to Nature, 
to Technology: Heidegger on Aristotle, Galileo, and Newton,” Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (2000): 95–118, for a discussion of Heidegger’s account of the relationship between nature and art.1 William Wordsworth laments:
Our meddling intellect
Misshapes the beauteous forms of things: –
We murder to dissect.
“The Tables Turned,” in Lyrical Ballads, with a Few Other Poems, originally published in 1798 with Samuel Coleridge (London: J. & A. Arch, Gracechurch Street).
William Blake soon after bewails “these dark Satanic mills” that have sprung up across “England’s green & pleasant Land” (“Milton,” in The Complete Poetry and Prose of William Blake, ed. David V. Erdman [Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982]). Paul Cantor notes in his essay “Romanticism and Technology: Satanic Verses and Satanic Mills” that “though some scholars have questioned whether Blake had industrial mills specifically in mind here, in the common understanding of these verses Blake views the so-called technological progress in England as an act of desecration” (Technology in the Western Political Tradition, ed. Arthur Melzer, Jerry Weinberger, and M. Richard Zinman [Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993], 110).
Henry David Thoreau focuses his ire on the new railroad system that is spreading like a web across the American countryside: “That devilish Iron Horse, whose ear-rending neigh is heard through the tow, has muddied the Boiling Spring with his foot, and he it is that has browsed off all the woods on Walden shore …,” deciding “We do not ride on the railroad; it rides upon us” (Walden and Civil Disobedience [New York: Penguin, 1986], 136.
2 For the sake of readability, all ancient Greek terms have been transliterated and presented without diacritical marks or accents.
3 In Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics, and Praxis (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1983), Richard Bernstein identifies phronesis as the “underlying common vision” of some of the most important and influential thinkers of our time including Hans-Georg Gadamer, Jürgen Habermas, Richard Rorty, and Hannah Arendt. Ronald Beiner’s Political Judgment (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983) similarly points to Gadamer, Habermas, and Arendt as “possible avenues of inquiry” to an updated understanding of phronesis. Peter Steinberger presents Michael Oakeshott and Arendt as subscribing to Aristotle’s concept of political judgment in The Concept of Political Judgment (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993). And Joseph Dunne argues that the work of Gadamer, Habermas, and Arendt as well as John Henry Newman and R.G. Collingwood all can be related to Aristotle’s concept of phronesis in Back to the Rough Ground (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1993). More recently, Bent Flyvbjerg even suggests that the whole of the social sciences should become “phronetic” in Making Social Science Matter (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). For a brief review of some other contemporary scholarship calling for a revival of phronesis see Richard S. Ruderman’s “Aristotle and the Recovery of Political Judgment,” American Political Science Review 91, no. 2 (June 1997): 409–20.
4 After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (South Bend, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2007), 259.
5 A definitive account of this debate can be found in Andrew Feenberg’s Questioning Technology (New York: Routledge, 1999). He argues that we can think about technology in one of two ways: technology as autonomous, what he calls “essentialism,” or technology as a tool, what he calls “constructivism.” Feenberg himself promotes this second option and calls for new technologies that “respect the person,” “create humane living spaces,” and “mediate new social forms” (“From Essentialism to Constructivism,” in Technology and the Good Life? ed. Eric Higgs, Andrew Light, and David Strong [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000], 313). A similar idea is presented by Lang-don Winner in Autonomous Technology: Technics-out-of-control as a Theme in Political Thought (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1977); by Herbert Marcuse in One-Dimensional Man (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966); and by Emmanuel Mesthene in Technological Change: Its Impact on Man and Society (New York: Signet, 1970). Essentialist approaches to technology include Marshall McLuhan’s Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964), Jacques Ellul’s The Technological Society (New York: Knopf, 1964), and most notably Martin Heidegger’s essay “The Question Concerning Technology,” in Basic Writings, ed. David Farrell Krell (San Francisco: HarperCollins, 1993), whose ideas will be discussed in more detail below.
1 Mary Shelley, Frankenstein or The Modern Prometheus (London: George Routledge and Sons, 1888), 73.
2 Bill Joy, “Why the Future Doesn’t Need Us: Our Most Powerful 21st Century Technologies – Robotics, Genetic Engineering, and Nanotech – Are Threatening to Make Humans an Endangered Species,” Wired, April 2000: 238–62.
3 Bill Joy, “Act Now to Keep New Technologies Out of Destructive Hands,” New Perspectives Quarterly 17, no. 3 (Summer 2000): 12–14.
4 “High Technology’s Dark Side.” 10 May 2000, available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/cyberspace/jan-june00/dark_5-10.html.
5 Available at http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=17295.
6 In the Matter of J. Robert Oppenheimer: The Security Clearance Hearing, ed. Richard Polenberg (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002), 46–7.
7 Hobbes writes: “But evil men, under pretext that God can do anything, are so bold as to say anything when it serves their turn, though they think it untrue; it is the part of a wise man to believe them no further than right reason makes that which they say appear credible. If this superstitious fear of spirits were taken away, and with it prognostics from dreams, false prophecies, and many other things depending thereon, by which crafty ambitious persons abuse the simple people, men would be much more fitted than they are for civil obedience” (Leviathan [London: Penguin, 1985], 93).
8 Ibid., 160.
9 Francis Bacon, The New Organon and Related Writings, ed. F.H. Anderson (New York: Macmillan, 1960), 23.
10 René Descartes, Discourse on Method, trans. Donald A. Cress (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1998), 35.
11 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, vol. 1, ed. David Norton and Mary Norton (London: Oxford University Press, 2007), 266.
12 Marie Jean Antoine Nicolas de Caritat, marquis de Condorcet, Sketch for a Historical Picture of the Progress of the Human Mind, trans. June Barraclough (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1955).
13 August 2001.
14 Leon Kass, “Testimony in Front of the National Bioethics Advisory Commission,” 14 March 1997, Watergate Hotel, Washington, DC. Available at bioethics.georgetown.edu/nbac/transcripts/1997/3-14-97.pdf.
15 Leon Kass, “Organs for Sale? Propriety, Property, and the Price of Progress,” The Public Interest, no. 107 (Spring 1992): 86.
