There are two rednecks in a field:
Bobby Joe: “Hey, you wanna play twenty questions?”
Billy Bob: “Sure. Lemme thinka somethin’.”
Bobby Joe: “Got it?”
Billy Bob: “Yeah, got it. Ask me.”
Bobby Joe: “Is it a thing?”
Billy Bob: “Yeah.”
Bobby Joe: “Can you fuck it?”
Billy Bob: “Yeah.”
Bobby Joe: “Is it a goat?”
Billy Bob: “Yeah.”
This brief summary of the history of humor theory yields a laundry list of the features that would comprise a complete cognitive theory of the subject. The list is presented here in the form of questions. Each question has been raised before, and even, to some degree, answered. Our goal is to synthesize the best points from the existing theories into a unified model that answers all of the questions. A good model should not overlook any recognizable variety of humor and should not identify items as humorous that don’t provoke mirth. A very good model should, moreover, make some surprising predictions: It should tell us how to turn a humorous event into a nonhumorous event by making minimal changes, and, ideally, it should give us good recipes for generating humor. It is one thing to be able to account for the favored cases purportedly accounted for by earlier theories; it is another thing to generate new classes of cases, or new taxonomies of existing cases, showing how and why they are humorous. In short, a good model should be testable in a variety of ways. We will address general concerns of refutability in more detail in chapter 10.
1. Is humor an adaptation? Is there a benefit that is conferred upon the genes by the humor trait and, if so, what is that benefit? What might the trait do to increase the likelihood of reproduction to the genes of its bearer? Humor is innate (see footnote 4, p. 6) and it is pervasive across all human cultures. Laughter shows up in infants ontogenetically early, and appears apparently spontaneously in congenitally blind and deaf children. The humor trait has not genetically drifted out of any population. Why not?
2. Where did humor come from? Do other species have humor, or anything like it? We should be able to tell a clear story about the behavioral precursors to humor, and eventually even plot the path of mutation from those precursors to the modern-day phenotype of the trait.
3. Why do we communicate humor? Making unnecessary noise draws the attention of predators. Communication also costs the organism in energy expenditure. There ought to have been some adaptive purpose to the early communication of humor. How does the communication differ from humor itself and what, if any, benefit is conferred upon the genes by such behavior?
4. Why do we feel pleasure in humor? We not only feel happy when we laugh; there is also a particular quality to that form of pleasure that is unique to humor: mirth. In what ways is mirth qualitatively different from other pleasures, and can we explain why this should be? Is there a benefit to our genes that pays for the energetic costs of the specific phenomenon of mirth?
5. Why do we feel surprise in humor? Most, or at least many, humorous stimuli contain an element of surprise, to the point that some have postulated surprise as the root cause of humor. (Others tack on surprise or suddenness as an additional but unmotivated requirement at the end of their theories.) Why is it so pervasive?
6. Why is judgment a ubiquitous component in the content of humorous stimuli? Superiority theorists often claim that judgment between a noble state and an ignoble state of a thing causes humor. But judgment exists extensively outside of humor as well. Why is there such value comparison in humor? What would be the purpose of a humor that made such judgments?
7. Why does humor often get used for disparagement? To make fun of something is to disparage it; when we make fun of people we often humiliate them—although there is also the derived practice of light-hearted mocking or roasting, “just for fun,” which people are supposed to endure with good humor. Why does this occur? You can insult someone, but you can’t make fun of or mock someone, without using humor. Superiority theorists think this is why humor exists. Should this be part of our theory? And is there a reproductive benefit derivable from disparagement or the feeling of superiority?
8. Why does humor so often point to failures? Aristotle claimed that humor points out failings. Even in good-hearted humor, there is often an aspect of mistakes made: mistaken identity, misunderstanding, misperception, and so on. Why does this connection exist?
9. Why, in humor, do we have a sense of nonsense? There are many models of incongruity—all different. Is there a simplifying view that treats them all as subclasses of a more general base class? (Relatedly, what is the role of expectation as Kant saw it? How can we explain Schopenhauer’s model of perception versus conception? Can we explain each of Suls’s, Shultz’s, Attardo’s, and Raskin’s models all under one rubric?)
10. If incongruity causes humor, how does it do it? We need something more than a descriptive account here. What causal mechanisms are triggered by incongruity and why? (See Ritchie’s questions about incongruity in chapter 10.)
11. Why is it that we laugh only at humans or anthropomorphized objects? It seems that only things that have minds, or are interacting somehow with things that have minds, can be humorous. Some aspect of the mind, then, might be the source of humor. What is it about humans that make them the topic of humor and not just the perceivers of humor?
12. What is right about Bergson’s claim that mechanical behavior is humorous? Bergson notes that it is detrimental to act nonadaptively, and a telltale sign of mechanical behavior is its failure to mesh adaptively with subtleties in the environment. Is he right that humor is a way to keep us in check? Is mechanism a marked subclass of humor?
13. Why can humor be used as a social corrective? Why do we laugh at someone when they do something inappropriate? What makes us judge that some kinds of inappropriate behavior are laughable while others are not? Why do we feel humiliated when people laugh at us? Does this process make us change our behavior? Does it tend to return us to “normal”?
14. What unites the broad variety of types of humorous stimuli? As Socrates never tired of saying when given a collection of examples: That’s fine, but what do they all have in common?
15. How does play relate to humor? What aspect of play is similar to humor? Both have an aspect of the nonserious in their content and both lead to pleasure. Play often leads to laughter. What common cause may there be for both? What is their relationship to tickling?
16. What is the relationship between problem solving, discovery, and humor? We tend to exclaim “Aha!” when we discover something new or solve a problem. Occasionally we even laugh. The same emotion of discovery occurs when we “get the joke.” What is the relationship between these phenomena?
17. Why do we desire humor so intensely? We are motivated to seek out humor. We lay our credit cards on the counter at the box office for comedies and wait in line to hear standup comedians. Situation comedies and animated cartoons dominate commercial television. Magazines keep their subscribers happy by inserting humorous cartoons every few pages, and every bookstore has a profitable humor section. Billions of dollars are spent annually on the comedy industry. Why is comedy such an attractive commodity?
18. What is the peculiar specificity often found in humor? Humorous stimuli often have less than universal appeal. In the limit, an “in-joke” may have a qualified audience of one. What features qualify one for what varieties of humor?
19. What is the generality in humor? On the other hand, much humor is universal. Some humor will reliably provoke mirth in almost everyone in the world. And why do we typically desire to spread humor to a wider public? Why is humor so seldom a solitary pleasure?
20. Why are there gender differences in humor? Why do men get more laughs and women give more laughs? Why do women, more than men, seek “a sense of humor” when writing personal ads? And why are there overwhelmingly more male comedians than female?
Each of these questions points to an important part of humor, and a theory that doesn’t answer to them all satisfactorily will be missing something. Of the many models in the previous chapter, only incongruity-resolution is a serious contender today, although a few theorists (e.g., Alexander 1986; Gruner 1997) and many armchair theorists—interview your friends and you’ll find some—are still trying to give the superiority theory a run for its money. However, as we explained in the previous chapter, while on the right track, even current incongruity theories have fallen short of describing all the phenomena in this list. The theory we offer in the next few chapters is, in some ways, simply a new twist on the incongruity theory; but in other ways, it offers something quite different. We claim it answers all twenty questions.