Manuals provided standardised designs for field fortifications, but there were many variations and exceptions in the field. This was caused by the need to blend the fortification into the terrain, thus modifying its size, shape and profile; locally standardised designs induced by material shortages; types of material available; terrain conditions; weather; time constraints; preferences and concepts of local commanders; and the ingenuity and imagination of the officers and NCOs supervising construction. Many of the positions and structures specified in manuals were quite elaborate, though these tended to be the ideal standard. Dimensions, even of positions housing the same type of weapon, could vary. A common basic design can be seen in many examples though.
A unit was assigned an area to defend based on terrain, vegetation, enemy forces, unit capabilities (most would be under strength and short of some crew-served weapons), and availability of reserves and supporting fire.
Infantry unit frontages could vary greatly (see Table 1). A major factor affecting the width of a division’s sector was its internal organisation. Standard German infantry divisions had three infantry/grenadier regiments with three battalions each. (On 15 October 1942 all regiments and smaller units designated Infanterie were redesignated Grenadier for ‘morale’ purposes.) This allowed for the standard ‘two up and one back’ formation: that is, two subunits of any given unit were deployed in the main battle line with one behind them in reserve. From late-1943, due to manpower shortages, most infantry divisions were reorganised with only two battalions per regiment, and the reconnaissance battalion (Aufklärungs-Abteilung) was converted to a Füsilier-Bataillon as a mobile reserve. (The Germans employed two terms for ‘battalion’: Bataillon was used by infantry and pioneer battalions, and Abteilung or ‘subdivision’ was used by armour, artillery, smoke, cavalry and other branches.) This required regiments to place both battalions in the line without a reserve, although a company may have been retained as a regimental reserve. However, this meant that one of the battalions was without a reserve. Often all three regiments had to be in the line with only the fusilier battalion as the divisional reserve. In 1942 combat-depleted divisions consolidated the remnants of their reconnaissance and anti-armour battalions into a single unit to serve as a mobile reserve (Panzerjäger und Aufklärungs-Abteilung). The separate battalions were later reconstituted. It was common for the only effective mobile reserve to be found at corps or army level. Mountain (Gebirgs) and light infantry (Jäger) divisions had only two regiments with three battalions, because they were expected to fight on rough terrain with narrow frontages. The 700-series occupation divisions raised in 1941 also had only two regiments and a single artillery battalion. Both of these divisional structures, three two-battalion regiments and two three-battalion regiments, greatly reduced a division’s ability to defend in depth and field a viable reserve.
A Panzergrenadier-Division Grossdeutschland command post. The Germans relied heavily on telephones when defending. The equipment includes two Feldfernsprecher 33 field telephones and a Feldklappenschrank 20-line field switchboard.
A cheval de frise used to close a roadblock. They were ineffective as anti-armour obstacles, but have been used as infantry and cavalry obstacles since ancient times.
The depth of each of the positions depended much on the terrain and likely avenues of enemy approach: there was no specified depth. Depth would be achieved by not only positioning the two subunits forward and the reserve subunit to the rear for each unit, but elements of each subunit might be deployed in depth within the position providing mutual support and protecting the flanks. Various crew-served weapons attached from higher formations added to the width and depth of positions as well.
The main battle line (Hauptkampflinie), analogous to the US ‘main line of resistance’, was determined by the commander using map reconnaissance. Subordinate unit commanders then reconnoitered the ground and moved their units into position. Commanders were cautioned not to spend too much time on reconnaissance so as not to delay construction of defences. They designated their subunit’s area, primary sectors of fire, locations of support weapons, obstacles, minefields, command posts, aid stations, ammunition and supply points, and so on. The higher commander might specify the locations and sectors of fire of crew-served weapons allocated from higher formations in order to ensure their integration into the overall defence plan. Artillery, infantry gun and mortar fire-support plans were developed. Reserve positions were established and counter-attack plans made.
The advanced position (Vorgeschobene Stellung) was established 4,500–6,500m forward of the main battle line. It would be manned by reconnaissance troops, detachments from reserve units, and anti-armour and machine gun subunits. Artillery forward observers would be located there, and the approaches forward of the position were within range of medium artillery (15cm): these could be employed to break up any attack. The forces were widely scattered and in shallow depth. Small troop elements covered the roads, trails and railways approaching the position, plus crossroads, river crossings, and key terrain such as high ground. They warned of enemy attack, prevented patrols from penetrating into the main defences, attempted to force the enemy to deploy early, and called for fire on the enemy. The troops manning the advanced position would withdraw using concealed routes before they became too committed. The advanced position was not employed if the front was stabilised: that is, if enemy forces were in established positions or in close proximity to the German line.
