The basic rifleman’s position (Schützenloch – literally ‘firing hole’) was a two-man slit trench, analogous to a foxhole; it was also nicknamed a wolf’s barrow (Wolfgrabhügel). While a one-man hole was used when necessary, the two-man was preferred. It offered soldiers moral support and allowed one to rest with the other on watch. Also, if a one-man position was knocked out, a wide gap was created in the defensive line, whereas in a two-man hole if one was lost the other could still conduct the defence. The one-man rifleman’s position, nicknamed a ‘Russian hole’ (Russenloch), was a simple 70cm-wide, 60cm-deep hole – deep enough to allow a man to kneel in. Soil was piled in a crescent to the front to reduce the amount of digging required. As with other positions the soil was meant to be removed, but often time constraints meant the parapet remained. In the absence of a parapet, the rifle was propped on a small mound of earth or a Y-shaped fork driven into the ground. The ‘Russian hole’ could be deepened to allow a standing position and could later be widened for two men. Initially, two-man positions (Schützenloch für 2 Gewehrschützen) were specified as a short straight trench, 80cm by 1.8m. A slightly curved trench was also approved and this became standard in 1944. This version had two firing steps with a deeper centre section, allowing the riflemen to sit on the firing steps with their legs in the centre hole during shelling and offering protection from overrunning tanks. Armour protection trenches (Panzerdeckungsloch) used the same concept and they too were suitable as rifle positions. They could be V-, W-, or U-shaped, or a shallow crescent. The firing steps were recommended to be 1.4m deep and the deeper central portion 1.8–2m. All of these positions were recommended to be 60–80cm wide at the top and 40cm at the bottom. The recommended distance between positions was 10m, but this varied depending on the unit’s assigned frontage, the terrain and vegetation.
Anti-armour rifles were placed in two-man positions. No special positions were provided for Panzerfausts, they could be fired from any open position with a few considerations. This rocket launcher was normally fired held under the arm, but it could be fired from the shoulder from a dug-in position. In the latter case the rear of the breech end had to be clear of any obstructions because of the 30m back-blast, meaning no rear parapet; nor could the breech-end be angled down too far. They could not be fired from within buildings unless from a very large room, such as a warehouse, with open doors and windows to relieve blast overpressure. The same restrictions applied to the 8.8cm Panzerschreck, but it had a greater back-blast. They were often employed in threes with two positioned forward and one to the rear, the distances dependent on terrain. This allowed the launchers to engage enemy tanks approaching from any direction plus provided an in-depth defence: at least two of the launchers could engage a tank. A 2m-long, V-shaped slit trench without parapet was used, with the two ends of the ‘V’ oriented away from the enemy. The gunner would occupy the arm of the ‘V’ that offered the best engagement of the target tank, and the assistant would load and take shelter from the back-blast in the other arm.
Panzergrenadiers from the Grossdeutschland Division in a two-man rifle position. They have erected a parapet to their front, and have provided it with a loophole. ‘Egg 39’ and ‘stick 29’ hand grenades lie ready on the edge of the hole.
A curved-type Schützenloch für 2 Schützen (rifle position for two riflemen). These were also dug straight.
The squad’s two-man light machine-gun position (Schützenloch für leichte Maschine-gewehr), or ‘machine-gun hole or nest’ (Maschine- gewehrloch oder nest), was a slightly curved, 1.4–1.6m trench with two short armour protection trenches angled to the rear. On the forward side was a 20cm-deep U-shaped platform for the bipod-mounted gun. The position could be placed anywhere within the squad line that provided it the best field of fire. Alternate positions were meant to be up to 50m from the primary position, but were often closer. The three-man heavy machine-gun position (Schützenloch für s.MG.) was similar to the light one, but with armour protection trenches extending from the ends. The platform was still 20cm deep, requiring the long tripod legs to be dug in to lower the weapon’s profile. The difference in design between the light and heavy positions was a weakness, as it allowed aerial photographic interpreters to differentiate between the types. A common design would have prevented this.
A heavy machine-gun position for a tripod-mounted gun could accommodate the two-man crew plus the squad leader.