16 Leon Kass, “The New Biology: What Price Relieving Man’s Estate?” Science 174, no. 401 (1971): 779–88. For more on Kass’s considerable and often controversial work on bioethics see his Toward a More Natural Science: Biology and Human Affairs (New York: Free Press, 1985) and Life, Liberty and the Defence of Dignity: The Challenge for Bioethics (San Francisco: Encounter Books, 2004).
17 The passage is from an unpublished cycle of four lectures on technology Heidegger gave in 1949. It was first quoted in Wolfgang Schirmacher’s Technik und Gelassensheit (Freiburg: Alber, 1983).
18 Martin Heidegger, “The Question Concerning Technology,” in Basic Writings, ed. David Farrel Krell (San Francisco: HarperCollins, 1993), 332.
19 The Canadian philosopher George Grant suggests that ancient techne had a limited role, whereas technology is characterized by its complete lack of limitation (Technology and Justice [Concord, ON: Anansi, 1986], esp. 11–13). Along the same lines, Stanley Rosen argues that techne is defensive, whereas technology is offensive (“Techne and the Origins of Modernity,” in Technology in the Western Political Tradition, ed. Arthur Melzer, Jerry Weinberger, and M. Richard Zinman [Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993], 73). Arthur Melzer proposes that rather than simply bringing something particular into being that would not have existed otherwise, as with techne, technology seeks to control nature as a whole (“The Problem with the ‘Problem of Technology,’” ibid., 299). For these thinkers, contemporary technology is not simply more complicated or of a greater scope and size than ancient techne, but is fundamentally different.
20 Leon Kass, “The Problem of Technology,” in Technology in the Western Political Tradition, ed. Melzer, Weinberger, and Zinman, 3–4. Kass repeats the same point in Life, Liberty and the Defence of Dignity: “Modern technology is less a bringing forth of objects than a setting upon, a challenging forth, a demanding of nature: that its concealed materials and energies be released and ordered as standing reserves, available and transformable for any multitude of purposes” ((32). For a discussion of the broader philosophical and religious ideas that help inform Kass’s ideas see Lawrence Vogel’s essay “Natural Law Judaism? The Genesis of Bioethics in Hans Jonas, Leo Strauss, and Leon Kass,” in Hastings Center Report 36, issue 3 (May/June 2006): 32–44.
21 See Trish Glazebrook’s excellent essay “From to Nature, to Technology: Heidegger on Aristotle, Galileo, and Newton,” Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (2000): 95–118, for a discussion of Heidegger’s account of the relationship between nature and art.
22 Francis Fukuyama, Our Posthuman Future: Consequences of the Biotechnology Revolution (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2002), 182.
23 Ibid., 12.
24 Aristotle, The Politics of Aristotle, ed. and trans. Ernest Barker (London: Oxford University Press, 1958), book 7, chap. 14, sect. 8. Herein Pol. All citations of Aristotle’s Politics will note the book, chapter, and section of this edition.
25 Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, trans. W.D. Ross (London: Oxford University Press, 1998), 1141b20ff. Herein NE. All citations of Aristotle’s Ethics will note the Bekker numbers.
26 Pol 7.1.13.
27 Pol 7.1.9.
28 For example, “providing a ‘biologically related child’ for an infertile or same sex couple; avoiding the risk of genetic disease; securing a genetically identical source of organs; ‘replacing’ a loved spouse or child who is dying or has died; or producing individuals of great genius, talent or beauty” (President’s Council on Bioethics, Human Cloning and Human Dignity: An Ethical Inquiry [Washington, DC, 2002], 78.
29 For example, the council warns that reproductive cloning might lead to the breakdown of the family. They explain: “Procreation as traditionally understood invites acceptance, rather than reshaping, engineering, or designing the next generation. It invites us to accept limits to our control over the next generation” (ibid., 85).
30 Robert Wachbroit, “Genetic Encores: The Ethics of Human Cloning,” Report from the Institute of Philosophy and Public Policy 17, no. 4 (1997), 2.
31 It has been argued that membership on the council was stacked against therapeutic cloning. See Chris Mooney, “Irrationalist in Chief,” The American Prospect 12, no. 17 (24 September–8 October 2001); available at http://www.prospect.org/print/V12/17/mooney-c.html; and Stephen Hall, “Human Cloning: President’s Bioethics Council Delivers,” Science 297, issue 558 (2002): 322–4. Even when not explicit, as was the case with high-profile Bush supporters like Leon Kass, then the chairman of the council, and Charles Krauthammer, many members of the council had publicly spoken out against all forms of cloning. Council member Robert P. George, for example, wrote in the journal National Review that harvesting stem cells from human embryos is “grotesquely immoral” and decried any efforts to publicly fund and promote this “injustice” (Robert P. George and Patrick Lee, “Reason, Science, & Stem Cells: Why Killing Embryonic Human Beings Is Wrong,” National Review Online, 20 July 2001; available at http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/comment-george072001.shtml).
Council member Mary Ann Glendon is a signatory to the “Statement of the Catholic Leadership Conference on Human Cloning.” It reads: “The CLC endorses the position of President George W. Bush which he stated in his first formal address to the American people: I strongly oppose human cloning, as do most Americans. We recoil at the idea of growing human beings for spare body parts or creating life for our convenience … Even the most noble ends do not justify any means … The moral justification of any research cannot be based upon the dehumanizing promise that a good end justifies the use of any means necessary. Destroying human life in order to help human life is intrinsically evil” (available at http://www.priestsforlife.org/articles/01-11-01humancloningclc.htm, November 2001).
