15

Night of the generals

FOR the most part, Brigadier Tolletjie Botha was an easygoing commander who didn’t give his guys at DCC a hard time, provided they did what was expected of them. But for some time he had been plagued by a bunch of former policemen from the Civil Cooperation Bureau that the generals had dumped on his unit.

Staal Burger, Ferdi Barnard, Slang van Zyl, Chappies Maree and the others had caused a pile of shit at the CCB, and when the covert unit was disbanded as the result of political pressure, they’d had the temerity to reject their discharge.

Which had left Tolletjie with a problem: a gang of loose cannons who knew absolutely fuck all about gathering intelligence on the enemy, but were so arrogant that no one could teach them anything. The defence force had no idea what to do with them, because officially they were no longer allowed to be on the payroll, but the generals were impotent to get rid of the thick-skinned thugs.

The irony was that it was precisely this cell of ex-cops that had caused all the shit resulting in the media exposing the CCB’s underground activities. They were the rotten eggs in the CCB that had ultimately caused its downfall.

‘None of them is worth a damn when it comes to collecting information. All they’re good for is running whorehouses in Johannesburg where ANC members can be compromised by prostitutes, and managing Hillbrow hotels for the druglords,’ Tolletjie thought out loud as he unlocked his office at Momentum Mews. ‘Before anything else today I’m going to speak to CSI about this and make a plan. Things can’t go on this way.’

He was all too aware that the CCB outcasts had been palmed off on him because it was a simple matter to pay them from the defence force’s slush fund – the B12 account – without politicians and journalists finding out, but he was not going to let his unit become the dump site for the criminal elements among them.

Almost telepathically, Tolletjie’s phone rang as he entered his office. ‘Good day, Brigadier,’ said the friendly voice at the other end, which Tolletjie immediately recognised as that of Major General Chris Thirion. He was deputy CSI, and one of the most approachable and helpful generals in the defence force.

‘My goodness, General, how did you know I wanted to speak to you?’ Tolletjie quipped with reference to the uncanny timing of the call.

‘I need to speak to you urgently about drastic budget cuts and where your unit can save money,’ said Thirion without preamble.

Tolletjie could hardly believe his ears as Chris went on to tell him he would do well to explore the possibility of offering that bunch of cops a severance package each in order to slash his budget.

‘General, give me the order and it’ll be done by tomorrow,’ said Tolletjie, delighted by such good news so early in the morning. ‘It’s very easy to balance our books. All I have to do is fire that lot.’

That, however, was far easier said than done. Joe Verster, head honcho at the CCB, had tried before, when Lieutenant General Witkop Badenhorst, CSI, had had to implement the political decision to disband the CCB. Negotiating with disciplined soldiers in CCB ranks was one thing – they were trained to follow orders. But the ex-policemen were an entirely different matter. At Brixton Murder and Robbery they had been a bunch of mavericks pursuing their own agenda, so why should they now submit meekly to military discipline?

Tolletjie lost no time putting together severance packages for the men, but just as had been the case when the CCB was disbanded, they dug in their heels and refused to go.

‘We’re not signing this crap,’ was their smug and arrogant response.

That was when Tolletjie began to realise that the hard-arsed attitude of these policemen was a far bigger problem than he had thought. For them to be so audacious, they must have some or other hold on people in high places in government or the defence force. What else could explain the fuck-you attitude that allowed them to flatly reject any form of authority and cling to their positions like shit to a wool blanket?

Chris Thirion shared Tolletjie’s feelings about the situation, and years afterwards he said it was clear to him at the time that the men had a potentially damaging hold on important people at top levels within the hierarchy. One has to wonder what kind of leverage they had, especially given their constant boasting about how good they were at using prostitutes in brothels to frame people.

The proposed severance packages were barely on the table before the fat was well and truly in the fire. Telephone lines between the ex-cops and their government contacts burnt hot, and it wasn’t long before the repercussions filtered down to Chris.

He was working quietly in his office on the fourteenth floor of the Liberty Life building in Vermeulen Street, Pretoria, when his telephone rang. It was Kat Liebenberg, chief of the defence force.

Kat always was a surly old turd who barked rather than spoke. From his curt tone, Chris immediately realised that he was livid.

‘I want to see you urgently, General,’ Kat growled. ‘Meet me at two o’clock on the pavement outside the main entrance of the NG Church Synodal Centre in Visagie Street.’

Chris had no idea what was going on, but he knew Kat was splenetic and that, apparently, he was somehow to blame. The old grouch hadn’t even had the courtesy to ask if he was available, Chris thought. But when CSADF said jump, you jumped.

Chris had lost respect for the man after learning something quite by chance when a lieutenant general had asked him one day: ‘What is this thing between you and Kat?’ Up to that point, he had not experienced any problems with Kat. As a junior general and consummate soldier, he’d made sure that he never overstepped the mark.

The curious general had then told Chris in confidence that, during a senior general staff meeting, Kat had asked if anyone knew what Thirion’s political affiliations were. When no one could enlighten him, the head of the defence force launched into a tirade. ‘Gentlemen, do you realise that we are talking about a very senior officer, and we do not have a clue where he stands politically! Let me tell you, Chris Thirion is a fucking maverick.’

And that was how Chris would always remember his supreme commander.

Chris made sure that he was early and waiting for Kat on the pavement so as not to upset the old man any further. Kat’s driver dropped him at the main entrance to the building, then went to park the car, while the general headed briskly and straight for Chris.

He wasted no time on the niceties of greeting before blurting out rudely: ‘Who the hell do you think you are to terminate the services of these guys?’

With no inkling of what he was to be hauled over the coals for, Chris had expected the worst, but he could never have envisaged that anyone would ask him such a stupid question. He was, after all, deputy CSI, and the head of the defence force had issued orders for cutbacks. Since the ex-policemen fell under his command, he had been perfectly entitled to make this decision.

He tried to point this out to Kat in a civil and polite manner, but the general cut him short, repeating angrily: ‘You don’t understand! Who the fuck do you think you are to sack these people without permission?’

It was mortifying for Chris to be taken to task by Kat on the pavement outside a busy public entrance. It obviously didn’t bother Kat in the least, and his parting shot was an order for Chris to see him the next day in his office at DHQ about the matter.

More than ever, Chris saw Kat’s tirade about the firings as confirmation that the ex-cops had protection in high places and were nothing less than a band of untouchables who could do as they pleased.

He hadn’t been back in his office long before Tolletjie telephoned.

‘General, why does CSADF want to see us tomorrow?’ he asked with concern.

Chris told him about the meeting on the pavement and said they should expect fireworks the next day, as General Liebenberg’s temper had been foul.

‘It’s obvious that he’s under enormous pressure,’ Chris told Tolletjie. ‘What I’d like to know is who’s responsible.’

The following day, Kat was still very much in a fighting mood. The atmosphere was grave when Chris entered his office in the Armscor building and noted that the chief of staff finance, Rear Admiral Paul Murray, was present. Tolletjie was already there.

Kat picked up where he had left off the day before and did a masterful job of wiping the floor with Chris. It was thoroughly inappropriate to humiliate and rebuke someone of Chris’s stature, a major general, in the presence of a brigadier and a senior admiral, but such behaviour was typical of Kat Liebenberg. Chris was left with no doubt that Kat was under serious pressure from above.

He was still telling Chris that if he was incapable of handling the Directorate Covert Collection’s budget, he would arrange for someone else to do so, when he suddenly turned on Tolletjie and ordered him to pay the ex-policemen’s salaries as usual.

Admiral Murray was ordered to ensure that money was available from the secret fund for this purpose. Kat wasn’t meowing, he was roaring, and the ex-policemen’s positions at DCC were assured. Little did the SADF chief know what terrible repercussions those orders would have for the history of South Africa and the life of many a soldier.

A few days later, Vrye Weekblad published a major story that marked the beginning of the end for DCC. A Mozambican, João Cuna, told the newspaper in an interview how he had been taken to Pietermaritzburg by members of the defence force to carry out political murders.

The report immediately caught the attention of the Goldstone Commission. It had been conducting investigations for some time into the existence of a Third Force within the South African security forces, with a view to exposing its activities.

FW had been jittery for months about the murder and mayhem on trains and the mysterious circumstances behind countrywide political violence in the form of assassinations and agitation. He was under huge pressure from the ANC, while in the international arena eyebrows were being raised over FW’s apparent inability to bring stability to the country in the interest of peaceful negotiations with the ANC.

Judge Richard Goldstone had been given a mandate by the government to halt Third Force activities, and he was becoming impatient with the slow progress and lack of success by his investigators. FW was turning up the heat, demanding to know who was stoking the violence. Meanwhile, the security forces appeared helpless to halt South Africa’s inexorable slide into anarchy.

So the report in Vrye Weekblad was like manna from heaven. It offered a golden opportunity to follow up and, perhaps, uncover the heart of the violence, the Goldstone Commission felt.

Colonel Henk Heslinga had been seconded to the Goldstone Commission’s investigation team. A seasoned detective, he worked closely with men such as Torie Pretorius of the Attorney-General’s office. Pretorius, a senior advocate, had also worked for Goldstone’s predecessor, the D’Oliveira special investigation unit, which had looked into Third Force activities until FW appointed the commission.

Goldstone called him in and discussed the Vrye Weekblad report with him. The team decided that Cuna’s claims warranted further investigation. This might be the breakthrough they had been waiting for, the chance to unmask those involved in promoting the ongoing violence between Inkatha and ANC supporters in Natal.