The 8cm mortar firing position was just large enough to accommodate three men and the mortar. An ammunition niche has been cut in the rear of the circular position. Armour protection trenches connect to both sides of the position. The 12cm mortar position was similar, but slightly larger.
The standard German minefield warning sign was a black skull on a white background. Signs marked Minen were also used. These were normally only placed on the German side of minefields, although in areas where civilians were present they were placed all around the field with the aim of removing the signs prior to the Allies’ arrival.
The combat outposts (Gefechtsvorposten) were 2,000–4,500m forward of the main battle line. While similar in concept to the US combat outpost line, they were often better manned. This sector had much the same mission as the advanced position, but might be more heavily armed and manned in stronger positions. It could mislead the enemy as to the location of the main battle line: dummy positions might be constructed for this purpose. Obstacles and minefields were placed on avenues of approach and covered by fire. The combat outposts were within light artillery (10.5cm) range and forward observers from the howitzer batteries were located in these positions Villages, tree lines and clumps, and hills covering the avenues of approach were developed as strongpoints. The Germans fully realised that enemy infantry would more than likely advance through woods and other terrain offering concealment rather than in the open, and so such areas were covered by reconnaissance patrols (Spähtrupp), outposts (Vorposten), lookouts (Feldwache), observation posts (Beobachtungstelle), listening posts (Horchstelle) and fire. The same types of units manning the advanced position, especially if it was not employed, manned the combat outpost position: platoons and companies from the reserve regiment held the strongpoints here. They could also execute small-scale, limited-objective attacks to delay any enemy advance. The outposts were abandoned on order or when in danger of being overrun. Concealed withdrawal routes were selected so as not to interfere with covering artillery fire. Artillery and mortar fire was often registered on the forward positions to delay the enemy and cover the withdrawal. Artillery was usually emplaced approximately one-third of its maximum effective range behind the main battle line.
The main battlefield (Hauptkampffeld) concentrated the bulk of the infantry and their supporting weapons on dominating terrain features or terrain that blocked or covered avenues of advance. Prior to 1942 the main battle position comprised mutually supporting platoon positions. Each company deployed two platoons forward and one in reserve. The reserve company of each battalion was similarly deployed to provide depth to the position. Light machine guns were deployed forward with riflemen, while heavy machine guns could be placed well forward, often slightly to the rear, covering gaps between units, possible enemy attack positions, and the flanks. Anti-armour rifles and light mortars (5cm) were located within the platoon positions to allow the gunners direct observation of targets. Heavy mortars (8cm) were placed on reverse slopes, as were infantry guns. Anti-armour guns were usually to the rear of forward positions and covering avenues of armour advance. Some anti-armour guns were emplaced in forward positions though. Mines were laid and obstacles constructed to the extent allowed by limits of time and matériel. These could be continuous belts laid in depth in well-developed positions.
A division with three three-battalion regiments would normally have two regiments in the main battle position with a total of four battalions forward. This meant that eight of the division’s 27 rifle companies were in the division’s main battle line, each with two platoons forward. To all intents and purposes, the reserve platoons were in the battle line, as they were within sight of the forward platoons and supported them with direct fire. This meant that 24 of the division’s 81 platoons were on the 6,000–10,000m frontline. The combat outpost position was manned by the forward regiments’ reserve battalion and the advanced position, if established, was manned by detachments from the reserve regiment, reconnaissance and anti-tank troops.
The 3.7cm Pak.35/36 gun was the principal regimental anti-armour weapon, but was later supplemented by 5cm and 7.5cm weapons. The brick roadway leads to a dug-in position in which to conceal and protect the gun. Note that the roadway is lower where the gun fires from, a feature intended to lower its silhouette.
In December 1941 the Germans adopted a new defensive concept to deal with the desperate situation on the Eastern Front. The initial plan for the winter of 1941/42 was to drive the Red Army towards the Ural Mountains, seize the main population and industrial centres, and withdraw two-thirds of the German forces, leaving the rest to establish a line of strongpoints to defend the Third Reich’s new frontier. The strongpoint defence was an economy-of-force effort to employ the smallest possible number of troops to cover the widest possible front. German losses had been tremendous and replacements could not be trained fast enough. Understrength units could not man the required wide fronts in the traditional manner – a near continuous linear defence. On 16 December Hitler issued his ‘no retreat’ order, putting a halt to local withdrawals then underway as units sought more easily defendable terrain in which to sit out the winter. The official term for a strongpoint was Stützpunkt, but Hitler preferred ‘hedgehog position’ (Igelstellung): Stützpunkt generally remained in use in official publications though.