Expedient efforts and materials were used to construct positions. As the Soviets swept into East Prussia in late-1944, the Germans employed civilians to con struct defensive positions and obstacles behind the field army, so that it could fall back on them. Two sections of 1.5m-diameter, 2m-long con crete culvert pipe were used to build ‘Tobruk pit’ machine-gun positions. A pit was dug and one section laid horizontally on the bottom with one end shored with sandbags or planks, creating the troop shelter. The second pipe was set vertically, with a U-shaped section cut out of one side of the bottom end to mate with the horizontal pipe. The top end of the vertical pipe was flush with the ground. It was quick to build and easily camouflaged.
The light machine-gun position for a bipod-mounted gun could accommodate two men.
An 8.8cm Panzerschreck R.PzB.43 rocket-launcher position. This weapon was shoulder-fired and served in an anti-armour role. The end points of the ‘V’ (at the bottom of the photo) face away from the enemy. The gunner could fire from either arm of the trench, allowing him a flank shot on passing enemy tanks. The other one or two crewmen would shelter from the back-blast in the opposite arm. Note that the area to the rear is clear of obstructions and camouflage. Two or three (sometimes more) of these positions might cover a specific Allied armour avenue of approach.
If a position was occupied for long enough, the rifle and machine-gun positions might be connected by trenches. Trench systems were widely used in the desert as they allowed concealed movement between firing positions in terrain otherwise devoid of cover. They were also used extensively within strongpoints. Trenches followed the terrain’s contours in difference to the geometric patterns laid out in World War I-style that ignored the terrain. Trench systems were not necessarily continuous. Some sections may have been covered with branches and saplings and perhaps a light covering of earth or snow. Trench patterns were zig-zag with each section 10–15m in length: in this way, artillery or mortar rounds striking the trench would only inflict casualties in the section struck. The angled trench sections also prevented any enemy troops that gained the trench from firing down its full length. Crawl trenches (Kriechgraben) were 60–80cm wide at the top (as specified for all trenches), 60cm deep and 60cm wide at the bottom. Connecting trenches (Verbingdungsgraben) or approach trenches (Annäherungsgraben) were 1.8–2m deep and 40cm wide at the bottom. Battle trenches (Kampfgraben) were the same, but with firing steps (Schützennische) and ammunition niches cut into the sides. Some firing steps might be cut into the trench’s rear side for all-round defence. Connecting trenches too might have firing steps, and adjoining armour protection trenches were recommended every 40–50m. Two-man rifle and machine-gun positions were usually dug 2–3m forward of the battle trench and connected by slit trenches (Stichgraben). These were located at the points of trench angles and along the straight sections. Dugout shelters (Unterschlupfe) protecting one to six men were situated in the trench’s forward side at intervals, and nicknamed ‘dwelling bunkers’ (Wohnbunker). These provided protection from sudden artillery and air attacks and tank overruns. They were built as small as possible and in a variety of manners. As the position developed, squad and half-squad bunkers were built off connecting trenches for both protection from artillery and as living quarters. In muddy and wet conditions plank duckboards (Lattenroste) might be placed in the trench’s bottom over a central drainage gutter.
The 5cm mortar position (Schützenloch für leicht Granatwerfer) was a simple slit trench similar to a two-man rifle position, with a 70cm × 1m × 70cm step in the front for the mortar. Shallow rectangular pits were also dug as hasty positions with a U-shaped parapet open in the front. The pit for the 8cm heavy mortar (Nest für s.Gw.) was a 1.6m-deep circular pit, 1.8m in diameter at the bottom. The top would be slightly larger, the degree of side slope depending on the stability of the soil. A 1m3 shelf was cut in the back for ammunition. On either side were armour protection trenches.
In 1943 the ‘8cm heavy mortar pit’ was redesignated the ‘firing position for medium mortar’ (Feuerstellung für mittleren Granatwerfer), as the new 12cm had been adopted as a heavy mortar. The latter’s Feuerstellung für s.Gw. was simply an enlarged version of its 8cm counterpart, 2m deep and 2m in diameter. Since mortars were highly mobile and relatively small, they were often simply emplaced behind any available cover such as in gullies and ditches, or behind mounds, walls or rubble.
