When the advance elements of the Afrikakorps arrived at Tripoli in February 1941 they found the Libyan Desert to be a totally alien environment. Regardless of the much-touted preparatory training that the troops bound for Africa received they were ill prepared.
Most of the fighting in Libya and Egypt occurred on the coastal strip extending up to 60km inland. This region predominantly comprises undulating ground crossed by 4–20m high ridges and hills with gentle slopes. The high ground is covered with barren exposed rock, much of it loose. In the wide flat valleys the rocky ground is covered by chalk, clay and dust on which patches of camel thorn grow. Wet and dry salt marshes are dotted along the coast. In some areas broad wadis cut the ground. These were normally dry watercourses edged by low banks, broken in many areas allowing vehicle passage, and with sand bottoms. The areas referred to as mountains are only a few hundred metres above sea level, and are barren, rocky, terraced and cut by numerous gouges and ravines. Sand dunes were encountered along the coast, at the base of the ‘mountain ranges’, near large wadis, and in the desert proper inland from the coastal plain.
A Tobruk light machine-gun position built from logs rather than the usual concrete (Machinegewehr-Ringstand aus Rundholz). The overhead cover was always flush with the ground, making the position difficult to detect. Note the inset illustration at the bottom left showing the method of notching logs.
Every metre of elevation provided an advantage for both observation, fields of fire, and cover. The lack of vegetation and significant high ground in most areas made camouflage efforts a challenge. Wadis were something of an obstacle, but were valuable for concealing units, vehicles and positions, as were the reverse slopes of low ridges.
The chalk surface found on much of the coastal plain presented both problems and advantages for the construction of field works. This layer was formed when winter rains were absorbed and then rose to the surface in the summer: their evaporation created a hard cement-like crust of gravel and dissolved chalk and silica. This surface crust could be 50cm–2m thick within 30km of the coast, lessening in thickness and firmness further inland and diminishing in the deep desert. A major effort was required to dig though the chalk layer, and often required blasting or power tools. Beneath it was soft soil or sand. Often a small hole was cut through the chalk and chambers dug out beneath it. The 1–2m-thick overhead chalk layer did not require support for distances up to 35m and was able to resist bombardment. Soft sidewalls had to be revetted. Dried-up cisterns, called Bir, dating from Roman times, were used as command posts, shelters and ammunition points. These had a small influx hole through the chalk layer and consisted of roughly 10m × 10m chambers.
The lack of wood meant that sandbags (in short supply), rocks, sand-filled ammunition boxes and petrol tins were extensively used for revetting. When positions could not be dug in the hard chalk layer, rocks were simply stacked in low circular walls creating a sangar (a Kashmiri term widely adopted by the British) – the German term was In Felsen gehauene (rock-encased). Unless made to appear like a natural rock pile, they were easy to detect at moderate ranges. Since materials to construct overhead cover were not available, positions would be dug into the ground in the thinner surface chalk areas and then niches dug at right angles beneath the crust layer. Even in the chalk-surface areas, loam and clay-filled depressions and wadi bottoms allowed positions to be dug as normal. In coastal areas brackish water was found within 1m of the surface, forcing shallow, partly above-ground positions to be built. In the rear areas spoil would be heaped in parapets. Tents and shelter quarters were pitched in pits and over slit trenches so the occupants slept below ground level and had protection from the sun and nighttime cold. In the frontline and outpost positions, soil was to be removed and parapets not used. This made it extremely difficult to detect fighting positions from even short ranges. If spoil could not be removed it was spread out around the position to a height of no more than 22cm. This usually created a layer of contrasting soil though. Desert haze, dust and ground glare all served to further conceal positions dug into the ground at longer ranges. In areas with hard or rocky ground the positions were shallow, forcing the defenders to remain motionless all day under the blistering heat and swarming flies, with many suffering from dysentery.
Camouflage of positions and vehicles was impossible in most areas. Dust clouds and vehicle tracks made it even more difficult. Once a weapon had been fired, its position was revealed by dust. Wadis, depressions and reverse slopes were used to the maximum extent possible. Camouflage nets and camel thorn were used to conceal vehicles. This may not have totally hidden the vehicle, but it prevented its distinctive shadow from revealing its presence and type. Key vehicles were dug in if possible and widely dispersed.
Barbed-wire and man-made obstacles in general were little used because of the lack of materials, the wide frontages and the capacity to outflank positions. They were sometimes employed around strongpoints though, but from the air they highlighted the positions they protected. When used they were often placed on low ground or reverse slopes. Barbed wire was more effective concealed if 200m from the frontline than 50m and exposed in the open. Extensive anti-armour and anti-personnel minefields were relied on as the principal obstacle.