Vrye Weekblad’s editorial staff were fully cooperative, and Henk succeeded in making contact with Cuna. The Mozambican was prepared to work with the commission while it investigated his allegations of assassinations in Natal.

Henk and Cuna travelled to Pietermaritzburg. With them was Lieutenant Nic Deetlefs of the police security branch in Johannesburg. Exactly why he accompanied them remains a mystery. He was an expert in the field of interrogating ANC terrorists.

Nevertheless, Cuna led the investigators to the Hilton Hotel near Pieter-maritzburg. He told them that he had gone there with a ‘Frank Smith’ of the defence force. They checked into the hotel.

The manager was more than helpful and searched the register on their behalf. According to hotel records, ‘Frank Smith’ had paid the bill with his Diners Club card.

Nedbank was less forthcoming. The bank refused to give Henk any information about Smith’s credit card. All information about the cardholder’s particulars was blocked, but Henk’s formidable powers of persuasion finally convinced Nedbank to lift the veil of secrecy over the bank account to some extent.

Frank Smith’s card was one of fifty-four credit cards on the books of an undertaking called ARAC. The average monthly turnover on the cards was R250 000. It was a tidy sum and a clear indication that the company was fairly active financially.

At the office of the registrar of companies, the investigation team established that ARAC stood for African Risk Analysis Corporation. Henk also found that ARAC’s registered business address was Momentum Mews Building, Faerie Glen, Pretoria.

It was becoming obvious that the commission had stumbled on a sinister business undertaking that could possibly be linked to Third Force activities. They had no idea what ARAC was or whether it was some kind of front organisation.

Plans were made without delay for a raid on ARAC’s offices. The operation was planned in great detail, and it was decided that only a core group from the commission’s investigation unit would take part.

What Judge Goldstone did not know at the time was that his master detective, Henk Heslinga, was playing a double role. He had been ordered by the police generals to act as their informant on the Goldstone Commission’s activities.

Ever since the D’Oliveira special investigation unit had been set up, the police had been edgy about what might be uncovered. The generals were well aware of the damage that would result from any further revelations about the Vlakplaas death squads.

Henk’s handler in the police was Major General Johan le Roux, national chief of detectives. He made sure that every snippet of information about investigations was fed to Le Roux.

In November 2006, Henk confirmed in an interview with me that he had acted as a double agent. He did his job so well that information and reports reached police headquarters in Pretoria even before Kobie Coetsee or FW saw them.

When Henk got the order to raid ARAC’s offices, he immediately set in motion plans to warn the right people in advance. He knew from the outset that the company could only be a front organisation for NI, MI or the security police. He informed General Le Roux, and asked him to find out if ARAC was not perhaps part of Military Intelligence’s underground network.

Le Roux contacted Witkop Badenhorst and told him of the impending raid. Witkop wasn’t unduly concerned, and commented that it was probably a bunch of rebel ex-Rhodesians who were involved in some or other shit.

Wednesday morning 11 November 1992 started as usual for the Goldstone commission at its offices in the General Synodal Centre in Visagie Street, though there was an underlying air of expectation about what the day would produce. The investigation team had an address from which unholy deeds were apparently being directed, but they had no idea which particular devil they would encounter.

Goldstone had indicated the previous day that they should conduct the raid in the afternoon to find out what ARAC was and what its people at Momentum Mews were doing with fifty-four Diners Club cards.

Fortunately, Henk and his team did not have to run around getting authorisation for search warrants. Their judge had been given extraordinary powers and, as a judge of the Supreme Court, was fully authorised to sign warrants for the raid himself.

Due to the wide coverage of and interest in South Africa’s peace talks, the country had been flooded for some time with foreign observers and envoys who had made themselves at home in various government offices, including those of law enforcers, in order to keep a watchful eye on the historic transition that was taking place.

The Goldstone Commission had been blessed with its quota of international observers. (No doubt we will never know how many of these palookas had managed to engineer a pleasant visit to sunny South Africa just to get away from the bleak and miserable European winter.)

Henk and Torie Pretorius were in charge of the raid. With them were police officers from Portugal, the Netherlands, France, Denmark and England, who went along to make sure that the South Africans did not commit any dirty tricks. Nothing less than an international police force to police the local police – at the ANC’s behest.

Had Henk and Torie known in advance whose front organisation they were about to raid, one might have sworn that they deliberately chose a Wednesday afternoon for the operation, but that wasn’t the case at all. They had no idea what or who they would find at that office block, which made the raid all the more exciting – almost like a lucky packet.

For the record, the defence force’s sport parade was traditionally held on Wednesday afternoons, and those who did not take an active part in sport made sure that they had a darts or snooker game lined up in a pub somewhere so as not to be in the office.

It was a veritable Babel of excited foreign policemen who drove with Henk and Torie in the convoy of vehicles heading for Pretoria’s eastern suburbs. Torie could hardly believe his eyes when he realised that Momentum Mews was just around the corner from the house where he and his family lived.

They turned left out of Lynnwood Road in front of the imposing thatch-roofed Gift Acres shopping centre, then turned sharp right into the parking lot of the shopping mall diagonally opposite Gift Acres. Momentum Mews was at the far eastern side of the mall.

Henk glanced at his wristwatch and noted that it was just before three o’clock when they entered the lift that would take them to ARAC’s offices on the fourth floor. Oddly enough, the company’s name appeared on a ground-floor board listing all the occupants of the building, but apart from that there was nothing to indicate the nature of its business.

Before knocking on the office door, Henk walked down the corridor and peered through the windows. He found it strange that there wasn’t much furniture in the offices. To one side he saw a table-tennis board and a dartboard, which showed signs of regular use. ‘What do these guys do?’ he wondered aloud as he raised his hand to knock.

It would later emerge that the woman who opened the door was a major, seconded from the army to act as Tolletjie’s secretary. The poor woman went white as a sheet when Henk handed her the search warrant and explained why the men outside were there.

As the investigators filed into the reception area, the woman said she needed to go to the toilet. Henk, who was no one’s fool, decided to keep an eye on her. Through a door that was slightly ajar, he saw her walk to her boss’s office and pick up the telephone. He promptly pulled the phone jack out of the wall and told her not to try any more tricks.

Then, while the rest of the team awaited instructions, Henk quickly questioned the secretary and decided that allowing her to telephone the person in charge would speed up the process of finding out who or what ARAC was. He especially wanted to know who the mysterious Frank Smith was and what business he had conducted in Pietermaritzburg with a shadowy figure like João Cuna.

About two hours later, the head of the organisation arrived. Tolletjie was dressed in white bowling togs and was in no mood for crap. Not only would it swiftly transpire that ARAC was, indeed, a top-secret front organisation for MI, but the raid had taken place on the day of the defence force’s national sport championships.

Needless to say, Tolletjie was not pleased when Henk informed him that they had a warrant to search the premises. Meanwhile, Witkop Badenhorst had also arrived, and told Tolletjie: ‘Okay, Brigadier, go ahead and give them the files.’

It was clear to Henk that he and Tolletjie were on a collision course.

‘Brigadier, this raid is the result of that recent report in Vrye Weekblad,’ he explained.

‘I don’t read that fucking newspaper,’ Tolletjie replied bluntly.

‘Well if you did, you would have known that you guys were going to be in the shit,’ Henk pointed out.

Tolletjie had no choice but to hand the keys of the ARAC safe to Henk and Torie. They went through the files and removed five. From their discussion with Tolletjie, it had become evident that ‘Frank Smith’ was, in fact, Ferdi Barnard.

When Tolletjie told the investigation team this, his thoughts immediately went back to the battle that he and Chris Thirion had waged with Kat Liebenberg about Ferdi and his cohorts in the old CCB. ‘Well now,’ he thought. ‘I wonder what that fucking turd of a Kat will have to say about this? If he’d listened to us, we would have been rid of this rubbish already.’

The fact that the investigation team now knew who Frank Smith was made the search of the files in the safe easier, and in the five files on Ferdi they found reports that he had written, as well as details about a brothel and high-ranking ANC members he intended compromising and then blackmailing for political ends.

They also found documents dealing with João Cuna that indicated he and Ferdi had been involved in gunrunning from Mozambique.

Tolletjie was extremely unhappy about the group of foreign policemen who had entered his domain and made this very clear to Henk. ‘How the hell can you allow strangers – foreigners – to come and scratch around here in one of our country’s top secret intelligence installations?’ he asked.

‘I’m just doing my job, Brigadier,’ said the detective, shrugging his shoulders.

The raid ended in a more congenial atmosphere, but Tolletjie didn’t realise at the time what the consequences would be. The so-called DCC raid by Goldstone would turn out to have far-reaching political results and, for the rest of his life, would be an albatross around FW de Klerk’s neck.

By the time Torie and the rest of the team left with the confiscated documents, the DCC staff were quite at ease with Henk and invited him to have a drink with them. After all, he was just a detective doing his job and had no interest in the politics of the duties he was required to perform for Goldstone. He was far more sympathetic to those on whom the raid had been conducted than to Judge Goldstone’s investigation.

With a beer in his hand and Tolletjie far more amenable after a couple of drinks, everyone was more relaxed, and the DCC men realised they need not treat Henk as the enemy. They were upset about the raid and obviously uneasy about the possible consequences, but grateful that only five sets of documents had been seized.

