s 42nd and 41st Group Armies, and one marine brigade. The objective of Southern Force is to serve as both a decoy and a reserve force. On Z-3, two large ship groups from the Shantou area will make threatening maneuvers toward the Penghu Islands and the beaches south of Tainan. Many old ships are expected to be sunk along the way, but they will be packed full of uniformed prisoners with mock military equipment. Fake radio chatter, oil slicks, and debris will mimic the demise of thousands of troops and marines. No actual forces will be landed anywhere. Real Chinese army and marine units will be held in reserve ashore, ready to board ships to reinforce the beachheads at Taoyuan or Hsinchu, as needed.
The invasion plan assumes that the United States will deploy three aircraft carrier groups to the Philippine Sea, augment Marine Corps and Air Force units on Okinawa, and station bomber wings in Guam, Japan, and Alaska. These will not all arrive at once. It is assumed by PLA planners that the buildup will not be complete by Z-Day, and direct U.S. intervention will not be ordered by the American President until Z+15. By that time, they expect that Taipei will have already fallen. The PLA allocates various space warfare, cyber warfare, rocket force, air defense, submarine, and bomber units to the command tasked with handling contingencies that could arise if the United States intervenes earlier or if the assault on Taipei is delayed.
A nuclear power plant in central China suffers catastrophic failure during an earthquake, releasing lethal doses of radiation that poisons hundreds of thousands of people and overwhelms medical response teams. This tragic event triggers a sudden outburst of party infighting and a failed coup attempt in Beijing, the underlying causes of which are unclear to the outside. The humiliated and weakened PRC leadership decides to use a war with Taiwan to unite the military and the nation against an external enemy.
The PLA’s plan is to employ a hammer and anvil approach. Forces are to land at Taoyuan, Tamsui, and Yilan to smash Taipei between three advancing fronts. Two major amphibious groups are to assemble: one at the harbors around Fuzhou and Pingtan Island, the other at Ningbo, far to the north. Decoy army groups are to be stationed at Xiamen, Quanzhou, and Dongshan to the south. Covert operations will be launched to convince Taiwanese intelligence that the outer islands of Kinmen and Matsu will be attacked, but nothing more.
The plan calls for building forces up slowly, coiling them up like a tight spring. When fully ready, they are to strike with lightning speed and maximum surprise to achieve their military objectives. Late September is chosen for launching the operation, allowing PLA units ample time to sharpen their skills over the spring and summer. A series of training drills and war games is organized to practice the invasion. Hainan Island is used as the main amphibious training ground. Propaganda reports on the war games show marine units capturing two small islands off of the big island of Hainan, furthering the fiction that Taiwan’s outer islands are the PLA’s real targets.
Acts of sabotage are staged on Kinmen and Matsu. In August, both island groups begin experiencing anomalies in their power grids that result in periodic blackouts. An arsonist on one island burns down several old warehouses. Gangsters attack a jail on another island, killing several officers and releasing all the prisoners back onto the streets. A third outer island is cut off when an approaching oil tanker loses control and crashes into the port, disabling the only pier and polluting the surrounding waters.
The plan will be set in motion on Z-7, when Chinese forces are to launch a concentrated artillery barrage against Taiwan’s outer islands, making it look like they are being softened up for invasion. Simultaneous cyber attacks and drone strikes in the Taiwan Strait are to be used to reduce Taiwanese maritime domain awareness. On Z-2, missile and air strikes are to begin against Taiwan’s air defense bases and command bunkers. The next day, hunter killer groups of submarines are to fire swarms of torpedoes into two Taiwanese naval task forces they are stalking, one thirty miles off of Hualien, the other well south of the Penghu Islands. The mission is to sink or scatter as many ships as possible. Naval bomber groups armed with supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles, and escorted by hundreds of fighter jets, are to mop up whatever remains.
Ship landing groups, escorted by dozens of large surface ships, are to approach anchorage sites to the northwest and the east of Taipei the night before Z-Day. To maximize surprise, mine sweeping and obstacle clearing operations will only start a few hours before landing craft are launched. It is recognized, and accepted as unavoidable, that some coastal water zones will still be heavily infested with lethal traps. Heavy bombing runs are to be made against Taiwan’s army formations before troops begin hitting the beaches at dawn. Hours before, specially trained commandos will attempt to infiltrate into Taiwan and seize both ends of the Xiangshan Tunnel and the highway system that links the Yilan landing zone to Taipei.
Casualties are expected to be very high for the PLA during the first several days, but it is hoped that if two of the three landing zones surrounding Taipei can be seized and built up, ground troops can execute a “hammer and anvil” attack, slamming into the capital before American forces can decisively intervene. Chinese planners assume, based on recent intelligence reports, that they will have only five to eight days of relatively unimpeded access to the Taiwan Strait. After that it is believed that American stealth fighter-bombers will sortie and flatten their high value logistics bases, and American submarines, laying in wait, will emerge from their hiding places to begin sinking the Chinese fleet. A preemptive strike on U.S. bases in Okinawa and Guam is planned for Z+4 to reduce the ferocity of the expected attacks.
Training areas for invasion