WHILE THEIR COLLEAGUES were engaged in the never-ending fight against espionage and terrorism, other officers were pursuing their careers in the less dramatic, yet equally vital business of protection. In an earlier part of this book reference is made to the role played by the Branch since its establishment in the provision of personal protection for VIPs and other vulnerable individuals. In this chapter, it is proposed to examine more closely how this role developed to contend with the increased threat from the PIRA and non-UK terrorist organisations.
Ministerial protection in the UK prior to the 1970s was essentially limited to the Prime Minister, the Foreign Secretary and the Home Secretary, these being the three ministers of state, or their equivalents, whom the Hague Conventions stipulated were entitled to personal protection when visiting the countries of fellow signatories. Also, of course, heads of state of any signatory would be provided with protection. Throughout the UK this close protection was the sole responsibility of MPSB. When principals travelled outside London, local police provided support to the Metropolitan Police Special Branch close protection officers.
In the UK, the provision of protection officers to former ministers in the above categories, or indeed to any other politician or VIP, was determined by threat assessments undertaken by the Home Secretary based on input from both Security Services and MPSB. The length of time and also the form of this protection were subject to regular review. Similar assessments were prepared in relation to visiting dignitaries who might be under threat but did not fall within the four categories mentioned above who were automatically entitled to protection. When residents in the UK receiving Special Branch protection travelled abroad, accompanying MPSB officers acted only in a liaison and advisory role, full responsibility for the safety of the ‘principal’ resting with the host country, usually in the hands of their equivalent to the Metropolitan Police Special Branch.
Throughout the 1970s, with the resurgence of the PIRA and also the growing threat posed by non-UK terrorist organisations to UK diplomats and politicians, one aspect of protection was increasingly causing concern to the SB teams involved in their security. Essentially, the problem was that there existed no central government department to assess, approve, authorise and regulate the expenditure on any close-protection security equipment and, in particular, measures relating to the protection of the private homes of politicians and other VIPs assessed as being under threat. The physical and electronic measures provided and also the very critical advice given to staff, spouses and families varied greatly throughout the UK depending, to a large extent, on the policies, priorities and commitments of the respective chief constables. In most cases, ministers’ own private offices would arrange directly for HMG Property Services Agency (PSA) alarm engineers and building construction experts to survey the private home of their own boss, make recommendations and, if so agreed, carry out the necessary measures. Whether the recommendations were acted upon depended very much on the particular department’s budget and the whim of the minister and his Principal Private Secretary (PPS).
There was no central reference point to standardise or approve expenditure on basic equipment for personal protection teams, including such items as ministerial vehicle protection and communication equipment and personal radios for individual officers. British protection officers viewed with envy the resources and equipment available to their American and European counterparts, which highlighted the inadequacies of their own equipment, research and training.
A significant improvement in the status quo was the establishment, in the latter months of 1978, of the ‘Standing Cabinet Office Committee on Ministerial Protection’ (the CMP as it was referred to), which directed that all surveys of ministers’ homes would henceforward be carried out by technical experts from the PSA accompanied by an officer from MPSB. Significantly, it was the Special Branch officer who would be responsible for compiling a report listing their recommendations, sending this to the appropriate PPS and, where necessary, discussing the findings with the principal. Any disagreements between the three parties concerned, i.e. SB, PPS and principal, would be referred to the CMP.
A further important step forward was achieved in the spring of 1979, when a small Special Branch Technical Protection Unit (TPU) under a detective superintendent, Colin Colson, was formed within the Special Branch complex at New Scotland Yard. Its role was to implement CMP directives and within the next few years it developed into a virtual property management agency. It was a great asset to the TPU that Colson had studied building technology, had previously been involved in Special Branch technical operations and, by virtue of three years’ protection duty with the Prime Minister, was familiar with routines and staff at No. 10 and government offices in Whitehall. The efficiency of the unit was also boosted by the unstinting support it received from the PSA technical officers, from the Metropolitan Police engineering department, from other government agencies and from private commercial companies.
The TPU became responsible for the installation, care and maintenance of security measures at some forty or more properties varying from small flats in Westminster to large estates in Cornwall, farms in Sussex, an ancient listed moated building in Norfolk and castles in Scotland – the private residences of ‘vulnerable’ VIPs, many of whom received SB close protection too. The unit also served as a point of contact for the families and households of principals seeking advice and reassurance about the intrusion of protective measures into their daily lives, often for the first time.
At the same time, the process of assessing the vulnerability of ministers was formalised into a system which placed them within one of five levels of threat, from one (being the highest) to five. In 1985, a standard package of building protection facilities was notionally allocated to each threat level, although a number of other factors was taken into consideration when deciding the package actually provided. TPU staff were closely involved in the nature and extent of the physical protection provided and often needed to explain directly to the individual the appropriateness of all their recommendations – occasionally this would result in protracted negotiations with the principal and his or her PPS, which would normally result in an amicable agreement.
With its increasing expertise and proven competence, the advice of the TPU was frequently sought about the development of security equipment and its assistance requested for an increasing variety of one-off tasks in addition to its basic property security role. Some of the more noteworthy events in its history were:
June 1979 – the compilation of a pocket book on personal security (the ‘Blue Book’), adapted from the RUC’s more comprehensive version. Initially issued to Members of both Houses of Parliament, the booklet was so much in demand that distribution was extended to virtually all senior civil servants, the judiciary and senior officers of the three armed forces. It was packed with sound advice on ‘measures to improve personal security’, chief of which must be: ‘Regardless of what assistance is provided by police, in the final analysis personal security is the responsibility of the individual.’ Following the IRA bombing of the Grand Hotel in Brighton and at the instigation of the Home Secretary, a ‘Brown Book’ on meetings’ security in the style of the ‘Blue Book’, but also covering wider aspects of security, was produced by the TPU for distribution to all MPs and lower echelons of political workers, e.g. constituency staff.