In any case, the files dealt only with Ferdi Barnard’s activities, and the dedicated DCC personnel had long regarded him and his buddies with contempt.

‘They have been an embarrassment for us and I don’t know why the fuck we had to protect them,’ Tolletjie remarked. Well-disciplined officer that he was, he did not mention his superiors by name, but had some harsh words to say about the ‘bastards’ in high places who had shielded the scum.

‘Tolletjie, old friend, I’ll make you a deal,’ said Henk, waving the DCC safe keys in the air. ‘Take these keys tonight and do whatever you want. I’ll pick them up from you tomorrow morning.’ Henk had decided on his own that this was the least he could do, especially since DCC’s big bosses had done nothing when he’d tried to warn them about the raid. ‘If those fools had reacted in time, these guys would have been spared all their worries,’ he thought.

When Henk left the offices without the safe keys, the boys quickly moved into top gear. A bakkie was swiftly arranged and the safe was emptied of all incriminating documents.

They wanted to make particularly sure that none of South Africa’s intelligence documents fell into the hands of foreign operators with the help of the Goldstone Commission or other non-governmental organisations.

‘Nowhere in the world would something like that be allowed by any government,’ said Tolletjie. ‘But thanks to that fucking FW, the sluices were opened for every Tom, Dick and Harry to come and spy on us.’

His men had a busy night. The bakkie full of documents was driven to a smallholding near the Rooiwal power station north of Pretoria, where they were burnt. To make sure that nothing fell into the wrong hands, the ash was carefully collected and thrown into an unused borehole on the property. Henk retrieved the keys to the safe the next day.

And that was the sum total of the DCC raid – an event that changed the course of South African history forever. In the process, a large number of innocent people were mortally wounded and would never recover.

The one person who was delighted with the success of the DCC raid was Judge Goldstone. The man had begun to think he would never be able to expose a Third Force, and the raid had been a blessing from above. Personally, he wanted to achieve far greater things in the future. It was precisely that ambition that would earn him the nickname of Richard Richard, due to his dreams of becoming Secretary General of the UN when Boutros Boutros-Ghali of Egypt eventually decided to retire.

Five days after the raid, Goldstone issued a lengthy statement. It was the prelude to FW’s controversial purge of his defence force on the strength of the opportunistic Steyn report, compiled by another ambitious man, Mirage pilot Pierre Steyn.

The full text of Judge Goldstone’s statement was as follows:

Since February 1990, the state president has made the government’s policy clear, namely that no involvement of the security forces in criminal, unlawful and subversive activities will be tolerated, especially in regard to political violence and intimidation.

In fact, the state president emphasised last Thursday at the annual Foreign Correspondents Dinner that the government found it unacceptable that the state security forces were involved in covert party-political operations.

When the commission was appointed, it was made clear to me, in no uncertain terms, by the state president and the minister of justice that my commission would at all times be allowed to operate independently as a judicial commission. That undertaking has been diligently honoured at all times by the state president and the government. Other political role players in South Africa have equally respected the commission’s independence.

Extraordinary and unique powers – for South Africa – were offered to the commission. I will refer, in particular, to the commission’s powers of search and seizure.

The commission has previously reported that the main reason for the current violence lies in the political struggle between the African National Congress and the Inkatha Freedom Party.

It has also been reported that the commission has no evidence of an organised ‘third force’ and that there is no evidence linking senior members of the security forces to political violence and intimidation. The commission reiterates that any such allegations will be investigated.

Last Wednesday, 11 November 1992, an investigation by the commission led us to a building that housed a major operational unit of military intelligence. The commission identified this building as the result of an eyewitness being brought before it by the South African Police.

On the basis of information given to the commission’s legal representatives and as a result of outstanding detective work by Colonel H Heslinga, a police officer in the commission’s service, together with members of the commission’s investigation team, the operational centre of MI was found. Two of the international experts attached to the commission’s investigation team participated in the probe.

With the assistance of reinforcements from the South African Police, the MI building was sealed off and five files were confiscated. The commission wanted the files as the result of information it had been given by the witness.

The files that were seized contained the following information:

•   From May 1991 to 31 December 1991, Mr Ferdi Barnard, a notorious former member of the CCB, was in the service of military intelligence.

•   Mr Barnard was appointed by DCC on the basis of a recommendation by the chief of staff intelligence (CSI), Lt Gen R (Witkop) Badenhorst.

•   From May 1991, Barnard was appointed on a trial basis at a salary of R3 000 with operational expenses of R800 per month. From 1 August 1991 he was appointed on a permanent basis at a salary of R3 500 and operational expenses of R2 000 per month. His appointment was recommended by DCC and approved by Lt Gen Badenhorst.

•   As became known in 1990, Barnard was formerly a sergeant in the drug squad and had two previous convictions for murder, one for attempted murder and three charges of theft. In 1984 he was sentenced to 20 years in prison. The effective sentence was six years. In 1988 he was released on parole and taken into service by the CCB shortly afterwards.

•   As a result of his previous convictions, Barnard was not permitted to own a firearm. On 6 June 1991, DCC recommended to Gen Badenhorst that Barnard be allowed to possess a firearm for his own protection. Badenhorst refused to authorise the issue of a firearm to Barnard.

•   On 20 June 1991, Barnard submitted a report to MI about a task team that he wanted to establish. The following points formed part of his proposal:

a)  They would focus their efforts exclusively on the activities of Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK).

b)  They would look in particular at MK’s involvement in crime and the organisation’s relationship with crime syndicates. For this purpose, MK members would be used to infiltrate criminal elements and where such MK members could not be recruited, they would be compromised. To this end, use would be made of prostitutes, homosexuals, shebeen owners and drug peddlers.

c)  As an example of the way in which MK would be criminally compromised, Barnard referred to the case of Peter Mokaba. In May 1991 it was widely reported by the media that Mokaba was a police spy. He denied this and soon afterwards, he was elected as president of the ANC Youth League.

d)  Barnard’s team had the ability to gain access to

•   the computer centre at the police criminal bureau;

•   contacts at immigration control;

•   contacts at the licensing department;

•   internal revenue’s computers;

•   credit bureaus;

•   an independent group involved in bugging telephones.

e)  Barnard’s detailed plan was presented to senior MI members and it was on the basis of this that he was appointed as an agent.

One of Barnard’s associates, or one of his sub-agents, was involved in the installation of computers at the ANC’s head office.

Barnard’s plans and follow-up reports were presented to senior members of MI. A report dated 23 August 1991 makes reference to a ‘support network’ of ‘prostitutes, homosexuals, nightclub owners and criminal elements’.

On 19 December 1991 a report appeared in Beeld concerning a Mr Christopher Human’s appearance in court on a charge of being in possession of an illegal Uzi sub-machine gun. In his bail application, Human claimed Barnard had left the weapon with him in an attempt to recruit him and a female escort as spies for MI.

According to Beeld, a spokesman for the army denied that Barnard worked for them. This denial was a lie.

On 19 December 1991, DCC saw the report and orders were issued for Barnard to be ‘put on ice’ immediately. On 30 December 1991, DCC ordered the immediate termination of Barnard’s services ‘on instruction of the minister’.

Barnard’s services were effectively terminated from 31 December 1991. He was paid three months’ salary in advance.

The following appears in a report from his handler dated 9 January: ‘This source was fired on 31 December 1991 on the orders of the minister of defence. Contact has continued in order to finalise certain matters and to persuade him not to act irrationally and thus embarrass the defence force.’

In a later report, dated 21 January 1992, the same handler states that Barnard’s attitude towards the defence force ‘is still very sour, but his relationship with his handler is strong enough that he can be controlled and prevented from going to the newspapers to make trouble. The handler is making a concerted effort to find private work for Barnard.’

Reference is made in the documents to ANC involvement in criminal activity, including counterfeit money and the illegal import of weapons.

To sum up, the Barnard files indicate the following:

•   High-ranking members of MI were involved in the appointment of a person who has a serious criminal record for violent crime and dishonesty.

•   The defence force issued a public statement denying that Barnard was in its employ while in fact it was known at top level that this was a lie.

•   At least one senior MI officer was prepared to recommend that Barnard be illegally issued with a firearm.

At the operational centre concerned, there are 48 members who use credit cards. One of the 48, up to and until his recent dismissal, is Mr LWJ Flores, who was detained by the British police on suspicion of being involved in a conspiracy to murder former policeman Dirk Coetzee.

The commission is of the opinion that no decent member of the security forces would condone or support such action in any branch of the force. To do so would undermine their respect for the legality and moral basis of their own organisation and be detrimental to their effectivity in the battle against crime.

In recent weeks the chief of the army, Lt Gen Meiring (Georg) has made public statements implicating MK in criminal plans to use ‘special operational teams’ from the PWV area to sabotage government installations in certain homelands. These and other statements have now been publicly supported by the minister of defence and Gen Kat Liebenberg, chief of the defence force. The South African public is entitled to be told by an independent source whether or not these allegations are true.

There is a widespread perception, supported by evidence, that the IFP and the ANC in Natal already have access to automatic weapons.

The South African Police have in fact not been able to apprehend the ringleaders behind thousands of political murders in the past few years.

During marches in Johannesburg and Durban, the IFP has blatantly flouted the law by brandishing dangerous weapons. No criminal charges have ever been brought against the organisers.

For months now the Azanian People’s Liberation Army (Apla) has claimed responsibility for numerous murders on white and black members of the police.

The morale of the South African Police is eroded daily by verbal and physical attacks on members. Their ability to deal with the frightening levels of violence has been seriously eroded.

