71 See Epictetus Diss. 1.28.2-3, with Burnyeat, ‘Can the Sceptic Live his Scepticism?’, p. 44. For other reports of the Stoic attitude towards suspension of judgement see Sextus Empiricus Adv. Math. 7.155 (= LS 41 C), Cicero Acad. 2.57 (= LS 40 I). For further discussion of the relationship between Pyrrhonian and Stoic suspension of judgement see Allen, ‘The Skepticism of Sextus Empiricus’, pp. 2596-97.

⁷² See Sextus Empiricus Adv. Math. 7.151 (= SVF 2.90 = LS 41 C), also Cicero Acad. 1.42 (= SVF 1.60 = LS 41 B), with further discussion in Arthur, ‘The Stoic Analysis of the Mind’s Reactions to Presentations’.

⁷³ See Annas, ‘Stoic Epistemology’, p. 187. For secure scientific knowledge to arise they must be made impregnable to rational argument; see Arius Didymus 2.7.51 (2.73.16-74.3 WH = SVF 3.112 = LS 41 H), Cicero Acad. 1.41 (= SVF 1.60), with Ioppolo, ‘Presentation and Assent’, p. 436; LS, vol. 1, p. 257.

⁷⁴ Adequate impressions cannot constitute scientific knowledge themselves because they can be experienced by both the foolish and the wise, whereas scientific knowledge is restricted to the wise (see Sextus Empiricus Adv. Math. 7.152). However it should be stressed that the sage does not know more than the fool, rather he knows the same things in a more secure and systematic manner (see Kerferd, ‘What Does the Wise Man Know?’). This difference may be seen as the same as that between the apprentice who knows an art or craft in theory and the master who has assimilated that theory and necessarily expresses his expertise in his actions. The expert does not know more than the apprentice but what he knows he knows ‘better’.

⁷⁵ See Hadot, The Inner Citadel, p. 105.

⁷⁶ To be more precise, Epictetus expresses little interest in the details of epistemological theory in the Dissertationes. That is certainly very different from claiming that he had no interest in such matters at all. The image of Epictetus as a popular moralist with little interest in logic or physics may simply reflect the fact that our only sources are the Dissertationes, texts produced within a specific literary genre primarily concerned with moral themes (see Souilhé (CUF), pp. xxii-xxx). One aspect of this quite common image of Epictetus is challenged in Barnes, Logic and the Imperial Stoa, pp. 24-125.