The ‘no retreat’ order denied commanders a proven, effective countermeasure to massed Soviet attacks. Regardless of the order, it was still carried out in some instances. When a Soviet attack was imminent the forward troops were pulled back prior to the artillery barrages striking the strongpoints. Depending on the terrain, a withdrawal of 800–2,000m back to second-line positions was all that was required. The barrages fell on empty positions and obstacles, as Russian infantrymen rushed forward supported by tanks. The Germans would then open fire with artillery, mortars and machine guns from long range and wait for the assault’s momentum to slow, formations to become disorganised and disorientated, and then to either withdraw or stumble piecemeal into the prepared defences. The forward positions could usually be reoccupied following German counter-attacks.
Army Group Centre had successfully employed the elastic defence in August and September, but by December German units were so severely under strength that such a defence could not be established other than as a thin screen. Sufficient troops were simply not available to man the multiple-zone, in-depth defence over such broad fronts, and the necessary mobile reserves did not exist. Panzer divisions fielded only a dozen tanks and the remaining crews were serving as infantrymen. Rear service units were stripped to provide infantry replacements. Infantry battalions were at less than company strength, and companies had 25–70 men. The infantry strength of entire corps was less than 2,000 troops with a 250-man battalion deemed well manned. Many units possessed only a quarter of their heavy weapons. Rather than the doctrinal 6–10km sectors, the hollow divisions were assigned 30–60km fronts against the unexpected Soviet counteroffensive. All three regiments had to be placed in the main battle line, with often all nine battalions as well, allowing no regimental reserves other than the battalions’ reserve companies, which were also manning deeper strongpoints. The Germans called it ‘putting everything in the shop window’. Scattered squads and platoons would be held in reserve by battalions and companies to conduct immediate, local counter-attacks. An under-strength reconnaissance battalion served as the division’s only mobile reserve, although if possible divisions retained one infantry battalion in reserve. To make matters worse, the strained German logistics system was on the verge of collapse.
A rifle platoon in defensive position, early war
An early-war rifle platoon (Zug) defensive position is depicted here with all three squads (Gruppe, labelled A, B and C) deployed on line. 19 two-man rifle positions (1) are used. It was intended that the squad light machine guns (2) be positioned to cover the entire platoon front without gaps, but this was not always possible. Alternate machine-gun positions may have been prepared to cover gaps as well as the flanks and the gaps between adjacent platoons. Time permitting, some scattered rifle and one or two light machine-gun positions may have been dug in the rear and oriented in that direction (3). On this type of terrain the positions were typically at 10m intervals, less in densely wooded terrain. In some exceptional circumstances one squad may have been deployed to the rear, oriented forward, to provide depth to the position. If the platoon had four squads one would normally be deployed in the rear. The platoon’s 5cm light mortar (4) is positioned to the rear, but in a place where it could observe its target area, as it had no observers. A 3.7cm anti-armour gun (5) and two heavy machine-gun squads (6) have been attached to the platoon along with an anti-armour rifle troop (7). The forward perimeter and flanks are protected by a double-apron barbed wire fence (a ‘Flanders fence’, 8) some 30–50m from the positions, keeping the troops beyond hand-grenade range. Sods of earth for camouflaging the positions have been removed in the rear from beneath trees and brush (9). The Zugfürher’s (10) and Zug-Truppführer’s (11) positions are also indicated. An observation or listening post (12) is located to the front of the platoon, beyond the wire fence. The large red arrow (feindwärts) indicates the direction towards the enemy.
A road junction strongpoint in Germany made conspicuous by the straight anti-armour ditches (A–D). The hedge-lined roads are blocked by anti-armour mines. Fighting trenches (E) are located in each quadrant of the road intersection. A 7.5cm infantry gun (F) is positioned in a hedgerow and a 2cm flak gun (G), also positioned to engage ground targets, is beside the intersection.
A water-filled portion of the anti-armour ditch ‘A’ shown in the photograph on the left. The moat-like, water-filled ditch was an effective anti-personnel obstacle.
Under-strength companies might organise into two platoons with three 6–10-man squads, each with a machine gun and positioned in a cluster of 3–5 two-man firing positions. Additional machine guns were often provided from service units as a substitute for riflemen. Remaining 5cm mortars were concentrated 50m to the rear under company control. Anti-armour guns were held in the rear to deal with tank breakthroughs. In some instances anti-armour guns were placed in strongpoints, making few available to block breakthroughs in the rear.
A cross-section of a typical Normandy hedgerow (the precise dimensions would vary). The core of the hedgerows comprised rocks gathered by previous generations and piled in lines along the edges of fields. Thick hedges then grew over these berms. The dense roots and rock core made the hedgerows formidable anti-armour and anti-personnel obstacles. They also provided ideal fighting positions.
Strongpoints were established around villages to control roads and provide shelter from the brutal weather until fighting positions and bunkers could be built. Other strongpoints were built on the little available high ground. Weapons were positioned to engage the enemy at maximum range, provide mutual support to adjacent strongpoints, and cover the gaps between strongpoints.
