part0016

IN order to record the personal experiences of each tank Crew Commander in battle, and to collect statistics as to the work of the tanks themselves, shortly before the battle of Arras was fought, a form was introduced known as a “Tank Battle History Sheet.” These sheets were issued to Crew Commanders prior to an engagement, were filled in by them after its completion and, eventually, forwarded to Tank Corps Headquarters, where they were summarised by the Tank Corps General Staff. By this means it was possible to collect many valuable experiences from the soldiers themselves, information which unfortunately so frequently is apt to evaporate when the final battle report starts on its journey from one headquarters to the next.

Outside the material value of these reports they frequently possessed a psychological value, and by reading them with a little insight it was possible to gauge, with fair accuracy, the moral of the fighting men, an “atmosphere” so difficult to breathe when in rear of the battle line, so impossible to create, and yet so necessary to the mental health of the General Staff and the Higher Command.

Orders received.—To attack Telegraph hill with infantry of 14th Division at 7.30 a.m. on April 9, 1917, then proceed along Hindenburg Line to Neuville Vitasse. To wait at rallying-point N.E. of Neuville Vitasse until infantry advanced again towards Wancourt. To proceed with infantry to Wancourt and assist them wherever necessary.

Report of action.— Tank left starting-point at Beaurains at 6.30 a.m., on April 9, 1917, crossed our front line at 7.27 a.m., attacking Telegraph hill with the infantry at 7.30 a.m.; then worked towards Neuville Vitasse along the Hindenburg Line. At a point about 1,000 yards N.E. of Neuville Vitasse, the tank was caught in a trap consisting of a large gun-pit carefully covered with turf. I and Sergeant B-immediately got out and went to guide other tanks clear of the trap in spite of M.G. and shell fire.

(Signed) A— Lieut.,

Orders received.— To proceed from Mercatel to the Zoo trench system through the Cojeul switch to Nepal trench, from thence with the infantry to Wancourt.

Report of action.— Owing to mechanical trouble tank was delayed in coming into action. Having rectified this, I proceeded to join D.10—D.11 as ordered.

I eventually found these tanks out of action and proceeded alone to a further line of trenches, where I met with decidedly severe hostile machine-gun and shell fire. I consider we were successful in quelling one of the many sniper posts, but on account of being ditched were prevented from proceeding. It would appear, however, that the presence of my tank—it being on the right flank of our infantry, which was up in the air—was a deterrent to the enemy, of whom small bodies were still in existence in the vicinity. I caused my 6-pounders to be manned, and we held our position for three days, when the tank was eventually got out of her position. As a whole, the crew worked together well and cheerfully, but I would especially commend Corporal D— for unfailing cheerfulness and devotion to duty under very trying and disappointing circumstances.

Orders received.— To attack enemy strong point at 0.19.a.07 as my first objective, then to proceed to banks in 0.19.b. and return with the infantry until the Blue Line was consolidated, as my second objective.

My third objective was to conform with an advance by the infantry at zero plus seven hours, and to attack a tangle of trenches in 0.21.a. & b. just in advance of the Red Line. It was eventually left to my decision as to the possibility of attempting this third objective.

Report of action.— Advanced with infantry, but owing to heavy mist had great difficulty in following exact route. Reached first objective at 5.20 a.m., having approached it from the river side. Successfully dealt with several of the enemy on left bank of river, causing them to retire. Cruised about until joined by tank No. 522, D. 3. Then proceeded towards second objective. On the way I saw our infantry retiring, went ahead to stop enemy advance. Whilst going forward I saw Lieutenant F—’s tank, which was then off its route. Lieutenant F—came out of his tank and informed me that he had lost his way. I redirected him, and he then rejoined his tank. Almost immediately after this (approx. 6.30 a.m.) both tanks came under direct antitank gun and machine-gun fire. The latter was silenced by my left 6-pounder gun. I manoeuvred to present as small a target as possible to the former. The tank, however, received about six direct hits, which damaged both tracks, set alight the spare petrol carried in box in rear of tank, and possibly caused other serious damage. The whole crew succeeded in escaping from the tank unhurt. Position of tank as stated.

I then returned to Coy. H. Q. and reported.

(Signed) E --, Lieut.,

Orders received. —To advance from starting-point on British front line at T.4.b.4.5 to Hindenburg Line at point T.6.a.0.5, from which point infantry were to bomb along Hindenburg Line (front and support) to river Sensee at U.7.a.4.4. Tank to assist infantry and after objective at river taken to proceed to Croisilles.

