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On this day the battle of Epehy continued on the front Epehy-ViIleret, some 7,000 yards long. In this attack twenty tanks of the 2nd Battalion assisted the IIIrd Corps, Australian Corps, and IXth Corps. On the IIIrd Corps front heavy machine-gun fire was encountered and overcome, many machine guns being destroyed. On that of the IXth progress was slow, and the Australians, meeting with little resistance, captured Ronssoy and Hargicourt.

After two days’ rest the attack was continued on the 21st, nine tanks of the 2nd Battalion operating on the IIIrd Corps front against the Knoll and Guillemont farm. Two of these machines carried forward infantry, but the machine-gun fire was so heavy that it was not possible to drop them. During this day the enemy put up a most determined resistance and there were not sufficient tanks engaged to silence his machine guns. Another two days’ rest followed, and then again was the attack renewed on the IXth Corps front against Fresnoy-le-Petit and the Quadrilateral, nineteen machines of the 13th Battalion attacking with the 1st and 6th Divisions. So heavy was the enemy’s gas barrage on this day that some of the tank crews were forced to wear their respirators for over two hours on end. In spite of the enemy being in great strength eighteen machines assisted the infantry. Thus ended the battle of Epehy and though the advance was not great nearly 12,000 prisoners and 100 guns were added to the “bag.”

Preparations were now set in hand for an extensive attack against the Hindenburg and auxiliary lines of defence, which together formed a zone of entrenchments for the most part very heavily wired and extending over a depth varying from 8,000 to 16,000 yards. This attack. entailed another hasty reorganisation of tank battalions, which was completed by September 26, when the battle order of Brigades was as follows:

The rapidity with which these changes were made would, a few months back, have bewildered both the Tank Corps Headquarter Staff and the Brigade and Battalion Commanders themselves; now the knack of rapid movement had been mastered, and though great energy had to be exerted during such reorganisations, they were generally accomplished in time and efficiently.

On September 27 the great battle began, comprising the First, Third, and Fourth Armies on a front of sixteen miles. The battlefield was divided into two main sectors, to the north that of the First and Third Armies, between the Sensée river and Gouzeaucourt, with the object of capturing Bourlon hill, and to the south that of the Fourth Army with the capture of the Knoll, Guillemont farm, and Quennemont farm as its objectives.

East of the First Army front line ran the canal Du Nord, a formidable obstacle to tanks in spite of the fact that it was dry, having never been completed. This canal varied from 36 to 50 ft. wide at the bottom, and was 12 ft. deep, and the slopes of its sides were in many places steep. The enemy, evidently suspecting that tanks might attempt to cross it, had at certain places rendered this temporarily impossible, so it was thought, by cutting in its bank a vertical wall 9 ft. deep for several hundreds of yards along the eastern side between Mœuvres and Inchy. In the Maquion-Bourlon sector the enemy had made little anti-tank preparation, probably considering that the canal itself formed a sufficient obstacle. In the Beaucamp sector, however, anti-tank preparations were exceptionally thorough, many anti-tank rifles being placed in position here.

Sixteen tanks of the 7th Battalion, all Mark IV.s, some of which had fought over very nearly the same ground in November 1917, were allotted to co-operate with the Canadian Corps. In spite of the formidable great ditch which lay in front of them, fifteen of these machines crossed the canal Du Nord near Mœuvres, and attacked Bourlon village and the western edge of Bourlon wood. Of these fifteen machines only three were put out of action, one by a mine placed in a road leading through a gap in the canal and two by a battery near Deligny hill.

On the Third Army front Corps were disposed from north to south as follows: XVIIth, VIth, IVth, and Vth Corps.

Twenty-six tanks of the 15th Battalion operated with the XVIIth Corps south of Bourlon wood, and with the VIth Corps against Flesquières and Premy Chapel. A fine performance was here carried out in crossing the canal, and although more than one attempt had to be made by several of the tanks the 9 ft. wall was successfully surmounted. This attack was an overwhelming success in spite of the heavy tank casualties, 11 out of the 26 machines operating being hit on the extreme objectives. On the IVth Corps front 12 machines of the 11th Battalion attacked between Gouzeaucourt and Trescault: this operation was, however, only partially successful.

On the front of the Fourth Army the 27th American Division, supported by twelve tanks of the 4th Tank Battalion, carried out a preparatory attack on the Knoll, Guillemont and Quennemont farms, the object being to advance the front line so as to be in a better position to attack in force on the 29th. The Germans holding this sector of their line were reliable and well led troops, and in spite of the fact that the tanks and infantry reached their objectives a counterattack drove them back, with the result that up to zero-hour on the 29th the actual location of our front line was very uncertain.

On September 28 a small local attack, which was completely successful, was carried out against Raillencourt and St. Olle; in this six tanks of the 7th Battalion took part.

On the following day seven tanks of the 11th Battalion co-operated with the Vth Corps in the capture of Gonnelieu and Villers Guislain in spite of strong resistance put up by the enemy.