Not long after the report’s release, the members on the other side of the debate expressed frustration with the direction the council had taken. Janet D. Rowley, Elizabeth Blackburn, Michael S. Gazzaniga, and Daniel W. Foster, all traditional university scientists, objected to the moratorium. In an open letter, they wrote: “The President’s Council, composed primarily of academics, now proposes to maintain our ignorance by preventing any research for four more years. That proposal is short-sighted: It will force U.S. scientists who have private funding to stop their research, and it will accelerate the brain drain to more enlightened countries … Our ignorance in this vitally important area is profound, and the potential for meaningful medical advances is very high indeed. To realize that potential, we must remove the current impediments to this critical research. Scientists should become more active in urging Congress to lift the ban and to establish the proposed, broadly constituted regulatory board NOW” (“Harmful Moratorium on Stem Cell Research,” Science 297 [2002]: 1957). The frustration of these scientists reflects a broader alienation of the scientific community from the administration. To add more fuel to the fire, on 27 February 2004, Professor Blackburn and William May were told their services would no longer be needed and were dismissed from serving on the council. Blackburn said she believed she was let go because her political views did not match those of the president and of Kass, with whom she had often been at odds at council meetings. “I think this is Bush stacking the council with the compliant,” Blackburn said to the Washington Post. Three new members were named to take their places. They included a doctor who had called for more religion in public life, a political scientist who had spoken out precisely against stem cell research, and another who had written about the “threats of biotechnology” (Rick Weiss, “Bush Ejects Two from Bio-ethics Council: Changes Renew Criticism That the President Puts Politics Ahead of Science,” 28 February 2004: p. A6).
32 Many bioethicists seek an “ethical bypass” out of this debate. See, for example, Mary B. Mahowald and Anthony P. Mahowald, “Embryonic Stem Cell Retrieval and a Possible Ethical Bypass,” American Journal of Bioethics 2, no. 1 (2002): 42–3. A promising way out is adult stem cell research. Marilyn Coors writes: “The challenge lies in making cells derived from adult stem cells function effectively. If this hurdle can be overcome, adult stem cells promise to be a practical, efficient, and therapeutic option that avoids the ethical problems associated with the therapeutic cloning” (“Therapeutic Cloning: From Consequences to Contradiction,” Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 27, no. 3 [2002]: 297–317). Harvesting adult stem cells from blood, bone marrow, or tissue does not require the creation or destruction of an embryo. Just as we give blood or tissue for medical tests for the benefit of our own health, we could provide stem cells for the development of therapies and organs. But as of this writing, therapeutic cloning is the best way to get stem cells.
1 Even though the great books of political philosophy may seem an unlikely source for ideas about how to live better with technology, there is a rich recent history of similar efforts to locate the source of our technological dilemma through an analysis of these texts.
For example, Jürgen Habermas has argued that Hobbes’s Leviathan, written in the mid-seventeenth century, clearly indicates a major shift away from the old Aristotelian model of politics based in “practical prudent action” to a new model based on the modern experimental sciences. Summarizing Hobbes’s logic, he explains that: “With a knowledge of the general conditions for a correct order of the state and of society, practical prudent action of human beings toward each other is no longer required, but what is required instead is the correctly calculated generation of rules, relationships and institutions … Human behaviour is therefore to be now considered only as the material for science. The engineers of the correct order can disregard the categories of ethical social intercourse and confine themselves to the construction of conditions under which human beings, just like objects within nature, will necessarily behave in a calculable manner. This separation of politics from morality replaces instruction in leading a good and just life with making possible a life of well-being within a correctly instituted order” (Theory and Practice, trans. John Viertel [Boston: Beacon Press, 1973], 43).
Habermas goes on to lament the rise of the scientific control of modern society and the associated loss of the practical orientation of classical politics, wondering whether it can be redeemed in our day and age. Habermas’s inclination, and the inclination of others who share this same approach, is to return to these texts to not only understand when and how we began to lose this practical capacity to judge, discuss, instruct, and learn what it is to live a good and just life, but also to comprehend the original articulation of this practice in the hope that we can remember and relearn it.
1 NE 1140b20.
2 Pol 1.11.8.
3 Pol 1.2.9.
4 NE 1140a10.
5 NE 1140b20.
6 Ronald Beiner, Political Judgment (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), 74.
7 Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, trans. Rex Warner (London: Penguin, 1972), 117 (1.138).
8 It should be noted that Aristotle makes a distinction between synesis and phronesis, explaining that the former describes good advice whereas the latter describes good action (NE 1143a7–10). However, it is clear that Thucydides is using the word to describe Themistocles’s “rapidity of action.”
9 NE 1103a14ff.
10 NE 1142a12–21.
11 A similar rationale might be used to explain the minimum voting age requirement in today’s democracies.
12 NE 1140a25.
13 NE 1106b36–7a2.
14 NE 1113a9–13.
15 Pol 7.14.15–17.
16 Pol 7.14.18.
17 Pol 7.14.8.
18 Ibid.
19 Pol 4.1.7–8.
20 261d.
21 “Kingly-techne blends and weaves together; taking on the one hand those whose nature tend rather to courage, which is the stronger element and may be regarded as the warp, and on the other hand those which incline to order and gentleness … the woof – these, which are naturally opposed, she seeks to bind and weave together” (line 309). We are told that the Statesman, by weaving the temperate with the courageous, can transform the vices into virtues and cure each side of its deficiencies (line 310).
22 In other words, for phronesis, the agent of change or the efficient cause is in the material and not an external source. Differently, in the case of techne, the agent of change or efficient cause is from an external source – in the technites, not the product.
23 Physics 192b, 14–15.
24 NE 1140a10–15.
25 NE 1140b6.
26 Pol 7.4.4.
27 Pol 7.12.9.
28 Furthermore, as he explains later in the Politics, we can only “pray that our state should be ideally equipped at all points where fortune is sovereign – as we assume her to be in the sphere of the ‘given’” (7.13.9). The makeup of the population would likely be included in this sphere of the given rather than the made.
29 Pol 2.1.1.
30 Pol 7.13.13.
31 Pol 1.10.1–2.
32 Pol 3.15.7.
1 Aristotle also warns that too much change, too quickly can weaken the power of law: “To change the practice of an art is not the same as to change the operation of a law. It is from habit, and only from habit, that law derives the validity which secures obedience. But habit can be created only with the passage of time; and a readiness to change from existing to new and different laws will accordingly tend to weaken the general power of law” (Pol 2.9.19–24).
2 Confessions, book 11, chapter 26.
3 Letter 140.
4 “Of the Morals of the Catholic Church,” 8.13.
