The stamping ground of roughly one-fifth of humanity, China is often regarded as being largely homogenous, at least from a remote Western perspective. This is probably because Han Chinese – the majority ethnic type in this energetic and bustling nation – constitute over nine-tenths of the population. But like Chinese cuisine, and of course the nation’s mystifying linguistic Babel, you only have to travel a bit further and turn a few more corners to come face to face with a surprising hodgepodge of ethnicities.
Han Chinese (汉族; Hànzú) – the predominant clan among China’s 56 recognised ethnic groups – make up the lion’s share of China’s people, 92% of the total figure. When we think of China – from its writing system to its visual arts, calligraphy, history, literature, language and politics – we tend to associate it with Han culture.
Distributed throughout China, the Han Chinese are however predominantly concentrated along the Yellow River, Yangzi River and Pearl River basins. Taking their name from the Han dynasty, the Han Chinese themselves are not markedly homogenous. China was ruled by non-Han Altaic (Turk, Tungusic or Mongolian) invaders for long periods, most demonstrably during the Yuan dynasty (Mongols) and the long Qing dynasty (Manchu), but also under the Jin, the Liao and other eras. This Altaic influence is more evident in northern Chinese with their larger and broader frames and rounder faces, compared to their slighter and thinner southern Han Chinese counterparts, who are physically more similar to the southeast Asian type. Shànghǎi Chinese for example are notably more southern in appearance; with their rounder faces, Běijīng Chinese are quite typically northern Chinese. With mass migration to the cities from rural areas and the increased frequency of marriage between Chinese from different parts of the land, these physical differences are likely to diminish slightly over time.
The Han Chinese display further stark differences in their rich panoply of dialects, which fragments China into a frequently baffling linguistic mosaic, although the promotion of Mandarin has blurred this considerably. The common written form of Chinese using characters (汉字; Hànzi – or ‘characters of the Han’), however, binds all dialects together.
Overseas Chinese frequently refer to people of Chinese blood from China or abroad as Huárén (华人; ‘people of China’. Conversely, foreigners are always called lǎowài ('outsiders' or 'foreigners'); the term is constantly used and does not respect geography – Chinese visitors overseas refer to local people as lǎowài, despite they themselves in context being lǎowài. Very rarely, Westerners may be called yángrén (洋人; ‘people of the ocean’), although down south you might encounter the slurs guǐlǎo (‘foreign devils’) and hēiguǐ ('black devil'; for black people).
A glance at the map of China reveals that the core heartland regions of Han China are central fragments of modern-day China’s huge expanse. The colossal regions of Tibet, Qīnghǎi, Xīnjiāng, Inner Mongolia and the three provinces of the northeast (Manchuria – Hēilóngjiāng, Jílín and Liáoníng) are all historically non-Han regions, some areas of which remain essentially non-Han today.
Many of these regions are peopled by some of the remaining 8% of the population: China’s 55 other ethnic minorities, known collectively as shǎoshù mínzú (少数民族; minority nationals). The largest minority groups in China include the Zhuang (壮族; Zhuàng zú), Manchu (满族; Mǎn zú), Miao (苗族; Miáo zú), Uighur (维吾尔族; Wéiwú'ěr zú), Yi (彝族; Yí zú), Tujia (土家族; Tǔjiā zú), Tibetan (藏族; Zàng zú), Hui (回族; Huízú), Mongolian (蒙古族; Ménggǔ zú), Buyi (布依族; Bùyī zú), Dong (侗族; Dòng zú), Yao (瑶族; Yáo zú), Korean (朝鲜族; Cháoxiǎn zú), Bai (白族; Bái zú), Hani (哈尼族; Hāní zú), Li (黎族; Lí zú), Kazak (哈萨克族; Hāsàkè zú) and Dai (傣族; Dǎi zú). Population sizes differ dramatically, from the sizeable Zhuang in Guǎngxī to small numbers of Menba (门巴族; Ménbā zú) in Tibet. Ethnic labelling can be quite fluid: the roundhouse-building Hakka (客家; Kèjiā) were once regarded as a separate minority, but are today considered Han Chinese. Ethnic groups also tell us a lot about the historic movement of peoples around China: the Bonan minority, found in small numbers in a few counties of Qīnghǎi and Gānsù, are largely Muslim but show marked Tibetan influence and are said to be descended from Mongol troops once stationed in Qīnghǎi during the Yuan dynasty.