On the Fourth Army front an important battle of considerable magnitude was fought on the 29th, involving some 175 tanks. The object of this battle was to, force the Hindenburg Line between Bellenglise and Vendhuile. Along this front is situated the St. Quentin canal, and as, between Bellicourt and Vendhuile, this canal runs underground through a tunnel, it provided the German garrisons of this sector of their line with good underground cover. An operation on this sector had been the subject of careful study by the Tank Corps General Staff both in England and France ever since the summer of 1917, as this tunnel and a shorter one just north of St. Quentin provide the only negotiable approaches for tanks over the canal. It was fully realised that the enemy would put up a most determined resistance to secure his retention of the tunnel, for should it be occupied by us the whole of the Hindenburg defences north and south of it would be threatened .

The attack was to be carried out by four Corps, the IXth Corps on the right, the American and Australian Corps in the centre, and the IIIrd Corps on the left.

The American Corps was to capture the first objective, the strongly entrenched system east of Bony; the Australian Corps was then to pass through the gap made and be followed by the American Corps exploiting north and south. The IXth Corps was to clear the west bank of the St. Quentin canal under cover of the southern wing of the American exploitation force, whilst the IIIrd Corps was to move forward with the left of the American Corps.

Tanks were allotted to Corps as follows:

A thick mist covered the ground when the tanks moved forward at 5.50 a.m. It will be remembered that the situation opposite the Knoll and the two farms of Guillemont and Quennemont was very obscure. This attack, which was to break the well sited and highly organised Hindenburg Line, was necessarily a “set piece” attack in which objectives, allotment of tanks, etc., had to be carefully worked out beforehand. The plan of operations was based on the assumption that the line—the Knoll-Guillemont farm-Quennemont farm—would form the “jumping off” line. The resistance put up by the enemy in this sector was far greater than ordinary, with the result that up to the time of the attack the above line was still in German hands. This meant that the artillery programme would have to be hastily changed or left as it was. The latter course was decided on so as to obviate confusion, and this necessitated the infantry attackers starting at a considerable distance in rear of the protective barrage. As events turned out the task set the Americans proved too severe, nevertheless with great gallantry they pushed forward, some of them actually forcing their way through the German defences. The majority, however, were mown down by the exceptionally heavy machine-gun fire which was brought to bear on them. The attack failed.

Meanwhile the 301st American Tank Battalion met with a disaster, for, whilst moving forward from near Ronssoy, it ran into an old British minefield west of Guillemont farm laid in the previous February; ten machines were blown up and only two succeeded in assisting the infantry. This minefield consisted of rows of buried 2 in. trench-mortar bombs, each containing 50 lb. of ammonal; the explosions were terrific, the whole bottom of many machines being torn out; in nearly all cases the crews of these tanks suffered very heavy casualties.

In the south, tanks of the 4th and 5th Brigades cleared Nauroy and Bellicourt and broke through the Hindenburg Line. The mist now began to lift, and consequent on the failure of the northern attack, the attackers were placed, tactically, in a very dangerous situation, for the enemy was now able to fire into their backs. Several tanks, which had been allotted to later objectives, on realising the seriousness of the situation went into action on their own initiative without either artillery or infantry support. This very gallant action undoubtedly saved a great many infantry casualties, though the tanks themselves suffered heavy losses.

On the right the attack of the IXth Corps was a complete success; in the first rush the 46th Division crossed the canal, a magnificent performance, and captured Magny and Etricourt with 4,000 prisoners. The tanks operating with this Corps, being unable to cross with the troops, who waded and swam the water in the canal, moved on Bellicourt, a difficult operation in the dense fog. From this place they swung south, working down the bank of the canal, and arrived in time to take part in the capture of Magny. During this action the enemy’s artillery fire proved very accurate; which was, however, to be expected, for this was the third tank assault on the Knoll-Guillemont-Quennemont position; consequently the German gunners had become thoroughly drilled in the defence of this sector.

On the following day eighteen tanks of the 13th Battalion worked up the Hindenburg and the Nauroy-Le Catelet lines, but on account of some misunderstanding the infantry did not follow, consequently the operation did not prove of much value.

On the First Army front six tanks of the 9th Battalion operated with the 3rd and 4th Canadian Divisions against Cuvillers, Blecourt, and Tilloy; they crossed the Douai-Cambrai road near Sancourt and greatly helped the infantry by overcoming the determined machine-gun resistance which was encountered throughout this attack. On the next day further tanks of this Battalion assisted the 32nd Division in occupying the Fonsomme line east of Joncourt. In this action smoke clouds were used from tanks to cover their approach from the observation of the German gunners; this proved very successful and undoubtedly reduced loss by gun fire. One tank had a curious experience: a smoke bomb having burst on the top of it, the crew were forced to evacuate the machine on account of the fumes being drawn inside. The tank commander, having put the fire out, was unable to find his crew; as time was short he got inside the tank and continued his advance alone; on his way forward he took on board an officer and two men of the Manchester Regiment. The tank then went into action against a machine-gun nest; as the improvised crew was ignorant of the Hotchkiss gun each time a jam occurred the tank commander had to leave the driver’s seat to rectify it. Shortly afterwards the truant crew turned up, so the tank commander, having first driven his newly-made comrades to cover, dropped them, and then proceeded on his way .