The commission has no doubt that the political violence and intimidation in South Africa will not be effectively brought under control without a thorough investigation into all public and private security forces and armies, both internally and externally. Even if the commission were to step up its enquiries, we would still be treating the symptoms rather than the disease of violence in South Africa.

Successful and constructive multiparty negotiations are not possible in the present climate of mutual suspicion and mistrust. It is highly improbable that free and fair elections could take place in the prevailing climate of violence and intimidation. No investment will be made in South Africa until a democratic and peaceful climate can be created.

In his report to the UN security council dated 7 August 1992, the secretary general stated:

‘The capacity for violence built up over many years by the various political groupings in South Africa is so central to the lack of confidence in the political life of the country that I believe it must be healed.

‘Consequently, I have suggested that the Goldstone commission should conduct a series of investigations into the activities and operations of certain agencies, inter alia the army and the police, Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), the Azanian People’s Liberation Army (Apla), the KwaZulu police and, in general, certain private “security companies”.

‘My special envoy has discussed these proposals with Judge Goldstone as well as with certain parties who feel that such investigations might indeed help bring the violence under control and be of benefit to the country as a whole.

‘While such investigations would expand the work of the Goldstone commission, they could be conducted in terms of the current mandate. Should the commission require additional funding to extend its investigations, it should be provided by the government.’

The security council accepted the secretary general’s recommendations in terms of resolution 772 of 17 August 1992. Both the South African government and the ANC accepted these recommendations.

At present, the commission has neither the resources nor the approval of the relevant parties to implement the secretary general’s recommendations. In fact, the commission does not have the resources needed to examine the hundreds of files found on Wednesday at the MI installation.

The commission is appealing to political parties and groups in South Africa, and the government in particular, to empower it, or any other independent body, to carry out the secretary general’s recommendations as a matter of urgency. The commission is also appealing to the international community to assist it in the speedy and meaningful implementation of these recommendations.

If the present climate of violence, intimidation, fear and suspicion can be removed, the commission believes that it can succeed in playing a significant role in establishing a security force, consisting of both the police and the military, that will have the support and trust of the majority of South Africans. Only then will the country enjoy the prospect of real peace and prosperity.

Goldstone’s statement was unquestionably calculated, and he deliberately highlighted the UN Secretary General’s view of the security situation, because he knew full well that this would touch a raw nerve in FW. The state president was extremely sensitive to the opinions of foreign leaders, and especially the UN, about his progress towards peace in South Africa.

As might have been expected, FW reacted to Goldstone’s statement without delay. After all, he didn’t want to antagonise his friends abroad – especially not his good friends at the UN.

Two days later, he drafted Pierre Steyn to look into the Military Intelligence service with a view to a possible restructuring, as well as possible contraventions of the law and government policy by DCC.

When FW announced that one General Steyn was to conduct such an investigation, many people asked, ‘Who is this Pierre Steyn?’ He had come out of nowhere to handle a most controversial investigation on behalf of the government.

Pierre Steyn must have had bloody good contacts to have been able to conclude the sensitive probe into DCC’s activities as rapidly as he did. Exactly one month and a day after he received his orders, he furnished his state president with an authoritative report that would lead to a purge of the South African Defence Force.

What he whispered in FW’s ear about the ‘subversive activities’ of his colleagues was damning, though it later turned out to be nothing more than gossip and rumour that was never substantiated.

To strengthen his case even further, Steyn had the temerity to tell FW that the investigation was so dangerous that he feared for his personal safety should he venture onto certain terrain. FW got the fright of his life when he heard this, and told Steyn to take the bull by the horns and pluck the demons out of MI.

This meant a great deal to Pierre Steyn, because it allowed him to score major points with the ANC and secure for himself a couple of cosy billets in the new South Africa.

On Saturday 19 December 1992, Die Burger reported that President FW de Klerk would make an extremely important announcement at an international news conference that morning, which was expected to have grave repercussions for the defence force’s intelligence services.

‘He will make known the government’s reaction to the investigation carried out by Lt Gen Pierre Steyn, defence force chief of staff, into alleged illegal activity by the defence force’s intelligence services.

‘Pres de Klerk cut short his holiday this week in order to study Gen Steyn’s first confidential interim report,’ according to Die Burger.

FW’s account of why he wanted to kick the military’s arse drew huge interest. But he was out of his depth. He had no contact or intimate relationship with his generals and was inordinately afraid of the defence force’s ability to unseat him as state president.

Confidants and certain elements close to him exploited that very uncertainty and nervous fear about his security forces for their own political advantage.

At three-thirty that Saturday morning, Chris Thirion’s telephone rang. It wasn’t his normal telephone; it was the red one. ‘When it rang, I knew immediately the shit had hit the fan. That telephone rang very seldom, but when it did, it signalled trouble.’

It was his boss, chief of staff intelligence Joffel van der Westhuizen, calling at that godforsaken hour.

‘Chris, you have to come to army HQ. We have to talk,’ was Joffel’s curt message before quickly revealing that he’d been called to Cape Town urgently the night before. FW had cut short his holiday to speak to Joffel, Kat Liebenberg, Georg Meiring and Minister Gene Louw. Pierre Steyn and Dr Kobus Scholtz of NI were also present.

Needless to say, the phone call from Joffel put paid to any more sleep that night for Chris. He was deeply disturbed. What the hell could he have done wrong to upset FW so much? He honestly couldn’t come up with a reason as he spent the next few hours in his living room, waiting to hear what Joffel had to say.

When Chris saw Joffel that morning, it was clear to him that the other man had also not had a good night’s rest. In fact, he wondered if the CSI had slept at all, because he looked like hell. Evidently, FW had read them the riot act, and something told Chris he was next in line on the hit list.

Chris didn’t question the gravity of the situation for a moment, but he still had no idea what was going on. Then Joffel began recounting how acrimonious FW had been when he saw them in the middle of the night. He was visibly upset – no, perhaps panicky, because he did not know where he stood in relation to his military generals.

At that stage of the political negotiations, FW was an extremely worried man, because the country was wracked by violence and bloodshed, and rumours of a right-wing uprising, perhaps even a coup d’état by his own defence force, were rife. FW didn’t know whom to trust, and Judge Goldstone’s statement had fuelled his paranoid fear of betrayal from within.

Joffel’s first words as Chris sat down in a chair were: ‘Do you know what FW told us last night? I don’t want to fire captains or majors, I want to get rid of generals! He said he had a list of names and he was ready to start sacking people,’ Joffel said of his nocturnal meeting with the state president.

He briefed Chris in detail about the background to Goldstone’s discovery of the existence of Ferdi Barnard, Slang van Zyl, Staal Burger and other sacked CCB members within the DCC structures.

‘Pierre Steyn had told FW that a coup was being planned, and that poison was being used against the enemy,’ Joffel said. ‘Your name was first on the list of people who have to be fired because you are apparently involved in gun-running, planning to overthrow the government, misleading politicians and following your own agenda,’ he informed Chris.

That night in Cape Town, it had been apparent that FW was backed into a corner. With the help of the UN, Judge Goldstone had called on him to act, and Pierre Steyn had whispered a series of grim stories in his ear. He had no alternative but to put his foot down and boot the rotten eggs, as presented to him by Goldstone and Steyn, out of the defence force.

FW handed his generals the list of names of those he wanted to sack. He offered them the opportunity to react to the list.

‘Gentlemen, if you do not agree with this list, you have to come back to me with other names,’ was the state president’s ultimatum. ‘You will then have to give me a list of the people I will fire. But bear in mind, General Chris Thirion and a few other names on the list are not negotiable.’

From his discussion with Joffel, it was clear to Chris that the state president had offered three options for consideration, but Chris was left in no doubt that FW specifically wanted to fire him. There were quite a few generals on the list, but he was one of those who would be sacked, no matter what.

The three options FW put on the table were:

•   Summary dismissal of the non-negotiable group.

•   Termination of service with pension benefits.

•   Compulsory leave of absence pending the outcome of investigations.

That was all well and good, but it mattered little, because within hours FW would announce at a press conference that, as supreme commander of the SADF, he was conducting a purge of his defence force.

Thirion made it quite clear to Joffel that he had no intention of leaving the defence force without protest. ‘I am a proud soldier who has always served my state presidents and my country faithfully and loyally,’ he told Joffel unequivocally. ‘Not even the president is going to kick me out without a fight.’

Some tough talk followed, because Chris was not prepared, under any circumstances, to be the proverbial scapegoat. They finally agreed that he would be placed in the second category and that his services would be terminated with full pension benefits. He refused point-blank to be summarily dismissed in terms of what he’d been told was the original plan.

‘There is no way that you are going to steamroller me, Joffel,’ Chris warned. ‘I demand full compensation for my years of service – and pension – and I demand a hearing.’

When he asked Joffel why this was happening, the general’s terse response was: ‘FW will say how and why at a press conference later today.’

The Burger had fanned the flames of expectation with its report that morning:

Pres De Klerk instructed Gen Steyn on 18 November to carry out an urgent and comprehensive investigation into the defence force’s intelligence services, with a view to their restructuring and the possibility of contravention of the law and government policy by MI’s Directorate Covert Collection.

This instruction followed sensational revelations by the Goldstone Commission of an alleged secret DCC project to discredit the ANC.

Former CCB member Ferdi Barnard was allegedly involved in the project.

