CHAPTER 2. THE CINDERELLA SERVICE
1. Lindsey Neas, “Undercutting Our Armed Forces,” Washington Post, April 23, 2015.
CHAPTER 3. THE AMERICAN ERA OF WAR
1. This narrative is taken from Hiromichi Yahara, The Battle for Okinawa, translated by Roger Pineau and Masatoshi Uehara (Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley and Sons, 1995).
2. Brig. Gen. R. Clements, USAF (Ret.), Letter: Subject: The Invasion of Japan, September 16, 2006.
CHAPTER 4. ADAPTIVE ENEMIES
1. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), 77.
2. This thesis originally appeared in Robert H. Scales Jr., “Adapting Enemies: Dealing with the Strategic Threat after 2010,” Strategic Review 27, no. 1 (Winter 1999): 5–14. Portions of the above articles are reproduced here with permission.
3. Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, vols. 1 and 3 (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1967); William H. Whitson, The Chinese High Command: A History of Communist Military Politics, 1927–1971 (New York: Praeger, 1973).
4. Frederick Fu Liu, A Military History of Modern China: 1924–1949 (Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1956).
5. Robert H. Scales Jr., Certain Victory: The U.S. Army in the Gulf War (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, 1993).
CHAPTER 5. FORECASTING WAR
1. Philip Tetlock, Superforecasting: The Art and Science of Prediction (New York: Crown, 2015), 232–37.
2. Thoughts in this and subsequent paragraphs I share with my colleague and gifted friend Douglas Ollivant. Most are contained in our op-ed “Terrorist Armies Fight Smarter and Deadlier than Ever,” Washington Post, August 1, 2014.
CHAPTER 6. THE NEW AGE OF INFANTRY
1. Frank G. Hoffman, “Hybrid vs. Compound War, the Janus Choice: Defining Today’s Multifaceted Conflict,” Armed Forces Journal (October 2009): 15 [emphasis original].
CHAPTER 8. WAR IN TWO EPOCHS
1. Obviously my juxtaposition of Patton and McChrystal is in large part a metaphorical “trick” to make the point about how warfare has changed in the American era. In fact, credit for the McChrystal method belongs to a generation of special warriors, many of whom are personal friends of mine, such as Lt. Gen. John Mulholland, who was first into Afghanistan after 9/11; Gen. Charles Cleveland, who commanded Special Forces in Central Command; Gen. Mike Flynn, who was the first to break though the intelligence barriers that kept Soldiers in the dark for too long; Adm. William McRaven, for his codification of the theory of special operations in this new era; and Gen. Tony Thomas, a longtime friend.
2. Most of the ideas depicted here and in subsequent paragraphs I jotted down during a personal interview with General McChrystal at his Alexandria, Virginia, office in May 2015. Subsequently, many were repeated in McChrystal’s book, Team of Teams: New Rules of Engagement for a Complex World (New York: Portfolio/Penguin, 2015).
CHAPTER 9. FEEDING THE NARRATIVE
1. Much of the detail and all of the ideas in this chapter are taken from my monograph The Past and Present as Prologue: Future Warfare through the Lens of Contemporary Conflicts (Washington, D.C.: Center for a New American Security, 2009).
2. Mark Mazzetti and Michael R. Gordon, “ISIS Is Winning the Social Media War, U.S. Concludes,” New York Times, June 12, 2015.
CHAPTER 11. INTENT AND INTUITION
1. I owe a special thanks and recognition to Lt. Gen. Don Holder (Ret.) for many of these ideas concerning the special requirements for developing operational-level commanders.
2. Col. Tom Kolditz, interview, West Point, June 9, 2006.
CHAPTER 15. MOTHER SHIPS AND BATTLESHIP BUREAUCRATS
1. One example of this traditionalist approach is a very influential House Armed Services Committee briefing by a retired colonel, Douglas McGregor, “Transformation and the Illusion of Change.”
2. S. L. A. Marshall, The Soldier’s Load and the Mobility of the Nation (Quantico, Va.: Marine Corps Association, 1980).
CHAPTER 16. FIREPOWER
1. Col. G. F. R. Henderson, Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War (London: Longman Green, 1978), 611.
2. Phillip Karber, “Lessons Learned from the Russo-Ukrainian War” (Draft, Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory, July 6, 2015).
CHAPTER 18. WIN FOREVER . . . IN COMBAT
1. Pete Carroll. Win Forever: Live, Work, and Play Like a Champion (New York: Portfolio, 2011), 282.
2. According to Pete Carroll, seven seconds is the accepted maximum allowable reaction time and the decision-making standard for most contemporary quarterback assessments.
CHAPTER 20. THE DRAFT
1. Joseph Epstein, “How I Learned to Love the Draft,” Atlantic (January–February 2015): 86.
CONCLUSION
1. Shakespeare, Henry V, 4.3.56–67.