‘Nests’ for anti-armour and infantry guns too were redesignated ‘firing positions’ in 1943. Anti-armour gun positions were circular or oval, about 4m across (though this varied), and shallow (40cm for 3.7cm anti-armour guns, and slightly deeper for the 5cm and 7.5cm). Slots were sometimes dug for the wheels to lower the profile of these anti-armour guns. Infantry-gun positions were similar, but deeper (3m in diameter, 50cm deep for the 7.5cm; 6m in diameter, 1.3m deep for the 15cm). Ramps dug in the position’s rear allowed the gun to be emplaced and withdrawn. A low parapet was placed some 2m behind the ramp’s upper end to protect the position’s rear opening. If armour protection trenches were not dug on either side of the position, shallow slit trenches were dug inside the position immediately adjacent to the gun and in some instances beneath the gun between the wheels. In fully developed positions a downward angled ramp was sometimes dug, and the gun could be rolled down this to place it below ground level. The lower end of the ramp was sometimes provided with overhead cover (Untersellraum). These were sometimes built for anti-armour and flak guns as well. Infantry guns, being smaller and lighter than artillery pieces, were often emplaced in hastily built positions, like mortars. Anti-armour guns by necessity had to be in well-concealed positions to survive and inflict losses on enemy tanks. They also had to be able to relocate to other positions quickly once detected by the enemy. For this reason, while a gun’s initial position may have been a fully prepared one, subsequent positions were often only partly prepared or simply a hastily selected site providing concealment and the necessary field of fire.
A light machine-gun position with a small firing platform and no parapet. A communications trench at the top connects this position to other ones. The boards lying forward of the position prevented dust from giving away its location.
A light machine-gun position with a large firing platform and a niche for the ammunition bearer. The parapet is low in order to reduce the profile of the position. This practice was first adopted in the featureless landscape of North Africa and was later used in other open areas.
2cm flak guns, single and quad, were increasingly employed in forward positions in the ground fire role, especially on the Eastern Front. When deployed so, they were positioned on their own in the frontline. The firing position for 2cm flak (Feuerstellung für 2cm Flak) was circular, 5.5m in diameter and 45cm deep, and was lined with ammunition niches and compartments for gun equipment. 2cm and 3.7cm guns were set on a slightly elevated triangular platform.
Flak positions
The Germans categorised flak gun positions according to their conditions of employment (Feldmäßig). (1) Feldmäßig: the gun was simply set up in the open and remained on the carriage. (2) Feldmäßiger Ausbau: the gun was dismounted from the carriage and positioned behind a hastily erected parapet (made of earth, sand, rocks, logs, sandbags, or packed snow). (3) Verstärkter Feldmäßiger Ausbau: a purpose-built position of planks and timber, brick, or light concrete. (4) Ständiger Ausbau: a solid, permanent, concrete position that included flak towers.
While the parapet’s exterior shape and thickness could vary, the interior dimensions of a six-sided position are given below. Square-shaped positions with approximately the same cross-section measurements were also common.
| Calibre | Cross-section A | Sidewall B |
| 2–2.5cm | 5m | 2m |
| 2cm (quad)–4cm | 6m | 2.5m |
| 5cm–10.5cm | 7m | 3m |
| 12.8cm | 8m | 4m |
2cm and 3.7cm flak platoons were positioned with the three guns in a triangle, with the point facing the expected direction of air attack. The interval between the guns was 50–75m, reduced to 30m in 1944. From that time, rather than having the guns under the control of individual gun commanders, a single command post was situated in the position’s centre.
The 8.8cm flak gun was sometimes employed as an ad hoc anti-armour gun on all fronts. While extremely accurate at long range and capable of knocking out any tank with high rates of fire, it had its limitations in this role. It was very large and had a high profile, making it difficult to conceal and requiring a great deal of effort to dig in. Its large size and the need for a heavy prime mover made it difficult and slow to withdraw and reposition. When used in the anti-armour role, the ‘88’ was hidden among buildings, or in wooded areas, or defiladed in gullies and road cuts.
