, 
, 
); also fr. 82 DK, fr. 145 DK. Further examples in Sophocles, Euripides, Thucydides, and Plato are mentioned in O’Brien, The Socratic Paradoxes, p. 114.25 See a number of fragments attributed to Democritus, including fr. 55 DK apud Stobaeus 2.15.36 (2.191.9 WH): ‘One should emulate the deeds and actions of virtue, not the words’ ( , , ); also fr. 82 DK, fr. 145 DK. Further examples in Sophocles, Euripides, Thucydides, and Plato are mentioned in O’Brien, The Socratic Paradoxes, p. 114.
26 See e.g. Plato Laches 188c-d & 193d-e, with discussion in O’Brien, The Socratic Paradoxes, pp. 114-17. In Xenophon, Socrates affirms actions over words as the true indicators of an individual’s beliefs (e.g. Xenophon Mem. 4.4.10, Apol. 3); in the Laches the interlocutor Laches proposes what he calls a ‘Dorian harmony’ between actions and words. Socrates responds by saying that although both of them might be judged courageous by their actions, their inability to give a definition or account (
) of courage means that they would be judged failures according to this criterion (193d-e). Note also Socrates apud Stobaeus 2.15.37 (2.191.11-12 WH = SSR I C 187).
27 Arius Didymus 2.7.11k (2.104.17-22 WH = SVF 3.682; trans. Pomeroy).
28 See Epictetus Diss. 2.19.20-25; note also 3.2.10-12. A similar idea is expressed in Bion fr. 49 Kindstrand apud Diogenes Laertius 4.51.