), and not action (
)’.11 See e.g. Aristotle Metaph. 987b1-6 (= SSR I B 24), Eth. Nic. 1144b28-30 (= SSR I B 30).
12 See e.g. Plato Apol. 21c-22e, with Gulley, The Philosophy of Socrates, pp. 12-13.
13 Plato Gorg. 500c (trans. Woodhead, in Hamilton & Cairns, modified).
14 See Aristotle Metaph. 1.1, esp. 981a30-981b6 & 982a1-3. Note also 993b19-21: ‘philosophy should be called knowledge of the truth, for the end of theoretical knowledge is truth (), and not action ()’.
15 See e.g. the anecdote concerning Thales’ business success based upon a prediction of a forthcoming harvest, in Pol. 1259a5-18. This, Aristotle suggests, shows that philosophers can be wealthy if they choose. But the sort of knowledge displayed in the anecdote would today be called scientific.
16 Of course, Aristotle does address ‘practical’ issues in his ethical and political works, and his division of knowledge into the practical (
), productive (
), and theoretical (
) at Metaph. 1025b24-28 does not appear to prioritize one form of knowledge over any other. However, under the heading of ‘theoretical knowledge’ falls first philosophy (
) or theology (
), which is accorded a priority over all other branches of enquiry because it deals with that which is unmoving and eternal. Knowledge of this sort forms the paradigm for Aristotle’s conception of philosophy. Indeed, he says further on that the theoretical sciences are superior to the other sciences, and that ‘first philosophy’ is superior to the other theoretical sciences (Metaph. 1026a22-23). See Guthrie, History, vol. 6, pp. 130-34.