Napoleon Bonaparte (1769-1821), Emperor of France. Napoleon Bonaparte was undoubtedly one of the great military captains of history. He had held Europe in thrall for over a decade, plunging the Continent into its most destructive wars for centuries. Napoleon was essentially a dictator and did little to encourage initiative among his subordinates lest a rival should emerge. His style of command was centralised, and the plan of campaign was a matter Napoleon kept to himself. His staff’s role was not advisory; it was functionary, being there merely to execute its master’s orders. Such a system worked well in the early days of Bonaparte’s campaigning in the Revolutionary Wars. However, this structure was cumbersome when attempting to control armies of the size used in the latter part of the Napoleonic Wars. The lack of initiative on the part of his subordinates could cause difficulties, as when Ney was caught out by the Allied movements on the morning of 2 May 1813. Three weeks later at Bautzen, Ney failed to properly execute the flanking movement ordered by Napoleon. It took Napoleon’s personal intervention to bring matters under control again. The larger armies of the later wars required officers capable of independent command who fully grasped the Emperor’s plans. However, Napoleon always had an eye on Paris and needed to be seen as the sole victor of his battles. He could not allow his subordinates to play too big a role in achieving the victories, lest they steal his glory. This inherent conflict of interests eventually played a role in Napoleon’s downfall.
Frederick William III, King of Prussia. Often regarded as a weak king, Frederick William showed considerable courage when he threw in his lot with Alexander. His gamble paid off, with Napoleon being finally driven from Germany after the Battle of Leipzig in October 1813. (Copy of a painting by François Gérard dated 1814)
Having expended so much horseflesh in Russia, Napoleon was particularly weak in cavalry, which had a noticeable effect on his handling of the campaign. The cavalry were his eyes and ears, and facing a greatly superior number of allied cavalry, Napoleon was essentially deaf and blind for much of the time. Lacking detailed knowledge of Allied positions, movements and intentions, he was at a great disadvantage that was only in part compensated for by his superiority in numbers.
Napoleon did as well as he could in the circumstances. He no longer had the army that had triumphed at Austerlitz and Auerstadt, nor was he facing his enemies of 1805-06. Instead of leading veterans against ponderous and easily demoralised opponents, Napoleon faced a gruelling slogging match against hardy Russians and determined Prussians. Nevertheless, his dynamism and tactical flair remained, as his lightning reaction to events at Lützen showed, while his plan for the Battle of Bautzen on 20/21 May 1813 was ahead of its time. But by 1813, Napoleon had simply run out of luck. He was also running out of time.
Michel Ney (1769-1815), Marshal of France. Ney was one of the more colourful characters of this period. Noted for his bravery, he was much respected by his men. Ney had also shown himself a highly capable corps commander, working his way up the ranks after having joined a regiment of hussars in 1787. Ney was also to play a significant role in the Spring Campaign of 1813. He failed to properly secure the positions of his corps during the night of 1–2 May, allowing the Allies to launch the surprise attack that began the Battle of Lützen. Had the Allies not handled their advance to contact so badly, they may well have won a decisive victory over Napoleon. Ney again had the fate of France in his hands during his flanking march at the battle of Bautzen. At a crucial stage, he delayed his advance, awaiting orders from Napoleon, then failed to use his initiative and break into the rear of the Allies, which would have decided the battle and campaign. Ney is often the scapegoat of Napoleon’s apologists. As we shall see, Napoleon was aware that Ney had not sent patrols out to screen his camp at Grossgörschen. Furthermore, it was understandable for Ney to enquire of Napoleon as to his next move at Bautzen once he had heard the sounds of gunfire. The Emperor had not shared the details of his plan of action for Bautzen with Ney. As such it was difficult for Ney to assess the best course of action.
Ludwig Adolph Peter, Prince of Sayn and Wittgenstein (1769-1843). As a boy, Wittgenstein joined the Page Corps of the Semenov Regiment with the rank of sergeant. In 1789, he was transferred to the Horse Guard Regiment, being promoted to lieutenant the next year. He received his baptism of fire in the Polish Campaign of 1795. He rose quickly through the ranks, becoming a full colonel in 1798 and major-general a year later. Made colonel-in-chief of the Mariupol Hussar Regiment in 1801, he distinguished himself at Austerlitz in 1805. He fought the Turks in 1806 before fighting the French at Friedland in 1807. He defended St Petersburg in 1812, taking command of the Prusso-Russian army in 1813, commanding it at Lützen and Bautzen. Due to his rather lack-lustre performance, Wittgenstein was replaced by Barclay de Tolly on 26 May 1813.
Mikhail Barclay de Tolly, (1761-1818). Barclay was the one Russian general capable of rising to the challenge of command in Germany in 1813. His military experience had started in 1788 in fighting against the Turks. He fought the Swedes in 1790 and saw action in Poland from 1792 to 1794. In 1806, he commanded the vanguard of Bennigsen’s army, winning a battle at Pultusk and being wounded at Eylau. He distinguished himself in Finland in 1808 and 1809, becoming Minister of War in 1810. In 1812, although he favoured withdrawing in the face of Napoleon’s advance into Russia, public opinion forced him to offer battle at Smolensk, the ‘gateway to Old Russia’. A German-speaker, he was not popular in Russia and was removed from command for his views on the best strategy to adopt against Napoleon’s invasion. The Russian Kutusov, considered a better man to defend the soil of Mother Russia, replaced him, eventually leading the army into Germany in 1813. Wittgenstein took over the command of the army on Kutusov’s death, but did not distinguish himself. On 26 May 1813, Barclay was given command of the Russian forces in Germany. He was known for his caution and pedantry, but the Spring Campaign ended before he was able to influence its events in an appreciable way.
Gebhardt Leberecht von Blücher (1742-1819). Blücher’s military career began at the tender age of fourteen in the Swedish cavalry. This was normal as Sweden held territories on the Baltic coast of Germany at this time and her army drilled according to Frederician regulations with orders given in the German language. The Prussians took him prisoner in 1760 during the Seven Years War, and he joined Belling’s regiment of hussars, later gaining a reputation for wild behaviour off the battlefield and aggression on it. Throughout this period, he was firmly in favour of dealing with French encroachments into Germany by firm military action and his successes in the Revolutionary Wars added to his reputation. At the Battle of Auerstadt in 1806, he mishandled the Prussian cavalry, attacking Davout’s men too early, but made up for this fighting a spirited retreat to Lübeck on the Baltic coast. He added his stature to the reform movement in the Prussian army that Scharnhorst and Gneisenau greatly influenced. A passionate man, his despair at Prussia’s humiliation following the defeats in 1806 caused a nervous breakdown. He gleefully took up his sabre again at the beginning of 1813. By now, the Prussian army had adopted a system of dual command for its larger formations. Blücher commanded a corps in the Spring Campaign with first Scharnhorst and then Gneisenau being his chief-of-staff. The individual genius of Napoleon was countered with the collective genius of the Prussian General Staff. At Bautzen, for example, Gneisenau tempered Blücher’s natural aggression, persuading him to withdraw once Ney’s flanking move became effective.
The Russian General Diebitsch and the Prussian General Yorck first met on the evening of 25 December 1812. Their negotiations took the Prussian contingent out of the Grande Armée and precipitated Prussia’s uprising against Napoleon. (Drawing by Richard Knötel)