Divisional field artillery pieces were provided circular or roughly triangular firing positions (Geschützestellung). These usually had substantial all-round parapets and were deeper than other more forward gun positions for protection from counter-battery fire. Ready ammunition niches might be dug into the forward side, armour protection trenches attached to the sides, a rear entry/exit ramp added, and separate ammunition niches and crew shelters located to the rear. A simple artillery firing position was prepared by digging a shallow pit and piling the earth to the front. Any existing cover might be used for this purpose. Armour protection trenches or merely simple slit trenches were dug to either side of the gun to protect the crew from ground, artillery and air attack. As air attack became common, these slit trenches were placed further from the gun position. Several ammunition niches were dug to the rear. A battery’s four gun positions were set 30–50m apart and could be placed in a straight or staggered line, a square or a diamond formation. The battery headquarters was to the rear of the positions. The horse and ammunition wagon parking was well to the rear of the battery position (up to 200m) in a concealed area to protect it from artillery. Camouflage was essential for the battery to survive, and so positions were often covered with camouflage nets. Each battery had two light machine guns for ground and air defence.
Slit trenches were dug in rear areas as air raid shelters (Luftschutzraum). These varied in form and dimension, but two typical examples were the straight trench (2m long, 40–60cm wide and 1.6m deep), and the three-leg zig-zag trench which had each leg with approximately the same dimensions as the straight trench. Trenches might be roofed over with earth-covered logs or bundled brushwood fascines. Interestingly, such shelters were dug in at distances as great as 40km behind the front.
A variety of different designs of squad and half-squad underground shelters or bunkers (Gruppen und Halbgruppen-unterstand) were available for protection and living. These bunkers were built to the rear of the main defences, within strongpoints and near crew-served weapons positions. They were not fighting positions, being completely below ground and lacking firing ports. They were to provide more practical living quarters than small dugouts, trenches and holes. They also provided good protection from artillery and air attack, as well as the extremes of wind, rain, snow and cold. Wherever possible, they were built completely below ground level, with the top flush with the ground. If the water table or extremely hard or rocky ground prevented a buried bunker they were dug as deep as possible with double log walls (50cm between logs), filled with rock or packed soil, and the above-ground sides and roof banked with packed soil and covered with sod. Entry was gained through a trench (connected to a communications trench), down some stairs, and into a vestibule separated from the main room, although this last luxury was not always present. Wood floors were provided if sufficient dimensioned lumber was available. When it was not, straw was used, which had to be changed periodically. Individual or multi-person two- or three-level platform bunks (Pritsche) were integrated. A table (Tisch) and benches (Bank) were provided. Rifle racks (Gewehrständer) might be mounted on a wall near the door. Sometimes a short emergency exit tunnel was provided.
If available a wood or oil stove (Ofen) was installed with a stovepipe. Small, canister-like, gasoline-burning heaters were used such as the motor vehicle heater and the smaller Juwel 33 heater. Little folding stoves (Esbit Kocher), fuelled by hexa-methylene tetamine tablets, were used to heat mess tins. Sand-filled cans soaked with petrol were used for heat during cold nights. Light was provided by kerosene lanterns, candles (with melted wax remoulded into new candles) and small ration cans fitted with a wick burning rifle oil known as a ‘Hindenburg lamp’ (Hindenburger Lampe). Expended cartridge cases, 2cm or 3.7cm for example, had the mouth crimped to a narrow slit, filled with oil, and a wick inserted to make a crude lamp. Issue field pocket lamps (Feldtaschen Lampe, flashlights) were used sparingly as batteries were scarce.
A squad trench in the final days of the war, in East Prussia. Firing steps have been cut into the trench’s sides. In the upper centre is the entrance to a squad bunker.
The elaborate bunkers pictured in manuals could not always be built in urgent situations. During December 1941, 6.Panzer-Division, with its former tank crews fighting as infantry, was forced from a chain of villages within a forested area. It could either withdraw to another line of villages and possibly be enveloped, or it could establish a hasty defensive line in a temperature of −49°F without adequate shelter, which would mean death from exposure. During the previous few days’ engagements on open terrain, daily casualties from frostbite had risen drastically to 800 per day. The division would soon lose its ability to function. The immediate construction of bunkers for both fighting and shelter was essential. The single corps and two divisional engineer battalions had only 40–60 men each and very little equipment. However, the division had recently received a large quantity of demolitions. The engineer battalion commanders were ordered to disregard the harsh weather conditions and blast multiple lines of craters in the solidly frozen ground along the specified battle line to shelter all combat units and reserves. The craters were sighted to provide mutual in-depth fire support. Each crater/bunker could hold 3–5 men. The engineers also mined approaches and built tank obstacles at three sites. The reserves and service troops packed down paths between the craters and to the rear, essentially snow communications trenches. They used readily available lumber and logs to cover the craters.