Attempts were initially made to emulate European defensive zones with near continuous lines. This proved ineffective and a strongpoint system was developed. Often each squad established a strongpoint with support weapons distributed to them. The squad strongpoint would have its light machine gun plus possibly a heavy machine gun, anti-armour or 2cm flak gun, and sometimes a mortar, with all positions connected by trenches. Two squads would be forward and one back. Platoons and companies would similarly be deployed in what was called a ‘chequered’ defence area in at least three lines and to a depth of at least 200m. Depth was critical, and preferred to a solid, continuous front. Fire and mines covered the gaps between strongpoints. Often efforts were made to link all the strongpoints with connecting trenches. This was acceptable within platoon areas, but attempting to connect all strongpoints over large areas was a waste of time, effort and resources. Once the enemy attacked, troops remained in their strongpoints. Evacuation of casualties, ammunition resupply and redistribution of troops would not occur while directly engaged, only during lulls. The connecting trenches could not be defended and if the enemy gained them they provided him with covered approaches to the strongpoints.
Mobile units employed defensive tactics as well. When they halted for the night they would form a tight perimeter (Lager) on defendable, slightly elevated ground with clear fields of fire: all tank guns, artillery pieces and anti-armour guns would be placed in the perimeter and soft-skin transport vehicles in the centre. Infantry would establish outposts on possible approaches. While mobile warfare was preferred in the desert, German offensives could not be sustained and the defence assumed great importance as Allied strength grew in North Africa.
The Apennine Mountains spread along almost the entire length of the Italian Peninsula. Rivers running into the sea across the hilly coastal plains cross-compartment the peninsula with narrow, flat valleys. The valleys were extremely muddy in the winter and spring. A force fighting its way up the peninsula was faced with repetitive ridges and steep-sided mountains. Citrus and olive groves and vineyards covered the terraced lower slopes and evergreen and scrub trees the upper. The roads were few and very restrictive being limited to valleys with only infrequent passes. The ground was extremely rocky. Villages were situated on naturally dominating terrain making them ideal for defence as well as shelter from the harsh weather. The thick-walled buildings, most with cellars, were substantially constructed of stone and mortar and the towns irregularly arranged. They provided even better defensive positions when rubbled. Anti-armour and machine guns were often emplaced in cellars and the overhead floors reinforced by rubble. AFVs were limited to the easily blocked narrow roads and were extremely exposed when approaching towns.
In many areas the terrain was cut by so many intertwined ridges, ridge fingers, gorges and ravines that not all approaches could be defended. The bases and lower slopes of mountains were often covered with jumbled boulders and loose rocks. Attackers, if they had effectively reconnoitered, would infiltrate the defended area and even attack it from above, the rear or the flank. While mutual support between fighting positions was desired, what Field Marshall Albert Kesselring called a ‘string of pearls’, the terrain was often too rough and too many positions were required to block every avenue of approach. Anti-personnel mines were used extensively and anti-tank mines could easily block roads, as did demolitions. While the mountains and ridges provided the defender with excellent long-range observation (clouds, fog, rain and snow permitting), fields of fire and observation in the immediate vicinity of defensive positions were usually limited. Surprise attacks and close-range fights were common.
This Italian-designed, hexagonal pillbox, featuring multiple machine-gun ports, was extensively used by the Germans in Italy. Some were better camouflaged than others, blending in well with the rocky terrain. However, because the embrasures were rock-faced, machine gun fire directed into them would ricochet into the pillbox, creating rock fragments.
Abundantly available rock was the most commonly used construction material for pillboxes, bunkers and other positions. Cement was sometimes available for mortar allowing substantial structures to be built. Railroad ties and rails were also available. In the well-prepared, in-depth defensive lines, such as the Gustav Line spanning the peninsula south-east of Rome, concrete fortifications were built. Rock-built fortifications hidden among the scrub trees were easily blended into the surrounding terrain and difficult to detect from the ground or air.
The 160km Gustav Line had been established along the Rapidi and Sangro river valleys in the autumn of 1943. Mountains in this area ranged from 900m to over 2,200m high. The Germans were able to maintain an adequate mobile reserve on the Italian Front. An outer defence line, the Winter Line, protected its western half. When this and the western Gustav Line were penetrated, the Germans fell back, hinging on 1,533m Monte Cassino, and established the Führer Riegel, known to the Allies as the Hitler Line, while the eastern portion of the Gustav Line remained intact until broken in mid-1944. (Riegel means ‘bar’ as in ‘a bar on the door’. It was renamed Senger Riegel, after the commander of XIV Panzer-Korps, to avoid having a ‘defeat’ line named after the Führer.)
Since digging was difficult to impossible, defenders made use of ravines, gullies, knolls and ground folds. Blasting was required to excavate many positions. There were usually enough nooks and crannies that could be covered over with logs and topped by rock for suitable fighting positions and shelters, if they were in the necessary location to cover approaches. Rock sangars were extensively used and these too were sometimes covered. Mortars proved to be especially effective in the short-range battles as they could respond quickly and their steep trajectory allowed them to reach into ravines and behind steep ridges.
The Soviet Union provided a wide variety of terrain, including immense forests, huge wooded swamps, vast seemingly endless steppes and mountains. Each of these areas presented its own challenges and opportunities to the Germans in defence.
