part0024

THE battles of 1914 were primarily infantry battles based on the power of the rifle, and it was not until 1915 that the quick-firing gun and the heavy howitzer began to replace the rifle as the reducers of resistance to the infantry attack.

In 1915, as far as the British Army is concerned, it may be said that artillery was generally looked upon as an adjunct to the infantry. This idea died hard, and it was not until the battle of the Somme was half way through that it became apparent that it was no longer a question of guns co-operating in the infantry advance,’ but of the infantry itself cooperating with the artillery bombardments. In other words the limit of the infantry advance was the limit of the range of the guns, particularly the 18-pounders. This meant that no penetration of a greater depth than about 4,000 yards could be effected unless a second echelon of guns and infantry was launched and brought into action simultaneously with or just before the first assault had reached the range limit of the guns which were supporting it.

Two factors prohibited this from being done; the first was the heavily shelled area which usually extends over the whole 4,000 yards of the initial advance; the second, the great difficulty of keeping the second echelon of guns supplied with sufficient ammunition to maintain the second barrage. The shelled area not only prohibited the movement of guns for days, but produced such exhaustion on the second echelon of infantry crossing it, that by the time it caught up with the first echelon its men were too fatigued to continue the attack.

By some it was hoped that the tank would partially overcome this difficulty if it were brought into action on the area over which the 18-pounder barrage was beginning to fail, and by producing a local barrage of its own, by means of its machine guns, that it would cover any advance from 4,000 yards onwards .

This idea, though perfectly sound in itself, was doomed to failure as long as the conditions of ground produced by artillery fire rendered it impossible to support these tanks by infantry in fighting condition.

The first solution to this problem was to cease using heavy artillery on ground to be traversed by the infantry attackers. This, however, is at best but a half measure, for though, in the present phase of the war, co-operation between infantry and tanks was of vital importance, this co-operation could not be maintained for long if one arm has to rely on its muscular power, whilst the other relies on petrol as its motive force. At best, the advance of 4,000 to 6,000 yards will be extended to 8,000 or 12,000 yards, when the endurance of the infantry will reach its limit and the advance automatically cease. This is not sufficient, for in a war such as was being waged in 1917 (a trench war), in order to beat an enemy, the first necessity was to prevent him using his spade. This can only be done by maintaining a continuous, if comparatively slow advance, that is, by replacing muscle by petrol as the motive force. This means the creation of a mechanical army.

In August 1917 the Tank Corps fully realised that the creation of such an army, even on a very small scale, would take at least a year; further, that its creation depended on the value of the tank being fully recognised by those who could create such an army, and upon this army being used in a suitable area of operations. Consequently the first thing to do was to discover a suitable tank area; the second, to hold a tactical demonstration on it with tanks so as to convince the General Staff of their power and value. These steps it was felt would have to be taken before the petrol engine would be accepted as the motive force of the modern battle.

The selection of a theatre of operations depends on the objective to be gained; the gaining of the objective on the breaking down of the enemy’s resistance. Consequently the weapon which will most speedily overcome this resistance must be considered first, and the area of attack in the theatre of operations chosen must be selected as far as possible with reference to its powers.

In the present instance we find that the chief resistance to our infantry advance comes from the enemy’s machine guns. We dare not concentrate all our artillery on these, for if we do, we shall release his guns, which, free, can put up a stronger resistance than his machine guns on account of their superior range. Further, whilst by sound and flash ranging and aeroplane observation we can discover his main gun positions, no means have yet been discovered whereby his machine guns can be located other than by advancing on them and risking casualties. Tanks must, therefore, be employed to do this in order to clear the way for the infantry advance. Consequently, if sufficient tanks are forthcoming, in order to guarantee a decisive success, it is no longer a question of the tank as a spare wheel to the car, in case of an unforeseen puncture in our operations, but as the motive force of the car itself, the infantry being merely its armed occupants; without which the car is valueless.

The area of operations selected must firstly be suitable to the rapid movement of tanks, and secondly, unsuitable to hostile anti-tank defences. Further, it should be chosen with reference to the tactical characteristics of this arm. Once chosen, all other weapons should be deployed and employed to facilitate the advance of the tank, because it is to be used as the chief maintainer of infantry endurance, and it is the infantry man with his machine gun and bayonet who is going, for some time to come, to decide the battle.

Such were the views held in the Tank Corps at the opening of the Third Battle of Ypres, and the following extract taken from a paper written on June 11, 1917, is not only of interest but prophetic of future events:

“If we look at a layered map of France we can at once put our finger on the area to select. It lies between the Scarpe and the Oise, the Flanders swamps in the north and the Ardennes in the south-east. It was down this funnel of undulating country that the Germans advanced in 1914, and it is up it that they will most likely be driven if strategy is governed by ground and tactics by weapons.”

The main area suitable for tank operations having been fixed upon by the Tank Corps, the next requirement was to .select a definite objective, the attack against which would draw the enemy’s reserves towards it and so relieve the pressure which was being exerted against the Fifth Army at Ypres. Two localities were considered, St. Quentin and Cambrai. The first was opposite the French area, the second opposite the British.

The suggestion put forward as regards the St. Quentin operation was abandoned on account of difficulties arising out of a British force operating in the French area; it must be remembered that at this time no real unity of command existed in France.

The Cambrai project consisted in a surprise raid, the duration of which would be about twenty- four hours. The whole operation may be summed up in three words, “Advance, Hit, Retire.” Its object was to destroy the enemy’s personnel and guns, to demoralise and disorganise his fighting troops and reserves, and not to capture ground or to hold trenches. It was further considered that such an operation would interrupt his roulement of reserves and make the enemy think twice as to replacing fresh divisions by exhausted and demoralised units in those parts of his line which were not included in his battle front. Further, it would confuse him as to the decisive point of attack; for any day one of these raids might be followed by a strong offensive.

The actual area of operations selected was the re-entrant formed by the L’Escaut or St. Quentin Canal between the villages of Ribecourt, Crèvecœur, and Banteux. The going in this area was excellent; further, the area to be raided contained several fair-sized villages and important ground, and was well limited by the canal, which not only made a rapid reinforcing of the area in the bend difficult, but completely limited the tank objectives.

The attack was to be launched at dawn, the first line of tanks making straight for the enemy’s guns, which before, and as the tanks approached them, were to be bombed by our aeroplanes. The second and third lines of tanks were to follow, whilst our heavy guns commenced counter-battery work and the shelling of the villages and bridges along the canal. The essence of the entire operation was to be surprise coupled with rapidity of movement. The spirit of such an enterprise is audacity, which was to take the place of undisguised preparation.

It must be realised that both the St. Quentin and Cambrai projects were the home product of the Tank Corps, and they did not emanate from higher authority, which, when approached, was unable to sanction either. In spite of this, steps were taken to reconnoitre the Cambrai area, and for this purpose both the Brigadier-General commanding the Tank Corps and the 3rd Tank Brigade Commander visited Sir Julian Byng, the Third Army Commander, at his Headquarters in Albert. Though it is not known whether the Third Army Commander had already considered the possibilities of an offensive on the front of his Army, in September it would appear that he approached G.H.Q. on the subject, with the result that still no action outside the Ypres area could be considered, anyhow for the present.