5 Book 1, chapter 2.
6 Book 1, chapter 3.
7 Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (University of Notre Dame, 1984), 182.
8 See, for example, Aristotle, NE 4.1 and 2.
9 Making a similar point, in Pagan and Christian in an Age of Anxiety (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990) the classical scholar E.R. Dodds notes: “What astonished all the early pagan observers … was the Christians’ total reliance on unproved assertion – their willingness to die for the indemonstrable … The Christians possess three of the four cardinal virtues: they exhibit courage, self-control and justice; what they lack is phronesis, intellectual insight, the rational basis of the other three” (121).
10 Consider 1 Corinthians 13:13: “There are three things that last forever: faith, hope, and love … but the greatest of them all is love.”
11 Anthony J. Celano, “The End of Practical Wisdom: Ethics as Science in the Thirteenth Century,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 33, no. 2 (April 1995): 230.
12 Summa theologiae 2-2, 52.1.
13 Ibid., 2-2, 47.6.
14 Aquinas also writes, “The right ends of human life are fixed” (ibid., 47.15); that prudence has its source in an understanding of those ends (ibid., 49.2); and that “prudence, which denotes rectitude of reason, is chiefly perfected and helped through being ruled and moved by the Holy Ghost” (ibid., 52.2).
15 In third century AD Domitius Ulpianus, the Roman jurists explained: “Jus naturale is that which nature has taught to all animals; for it is not a law specific to mankind but to all animals – land animals, sea animals, and birds as well. Out of this comes the union of man and woman which we call marriage, and the procreation of children, and their rearing. So we can see that the other animals, wild beasts included, are rightly understood to be acquainted with this law. Jus gentium, the law of nations, is that which all human peoples observe. That it is not coextensive with natural law can be grasped easily, since this latter is common to all animals whereas jus gentium is common only to human beings among themselves.” The Digest of Justinian, ed. T. Mommsen, A. Watson, and P. Krueger (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1985), 1.1.1.3,4.
16 Aquinas writes: “The natural law is nothing else than the rational creature’s participation of the eternal law” (Summa theologiae 2-1, 91.2).
17 Ibid., 2-2, 47.15.
18 Ibid., 2-2, 49.2.
19 Ibid., 2-2, 52.2.
20 Ibid., 2-1, 2.1–8.
21 Ibid., 2-1, 3.8.
22 Ibid., 2-1, 5.3.
23 Ibid., 2-1, 4.7 and 2-2, 184.2.
24 Ibid., 2-2, 55.1.
25 Ibid., 2-1, 4.5.
26 Ibid., 2-1, 4.8.
27 Book 1, 20.
1 A religious and political schism resulted in the fracturing of the Church’s power in Europe. This period is often referred to as the Western Schism (1378–1417), which saw the election of three rival popes and thus three rival factions within the Church. The 1492 election of Pope Alexander VI, known for his corruption and numerous illegitimate children, further damaged the moral authority of the Church.
2 The Prince, chap. 25, p. 90. Quotes from Machiavelli are from The Chief Works and Others: Volumes I and II, trans. Allan H. Gilbert (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1989).
3 Machiavelli writes: “I compare Fortune with one of our destructive rivers which, when it is angry, turns the plains into lakes, throws down the trees and the buildings, takes earth from one spot, puts it in another; everyone flees before the flood; everyone yields to its fury and nowhere can repel it. Yet though such it is, we need not therefore conclude that when the weather is quiet, men cannot take precautions with both embankments and dykes, so that when the waters rise, either they go off by a canal or their fury is neither so wild nor so damaging. The same things happen about Fortune. She shows her power where strength and wisdom do not prepare to resist her, and directs her fury where she knows that no dykes or embankments are ready to hold her” (ibid., 25.90). Technical means, the building of defences and embankments, are applied to subdue nature or chance. And, while the river is redirected as it is moving through the city, its course is not fundamentally altered on the landscape as a whole. Machiavelli believes that a portion of nature can be controlled, but that it cannot be completely overcome.
4 Ibid., 3.16. Machiavelli often used the terms wisdom (saggezza) and prudence (prudenza) interchangeably.
5 Ibid., 7.62.
6 In Discourse on Livy, he explains: “Prudent men usually say (and not by chance or without merit) that whoever wants to see what is to be, considers what has been; for all the things of the world in every time have had the very resemblance as those of ancient times. This arises because they are done by men who have been, and will always have, the same passions, and of necessity they must result in the same effects. It is true that men in their actions are more virtuous in this province than in another, according to the nature of the education by which those people have formed their way of living. It also facilitates the knowledge of future events from the past, to observe a nation hold their same customs for a long time, being either continuously avaricious, or continuously fraudulent, or have any other similar vice or virtù” (book 3, chap. 63).
7 The Prince, 15.58.
8 Phys 185a2ff.
9 The Prince, 6.25.
10 Thomas Hobbes, The Leviathan, ed. C.B. Macpherson (London: Penguin, 1985), 97.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid., 117.
13 The Scientific Revolution demarcates a period during the sixteenth and seventeenth century that saw a great expansion in scientific knowledge, including proofs for heliocentricism, the birth of modern chemistry, and insights into the inner workings of the human body.
14 The Leviathan, 166.
15 Ibid., 308.
16 Ibid.
17 “For prudence is but experience, which equal time equally bestows on all men in those things they equally apply themselves unto” (ibid., 183). As he later says: “It is evident that we are not to account as any part thereof that original knowledge called experience, in which consisteth prudence, because it is not attained by reasoning, but found as well in brute beasts as in man; and is but a memory of successions of events in times past, wherein the omission of every little circumstance, altering the effect frustrateth the expectation of the most prudent: whereas nothing is produced by reasoning aright, but general, eternal, and immutable truth” (682).
18 Ibid., 392.
19 Ibid., 387.
20 Ibid., 223.
21 Ibid., 161–2.
22 Ibid., 379.
23 Ibid., 139.
24 Ibid., 263.
25 Ibid., 161–2.
26 Ibid., 264.
27 Ibid., 407–8.
28 This is similar to Machiavelli’s “exhortation” to liberate Italy in chapter 26, the final chapter of The Prince. Both thinkers look to or, better yet, call to a great political leader to come forward and put their theories into practice.