Squad (Gruppenunterstand) and half-squad bunkers (Halbgruppenunterstand) were built in many forms, from simple single rooms to large, complex, multi-room bunkers.
2cm flak gun position
Single and quad 2cm Flak38 guns were found to be extremely effective against massed infantry attacks on the Eastern Front; they were also used against light armoured vehicles. Although emplaced in positions optimised for ground fire, they could still engage ground attack aircraft. This well-developed position consists of four components: the gun position (1, Feuerstellung für 2cm Flak), gun shelter (2, Untersellraum), half-squad living quarters bunker (3, Halbgruppenunterstand) and an armour protection trench (4). The gun position’s interior was lined with niches for dozens of 20-round magazines of high-explosive and armour-piercing ammunition as well as equipment, such as containers for spare barrels, spare parts, tools, cleaning gear, the optical sight, and the Em.R.36 1m stereoscopic range finder (deleted in winter 1944/45, with aiming now accomplished only using tracer stream). The underground gun shelter, with a recess for the gun barrel, was intended to protect the gun during shelling, but these were seldom built because of the time and effort involved. Left in the open, the gun was protected by a canvas tarp, which also camouflaged it. Other weapon crews and small subunits typically used the half-squad bunker. The inset (A) shows the position in plan view.
Blasting holes
Exceedingly hard, rocky or frozen ground proved to be virtually impossible to dig into with infantry hand tools. Blasting with TNT or picric acid demolition charges (Sprengstoff) was necessary. The cylindrical 100g boring cartridge 1928 (Bohrpatrone 28) was covered with light brown paper. The rectangular 200g demolition charge 1928 (Sprengkörper 28) was covered in brown paper, but picric acid charges were also issued with brown Bakelite covers. The 1kg demolition charge 1924 (Sprengbüchse 24) had a green, rectangular pressure-resistant zinc casing, which allowed it to be used under water. There were also 3kg (pictured above) and 10kg (6.6 lb and 22 lb) charges similar to the 1kg. A starter hole was dug by hand and a small charge inserted. The explosion created a small crater in which progressively larger charges were detonated until a hole of the desired size was obtained. German pioneers possessed earth-boring drills; if these were available, a deep hole could be made and a large charge inserted, creating a sizeable crater. Loose spoil was then removed from the hole, the interior squared off, and firing steps and ammunition niches added.
The blasting of the crater lines began the next morning. The enemy appeared to think the blasting was artillery fire and did not advance. The blasting was completed by noon and by night the craters were finished by infantrymen with hand tools, covered with lumber, logs and snow, and occupied. Smoke soon rose from the bunkers, where the troops kept warm with open fires. Outposts were established forward of the bunkers, and abatis obstacles were laid in front of these, with anti-armour guns emplaced on higher ground covering the tank obstacles. The entire line was prepared within 12 hours of the first detonation. The engineers who prepared the positions suffered 40 per cent frostbite casualties, but the next day division frostbite casualties dropped from 800 to four. The line withstood all enemy attacks and was not abandoned until ten days later, in milder weather, when the adjacent units on both flanks were forced to withdraw after enemy tanks had penetrated their lines.
German camouflage (Tarnung) practices attempted to blend fortifications into the surrounding terrain and vegetation to prevent detection from both the ground and air. Efforts were made to hide positions outright as well, an example being the completely buried below ground personnel bunkers. Natural materials were used alongside camouflage nets, screens and pattern painting. German directives stated that cover and camouflage measures should not obstruct a weapon’s field of fire.
Basic camouflage principles of frontline positions included positioning emplacements within vegetated areas and among rubble and broken terrain, avoiding a neat orderly appearance (though manuals depicted fortifications as tidy, in practice they were not), avoidance of silhouetting against the sky and contrasting backgrounds, removing spoil or concealing turned earth, concealing firing ports with tree branches or wreckage materials, building fortifications inside existing buildings, and the fabrication of screens from brushwood to mask movement along roads and tracks. The dispersal of fortifications, positions and facilities in irregular patterns was also common.
