DESPITE THE SECRET Service Committee’s overhaul of the secret services in 1921, it became apparent that the system was still not working effectively and the committee was reconvened in 1925. It commissioned an investigation to be carried out by Sir Russell Scott of HM Treasury ‘into all Branches of Scotland Yard, as more light is required on the internal workings of Scotland Yard than has hitherto been available’.1 Sir Russell based his subsequent report on material supplied by Sir Wyndham Childs in a detailed breakdown of the work carried out by the three bureaux at Scotland Yard, dealing with what is loosely referred to as ‘secret service’ work. This document also served as a useful reference point for police historians endeavouring to penetrate the largely uncharted territory of Special Branch. The following is an abridged version of Sir Russell’s report to the committee.2
In April 1922, when Sir Wyndham Childs took command of Special Branch, it was being run by Lieutenant Colonel Carter who, to quote Childs, ‘was not a police officer and had no power of command over the personnel of the Special Branch’. His position was regularised on 24 October, when he was appointed a Deputy Assistant Commissioner responsible for the management of the Branch, which remained under the direction of the ACC. (Note: Carter himself was merely a figurehead; the de facto head of the Branch, as he had been since 1918, was Superintendent James McBrien.)
Childs was highly critical of his predecessor and the manner in which he ran Special Branch, commenting, ‘It was obvious to me before I had been here more than a few weeks that the staff had been working in the dark and had no knowledge of the activities of their Chief.’ The ACC had inherited:
(i) SS1, the four civilian members of which (two officers, two clerks) dealt with the study and investigation, through the SIS, of revolutionary movements abroad and the monitoring of communist and other revolutionary aliens and literature entering the United Kingdom from the Colonies.
(ii) SS2, comprising only two female officers and a clerk, all civilians, who dealt with ‘all matters relating to revolutionary movements and organisations in this country other than of alien or Irish origination’. This included, among other things, the weekly submission of intelligence reports to Chief Constables, government departments and intelligence branches on revolutionary activity (political and industrial) taking place in England, Scotland and Wales; informing MI5 and appropriate military authorities of communist activity likely to affect them; and keeping the Deputy Assistant Commissioner of Special Branch informed of political activities that might call for police action.
Both these sections were financed by Secret Service funds, but expenses of the third were chargeable to the vote for the police.
(iii) Special Branch itself, under the overall administration of the ACC and a Deputy Assistant Commissioner, with an establishment of 134 police officers of all ranks – the superintendent in charge supported by one chief inspector; seventeen inspectors; sixty-nine sergeants; forty-five male and one female constable. In very general terms its functions were:
To do such police work in regard to revolutionary activities as may be necessary within the Metropolitan area and at certain ports [and to deal with] all phases of the Irish revolutionary movement within this country. It also provides the necessary staff for the protection of members of the royal family [not strictly true], Cabinet ministers and other persons.
The term ‘revolutionary’ was applied to a surprisingly wide range of organisations and included such groupings as the Communist Party of Great Britain, Young Communist League, Irish Workers’ League, Irish Self Determination League of Great Britain, Irish Republican Army, Egyptian Association of Great Britain, Union of Chinese Associations in Great Britain, East West Circle, various anti-fascist organisations and a host of less well-known groups.
Childs emphasised that not all revolutionary activity in the country was monitored by Special Branch. ‘A special section of the Directorate of Military Intelligence at the War Office [MI5]’ dealt with such activity directed at the armed forces. Furthermore, outside the Metropolitan Police District (MPD), the local police authorities concerned themselves with such matters, while maintaining close contact with Scotland Yard. The Assistant Commissioner condemned the system that had been in operation before he took up his current post, whereby nine Special Branch men were ‘out in the Provinces poaching in the preserves of Chief Constables’ in order to obtain information for the Cabinet on industrial unrest. Childs wasted no time in withdrawing these men, thereby reducing any friction with provincial forces, and setting up better lines of communication with the county forces, of which he declared with pride:
Today there is an absolute and complete liaison between all Chief Constables in the United Kingdom and myself and the exchange of information can I think be justly termed colossal, and I think I can safely say that there is no Chief Constable in the United Kingdom who will not today do anything for me.
In order to protect the confidentiality of Special Branch work, Childs set up what he referred to as a ‘barrier’ which would prevent ‘rank and file policemen’ being privy to secret service work. Documents relating to secret work filed in SB registry, an adjunct of the Scotland Yard general registry, would be stamped with the letter ‘Y’ and be accessible only to Lieutenant Colonel Carter. There was also a ‘secret registry’ closely supervised by a trusted civilian, in which highly sensitive documents would be stored.
Childs observed that: ‘The Special Branch is entirely distinct from the CID and has a separate establishment. The only connecting link is that the personnel of the Special Branch is recruited from the CID but when once permanently allocated to the Special Branch all connection with the CID is severed.’
One of its main functions was to act as an ‘intelligence department’ for the rest of the Metropolitan Police and, to a lesser extent, for provincial forces. From various sources, intelligence would be obtained relating to public order problems (strikes, demonstrations etc); this would be submitted to the appropriate department or police force so that the necessary police arrangements could be made. One such source was meetings, both indoor and open air, at which revolutionary and other subversive organisations would broadcast their views and sometimes give details of future activities. Such events were, and always have been, covered by SB officers, who have frequently been required to use their shorthand skills to record actionable speeches.