On October 3 an attack was launched against the Sequehart-Bony front in which twenty machines of the 5th Tank Brigade proved of very great assistance to the 32nd and 46th Divisions. Sequehart was cleared and so was Rami-court and Doon copse, but Montbrehain remained uncaptured.

On the 4th, the 3rd Tank Battalion was transferred from the 5th to the 3rd Tank Brigade, and a day later the 16th Tank Battalion from the 5th to the 4th Tank Brigade. The 8th, 9th, and 13th Battalions were withdrawn into G.H.Q. reserve. On the 5th the first phase of the battle of Cambrai-St. Quentin opened with a failure to take Beaurevoir in which attack six tanks of the 4th Tank Battalion attempted to assist the 25th Division. Co-operation in this action was indifferent, due chiefly to the fact that the infantry of this division had never been trained to work with tanks. This failure was partially retrieved by a brilliantly executed attack by the Australians supported by twelve tanks of the 16th Battalion against Montbrehain. This village was held by the enemy in strength, and many good targets at close quarters were obtained for 6-pounders firing case shot. The co-operation throughout was excellent, as, since the battle of Hamel, had always been the case when operating with the Australian Corps—tank commanders constantly getting out of their tanks and talking to the infantry.

The second phase of the Cambrai-St. Quentin battle opened on the morning of October 8 on an eighteen miles front—it was entirely successful. Tanks were allotted as follows, eighty-two in all being used:

The attacks, carried out by the 12th Tank Battalion on the front Niergnies-La Targette, were successful, the infantry universally testifying to the assistance rendered by this battalion. An interesting encounter now took place, the enemy counter-attacking from the direction of Awoingt with four captured British Mark IV tanks, one male and three females. The counter-attack was speedily dealt with, the renegade male being knocked out by a 6-pounder shell fired by one of our own tanks and one female put out of action by a shell fired from a captured German field gun by a tank section commander; the remaining two females fled on the approach of one of our machines of the same sex. So ended the second tank encounter as successfully as the first, which it will be remembered was fought near the village of Cachy on April 24, 1918.

The other actions fought on this day were briefly as follows:

One Company of the 11th Battalion assisted the 32nd Division against Villers-Outreaux, another company operated with the 21st Division and the third company with the 38th. This last company was of great assistance, as the infantry had been held up by a broad belt of wire which they were unable to cross until the tanks crushed down pathways through it.

The 6th Tank Battalion, operating with the IInd American Corps, carried out its programme, one of its machines putting three batteries of field guns out of action in Fraicourt wood; and the 3rd Battalion came into action in the neighbourhood of Serain. This village was very strongly defended, the enemy holding it to cover his withdrawal.

On October 9 the attack continued along the whole front, eight tanks of the 4th Battalion coming into action east of Premont and the 17th Armoured Car Battalion, under orders of the Cavalry Corps, operating around Maurois and Honnechy. Two days later, on the 11th, five tanks of the 5th Battalion operated with the 6th Division north of Riguerval wood; this was the last tank action fought in this battle .

The battle of Cambrai-St. Quentin was at an end. The Hindenburg Line had now to all intents and purposes ceased to exist as an obstacle. It had been broken on a front of nearly thirty miles, on which frontage a penetration of some twenty miles had been effected, and no fewer than 630 guns and 48,000 prisoners captured during the last fourteen days. The effect of this great battle, coupled with the successes of the French in the south and the operations east of Ypres and round Courtrai, fought by the British, French, and Belgians in the north, resulted in the withdrawal of the German forces in the Roubaix, Lille, and Douai area, and with this withdrawal the whole of the British forces in France from north of Menin to Bohain, seven miles north-west of Guise, were faced with field warfare; open country stretched before them, uncut by trench, unhung by wire. The period of exploitation had arrived—that period all our endeavours had been concentrated on attaining during four years of the most desperate and relentless war in history .

Considering the comparative weakness of the British Army, the time of the year, and the nature of the fighting, it had truly been a notable performance on the part of the English and the Dominion infantry, to have fought their way so far. To carry out a rapid pursuit was beyond their endeavours, for the German Army, though beaten, was not yet broken. For cavalry to do so was unthinkable, for the German rear-guards possessed many thousands of machine guns, and as long as these weapons existed, pursuit, as cavalry dream it to be, is utterly impossible. One arm alone could have turned the present defeat into a rout—the tank, but few of these remained, for since August 8 no fewer than 819 machines had been handed over to Salvage by the tank battalions, and these battalions themselves had lost in personnel 550 officers and 2,557 other ranks, a small number indeed when compared with the number of actions the Corps had been engaged in, yet a severe loss out of a fighting state of some 1,500 officers and 8,000 other ranks .

Had it been possible at this crisis to put into the field two fresh brigades of medium tanks, that is about 300 machines, the cost of which would be approximately 11,500,000, or one-fifth that of one day’s cost of the war, the greatest war in all history might have closed on or near the field of Waterloo in a decisive victory ending in an unconditional surrender or an irretrievable rout.