China’s minorities tend to cluster along border regions, in the northwest, the west, the southwest, the north and northeast of China, but are also distributed throughout the country. Some groups are found in just one area (such as the Hani in Yúnnán); others, such as the Muslim Hui, live all over China.
Wedged into the southwest corner of China between Tibet, Myanmar (Burma), Vietnam and Laos, fecund Yúnnán province alone is home to more than 20 ethnic groups, making it one of the most ethnically diverse provinces in the country.
Despite Manchu culture once ruling over China during the Qing dynasty (1644–1911), possibly fewer than 50 native speakers of the Manchu language survive today, although the closely related Xibo language is spoken by around 20,000 descendants of Xibo tribes resettled in Xīnjiāng in China’s northwest in the 18th century.
Shaped by Confucian principles, the Chinese are thoughtful and discreet, subtle but also pragmatic. Conservative and rather introverted, they favour dark clothing over bright or loud colours while their body language is usually reserved and undemonstrative, yet attentive.
The Chinese can be both delightful and mystifyingly contradictory. One moment they will give their seat to an elderly person on the bus or help someone who is lost, and the next moment they will entirely ignore an old lady who has been knocked over by a motorbike.
Particularly diligent, the Chinese are inured to the kind of hours that may prompt a workers’ insurrection elsewhere. This is partly due to a traditional culture of hard work but is also a response to insufficient social-security safety nets and an anxiety regarding economic and political uncertainties. The Chinese impressively save much of what they earn, emphasising the virtue of prudence. Despite this restraint, however, wastefulness can be breathtaking when ‘face’ is involved: mountains of food are often left on restaurant dining tables, particularly if important guests are present.
Chinese people are deeply generous. Don’t be surprised if a person you have just met on a train invites you for a meal in the dining carriage; they will almost certainly insist on paying, grabbing the bill from the waiter at blinding speed and tenaciously resisting your attempts to help out.
The Chinese are also an exceptionally dignified people. They are proud of their civilisation and history, their written language and their inventions and achievements. This pride rarely comes across as arrogance, however, and can be streaked with a lack of self-assurance. The Chinese may, for example, be very gratified by China’s new-found world status, but may squirm at the mention of food safety or pollution.
The modern Chinese character has been shaped by recent political realities, and while Chinese people have always been reserved and circumspect, in today’s China they can appear even more prudent. Impressive mental gymnastics are performed to detour contentious domestic political issues, which can make the mainland Chinese appear complicated, despite their reputation for being straightforward.
The ‘one-child policy’ (in effect a misnomer) was railroaded into effect in 1979 in a bid to keep China’s population to one billion by the year 2000 (a target it failed to meet); the population is expected to peak at around 1.5 billion in 2028. In a momentous reversal, in 2015 it was announced that the policy would be abolished and in January 2016 the regulation was officially amended to a two-child policy.
The policy was harshly implemented at first but rural revolt led to a softer stance; nonetheless, it generated much bad feeling between local officials and the rural population. All non-Han minorities were exempt from the one-child policy; Han Chinese parents who were both single children could have a second child and this was later expanded to all couples if at least one of them was a single child. Rural families were allowed to have two children if the first child was a girl, but some had upwards of three or four kids. Additional children often resulted in fines, with families having to shoulder the cost of education themselves, without government assistance. Official stated policy opposed forced abortion or sterilisation, but allegations of coercion continued as local officials strived to meet population targets. In 2014 the film director Zhang Yimou was fined US$1.2m for breaking the one-child policy.
