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IN spite of the fact that throughout the war the Germans never had at their disposal more than some fifteen tanks of their own manufacture and some twenty-five captured and repaired British Mark IV machines, their employment of these machines is worth recording.

As already mentioned the Germans learnt little from the Mark I machine they captured and held for several days during the battle of the Somme. In fact, they appear to have treated the tanks generally, during these operations, with scorn. The machine was indeed mechanically indifferent, but the German, who is essentially a stupid (dumm) man, could not apparently differentiate between the defects of mechanical detail and the advantages of fundamental principles, such as mobility, security, and offensive power, which indeed the whole “idea” of the tank represented .

The action at Bullecourt, it is thought, opened the German eyes to the possibilities of a tank attack, that is an attack in which tanks are used as the resistance-breakers in advance of the infantry. If two tanks could accomplish what the two Mark I’s did on April 11, 1917, there was no reason why 200 should not win a great victory, and 2,000 end the war. Be this as it may, it was at about this time —the spring of 1917—that the first German tank construction was begun at the Daimler works near Berlin, and the result of this was the production of fifteen machines known as “Type A.7. V.” (see Plate VI), some of which first took the field in March 1918.

The chief characteristics of this tank were: its good speed on smooth ground, on which it could attain some eight miles an hour; its inability to cross almost any type of trench or shelled ground on account of its shape. In weight it was about 40 tons, it carried very thick armour especially in front, capable of withstanding A.P. bullets at close range and field-gun shells, not firing A.P. ammunition, at long; it was, however, very vulnerable to the splash of ordinary bullets on account of the crevices and joints in its armour. The most interesting feature of this otherwise indifferent machine was that its tracks were provided with sprung bogies. The use of sprung tracks in so heavy a tank was the only progressive step shown in the German effort at tank production.

The German tank was 24 ft. long and 10 ft. 6 in. wide; its armament was one 1.57 mm. gun and 6 machine guns; its crew, one officer, eleven N.C.O.s, and four private soldiers —exactly twice the strength of the crew of a British Mark IV tank. This crew comprised three distinct classes, drivers (mechanics), gunners (artillerymen), and machine-gunners (infantrymen). These three classes remained distinct, little co-operation existing between them.

Both the tanks of German manufacture and the captured British tanks were divided into sections ( Abteilungen) of five machines each, the personnel establishment of which was as follows:

This establishment was a very extravagant one when compared with that of a Mark IV section of five tanks, namely, six officers and thirty-five other ranks.

Besides the “A.7. V.” machines the Germans employed, during their various offensives of 1918, a number of caterpillar ammunition carriers known as “Munitions Schlepper,” or “Tankautos.” These could proceed across country as well as by road .

The moral of the German Tank Corps was not high, and as regards the personnel of the captured Mark IV Tanks it was decidedly low, the Germans having made considerable efforts to prove to their own troops, by means of demonstrations, that this type of tank was both vulnerable and ineffective. The training of this Corps appears to have been indifferent; a certain number of Assault Divisions were trained with wagons representing tanks, and in a few cases it is believed that actual tanks were used with infantry in combined training.

The tactics of the German tanks simply consisted in the “mopping up” of strong points. On several occasions they did get in front of the attacking infantry, but they do not appear in any sense to have led the attack. The following extract from the German G.H.Q. instructions, “The Co-operation of Infantry with Tanks” (!), indicates that no real co-operation was ever contemplated. It reads :

“The infantry and tanks will advance independently of one another. No special instructions regarding the cooperation with tanks will be issued. When advancing with tanks the infantry will not come within 160 yards of them on account of the shells which will be fired at the tanks.”

In all, there are nine recorded occasions upon which the Germans made use of tanks, the first of which was in their great offensive which opened on March 21, 1918. In this attack about ten German and ten captured British machines were used, and although they accomplished very little they were much written up in the German press .

A little over a month later, on April 24, the only successful German tank attack during the war was carried out. On this occasion, which has been referred to in Chapter XXVI, fourteen tanks were brought forward, and of these twelve came into action and captured Villers-Bretonneux, a point of great tactical importance; a counter-attack carried out by the Australian Corps and a few British tanks, however, restored the situation.

A month later a few tanks were used by the Germans Against the French on the opening day of the great Aisne offensive, namely May 27. None of these machines, however, succeeded in passing a large trench in the second defensive system known as Dardanelles trench.

On June 1, fifteen operated with little success in the Reims sector, eight being left derelict in the French lines. Similar unsuccessful operations were carried out on June 9 and July 15.

On August 31, three German tanks approached our lines east of Bapaume; two were knocked out by our guns and eventually captured .

On October 8, some fifteen captured British machines were used against us in the Cambrai sector. Of this action the German account states that these tanks were employed defensively to fill up a gap in their line; whether this was so or not, they undoubtedly produced a demoralising effect amongst our own men, equilibrium only being re-established when two of them were put out of action. Three days later, on the 11th, a few tanks were used at St. Aubert; this was the last recorded occasion upon which the Germans made use of tanks in the Great War.

Indifferent as were the German tank tactics as compared with our own, one fact was most striking, this being that the British infantry no more than the German would or could withstand a tank attack. The reason for this is a simple one, namely, inability to do so. So pronounced was this feeling of helplessness that when, during our own retirement in March 1918, rumours were afloat that German tanks were approaching, our men in several sectors of the line broke and fell back. During the German retirement a few months later on we find exactly the same lowering of moral by self-suggested fear, fear based on the inability to overcome the danger. This moral effect produced by the tank was appreciated by the Germans, for in a note issued by the XVIIth German Army we find:

“Our own tanks strengthen the moral of the infantry to a tremendous extent, even if employed only in small numbers, and experience has shown that they have a considerable demoralising effect on the hostile infantry.”