1 Abbot Lawrence, who founded the textile mills at Lawrence, Massachusetts, typified the common attitude among American industrialists when he remarked, “The water-power on the James River at Richmond is unrivalled,” and lamented: “It seems a great waste of natural wealth to permit it to run into the sea, having hardly touched a water-wheel” (quoted in Theodore Steinberg, Nature Incorporated [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004], 71).
2 Stevens even hired a carnival performer known for swallowing and regurgitating stones to ingest silver spheres so he could later test the effect of the stomach’s digestive juices upon them. See Thomas L. Hankin, Science and the Enlightenment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 123.
3 As the historian Peter Gray points out, before the wide application of the Enlightenment belief in the power of reason to the human body, “It is safe to speculate that in the eighteenth century a sick man who did not consult a physician had a better chance of surviving than one who did” (The Enlightenment: The Science of Freedom [New York: Norton and Co., 1996], 19).
4 Joel Kupperman, Character (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 71–2.
5 Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, in Immanuel Kant: Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals in Focus, ed. Lawrence Pasternack, trans. H.J. Patton (New York: Routledge, 2002), 39.
6 Immanuel Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. Lewis White Beck (New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1959), 39 For a study of Kant’s ideas on political judgment see Ronald Beiner, Political Judgment (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), 31–63. For a similar study that includes Marx see Dick Howard, Political Judgments (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1996), 31–43 and esp. 133–51, 211–29.
7 Jean Bodin, Six Books of The Commonwealth, abr. and trans. M.J. Tooley (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1955), book 6, chap. 1.
8 In the same chapter, he decides that “If at any time they omitted the censorship, as occasionally happened during a long war, one can see at a glance how the morals of the people declined, and the commonwealth fell sick, like a body denied its customary purgations …”
9 Sketch for a Historical Picture of the Progress of the Human Mind, Tenth epoch, “Future Progress of Mankind” (trans. June Barraclough [London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1955]).
10 “Essay on the Application of Analysis to the Probability of Majority Decisions” (1785), in Condorect: Selected Writings, ed. K.M. Baker. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1976.
11 He even suggests that the institution of public education would alter the physical function of the brain and that this change would be passed from one generation to the next, “It is therefore simple enough to believe that if several generations of men receive an education directed toward a constant goal, if each of the individuals comprising them cultivates his mind by study, succeeding generations will be born with a greater propensity for acquiring knowledge and a greater aptitude to profit from it” (On Public Instruction, First memorandum, “The Nature and Purpose of Public Instruction,” 1791, in Condorect: Selected Writings, ed. Baker).
12 Anne-Robert-Jacques Turgot, “Memorandum on Local Government” (1775), in The Old Regime and the French Revolution, ed. K.M. Baker (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 99.
13 The Scottish historian Thomas Carlyle describes the hectic build-up to the “Feast of Reason” celebrating the Goddess in the third volume of his three-volume The French Revolution: A History, first printed in 1837:
“Above all things, there come Patriotic Gifts, of Church-furniture. The remnant of bells, except for tocsin, descend from their belfries into the National melting-pot to make cannon. Censers and all sacred vessels are beaten broad; of silver, they are fit for the poverty-stricken Mint; of pewter, let them become bullets, to shoot the ‘enemies du genre humain.’ … In all Towns and Townships as quick as the guillotine may go, so quick goes the axe and the wrench: sacristies, lutrins, altar-rails are pulled down; the Mass-Books torn into cartridge papers: men dance the Carmagnole all night about the bonfire … This, accordingly, is what the streets of Paris saw: ‘Most of these persons were still drunk, with the brandy they had swallowed out of chalices; eating mackerel on the patenas! Mounted on Asses, which were housed with Priests’ cloaks … Next came Mules high-laden with crosses, chandeliers, censers, holy water vessels …’ For the same day, while this brave Carmagnole-dance has hardly jigged itself out, there arrive Procureur Chaumette and Municipals and Departmentals, and with them the strangest freight-age: a New Religion! Demoiselle Candeille, of the Opera, a woman fair to look upon, when well rouged; she borne on palanquin shoulder-high; with red woolen nightcap; in azure mantle; garlanded with oak; holding in her hand the Pike of Jupiter-Peuple, sails in: heralded by white young women girt in tricolor. Let the world consider it! This, O National Convention wonder of the universe, is our New Divinity; Goddess of Reason, worthy, and alone worthy of revering” (New York: American Book Exchange, 1881), 581–2.
14 See, for example, Norman Schofield, “The Intellectual Contribution of Condorcet to the Founding of the US Republic 1785–1800,” Social Choice and Welfare 25, nos. 2–3 (2005): 303–18.
15 Carl von Linné (a.k.a. Linnaeus) wrote A General System of Nature through the Three Grand Kingdoms of Animals, Vegetables, and Minerals: Classes, orders, genera, species, and varieties, with their habitation, manners, economy, structure and peculiarities (1735), a periodic table of plants and animals that places human beings in a nondescript corner along with other primates.
16 Popular Instructions on the Calculation of Probabilities, trans. Richard Beamish (London: J. Weale, 1849), 107.
17 This quote is taken from the 1842 English translation titled A Treatise on Man and the Development of His Faculties (Edinburgh: William and Robert Chambers), repr. in “Quetelet on the Study of Man,” Population and Development Review 22, no. 3 (Sept. 1996): 550.
18 Ibid., 551.
19 In an earlier work, he similarly concludes: “The power of man over animal life, in producing whatever varieties of form he pleases, is enormously great. It would seem as though the physical structure of future generations was almost as plastic as clay, under the control of the breeder’s will. It is my desire to show … that mental qualities are equally under control.” Francis Galton, “Hereditary Talent and Character,” Macmillan’s Magazine no. 12 (June and August 1865): 157. As quoted in Ruth Schwartz Cowan, “Francis Galton’s Statistical Ideas: The Influence of Eugenics,” Isis 63, no. 4 (Dec. 1972): 510.