The little remaining artillery was positioned further forward than normal, increasing the danger of it being overrun, to cover the different strongpoints. Many divisions fielded only an under-strength artillery battalion, rather than four, causing the few batteries to be widely dispersed to cover all the strongpoints. This prevented artillery fire from being concentrated en masse on main attacks, as not all batteries could range the wide division front. Mortars were distributed among strongpoints rather than being concentrated behind the forward units, meaning they were unable to range all the strongpoints. They could usually cover adjacent strongpoints though. Light air-defence units positioned their 2cm flak guns in strongpoints, which proved ideal for breaking up mass infantry attacks.
The strongpoint defence remained into mid-1943/1944 in some areas. After that the Germans were in steady retreat. Defences consisted of hastily established lines in scattered sectors without continuous frontlines, little depth, and few if any reserves. As relentless Allied assaults hammered at the Germans on all fronts, time and resources rarely allowed anything close to a doctrinal defence to be established. Pioneer units often built defensive positions and obstacles to await withdrawing infantry. Defences were built on rivers to provide major obstacles; villages and towns were turned into strongpoints and cities into ‘fortresses’ (Festung, essentially a propaganda title). Some of these, though, were well defended with multiple rings of strongpoints protected by anti-armour ditches and minefields. In-depth defences were prepared on the roads leading into the fortress city. Switch positions were constructed between the fortified lines to protect against breakthroughs.
In Normandy the Germans encountered a compartmented maze of cultivated fields, orchards and pastures atop the Collines de Normandie plateau 10–15 kilometres inland (the Bocage country). These fields were separated by earth and rock berms 0.5–1.5m thick and up to 1.5m high. They were topped with dense hedges and small trees from 1m to 5m in height. Ditch-lined roads and wagon tracks, often sunken, ran throughout the area bounded on both sides by hedgerows with small, gated openings into the fields. The enclosed fields could be relatively small up to a few hundred metres to a side. They could be square, rectangular or triangular and were laid out in irregular patterns.
This aerial view of the Normandy Bocage shows how the hedgerows were devoid of formal patterns. Utah Beach is just off the bottom of the photo. The dark areas are cloud shadows.
A slit trench adjacent to a 10.5cm howitzer position in a Normandy hedgerow. While the howitzer’s position was well concealed, the slit trench was poorly camouflaged, a fact that helped aerial photo interpreters detect the battery’s position.
The Germans dug weapon positions and riflemen holes, often with an attached dugout, into the hedgerows as well as dugouts and positions for command posts, telephone exchanges, ammunition points, medical stations and others. Well camouflaged, they were difficult to detect from the ground or air. Observation between fields was impossible and an attacking force had no idea what was behind the next or adjacent hedgerows. The only way to approach a hedgerow was by crossing the open fields. The Germans would dig positions along the far side of the hedgerow and those on the flanks in the defended sectors. There were no continuous straight lines, consisting more of a chequerboard pattern. Allied tactics evolved with alternating fields attacked with tank support while mortars and artillery suppressed the intervening fields’ hedgerows. Hedgerow-cutter ploughs were fabricated for attachment to tanks, allowing them to burst through the berms. The compartmented nature of the hedgerows allowed the Germans to break contact easily though, and withdraw to the next hedgerow.
Defence of a village, north-west Europe
Villages were extremely irregular in pattern and layout, making the organisation of the defence, the selection of strongpoints, the positioning of crew-served weapons, and the placement of obstacles as difficult for the defender to determine as for the attacker to predict. There were endless possibilities. Light defences and observation posts were positioned on the village’s outskirts. In this example, significant anti-armour defences are positioned on the outer edge to the left to blunt an expected tank penetration. These anti-armour guns would have alternate positions deeper in the village. Most strongpoints are located well within the village and machine gunners and snipers (in reality selected riflemen) are scattered through the village to disrupt and delay the attackers. Mortars and infantry guns are positioned to fire on all main approaches and they too have alternate positions in the event of the attacker approaching them. The strongpoints consist of interconnected defended groups of barricaded buildings with concealed firing positions, reinforced cellars and mouse holes connecting buildings. Two of the main roads through the village are left unblocked to allow attacking tanks to enter killing zones within the village. Anti-armour guns repositioned from the outer defence line to the left will cover these. The reserve platoon is located at A. Strongpoints are shown enclosed within red lines.
Hedgerow defences, Normandy, 1944. The faint lines represent the hedgerows and the double broken lines are sunken roads. This c. 300m × 800m company area was self-contained and could fend off attacks from any direction. Note that the buildings were undefended, as they attracted artillery fire. If the perimeter were penetrated, troops would move to the flanking hedgerows to engage the attackers. There were several clusters of positions located in adjacent hedgerows on all sides of this area.