In barren, snow-covered, and featureless desert areas it was cautioned that camouflaged positions should not be located near any existing features, otherwise this would allow an enemy observer to reference the position’s location. Snow positions were not as easy to camouflage as may be assumed. Dug-up snow looks very different to undisrupted snow and even after additional snowfall it appears different. Vehicle and foot tracks point to positions. Machine guns cause black powder marks in front of firing ports making them easy to detect. Any movement, even by white-clad troops, is easily detectable against snow backgrounds. Smoke from heating and cooking fires also signals the locations of positions. White sheets were often used to conceal crew-served weapons, but were easily detected at close range.
A four-metre Em.R.4m range-finder used with 8.8cm flak guns in an above ground position. This is an excellent example of small-diameter log revetting banked with earth on the exterior. The earth banking has been covered with camouflaging sods. The entrance to the right has been revetted with planks of wood.
An incomplete tank turret emplacement (Ringstand für Panzerkampfwagen Turn), here using a 7.5cm Panther Pz.Kpfw. V turret. The turret was mounted on a steel frame and could be hand-traversed. The frame’s sides would be strengthened with timbers or logs and banked with earth. Beneath the frame is the crew’s log-built shelter. While under construction, the position was camouflaged from aerial detection by branches, which have been pulled away to allow it to be photographed.
The removal of soil from around positions and the lack of parapets were for concealment purposes. It is extremely difficult to detect such positions from ground level, especially if all signs of work have been removed or concealed. Soil parapets around positions are easily detectable from the air because of the turned soil’s contrast with surrounding undisturbed soil and vegetation, which appears white or very light grey. Parapets also cast shadows, which are detectable from the air. The lack of parapets for concealment was especially effective in the desert and Russian steppes.
One determining factor might be the location of a position in relation to enemy ground-level observers. A parapet might be thrown up behind a position so that the occupants would not be silhouetted against the sky or contrasting terrain. When parapets were built they were sometimes camouflaged with sod removed from the position’s site and beneath where the parapets would be thrown. The soil was spread outward from the position and the parapet kept low. Evergreen tree branches were also used to conceal parapets, but had to be replaced every couple of days: in the Russian winter they froze and remained green for some time. If the ground was covered with fallen leaves these too were spread over parapets and other turned soil for camouflage. Positions were often placed on the reserve slopes of hills and ridges to conceal them from ground observation and direct fire. Camouflage nets were used to conceal the entrances to bunkers, erected over artillery positions, and sometimes laid on the ground to cover trenches and their parapets. In the latter case the nets were supported by taut wire staked in a zig-zag pattern over the trench, and it also supported camouflaging brush and branches.
Riflemen’s positions were sometimes camouflaged with camouflage tent quarters (Zeltbahn rain capes), covers woven from vines and twigs, and sections cut from camouflage nets. Lift-up lids for riflemen’s positions were made by constructing a criss-crossed stick frame and wiring on sections of sod trimmed to match the surrounding ground. These are known as ‘spider holes’.
The use of dummy positions and facilities and mock-up vehicles was very common, especially in Africa. Since it was impossible to conceal activity in the desert, deception efforts were widespread. To be effective, dummy vehicles had to be moved nightly, at least partly camouflaged, and fake tracks had to be made. Dummy bunkers were constructed by simply piling, shaping, and lightly camouflaging spoil removed from actual positions, which provided a means of disposing of excess soil. Knee-deep dummy trenches connected dummy positions and were filled with brush to make them appear deeper from the air. Sentries manned dummy positions and fires were burned to make them appear occupied.
This U-shaped 10.5cm 18/1 Wespe (‘wasp’) self-propelled howitzer position was also used to shelter tanks and assault guns. It might be used as a firing position or as a shelter for protection from artillery and air attack. Such emplacements were commonly built into hedgerows or hidden beneath trees, and were also dug deeper without a parapet, with only the turret exposed above ground level. The crew would often dig a shallow pit beneath the vehicle to sleep in.
Any night-time illumination can sharply silhouette a defensive position, as demonstrated here by the muzzle flash of a mortar.