The international media was well represented when FW entered the venue of the press conference with a sombre face.

After announcing his far-reaching and controversial purge of the defence force, it was question time.

What exactly has been revealed?

‘I want to emphasise that this is a progress report and it would be counterproductive, in so far as there has been criminal activity, to find, arrest and take the guilty parties to court. We are still in the process of gathering evidence and cannot release too much information at this time.

‘In general, however, the activities have to do with what one can clearly see as crimes and include the personal political agendas of a small group of people. I cannot provide details about the various crimes, but if they include political killings or theft, drug trafficking, ivory smuggling or any other criminal activity, we will take this information to court as prima facie evidence. We are looking for that evidence.

‘The Directorate Covert Collection has already been identified as one of the units whose activities are being investigated, not only by Gen Steyn but also by a police general and Judge Goldstone. This is one of the units.

‘Whether it will be disbanded? No decisions have yet been taken about restructuring, but there will definitely be reorganisation and regrouping and this forms part of Gen Steyn’s instructions.

‘Any government needs to gather intelligence covertly, so some functions will continue once irregularities have been eradicated and the unit has been stripped of functions that ought not to be carried out by defence contractors and collaborators.

‘The reason for not making the names known is that some of the people have not yet been notified. They have not all been informed. The names will be released, but we must first notify the people themselves.’

What kind of crimes have been committed? Is murder included?

‘I believe I can say yes, the findings will lead to the conclusion that some of the activities have resulted in the death of individuals.’

When will the names be released?

‘As soon as possible, before the end of the month.’

Who are you referring to when you talk about those who are responsible for violence and unrest?

‘Everyone who is involved in the planning of violence. Anyone in the forces, supporters of any political party, each and every South African and non–South African involved in the promotion of violence. I do not have specific opposition or the security forces in mind. Everyone.’

Whose services have been suspended or who has been dismissed?

‘Some of the twenty-three form part of the first phase of reorganisation. The seven whose services have been suspended will be subject to further intensive investigations. The sixteen who form part of the reorganisation and regrouping are not necessarily guilty of crimes.’

Is this the exposure of the so-called Third Force?

‘I don’t believe that the relatively few people who are involved, according to the information that I have, can in any way be called a Third Force. The term has come to denote a sinister force that is behind all South Africa’s problems. There is no suggestion that such a force exists within the security forces. The main reason for the violence is the conflict between supporters of different parties who are systematically killing one another.’

Is there anything that represents a threat to state security?

‘I do not believe the extent of the activities can lead us to think so. They come from more than one unit and there are indications that some of them have contact with people who are politically active outside government circles or those in government service.

‘One of the consequences is that not one of these people will be in a position to cover their tracks, should there be tracks to cover. It amounts to a freezing of the situation in a specific section as far as personal involvement and activity of the individuals concerned present a basis for further investigation. Not all of them served in the same unit.

‘It should be borne in mind that we are working with provisional information and are nowhere near final conclusions. We have acted quickly, but at this stage, information does not indicate an iceberg, rather that we are in fact dealing with a limited number of people – a small core and limited number of people.’

How were they able to hide their activity?

‘There is the historical background. We have come out of an era that some people would say saw us involved in a war, when many special measures were taken and broad powers delegated that have been restricted and redefined to improve control. The restrictions began under my predecessor, but since I became president, I have taken various steps.

‘Secondly, all intelligence services, here and abroad, need room in which to manoeuvre, because they operate in a shadowy world, and this is an additional contributing factor, but the test is whether this leeway and absence of watertight regulations, which are required for any intelligence service to function, are managed properly and supported by internal administrative and financial measures, so as to prevent abuse.

‘For this reason, existing controls will be upgraded.’

Was this [abuse] aimed at halting reform or even overthrowing the government?

‘I believe there are indications that some of the individuals and some of the operations were motivated by a desire to prevent us from attaining our constitutional objectives. No evidence has been presented to me that might indicate a violent overthrow or a coup d’état.

‘It is almost as if we have been going round in a circle. Internal investigations have always been questioned by the media and for years there have been calls for judicial inquiries. We have done both. The Goldstone Commission was my initiative. It is working relatively successfully, but we have found that commissions also have their limitations.

‘We are aware that evidence, files, have been destroyed. We are not dealing with children. We are dealing with well-trained individuals who constantly take steps not to be found out. What we have now is an internal investigation combined with instruments such as the Goldstone Commission, and hopefully this combination, which goes hand in hand with cooperation between all the investigation teams, will deliver better results than we have seen until now.’

Is there a danger that individuals who have not been informed are even now destroying files?

‘Those who are at work have been informed, but those who are on holiday have to be tracked down. I can assure you that we are aware of the risk and the necessary steps will be taken, but it has been known since 18 November that Gen Steyn was conducting an investigation, and in certain circles this gave rise to a hive of all kinds of activity.’

Right wing?

‘That is not impossible, but I don’t want to go into detail. The defence force is expected to be politically neutral.

‘I am shocked and disappointed, but determined – I have always said if there is an ulcer, I want to lance it and get to the roots. We are finally doing that and I am determined that we will leave no stone unturned in our efforts.

‘I do not have a written report from Gen Steyn. I sat down with my colleagues, including Minister Louw, and we were briefed, but there is no formal document. Everything has happened under great pressure. The statement was sent to Judge Goldstone and other ministers and people with a direct interest, and a transcript of the press release will also be made available to Judge Goldstone.’

Who told the twenty-three?

‘Heads of their sections or CSADF or their commanding officers. The instructions were to waste no time and work through the night.’

The press conference ended with a few words from Minister Gene Louw. He was new to the portfolio and this was, in fact, his baptism of fire as minister of defence.

‘I am deeply disappointed,’ he said, ‘but we are dealing with a small number of the SADF’s 100 000 members. The 100 000 are the ones who are suffering. I am shocked that these people have sullied the name of the SADF.

‘Some of them might have acted out of political conviction, but in the majority of cases, these were people who were following their own agenda under the influence of actions that demand disciplinary steps, be they criminal or in the form of reprimands.’

FW’s international press conference had been carefully stage-managed and the date was chosen deliberately, not only to get rid of the twenty-three military officers, but in close cooperation with the ANC.

Ideally, FW would have liked to sack his defence force chief, Kat Liebenberg, army chief Georg Meiring and CSI Joffel van der Westhuizen as well, but this was not strategically feasible. He knew that these three key generals were extremely anti-ANC and he was itching to oust them at the first opportunity.

But, according to military and political analysts, FW’s decision to leave them in their posts could be seen as a preventive measure. The risk of his armed forces unleashing a rebellion within the defence force was simply too great for such a drastic move.

The day after FW’s announcement, Roelf Meyer, his minister of constitutional development, confirmed in Washington that the purge had been carefully planned to coincide with the festive season, when the majority of military officers would be on leave and dispersed throughout the country. This would make it more difficult for them to regroup and rise up against FW’s dismissals.

There had been close liaison with the ANC to ensure that the two groups could take joint control of the security forces and that MK members would be included in the new national army.

Retired MI chief General Tienie Groenewald reacted to FW’s measures as follows: ‘I have never before seen a government destroy its own power base the way this one has done. At a time when the country is systematically moving towards total chaos, the government has effectively neutralised its Military Intelligence capabilities by removing the eyes, ears and nose of its defence force.’

For Chris Thirion, that Saturday saw the collapse of his career as a dedicated soldier. He was more heartsore and stunned than bitter and angry over FW’s rash actions. As the highest-ranking officer sacked by FW, he would draw the most attention from the media.

True to the disciplined nature of his calling, he sat down and composed a letter to FW, in which he told the state president and supreme commander of the SADF that, as a loyal soldier, he had no choice but to accept his orders.

‘But as an individual, Mr President, I cannot make peace with this,’ he wrote. ‘I must therefore request that I be charged before a court martial or tried in terms of any other formal legal process for the deeds of which I stand accused by you.’

FW never even bothered to respond to this request from one of his generals.

Chris knew very well why FW, acting on Pierre Steyn’s advice, had decided to dismiss him as one of the twenty-three. It wasn’t simply because FW so badly wanted to fire generals, but because certain top NI officials hated him. He quickly put two and two together and realised – as indeed would be confirmed in due course – that the loudest whispers in Steyn’s ears had come from NI.

Some months before FW wielded the axe at DCC, Chris had crossed swords with NI and he had little doubt that this had played a significant role in him being labelled a coup plotter and renegade soldier for the rest of his life.

During the confrontation with his NI counterparts, he got the message loud and clear that Niel Barnard’s men, with their arrogant and superior attitude, believed that they were the country’s top intelligence agents, and FW’s blue-eyed boys to boot.

It was over the Easter weekend in 1992 – eight months before FW sacked him – that Chris had had to carry the can for his superiors, while Kat, Joffel, Georg and an entire echelon of top generals were enjoying some rest and recreation on a bushveld hunting expedition.

When he’d been summoned to a meeting with a gravely concerned Roelf Meyer and two senior NI agents, Mike Kennedy of counter-espionage and Dr Kobus Scholtz, Chris was mystified. They told him that two of his people, Pamela du Randt and Leon Flores, had been arrested in Britain.

They also told him that the couple had been sent to England by MI to locate the hiding place of Dirk Coetzee, former commander of the police death squads, so that he could be taken out by assassins. Scholtz claimed that conversations between the two spies in their London hotel rooms had been taped by MI5, the British intelligence service.