20 Ibid.
21 Schwartz Cowan points out: “If one assumes, as Galton did, that every organic character is produced by a number of genetic determinants, then the problem of reducing and combining meteorological data so as to be able to predict the weather in one time at one place is strikingly similar to the problem of predicting the characteristics of an offspring once the constitution of its parents is known” (ibid., 513).
1 For a thorough review of the Romantics’ view of technology, see again Paul Cantor’s “Romanticism and Technology: Satanic Verses and Satanic Mills,” in Technology in the Western Political Tradition, ed. Arthur Melzer, Jerry Weinberger, and M. Richard Zinman (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993).
2 Ernst Jünger, “Technology as the Mobilization of the World through the Gestalt of the Worker” (1932), repr. in Carl Mitcham and Robert Mackey, eds, Philosophy and Technology: Readings in the Philosophical Problems of Technology (New York: Free Press, 1983).
3 Oswald Spengler, Der Mensch und die Technik: Beitrag zu einer Philosophic des Lebens (1931) (Munich: C.H. Beck’sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1971), as quoted in John Farrenkopf, “Spengler’s Historical Pessimism and the Tragedy of Our Age,” Theory and Society 22, no. 3 (1993): 405–6.
4 Martin Heidegger, “The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking,” in Basic Writings, ed. David Farrel Krell (San Francisco: HarperCollins, 1993), 434.
5 Robert Bernasconi has already discussed a connection between authenticity and phronesis. He questions the legitimacy of a parallel between the dichotomies of phronesis and techne and authenticity and inauthenticity. R. Bernasconi, “Heidegger’s Destruction of Phronesis,” Southern Journal of Philosophy 28, supplement (1989): 127–47.
6 Martin Heidegger, Plato’s Sophist, trans. Richard Rojecwicz and André Schuwer (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1997), §8a (p. 47–9).
7 The familiar English word “authentic,” associated with things like integrity and genuineness, comes from the Greek “authentikos,” meaning original or authoritative. However, Heidegger does not use the German word “authentische,” but instead the coined word “eigentlichkeit,” which translates as something close to “ownmostness” or “that which is my own” (eigen), Heidegger presents authenticity in opposition to Uneigentlichkeit, inauthenticity, or “that which is not my own” (uneigen). See Being and Time, division 1, section 9.
8 Plato’s Sophist, §8b (51–2).
9 Ibid.
10 Aristotle recognizes the problem of a corrupt education system perpetuating a corrupt political system. He points to the “vulgar decline” of statesmen who are concerned only with the “useful” and “profitable” as well as empire building (Pol 7.14.15–17). If the polis fails to pass down the bases of its ethos, laws, and the good life to the next generation of citizens, then the constitution of the whole city will become deviant. He is clear that the citizens reproduced by that city’s legislators will be unhappy (7.14.18).
11 Heidegger writes: “A future thinker, who is perhaps given the task of taking over this thinking which I have tried to prepare, will have to acknowledge the following words, which Heinrich von Kleist once wrote: ‘I step back before one, who is not yet here, and I bow a millennium ahead of him, before his spirit.’” M. Heidegger, Martin Heidegger in Conversation, ed. Richard Wisser (Freiburg: Arnold-Heinemann, 1970), 47.
12 See “The Self-Assertion of the German University,” in The Heidegger Controversy: A Critical Reader ed. Richard Wolin, trans. William S. Lewis (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1993), esp. 33.
13 Martin Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. Ralph Manheim (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959), 37–8.
14 Michael Gillespie explains that “Heidegger was attracted to Nazism because he believed it offered a solution to the crisis of Western civilization … Heidegger clearly felt that resolute action was needed to deal with the social and spiritual crisis and was attracted to the Nazis because of their determination for action.” M. Gillespie, “Martin Heidegger’s Aristotelian National Socialism,” Political Theory 28, no. 2 (2000): 141–2.
15 See Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1962), §§ 54–60.
16 Heidegger, “The Self-Assertion of the German University,” 33.
17 Rather than the instrumental rationality, sterility, and humanism indicative of Plato’s theory of the forms (eidos), Heidegger wanted to somehow recover a lost Hericlitean universe in flux where man is tossed “back and forth between structure and the structureless, order and mischief, between the evil and noble” (Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. Richard Polt and Gregory Fried [New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000], 161). He also asks, “But if that which is an essential consequence is raised to the level of essence itself, and thus takes the place of the essence, then how do things stand?” He continues, “What remains decisive is not the fact in itself that phusis was characterized as idea, but that the idea rises up as the solid and definitive interpretation of Being” (194). Heidegger explains that the idea or eidos is initially understood as the visible appearance of the “movedness” or “emerging power” of nature (physis). From here, physis as movedness is ignored in lieu of the superficial, unmoving eidos. Eidos becomes a paradeigma, a model or prototype rather than anything immediately apparent. Heidegger concludes, “Because the actual repository of being is the idea and this is the prototype, all disclosure of being must aim at assimilation to the model, accommodation to idea” (184–5).
18 Steven Crowell argues that resolve can “be encompassed by no rules, assessed by no public criteria, be integrated into no public practices; it is not a form of skillful coping and cannot be thought of in terms of phronesis.” In fact, we can hardly even say that resolve involves action because it “transpires on the basis of death, the total breakdown of such abilities-to-be.” “Authentic Historicality,” in Space, Time, and Culture, ed. David Carr and Canhui Zhang (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer, 2004), 68.