The use of informants was essential for obtaining information to prevent and detect crimes against the state. Strict control was exercised in managing the money allocated for the payment of these individuals; an informants’ fund was maintained by the Receiver for the Metropolitan Police, who once a fortnight disbursed payments on receipt of accounts countersigned by the AC or DACSB.
Other work performed by members of Special Branch was referred to in Sir Russell’s report. Many officers were fluent in foreign languages and were frequently called upon to act as interpreters or carry out translations in police cases. On occasions, they were employed in this capacity for other government departments. Naturalisation enquiries occupied many hours of police time and were constantly increasing in number. Officers were frequently engaged out of London on port work, while others were employed full time protecting ministers and other dignitaries, both British and foreign.
Scott’s report, quoting Childs verbatim, concluded with favourable comments on the Branch.
The work of Special Branch is of a highly specialised character. Officers in this Department, besides having a full knowledge of the powers and duties of the Uniform Police and CID, have to possess an intimate knowledge of world-wide revolutionary politics. The inquiry staff is recruited from serving Metropolitan Police Officers who are of good appearance and address, of good education, and possessing knowledge of foreign languages or the ability to write shorthand at a high speed in order to submit a verbatim report and give evidence on their notes in a Court of Law.
The Officers, although usually specialising in one section of the work, are engaged in the general work of the Branch, as the principle is inculcated that an all-round knowledge of Special Branch work is necessary for promotion.
It is, of course, realised that the work performed is of an especially secret nature. Many matters are dealt with between DACSB and the superintendent which are unknown to subordinates, such as dealing with informants, where frequently a man’s life is at stake if his identity were to become known.
In his report, Scott concluded that he had ‘no reason to think that the present arrangement by which the Assistant Commissioner at Scotland Yard keeps in touch with local police authorities throughout the country [or indeed with other agencies] is unsatisfactory’. However, he did express misgivings about the relationship between SS1, SS2 and Special Branch, which appeared to lack ‘adequate control and direction’.3
When publishing the result of its deliberations on 1 December 1925,4 the committee also examined the roles of the other four sections of the secret service – GC&CS, MI5, MI6 and the Indian Political Intelligence Service.
Eventually, after the collection of wisdom from a vast array of security experts, the committee noted that with one exception, Rear Admiral Hugh Sinclair, the Chief of SIS, those consulted expressed general satisfaction with existing arrangements.5 However, it was not until several years had elapsed that any changes suggested by him were forthcoming.
The committee remained in being and produced other reports up until 1931; in the final year of its existence it made a number of recommendations, which the government approved. SS1 was taken over by MI5 and SS2 by the Home Office. MI5 was renamed the Security Service, and its responsibilities extended to cover the collation and dissemination of intelligence concerning espionage and civil subversion throughout the Commonwealth. It ceased to be a department of the War Office. It was brought under the control of the Home Secretary, but remained independent of the Home Office. The gathering of intelligence concerning espionage remained its prime responsibility. The main change, however, was that the Security Service took over responsibility for assessing all threats to the United Kingdom, except for those posed by anarchists and Irish republicans. The staff of SS1, Captain Guy Liddell, Miss Bunty Saunders and Miss Millicent Bagot, were transferred to the Security Service offices in Cromwell Road, Kensington. The committee was no doubt influenced in its recommendations by the Zinoviev Letter affair, the ARCOS raid and the scandal of the Ewer Spy Ring, which led to the sacking of Detective Inspector Van Ginhoven and Detective Sergeant Jane.6 The Special Branch retained responsibility for extreme Irish republicanism, anarchists, gun-runners, personal protection of ministers and others at risk, and port controls.
Sir Vernon Kell was jubilant about the expansion of his empire, but was given few additional resources with which to fulfil his new remit. MI5 continued to rely on the support of the police, the armed forces and the civil service for supplying information and making enquiries, and on the GPO and GC&CS for the interception of communications. While it was able to employ agents of its own to penetrate suspect organisations, it had only thirty case officers, most of whom were former officers in the armed services or the police. In addition, it had six watchers to carry out surveillance and a secretarial and registry staff. In fact it was reliant on the good will of other organisations and powerless to order them to do anything. Decisions to prosecute remained the prerogative of the Attorney General.
The diminishing of Special Branch’s responsibilities must have been a blow to their pride, which was exacerbated by the knowledge that in future they would be saddled with helping the understaffed Security Service to cope with its increased workload, a situation that was not calculated to improve the already fractious relations between the two services.
1 Letter from Secret Service Committee to Prime Minister, dated 19 June 1925.TNA CAB 127/361
2 Report by Sir Wyndham Childs (for the information of Sir Russell Scott), dated 30 June 1925. TNA CAB 127/366
3 Sir Russell Scott’s report of October 1925 to the Secret Service Committee. TNA FO 1093/68
4 The Secret Service Committee’s report, dated 1 December 1925. TNA FO 1093/67
5 Undated note by Sinclair to Secret Service Committee. TNA CAB 127/364 & FO 1093/67
6 See Chapters 11 and 12