When Chris responded that his people would not get involved in the murder of someone like Dirk Coetzee, Scholtz told him to his face: ‘If that is what your people tell you, they are lying.’

Chris didn’t pay too much attention to Scholtz’s hard-arsed attitude and decided to investigate the incident himself. He called on Tolletjie Botha of DCC and Ferdie van Wyk of ComOps (GS2) to find out what was really going on.

It seemed that the army had sanctioned something called Operation Echoes, and that Flores had been temporarily seconded from DCC to work with Pamela on the project. Their mission was to make contact in England with members of the banned Irish Republican Army (IRA).

Army intelligence had information that the ANC’s armed wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) was collaborating with the IRA, and if this was true, proving that the organisation had links with international terrorist organisations would make for ideal propaganda against the ANC.

‘I found out later that this was bullshit and that Flores, an ex-cop from the Vlakplaas unit, had hijacked the operation and was playing a dual role. He was being used by the police, without the defence force’s knowledge, as a courier to take money to people who had Coetzee under surveillance in London,’ Chris recalled.

He spent the entire Easter weekend getting to the bottom of the Flores matter. He was worried about the welfare of his people while they were in MI5’s hands, and wanted to prevent them being interrogated at all cost. Chris had no problem offering an assurance that they would cooperate, but he wanted to avoid them coming to any harm.

No novice when it came to espionage, Chris managed quite quickly to reach a CIA contact in South Africa. When they met, the contact casually mentioned the London incident, and Chris realised that the news had already spread about South African spies being held in a British prison.

When he met the local MI5 agent, Chris emphasised that he wanted to make sure his people were safe and unharmed. He also made it clear that he wanted to request the British intelligence authorities to allow the pair to return to South Africa, where they could be interrogated thoroughly in order to determine what exactly had happened.

Chris also asked the Brits for copies of their surveillance tapes, but the agent told him no such tapes existed. ‘Fuck me,’ Chris thought when he heard this. ‘A senior colleague from NI lied blatantly to my face!’

On Easter Monday, the British officials notified Chris that they were sending his people back to him without first interrogating them. He immediately placed medical personnel at 1 Military Hospital on standby so that Flores and Du Randt could undergo both physical and psychological examination before being stashed in a safe house.

It was at this point that NI tried to muscle in on the action, insisting that they would pick the pair up at the airport and interrogate them. Chris refused point-blank. ‘This is a military matter and we will handle it ourselves,’ he told NI in no uncertain terms. He had no intention of giving the Ray-Ban-and-leather-jacket brigade any chance to score more points with FW.

Like any school-yard tattletale, NI ran to Niel Barnard. He, in turn, pulled strings and the next thing Chris found himself embroiled in a heated confrontation yet again and under attack from all sides.

Kobie Coetsee, Niel Barnard and Kat Liebenberg were all there. Kat, of course, had no idea what the fuss was about, since he had only just returned from his weekend of hunting and hellraising in the bush. In the end, however, little was achieved, as the two spies remained under military jurisdiction.

Members of the Recces were assigned to protect Pamela. There was one incident when she was playing golf at a Pretoria course and her bodyguards confronted two suspicious-looking men. It goes without saying that the Recces gave the intruders a bloody good hiding, only to find out shortly afterwards that they were NI agents. In military circles the incident gave rise to much hilarity, but NI didn’t find it nearly so amusing.

For Chris, it seemed entirely likely that NI’s hate campaign against him had finally manifested itself in FW’s purge of the defence force. ‘NI was extremely upset because I had made contact with the CIA directly. They always believed they held the copyright on liaison and negotiations with foreign intelligence agencies, like those of the Americans.

‘Unfortunately for them, the CIA was closely involved at the time with top secret support for Jonas Savimbi and his UNITA troops in Angola. Weapons like Stinger missiles were supplied to them in the utmost secrecy, and this inevitably required contact between the CIA and CSI. It rendered NI impotent with rage.’

As South Africa returned to work in January 1993, tempers began to rise over the black Christmas that FW had visited on his defence force. Systematically, people began regrouping and putting pressure on FW to start charging them for the heinous crimes they had been accused of – as he had promised at his press conference. The media, too, began pressing for access to Pierre Steyn’s controversial report, but the silence was deafening from both FW and Steyn.

The first counter-attack was launched by a former head of DCC, Commander Jack Widdowson, who took FW to court over his dismissal. He was one of the twenty-three DCC officers who had been sacked.

On the eve of Widdowson’s civil claim being heard by the Pretoria High Court, FW got cold feet, and his legal representatives settled with the former naval officer on the court steps. He had claimed R500 000 in damages from FW and Kobie Coetsee, but how much he received and the terms of the settlement were not made public.

Meanwhile, the regularity with which the Goldstone Commission was hauling skeletons out of the closet had given rise to great discomfort in police ranks. The police finally began to realise that the commission was moving ever closer to exposing the full range of their activities, and the generals were becoming increasingly nervous.

In 1993, a classified information note that clearly spelt out their anxiety was circulated at the highest level within the police force:

Currently there are serious concerns among senior police officers about allegations by the Goldstone Commission that generals and other members are involved in so-called Third Force activities.

The feeling is not only that, should there be a basis for these allegations, the law must run its course, but also that the police force, as the relevant institution, should distance itself totally from such activities and denounce them.

One of the most pressing questions concerns the obvious manner in which the commission makes the content of its reports about sensitive matters available to other parties/groups, such as the ANC, even before such reports have been submitted to the commission’s mandatory head, the state president, and the casual manner in which basic legal principles are ignored by a judicial commission.

In this respect, two examples stand out clearly. The report on hostel violence was handed to the state president during September 1992. However, according to the media, Judge Goldstone had made the report available to Cyril Ramaphosa of the ANC and asked for his comments three days earlier. Despite the fact that the IFP was also affected by the report, they were not afforded the same opportunity. Why not?

The way in which the commission carried out its investigation into the SADF’s directorate covert collection (DCC) is another example. On the basis of allegations made by the commission, various SADF generals and other senior officers were forced to retire on early pension.

No further steps were ever taken against any of them and, in fact, most of them returned to duty with the SADF. However, the damage to the image of the SADF in terms of members’ professionalism and integrity, especially at senior level, had already been done.

On the question of credibility regarding the commission’s report in the case of the DCC, even the Weekly Mail had the following to say in its edition of 25 July 1993:

‘This week, 18 months later, this elephant has given birth to a whitewashed mouse. Judge Goldstone published a report that looked as if it had been dashed off in the aeroplane as he was rushing between the appellate division and his numerous inquiries into violence.’

In the interim, the sacked members of DCC, both individually and later as a concerned group, had regularly directed inquiries to FW’s office, as well as to Steyn himself, about the nature of the charges they might expect to face. They insisted that they had the right to be fully informed about the crimes they had allegedly committed.

The group approached the situation on a strictly confidential basis, so as not to embarrass the office of the state president or diminish Steyn’s stature. They acted correctly and with utmost responsibility. They were not seeking to kick sand in anyone’s face, but they wanted the truth – they were looking for answers, but all they got was a cold shoulder, repeatedly. For FW, his fuckup was a huge embarrassment, and he evidently hoped that by ignoring it, it would quietly go away.

The spark that ignited the DCC powder keg anew was struck by Nelson Mandela in April 1994, at a memorial service in Soweto marking the first anniversary of Chris Hani’s murder. When Mandela said Pierre Steyn’s probe into the DCC had exposed the Third Force, it opened up old wounds. It was simply not acceptable to the former DCC officers to be referred to, yet again, as a Third Force, when none of them had ever been charged with a crime.

Three days after Mandela’s inflammatory statement, DCC moved its battle into the open and issued a press statement in the name of Pan Afrik Industrial Investment Consultants (PAIIC), one of their front organisations.

For more than a year, we have remained silent. However, we have added our voices to the many others that have begged the state president and the Goldstone Commission to make available their findings on Third Force activities within DCC, but in vain.

Unfortunately, Mr Mandela has now joined the choir of those who found us guilty without trial.

Prior to the Goldstone raid, DCC was responsible for the covert collection of information about foreign files that represented a threat to South Africa, strategic and tactical information about the military activities of MK, Apla and Azania, the activities of foreign intelligence services engaged in espionage against South Africa, and an international section that dealt with intelligence matters beyond South Africa’s borders.

On 16 November 1992, Judge Goldstone issued a premature and damaging press release about the results of his raid. This statement contradicted the facts that had been testified to by DCC before the commission that very morning.

Equally damaging were the state president’s public utterances on 19 December 1992 when he placed 23 of his officers on compulsory leave and early pension. Without any reserve, we can state that this created the impression that the alleged Third Force had been unmasked.

Certain matters related to our fate have forced us to believe that a secret agenda exists:

•   We have never been given any reasons for the termination of our services, except for a letter from Cmdt Sandra Nolan stating that ‘due to altered circumstances in South Africa’ our services are no longer required.

•   All our efforts to obtain answers at high level about the reasons for our dismissal have been fobbed off. By the end of February 1993 we had been removed from the military system, yet remained completely in the dark.

•   An even greater shame is that we were given a 12-month remuneration package on termination without ever being given the chance to negotiate a settlement. We received no compensation in recognition of our many years of loyal service to the defence force and the country.

•   No attempt was made by the defence force to reorientate or prepare us to work in the private sector. Very few of the affected members managed to find work. The lack of private sector experience and the stigma of the ‘Third Force’ are chiefly to blame for this situation.