Report of action. —I started from starting-point at T.4.b.4.5 at zero, and made for Hindenburg wire at T.6.a.0.5, crossing same and getting into touch with our infantry, from whom I received report that they were held up by machine-guns along the trench. I proceeded to this point and cleared the obstacle. I then travelled parallel to the trench, knocking out machine-gun emplacements and snipers’ posts all the way down to point U.l.c.5.0. The infantry kept in touch all the way down, moving slightly in rear of tank, and after emplacements were knocked out they took the occupants prisoners. In two cases white flags were hoisted as soon as the emplacement was hit. The shooting was very good. Up to point U.l.c.5.0 the shelling had been casual, but when we reached the N. bank of the sunken road at this point and were firing into emplacements towards the river we were in full observation from the village and the artillery fire became very heavy. The supply of 6-pounder ammunition now became exhausted, and the ground on the S. side of sunken road being very bad, I decided to move back along the trench and then crossed the wire, and crossing sunken road at about T.12.b.5.3, made for rallying-point at Factory at Croisilles, where I arrived at 12 noon. I was shelled heavily all the way back to the rallying-point, but no damage was done. I was of opinion that the Hindenburg front line was too bad (wide) to cross, and so could not deal with support line and was unable to observe this line from front line. I sent two pigeon messages at 9.30 a.m. and 12 noon. I had only one message clip, so had to fasten second message with cotton.

Unit to which attached—51st Division.

Hour the tank started for action—5.12 a.m.

Hour of zero—. 4.15 a.m.

Extent and nature of hostile shell fire—. Severe.

Ammunition expended—About 220 6-pounder; 14 drums L.G.

Casualties—. Four.

Position of tank after action—H.24.b.3.9. (Sheet 51B).

Condition of tank after action—. Bellied, right track very slack.

Orders received.— To clear Mount Pleasant wood, Rœux, and northern edge of village.

Report of action.— Time allowed for tanks from deployment point to starting-point proved to be insufficient, which delayed my start some twenty minutes. Having learnt that the other car which was operating with me was “out of action,” I made my way alone to the railway arch, where I was held up some few minutes owing to a number of stretcher cases which had to be removed, and a sand-bag barricade which I could not push down.

I soon caught up the infantry, who were held up by machine-gun fire in Mount Pleasant wood. At their request I altered my course and made for the northern side of the wood running parallel with the trench which we held at the south of the wood, and which the enemy held at the north. I was told that a bombing party would follow me up the trench.

Having cleared this wood, I pushed on towards the village of Rœux, where I again met the infantry who had come round the other side of Mount Pleasant wood, where they were again held up by machine-gun fire which came from the buildings.

Our barrage could only have been very slight, to judge from the comparatively small amount of damage which was done to the buildings. Here I used 200 rounds of 6-pounder ammunition.

It is difficult to estimate with any accuracy the number of machine-guns actually “put out.” One of my best targets was a party of some thirty men whom we drove out of a house with 6-pounders, and then sprayed with Lewis-gun fire.

I am sure that at least one 6-pounder shell dropped amongst these—this made a distinct impression.

Another target that presented itself was a party of men coming towards us. I do not know whether they intended giving themselves up or whether they were a bombing party —I took them for the latter.

Parties were frequently seen coming up from the rear, through gaps in the buildings.

Twice an enemy officer rallied some dozen or so men and rushed a house that we had already cleared. Here again a 6-pounder through the window disposed of any of the enemy remaining in the buildings.

In regard to the machine-guns in the wood, we could only locate them by little puffs of smoke at which we fired our 6-pounders. We did not take our departure until these puffs had disappeared, and there was in consequence reasonable ground to suppose that the guns had been knocked out. Finally our infantry reached the village. Apparently there was no officer commanding our infantry in this part of the line.

I then moved towards Rœux wood and learnt of a sniper still left in Mount Pleasant wood and a machine-gun, which was causing great trouble, on the railway embankment, and I then made my way back to the railway arch with a view to running parallel with the embankment towards the station, but unfortunately my car bellied in the very marshy ground by the canal.

With regard to casualties, it is my opinion that I was in the district sufficiently long enough, some three hours, to enable the enemy to send for a supply of armour-piercing bullets. All four of my crew were hit whilst in the car.

The Lewis-gun mountings were bad, many targets were lost owing to the time it took to mount the gun, and finally we mounted the gun through the front flaps. The flap of the present mounting does not rise high enough to clear the foresight .

Both the 6-pounder guns worked splendidly, only giving one misfire the whole time. There was no hostile shelling of any kind in the village of Rœux or immediately in the district where I was operating, but the enemy barrage falling round the railway was of a very severe nature. When I found that it was impossible for me to proceed towards the railway station, I sent off a pigeon message at the request of an O.C. requesting that one of the cars operating in the Chemical Works district should be detailed to deal with the machine-gun on the embankment.