Families who abided by the one-child policy often went to horrifying lengths to ensure their child was male, with female infanticide, sex-selective abortion and abandonment becoming commonplace. In parts of China, this resulted in a serious imbalance of the sexes – in 2010, 118 boys were born for every 100 girls. In some provinces the imbalance has been even higher. By 2020, potentially around 35 million Chinese men may be unable to find spouses.
As women could have a second child abroad, this also led to large numbers of mainland women giving birth in Hong Kong (where the child also qualified for Hong Kong citizenship). The Hong Kong government eventually used legislation to curb this phenomenon, dubbed ‘birth tourism’, as government figures revealed that almost half of babies born in the territory in 2010 were born to mainland parents. In 2013, the Hong Kong government prohibited mainland women from visiting Hong Kong to give birth, unless their husband is from the territory.
Another consequence of the one-child policy has been a rapidly ageing population, with over a quarter of the populace predicted to be over the age of 65 by 2050. The 2016 abolition of the one-child policy has sought to adjust these profound imbalances, but some analysts argue it has come too late.
APopulation: 1.37 billion
ABirth rate: 12.49 births per thousand people
APeople over 65: 10%
AUrbanisation rate: 3.05%
AMale to female ratio: 1.17 : 1 (under 15s)
ALife expectancy: 75.4 years
Growing up in a Confucian culture, women in China traditionally encountered great prejudice and acquired a far lowlier social status to men. The most notorious expression of female subservience was foot binding, which became a widespread practice in the Song dynasty. Female resistance to male-dominated society could sometimes produce inventive solutions, however: discouraged from reading and writing, women in Jiāngyǒng county (Húnán) once used their own invented syllabic script (partly based on Chinese) called nǚshū (女书) to write letters to each other (which men found incomprehensible).
Women in today’s China officially share complete equality with men; however, as with other nations that profess sexual equality, the reality is often far different. Chinese women do not enjoy strong political representation and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) remains a largely patriarchal organisation. Iconic political leaders from the early days of the CCP were men and the influential echelons of the party persist as a largely male domain. Only a handful of the great scientists celebrated in a long photographic mural at Shànghǎi’s Science and Technology Museum are women.
The Communist Party after 1949 tried to outlaw old customs and put women on equal footing with men. It abolished arranged marriages and encouraged women to get an education and join the workforce. Women were allowed to keep their maiden name upon marriage and leave their property to their children. In its quest for equality during this period however, the Communist Party seemed to ‘desexualise’ women, fashioning instead a kind of idealised worker/mother/peasant paradigm.
High-profile, successful Chinese women are very much in the public eye, but the relative lack of career opportunities for females in other fields also suggests a continuing bias against women in employment.
Women’s improved social status today has meant that more women are putting off marriage until their late 20s or early 30s, choosing instead to focus on education and career opportunities. This has been enhanced by the rapid rise in house prices, further encouraging women to leave marriage (and having children) till a later age. Premarital sex and cohabitation before marriage are increasingly common in larger cities and lack the stigma they had 10 or 15 years ago.
Some Chinese women are making strong efforts to protect the rights of women in China, receiving international attention in the process. In 2010 the Simone de Beauvoir prize for women’s freedom was awarded to Guo Jianmei, a Chinese lawyer and human rights activist, and film-maker and professor Ai Xiaoming. Guo Jianmei also received the International Women of Courage Award in 2011.
In a sign of growing confidence among the female workforce, a young Běijīng woman won the first ever gender discrimination lawsuit in China in 2014.
A strong rural–urban divide exists. Urban women are far more optimistic and freer, while women from rural areas, where traditional beliefs are at their strongest, fight an uphill battle against discrimination. Rural Chinese mores are heavily biased against females, where a marked preference for baby boys still exists. This results in an ever greater shift of Chinese women to the city from rural areas. China’s women are more likely to commit suicide than men (in the West it is the other way around), while the suicide rate for rural Chinese women is around five times the urban rate.