•   On termination of our services, Brig Doncaster forced us to sign a document in which we waived all our rights to take any legal action against any persons or state installations.

•   The defence force was fully aware that none of us had the financial resources to bring protracted labour action against the state.

Five months later and, for the first time, the Goldstone Commission made an effort to interview us. It was a half-hearted attempt. Most members tried to elicit answers from Goldstone, but he either would or could not offer any explanations.

Earlier this year, the defence force deemed it convenient to send written notices to members who were under investigation, informing them that no evidence had been found against them of ‘Third Force or criminal activities’.

Throughout 1993, all our attempts to find out the truth via official channels failed dismally. We have recently made further efforts to normalise our position by talking to the ANC and the government. We have put pressure on the relevant authorities to make known the Goldstone Commission’s findings once and for all.

We have also taken note that the release of the findings would be a great embarrassment for the government, because the Goldstone Commission and the defence force would have to accept responsibility for the unfounded allegations that were made without a proper investigation.

This past year we have had to listen, with extreme frustration, to leading politicians making utterances about the Third Force that were based on poorly informed and unfounded allegations, instead of applying their energy to exposing the real Third Force. On the other hand, perhaps that would be an even greater embarrassment.

We appeal to De Klerk to prove his integrity and statesmanship by clearing our names and instituting positive corrective measures to restore us to a position of honour and to enter a dialogue with us.

We also appeal to De Klerk, Goldstone and Mandela to stop furthering their political careers at the cost of ours.

For years afterwards, Pierre Steyn played a cat-and-mouse game with the media over the existence, or not, of his controversial report. He and FW denied at regular intervals that there even was a written Steyn report. Why they did so has never been clear. Perhaps they were ashamed of what they had done.

For Steyn himself, however, the report was a good thing. Following the 1994 elections, he was appointed to a financially rewarding and cosy berth as the new South Africa’s first secretary of defence.

On 16 January 1997, Dr Alex Boraine, deputy chairman of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, announced that the TRC had managed to track down the Steyn report.

‘The TRC’s research department has established that, while technically speaking no formal report was drawn up by Gen Steyn, his verbal report to former President FW de Klerk and senior members of his cabinet was based on a “staff report”, which consisted of notes and a diagram. This report was given to Mr de Klerk.

‘General Steyn has furnished the research department with a large file of information, including the “staff report”,’ Boraine confirmed.

Steyn had finally decided to produce his report – from somewhere – when the TRC’s research director, Professor Charles Villa-Vicencio, asked him to prepare a briefing on the basis of the report that had led to FW’s Christmas conference in Cape Town.

Steyn suddenly conjured up his report when he briefed the TRC on 10 October 1996. He insisted that he had warned FW that his information was based on raw intelligence. He had strongly recommended that a criminal investigation be launched immediately to establish the substance of the information that he conveyed.

According to Boraine, Steyn never advised FW to sack anyone or place any officers on early pension without a thorough investigation first being conducted. ‘This casts the drastic steps announced by FW in an extremely strange light,’ said Boraine.

In the interim, Steyn had also submitted several additional written and verbal reports to FW and Kobie Coetsee.

In every one of these reports he had reiterated the urgent need for further criminal investigations and expressed his concern over the lack of progress with such probes. ‘General Steyn’s view was that more energy had been expended by the police and the defence force on “cover-ups” and identifying “leaks” than on finding evidence to substantiate the allegations.

‘Notwithstanding his orders at the outset of his investigation that no documentation was to be destroyed, he was told by NI that the destruction of documents had proceeded throughout the duration of his investigation.’

More than twelve years after it was compiled, the Steyn report, which carried a Top Secret classification at all times, was finally declassified and could be examined.

It took little expertise to figure out that the report was a hodgepodge of intelligence reports from NI agents and the directorate counter-intelligence. It was also clear that Steyn had merely served as the instrument of these intelligence elements to carry a message to FW.

One extract from the Steyn report – obviously originating from an NI agent – spells out the consequences of intervention in MI’s activities on the rest of the defence force as follows:

•   In the light of the current negative atmosphere, a sudden, drastic intervention will be detrimental to stability.

•   An appropriate peg, such as the outcome of the Steyn investigation, would offer the most acceptable course of action in a positive climate.

The report makes reference to Annexure A, described as a summary of the allegations of ‘risky activity’ within military components, and contains the names of various defence force members who should be subject to further investigation.

‘To sum up, these individuals can be divided into three categories:

‘Those in command posts who are carrying an albatross from the past which they cannot escape. They are: Gen Kat Liebenberg; Lt Gen CP van der Westhuizen; Lt Gen Georg Meiring; Major Gen HJ Roux; Brig JC Swart; Brig Tolletjie Botha.

‘Individuals involved in apparent initiatives that are contrary to the interest of the state (not necessarily consciously) are: Brig Ferdie van Wyk; Brig (Dr) Wouter Basson; Brig Oos van der Merwe; Col At Nel; Col HAP Potgieter; Col Mielie Prinsloo; Col Bert Sachse; Cmdt Anton Nieuwoudt; Cmdt Henri van der Westhuizen.’

Annexure A of the so-called ‘staff report’ that Steyn dealt with was the nub of his reporting to FW:

This document contains source information and conclusions that have been made available to Lt Gen Steyn. As an addendum to other available information, the intelligence picture has been used as the basis for the staff report.

Analysis of available information indicates that some members, contract members and associates of the SADF were involved, and in some instances remain involved, in unlawful and unauthorised activities that threaten the security, interest and welfare of the state.

The spectrum of these activities includes murder, acts of terror, disruption and coercion, foreign destabilisation, corruption, promotion of factional party-political objectives and blatant disregard for government policy.

Individual motives vary and range from personal gain to vengeance, personal political agendas and the pursuit of strategic and tactical objectives that are in conflict with government policy. Some of the role players are, however, trapped in the activities of the past which are unacceptable in the present era.

Evidence available to the counter-intelligence community, on whose information the report is based, relies on facts, both confirmed and uncorroborated, from reliable sources, and indications are that they are true. This information is also based on testimony given in court and other investigative forums.

A superficial examination of the information indicates that the aforementioned activities are mainly centralised within certain defence force components such as army intelligence (GS2), DCC and certain components of Special Forces and 7 Medical Battalion.

DIRECTORATE COVERT COLLECTION (DCC)

•   Destabilisation of the domestic political situation by means of planning and execution of coups d’état in self-governing homelands and manipulation of important political role players.

•   The propagation of unrest through murder, supplying arms to political factions and the launch of intimidation campaigns.

•   Involvement of DCC members in planning to destroy the government’s reform initiatives by fomenting violence.

•   Corruption among members through trade in illegal firearms.

•   Involvement in planning and execution of murder with major political consequences (for example the Leon Flores incident).

ARMY INTELLIGENCE (GS2)

•   Discrediting of the ANC and other political opponents.

•   Influencing and creation of perceptions in the mass media as well as within the defence force.

•   Intelligence support for destabilisation operations.

•   Members’ participation in the planning of coups d’état.

•   Dissemination of disinformation.

SPECIAL FORCES

•   Participation in destabilisation operations in black townships.

•   Creation of arms caches and development of operational springboards in neighbouring states.

•   Training of military wings of internal political groups such as Inkatha, as well as training of resistance movements in other African states, including Renamo.

7 MEDICAL BATTALION

•   Involvement in the defence force’s chemical and biological warfare programme.

•   Involvement in so-called ‘poison murders’.

•   Involvement of certain members in corruption for personal gain.

•   Handling of drugs for operational application.

When the intelligence picture is analysed, it becomes apparent that the senior command structure of the defence force components are controlled by generals Georg Meiring and CP van der Westhuizen, who in turn fall under the command of Gen Kat Liebenberg, chief of the defence force.

Liebenberg and Van der Westhuizen are to a great degree caught up in the momentum of past activities which currently attract negative publicity, while Gen Meiring encourages and promotes a personal agenda that is not in state interest.

At executive level and at various other levels, the following officers are linked to the above-mentioned activities due to their positions or command positions or their personal involvement in the activities concerned: Brig Jake Swart; Gen H Roux; Gen Chris Thirion; Brig Ferdie van Wyk (GS2); Brig Tolletjie Botha (DCC); Col At Nel (DCC); Brig Wouter Basson (7 Med); Col HAP Potgieter (Special Forces); Brig Oos van der Merwe; Col Mielie Prinsloo (GS2); Cmdt Anton Nieuwoudt (DCC); Col Bert Sachse (Special Forces) – 5 Reconnaissance Regiment; Col Hannes Venter (Special Forces) – 4 Reconnaissance Regiment; Cmdt Henri van der Westhuizen (DCC).

Strong interaction exists between the above-mentioned defence force components, which results in the leading role players being relatively restricted.

Secret funds are accessible with virtually no controls due to the Total Onslaught syndrome that has given rise to a situation in which the defence force components are self-sufficient and responsible for their own existence. The leadership and unique milieu have afforded like-minded individuals the opportunity to move up in the ranks of the hierarchy. This, in turn, has resulted in these components being caught up in a particular value system and way of thinking.

From analysis of the information it has become clear that an informal structure was established within which the most important role players pursued a common agenda that has been harmful to the interests of the state.

It has also become clear that the officers in control of these defence force components were involved at executive level in irregularities, or were aware of them. Conversely, if they were doing their duty, they should have been aware.