Forests allow only limited fields of observation and fire to both the defender and attacker. The advantages to the defenders are the limited and channelled AFV approaches, ease of concealment from ground and air observation, and abundant building and obstacle materials. The Germans would not defend on the forward edge of a forest, but would dig in well within the forest to make the enemy guess their location, make it difficult to adjust artillery fire on them, and avoid direct fire from the approaching enemy. Outposts (to warn of the enemy’s approach) and observers (to direct artillery) were positioned on the wood line. Heavy timber roadblocks were constructed and abitis obstacles made from fallen trees, and tangled branches provided good anti-personnel obstacles. They could restrict fields of fire and observation though, as did dense vegetation, forcing positions to be located more closely together. Fields of fire in forests were not stripped bare as this would alert the enemy. Small bushes and lower branches were selectively removed and the bare cut marks smeared with mud so that the enemy unknowingly entered the field of fire. Individual riflemen, snipers and machine gunners could be scattered in-depth to make forward movement of the enemy difficult. They also protected gaps between units. Anti-armour guns could be concentrated and placed in-depth along the few roads penetrating the forest. Indirect fire weapons had to be positioned where scarce clearings provided high-angle fire rather than being positioned to optimise their range.
A squad strongpoint in the desert
Because of the need to defend wide frontages in the desert and the expansive fields of observation and fire, German units often built self-contained, widely scattered, reinforced squad strongpoints. An ideal example is shown here. The weapons positions and dugouts were to be at least 6m apart along the 40–60m zig-zag trench. One- and two-man rifle positions (1) were set 1–2m forward of the trench. Firing steps might be used, including on the trench’s rear side. Not all such strongpoints had an 8cm mortar (2). A 2cm flak gun may have been substituted for the 3.7cm or 5cm anti-armour gun (3, shown above scale for clarity). Some strongpoints may have had two machine guns, one at each end (4 and 5). Lacking a flak gun, one of the machine guns (5) would be provided with an air-defence mount as well as an alternative position for ground fire. This combination of weapons provided the strongpoint with direct and indirect anti-personnel fire, direct anti-armour fire and air defence. Sufficient dugouts and small bunkers (6, hidden) were available for all personnel. Such a strongpoint might be manned by 16–24 troops. It would be sighted on any piece of high ground, even if only a couple of metres above the surrounding desert. Camouflage nets might have been used. The barbed-wire barrier (7), if present, was erected c. 50m from the strongpoint. Anti-armour mines would be emplaced outside the barbed wire along with some anti-personnel mines (8). The listening post (9), accessed via a crawl trench, was manned at night to guard against infiltration. Flare pistols were used to signal other strongpoints and command posts that a strongpoint was under attack, with coloured flare combinations identifying the type of attack and direction. The large red arrow (feindwärts) indicates the direction towards the enemy.
Swamps had characteristics similar to forests, but caused severe problems for both defender and attacker. The flooded terrain, though shallow, severely limited movement and made large attacks difficult. To the defender’s advantage was the fact that AFVs could seldom be employed. The few dirt roads and tracks could not support armour. It also made the supply of forward positions and the movement of heavy weapons difficult. Every patch of above-water ground and every clump of trees were used for defensive positions. High-water tables meant most positions had to be built above ground. Timber fighting positions were built on log rafts and could be moved to better positions if required. Mines could not generally be used.
On the Russian steppes, long snow-bank barriers formed defensive lines with firing positions. Dugouts too were set in the snow berms, which were revetted with snow-filled fuel drums and hay bails (as shown here). Canvas tarps sometimes covered the dugout entrances.
The view from an Eastern Front trench. The irregular piles on the berm served as camouflage. Beyond the trench is a battered barbed-wire cattle fence reinforced with tangled brush.
Pakfront
The Germans developed the Pakfront (armour defence gun front) concept in Russia in 1943. This was an extension of the idea of emplacing anti-armour guns behind the forward positions and engaging them after the enemy had broken through, the reasoning being that the enemy was in a more disorganised state at this point, with its armour separated from any supporting infantry. Soviet armour usually broke through in large numbers, and since some at least remained under the effective control of the commander, they could drive into the German rear and cause havoc. The concept called for the divisional anti-armour battalion (corps- and army-level battalions were also employed) to position 6–10 (sometimes more) 7.5cm anti-armour guns (pictured below to the rear of the 3.7cm and 5cm) under a single commander on favourable terrain that blocked the main tank routes into the rear. The guns were well dug in and concealed. Their prime movers were hidden close by to quickly relocate the guns to alternative positions or a second fallback Pakfront position. In effect the Pakfront ambushed marauding tanks at short range with all guns opening fire simultaneously. Artillery and rocket projector (Nebelwerfer) fire would support the Pakfront as available reserves and armour moved into counter-attack positions. The Soviets adopted a similar antitank reserve (Protivotankovny Rezerv).
The hundreds of kilometres of broad, gently rolling steppes were barren terrain, with few roads, villages, rivers or notable features. It was often impossible for units to determine their location on a map, as the sunflower-covered land was flat from horizon to horizon in all directions. There were fewer significant terrain features on which to defend than in the desert and fewer building materials. Simply digging in was all that could be accomplished. Units were often scattered widely with little contact between them. Whether defending or when halted during an advance, they prepared an all-round defence.