19 NE 1094a22–6.
20 Wolin notes that Eric Weil and Alphonse de Waelhens support this view. On the one hand, Heidegger’s many speeches and activities during his time as rector of Freiberg University made it clear that he promoted support of Hitler and National Socialism as “an affirmation of ‘authentic existence.’” On the other hand, these same speeches and actions seemed not to explicitly support the Jewish and racial considerations normally associated with Nazism (Karl Löwith, “My Last Meeting with Heidegger in Rome, 1936,” repr. in The Heidegger Controversy: A Critical Reader, ed. Wolin, 180–2). It seems possible that Heidegger truly believed that the Germany of the early 1930s held out the possibility for authentic existence – he was not simply swept up in the fervour of the times – but his vision of a Nazi state did not match Hitler’s vision. Jeffrey Herf argues that the Nazi appropriation of the language of authenticity highlights the disjuncture between Heidegger’s philosophy and his “political error” (Jeffrey Herf, Reactionary Modernism: Technology, Culture and Politics in Weimar and the Third Reich [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984], 224). Still, an argument can be made that Heidegger both explicitly (Tom Rockmore, The Heidegger Case: On Philosophy and Politics [Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992], 111) and implicitly supported Nazi racial considerations (ibid., 192). What Steiner calls Heidegger’s “total public silence” (George Steiner, Martin Heidegger [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987], 116) on the Holocaust and the policies of the Third Reich lends credence to this view. But, in a return letter to Herbert Marcuse written not long after the war, Heidegger addresses his failure to “provide a public, readily comprehensible counter-declaration.” As he explains, “It would have been the end of both me and my family” (20 January 1948, repr. in The Heidegger Controversy, ed. Wolin, 163). This seems a most common and legitimate excuse for silence. It also worth reviewing some of the other points raised in the same letter: “I expected from National Socialism a spiritual renewal of life in its entirety”; “I recognized my political error and resigned my rectorship in protest against state and party”; “[I] was exploited for propaganda purposes both here and abroad”; none of his students “fell victim to Nazi ideology”; “the bloody terror of the Nazis in point of fact had been kept secret from the German people.” We can conclude with some confidence that Heidegger’s philosophy did not match up with the politics of the day. This is evident in his Bremen lectures of 1949, where he compares the Holocaust to mechanized agriculture and nuclear war. It seems clear that Heidegger understands the Holocaust as one of the worst reflections of global technology – far from the “spiritual renewal” he was looking for.
21 Nicols Fox explains that “[Neo-]Luddism is neither conservative nor liberal: both capitalism and Marxism are committed to the concept of industrial progress, the wisdom of which Luddites question” (Against the Machine: The Hidden Luddite Tradition in Literature, Art, and Individual Lives [Washington, DC: Island Press, 2002], xvii).
22 This is Alston Chase’s contention in his June 2000 Atlantic Monthly article “Harvard and the Making of the Unabomber,” vol. 285, no. 6: 41–65.
23 Edward Abbey, The Monkey Wrench Gang (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1975), 100–1.
24 Chuck Palahniuk, Fight Club (New York: Norton), 124.
25 Kirkpatrick Sale, “Lessons from the Luddites: Setting Limits on Technology,” The Nation 260, no. 22 (1995): 785.
26 Chellis Glendinning, “Notes toward a Neo-Luddite Manifesto,” Utne Reader 38, no. 1 (1990): 50.
27 Martin Heidegger, Discourse on Thinking, trans. John M. Anderson and E. Hans Freund (New York: Harper & Row, 1966), 19.
28 Martin Heidegger, Martin Heidegger in Conversation, ed. Richard Wisser (New Delhi: Arnold-Heinemann, 1970), 43. In his 1949 essay “The Turning,” Heidegger unequivocally states that he is not advocating anything as ridiculous as the abandonment of technology. “Technology,” [Heidegger] repeats, “will not be done away with. Technology will not be struck down, and certainly it will not be destroyed.” As quoted in Iain Thomson, Heidegger on Ontotheology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 72–3.
29 Olafson explains that “Heidegger appears to have understood Nazism as a way of having things both ways.” That is to say, he embraced the idea that the Nazis would wipe away the inauthenticity of modern society while, at the same time, protect the authentic völkisch traditions of Germany by the military and economic power of a modern state. Frederick A. Olafson, “Heidegger’s Thought and Nazism,” Inquiry 43, no. 3 (2000): 277–8.
30 Heidegger, The Heidegger Controversy, ed. Wolin, 31.
31 Martin Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. Richard Polt and Gregory Fried (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), 174.
32 Thomson discusses the mislabelling of Heidegger as nostalgic for the pre-industrial world, as embracing the “reactionary antimodernism of a philosophical ‘redneck’” or a “Luddite ‘technophobia.’” Thomson, Heidegger on Ontotheology, 45.
33 Heidegger, The Heidegger Controversy, ed. Wolin, 32.
34 Heidegger, Basic Writings, ed. Krell, 362.
35 Ibid., 355.
36 Hubert Dreyfus and Charles Spinosa, “Highway Bridges and Feasts: Heidegger and Borgmann on How to Affirm Technology,” Man and World 30 (1997): 173. See also Thomson, Heidegger on Ontotheology, 439. The “focal” is in reference to Albert Borgmann’s work on focal things and practices (discussed below).
37 Dreyfus and Spinosa, “Highway Bridges and Feasts,” 159.
38 Heidegger, Discourse on Thinking.
39 Later thinkers such as Neil Postman, Hans Jonas, Langdon Winner, and Albert Borgmann attempt a similar moderate response to the challenge of technology. For example, in Technology and the Character of Contemporary Life, Albert Borgmann writes: “Focal things and practices can empower us to propose and perhaps to enact a reform of technology” (Technology and the Character of Contemporary Life [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984], 155). He then goes on to suggest that things such as cyclotrons and space shuttles may bear resemblance to medieval cathedrals and monuments in that they serve as “focal points” for our communities, inspiring awe and appreciation for the place of humanity in the cosmos: we can find peace and serenity in “midst of our own creations which surround us daily” (161). Borgmann and other moderate essentialists believe that by reorienting or reforming the way we relate to technology, by recognizing that it is revealing something to us, we can mitigate its threat. So yet again we see essentialism as something other than determinism. By recognizing and changing our relationship to technology, we can help determine the course technology will take.