It is not possible to mould this information into a format that could be used during court or other legal procedures or disciplinary hearings, because:

•   Evidence has already been destroyed and continues to be disposed of on a major scale.

•   Available testimony has been gathered under unbelievably sensitive circumstances and would expose agents to retribution.

•   The capabilities of the members and groups involved are such that the lives of eyewitnesses would have no value.

•   The role players protect one another.

The security situation and the delicate stage that has been reached by negotiations for a new constitutional dispensation demand radical intervention in order to eradicate the malpractices that have been uncovered without delay. This includes court-directed or administrative steps.

And that was the crux of the voluminous ‘Steyn report’, the enigma that had lain somewhere for so many years, gathering dust, while no one was willing to admit that it even existed. When one examines it in retrospect, it appears to have been much ado about nothing, a barrage of hot air that went nowhere in the end.

After struggling for years to have their reputations restored, Chris Thirion and the DCC members finally realised that FW believed his continued silence about the unfortunate events of Christmas 1992 would absolve him of all blame.

Things were relatively quiet until FW’s autobiography, The Last Trek – a New Beginning, was published in January 1999 and Chris read FW’s bald-faced assertion that the Night of the Generals had marked the most difficult decision of his career. To crown it all, he claimed that the amnesty applications submitted to the TRC had proved that his decision had been the right one. What he was saying, by implication, was that Chris and the DCC members were indeed guilty as never charged.

‘As true as God, he publicly declared me guilty for the second time, when I was never charged with a single crime,’ Chris told me. ‘He left me with no choice but to sue him for libel.’

For most of his life, Chris had relegated his family to second place, always putting his duty as a South African soldier first. ‘I was not prepared to be trampled on yet again.’

He instructed his attorney to sue. FW’s legal representatives responded with typical scare-mongering tactics, pointing out that a court case of this nature was likely to be a long, drawn-out and costly process. ‘I informed him that this wasn’t about the money. What it came down to was that FW tried to intimidate me by suggesting that I had not fully realised how much the case would cost me.’

FW proposed that he would acknowledge Chris’s innocence in writing. ‘I told his attorney that once he had drawn up the apology, I would decide if it was acceptable. I also made it absolutely clear to my legal team that I did not even want to be in the same room as that man (FW).’

Chris accepted FW’s written apology and did not lower himself to claim his legal costs from the former state president. ‘I paid them myself. I want nothing from him. He should have set right what he lied about – while he was state president and later also as a former state president and “honoured” Nobel peace laureate,’ said Chris, making no secret of his contempt for FW.

He became embittered because he was branded for the rest of his life as having been involved in subversive activities while serving his country as a general officer. ‘I was a soldier for thirty years. It was drilled into me from my youth that a peaceful end to any revolution could only be achieved through a political solution.

‘My purpose was never to keep the old NP government in power at all cost. I would have served any government of the day, as might be expected of any professional and honourable soldier. I don’t necessarily agree with the way the present government is running the country, but it is a democratically elected government and not a typically autocratic African regime.

‘My career was cut short in such a way that I can never make peace with it,’ admitted a proud General Chris Thirion on the deck of his well-known and hugely popular Boere restaurant, Die Werf, in Pretoria.

The fact that the ghost of FW’s military purge in 1992 continues to haunt him became obvious as late as May 2006, when his spin doctor, Dave Steward, made yet another attempt to justify the former state president’s actions in an article published in the Sunday Argus. Earlier in his career, Steward had made his name as director-general of the NP government’s highly controversial propaganda machine, the Bureau of Information.

A somewhat shortened version of the Steward article appears below. The full report is available on the Web page of the FW de Klerk Foundation.

When I was appointed Director-General in the Office of the President at the beginning of November 1992 it seemed that the negotiation process was, once again, back on track. The ANC had returned to the negotiations following the misnamed ‘Record of Understanding’ of 26 September. The main challenge appeared to be to get the IFP and the right-wing parties back into the negotiations which they had left because of misunderstandings over the ‘Record of Understanding’.

Then, out of the blue on 16 November, Judge Richard Goldstone held a press conference at which he announced that investigators from his commission had raided the offices of the Directorate of Covert Collection in Pretoria and had discovered that elements of the SADF were involved in illegal and unauthorised activities.

The cabinet discussed Goldstone’s statement at its next meeting on 18 November. It decided that action – above and beyond Goldstone’s investigation – should be taken, since it might be necessary, once and for all, to restructure the SADF’s intelligence activities to ensure that there would be no possibility of continuing malpractices. Later that day the president announced that he had appointed the Chief of Defence Staff, Lt Gen Pierre Steyn (an SAAF officer), to carry out a thorough investigation of all the SADF’s intelligence activities. He also took the unprecedented step of placing General Steyn in immediate command of all the SADF’s intelligence operations and instructed him to ascertain whether there had been any contraventions of the law or of government policy.

Two days later Judge Goldstone saw the president at the Union Buildings. They discussed the manner in which the commission would liaise with General Steyn to ensure that it received any information that might be relevant to its mandate.

On 26 November the president had a strained meeting with the newly appointed Minister of Defence, Eugene Louw (who was still not quite in the loop); Minister of Justice Kobie Coetsee; the Chief of the Defence Force General Kat Liebenberg and General Steyn. President De Klerk made it clear that General Steyn’s investigation would not be a sham and would involve a thorough review of military intelligence. He wanted a proper division of responsibility between the SADF, the SAP and National Intelligence. Above all, he wanted to be able to state categorically that military intelligence was no longer involved in unacceptable activities. Firm action had to be taken against anyone guilty of any form of misconduct. The president said that the government was wrestling with the image of a defence force that could apparently evade the scrutiny of the auditor-general; that had been accused of sinking the Harms Commission and of frustrating the government’s attempts to obtain information. He added that nothing should be done that would damage the morale of the SADF – however, ‘the SADF should for once and all get its house in order’.

On 10 December General Steyn called on President De Klerk at the Union Buildings. The president was shocked by the general’s concern that his investigations might lead him into areas where his personal security might be at risk. President De Klerk encouraged him to press ahead with his investigation as quickly as possible and offered him any support that he might require. He also instructed National Intelligence to assist him wherever possible.

On 18 December General Steyn presented his preliminary findings to President De Klerk and senior members of the government at Tuynhuys in Cape Town. He did not hand the president a report as such but gave a briefing based on contributions from a variety of intelligence sources including the Directorate of Counter-Intelligence.

The information presented by General Steyn was evaluated variously as ‘vague’, ‘strong possibilities’, probably true’ and ‘confirmed’. Steyn added that ‘some members of the senior command structure were largely caught up in the momentum of activities of the past while others were possibly promoting their own agenda against the interests of the state’.

The government was confronted with a situation where the top structure of the SADF was either no longer in control of several key units or was itself condoning or involved in actions that were illegal or in direct contravention of the policy and express instructions of the government. It was either a question of gross incompetence, gross insubordination or active subversion of the state.

President De Klerk seriously considered dismissing General Liebenberg and other top officers. But he did not – firstly because he could not afford to destabilise the SADF, which for better or worse represented a key component of the country’s stability at a pivotal and volatile time in our history. Secondly, there was no clear indication that the top structure of [the] SADF was aware of the details of rogue operations and, finally, he could hardly take such draconian action based on uncorroborated reports.

Still, firm, immediate and decisive action was essential. He summoned the Minister of Defence, General Liebenberg, Lt Gen Meiring, the Chief of the Army, and Lt Gen Joffel van der Westhuizen, the Chief of Military Intelligence, to Tuynhuys. When confronted with General Steyn’s provisional findings, General Liebenberg said that he was surprised and shocked and that he had no knowledge of such illegal activities.

Ironically, the TRC criticised FW de Klerk for acting against SADF members on the basis of insufficiently corroborated information. However, FW de Klerk still believes that he took the right decision. On the one hand, he had to bring the security forces to heel, once and for all; on the other he had to ensure that the overall effectiveness of the security forces would not be seriously damaged.

Mr De Klerk has been criticised for ‘concealing’ the findings of the Steyn investigation. This is absolute nonsense. Obviously, he could not release the information on which the Steyn briefing was based because the allegations were uncorroborated and were the subject of ongoing investigations. However, he immediately informed the media of the seriousness of the situation and of the steps that he had taken. All the relevant information was made available to the TRC, which in 1997 leaked a synopsis to the media.

FW could try a thousand times over to justify his actions, but those twenty-three soldiers whose careers and futures were destroyed on that dark day in Cape Town by the state president would always believe it was the desperate action of a man in a panic.

FW was under enormous pressure from Mandela and the ANC. CODESA 1 had seen its arse and the ANC had refused to continue negotiating with the government. Mandela had also made it quite clear that he would not speak to FW again until the Third Force, which was murdering his people on the trains and elsewhere in the country, had been unmasked and finally destroyed.

The ANC’s attitude was that the NP had been negotiating in bad faith, while the Third Force was being allowed free rein to destabilise the country. Mandela also refused to accept FW’s excuse that he did not know who or what the Third Force was.

There was no doubt that FW had been backed into a corner. Come hell or high water, the state president had to pull a Third Force out of his hat from somewhere, or all his noble plans for peace would be in tatters.

The DCC raid and Pierre Steyn’s ‘revelations’ were as good as an answer to a prayer. Judging by the heavy-handed way in which FW eventually got rid of twenty-three military officers, including two brigadiers and a general, the man must have been under unbearable pressure.

And the easiest sacrifice was the DCC.