In 1980 – the development of an attaché case portable radio intrusion detection system which could be used when a protected VIP stayed overnight away from his or her normal place of residence in a hotel or private residence with inadequate security. This enabled the SB team to set up a secure perimeter quickly and also provide a ‘personal attack’ alarm to assist venue security; this was often provided at very short notice by local police.
29 July 1981 – on that day over 700 million TV viewers worldwide watched the wedding of the Prince of Wales and Lady Diana Spencer; over ninety-seven armed SB officers didn’t. They were engaged in protecting the monarchs, heads of state and other dignitaries attending the event. The TPU manned an SB control room which, among other functions, ensured that the forty-three teams protecting them ‘got them to the church on time’ and in the right protocol order. The TPU control also endeavoured not to ‘lose’ any VIP during the ensuing celebrations at the Palace and the Hyde Park firework display.
In the period leading up to the big day, the TPU installed their portable alarm systems (see above) in several suites in major London hotels which would be the temporary homes of some of the guests. Thanks to a system installed at the Hilton Hotel in Park Lane, the one and only arrest by protection officers was made – a hotel thief was caught attempting to sneak up the back stairs in the hope that everyone would be watching TV!
13 November 1981 – a bomb planted by the IRA badly damaged the rented home of Sir Michael Havers, the Attorney General. At first sight it appeared that the PSA-installed and subsequently TPU-approved system had failed, but a closer examination of the scene revealed that the bomber had gained access to the rear of the property through the adjacent garden, which belonged to Sir Michael’s landlady, and he (Sir Michael) had refused permission for a beam system to be installed there. He had evidently not read his ‘Blue Book’ or chosen to ignore the advice about personal security being, in the final analysis, the responsibility of the individual.
28 May to 2 June 1982 – the pastoral visit of Pope John Paul II to the UK (see Chapter 26) saw the close involvement of the TPU from approximately six months before the pontiff’s arrival until three days after his departure. The early start was due to the frequent meetings with the Catholic Church to keep up with the continual changes in the programme and the complex logistics involved in moving both officers and four specialist papal vehicles about the UK.
The unit was particularly involved with all matters concerning transport security and took particular care to ensure that effective communication systems were available to all SB close protection officers. They also had to ensure that officers were aware that, at that time, ballistic-resistant armour, both glass and panelling, extended only to forty-eight inches from the floor in the rear compartments of all vehicles, so it might be necessary to duck down swiftly or get behind a papal figure in the event of an attack. SB protection officers normally occupy the front passenger seat.
As was the case at the royal wedding in July of the previous year, a control room was manned by TPU officers to assist all SB officers involved in the operation, motorcades, venues and lines of route surveillance.
12 October 1984 – the IRA bomb at the Grand Hotel in Brighton (see Chapter 25) was to have significant effects upon the future of the Special Branch Technical Protection Unit. Following completion of an inquiry into the lax security arrangements made for the 1984 Conservative Party conference, the Home Secretary announced the setting up of a committee chaired by the Home Office and including Police, Security Services and the Army. The intention was to plan a course for the training in search techniques of police officers from all mainland police forces. The TPU was directed by DACSB to represent the Branch in all future committee meetings and to attend the Royal School of Military Engineering, Rochester, to assist in the design of the initial POLSA (Police Search Adviser) courses to be held in April and again later in 1985. As this was a long-term commitment, DI Smither, Colson’s deputy in the TPU and earmarked to succeed Colson on the latter’s retirement in a year’s time, was appointed to take full responsibility for all aspects of police involvement in the POLSA courses. Colin Colson duly retired in 1986 and was awarded the MBE for services to the security of the state.
Due in no small measure to his outstanding achievements with POLSA, Smither was seconded to the Home Office in September 1987 and attached as the first Police Liaison Officer (with temporary rank of DCI) to the Royal School of Military Engineering (RSME). He became a key figure in the growth of police search training throughout the UK, and was closely involved in the establishment of the first National Search Training Centre. He retired nine years later, in April 1996, with the rank of detective superintendent. In 1994, he had been awarded the Queen’s Police Medal for his ‘distinguished service’.
What started as a single residential course in 1985, with thirty police students of sergeant to chief inspector rank, developed into full-time ongoing courses at three levels carried out both at RSME and within all GB police services, by one HQ team and two fully equipped mobile teams of police and Royal Engineer staff, comprising some eight police officers, seven Royal Engineer personnel and a number of civilian support staff managed by a detective superintendent.
Among the more personal and rewarding tasks successfully carried out by the TPU after the Brighton bomb, was the design of communication equipment attached to the motorised wheelchair of Mrs Tebbit, who was severely injured in the blast, enabling her to move freely around unaided but always in contact with both security and care staff. The adaptation of special protective measures and alarm systems at both the Tebbits’ London and country residences also demanded several unique adoptions of other equipment. The team also designed the security system at the new Dulwich home of the Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, and her husband Denis, a job made most enjoyable by the active assistance of the latter; always accompanied by his offer of very expert suggestions and gin and tonics.
In 2006, when Special Branch lost its identity, management of the Technical Protection Unit was taken over by the Home Office.
1 I am indebted to Colin Colson and Peter Smither for providing the information on which this section is based