40 The Heidegger Controversy, ed. Wolin, 111. The rest of the quote reads: “It seems to me that you are taking technology too absolutely. I do not see the situation of man in the world of global technology as a fate which cannot be escaped or unraveled. On the contrary, I see the task of thought to consist in helping man in general, within the limits allotted to thought, to achieve an adequate relationship to the essence of technology. National Socialism, to be sure, moved in this direction. But those people were far too limited in their thinking to acquire an explicit relationship to what is really happening today and has been underway for three centuries.” In his book On Heidegger’s Nazism and Philosophy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), Tom Rockmore explains: “Here, in his own way, Heidegger is signaling, as clearly as he can – candidly, and accurately – that his theory of technology is meant to carry out the ideas which the National Socialists were too limited to develop through a theory of technology with political consequences” (206).
41 As quoted in The Heidegger Controversy, ed. Wolin, 104.
42 As Zimmerman puts it, “Despite his descriptions of how the old world was being obliterated by the advance of the technological one, Heidegger did not finally despair. Rather, he held out the hope that a saving power could grow from out of the dangerous depths of technological nihilism.” Michael Zimmerman, Heidegger’s Confrontation with Modernity (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990), 133. Zuckert similarly explains, “What he had learned both from his study of the history of philosophy and the outcome of World War II was the impossibility of checking this technological leveling with ‘will’ or force.” Catherine Zuckert, “Martin Heidegger: His Philosophy and His Politics,” Political Theory 18, no. 1 (1990): 72.
43 Basic Writings, ed. Krell, 341.
44 Lewis Mumford, Pentagon of Power: The Myth of the Machine, vol. 2 (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1974), 433.
45 Jacques Ellul, The Technological Society (New York: Vintage, 1967), xxxiii.
46 Ibid., 311.
47 Ibid., 316.
48 Marshall McLuhan, The Gutenberg Galaxy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992), 3. McLuhan is not calling for the elimination or destruction of technology. In a late interview, he puts it bluntly, “Resenting a new technology will not halt its progress.” M. McLuhan, “Playboy Interview,” in Essential McLuhan, ed. Eric McLuhan and Frank Zingrone (Concord, ON: Anansi, 1995). He continues: “First of all – and I’m sorry to repeat this disclaimer – I’m not advocating anything; I’m merely probing and predicting trends. Even if I opposed them or thought them disastrous, I couldn’t stop them, so why waste my time lamenting? … I see no possibility of a worldwide Luddite rebellion that will smash all machinery to bits, so we might as well sit back and see what is happening and what will happen to us … The central purpose of all my work is to convey this message, that by understanding media as they extend man, we gain a measure of control over them … If we persist, however, in our rearview-mirror approach to these cataclysmic developments, all of Western culture will be destroyed and swept into the dustbin of history” (264–5).
49 George Grant, Technology and Empire (Toronto: Anansi, 1969), 139.
50 Ibid.
51 Heidegger, “The Question Concerning Technology,” in Basic Writings, ed. Krell, 340.
1 An 1862 issue of the leading medical journal The Lancet speaks of “the impression on the brain produced by the rattle affecting it through the nerves of hearing; the rapid succession of objects presented to the sight, and the vibrations actually transmitted by the movement of the carriage to the very substance of the brain and spinal cord … the effects of hurry and anxiety to catch trains, and the frequent concentration of effort required to compress business matters at the last moment into the strict limits imposed.” John Ruskin, the nineteenth-century social critic and poet, warned of a different threat posed by trains, forewarning of a “deterioration of moral character in the inhabitants of every district penetrated by the railway.” John Ruskin, “A Protest against the Extension of Railways in the Lake District” (1876), in The Works of John Ruskin, ed. E.T. Cook and Alexander Wedderburn, 39 vols. (London: George Allen, 1903–12), 34: 141, as quoted in Ralph Harrington, “The Neuroses of the Railway,” History Today 44, no. 7 (1994).
2 In his essay “What Is Practice? The Conditions of Social Reason,” Gadamer writes that “in our civilization, characterized by technological growth, what has been artificially produced sets the new terms” and, in turn, there is “the loss of flexibility in our interchange with the world” (71). He argues that “it is inevitable, then, that the modern technology of communication leads to a more powerful manipulation of our minds” and “the individual in society who feels dependent and helpless in the face of its technically mediated life forms becomes incapable of establishing an identity” (73) (in Reason in the Age of Science, trans. F.G. Lawrence [Cambridge: MIT Press, 1981]).
3 Pol 7.1.9.
4 Peter D. Kramer, Listening to Prozac (New York: Penguin Books, 1993), 13.
5 Ibid., 32.
6 S.B. Patten, J.V. Williams, J. Wang, C.E. Adair, R. Brant, A. Casebeer, and C. Barbui, “Antidepressant Pharmacoepidemiology in a General Population Sample,” Journal of Clinical Psychopharmacology 25, no. 3 (2005): 285–7. See also National Center for Health Statistics, United States, Chartbook on Trends in the Health of Americans (Hyattsville, MD, 2007), 88.
7 This problem of circumvention applies to many new drugs. The development of drugs like Viagra suggests that such things as sexual arousal can be regulated by external means.
8 In a 1999 report, the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB), an agency of the World Health Organization, noted: “In the Americas, particularly in the United States, performance enhancing drugs are given to children to boost school performance or help them conform with the demands of school life.”
9 See Michael S. Bahrke, Charles E. Yesalis III, and James E. Wright, “Psychological and Behavioural Effects of Endogenous Testosterone Levels and Anabolic-Androgenic Steroids among Males: A Review,” Sports Medicine 10, no. 5 (1990): 303–37.
10 Amy Shipley, “Chemists Stay a Step Ahead of Drug Testers,” Washington Post, 18 October 2005, p. E01.
11 Steve Gardner, “Young Players Need a Few Good Role Models,” USA Today, 28 March 2005. President Barack Obama expressed a similar sentiment in his 9 February 2009 press conference: “What I’m pleased about is Major League Baseball seems to finally be taking this seriously, to recognize how big a problem this is for the sport, and that our kids hopefully are watching and saying, ‘You know what? There are no short cuts, that when you try to take short cuts, you may end up tarnishing your entire career, and that your integrity’s not worth it.’”
12 M. Thevis and W. Schänzer, “Emerging Drugs – Potential for Misuse in Sport and Doping Control Detection Strategies,” Mini-Reviews in Medicinal Chemistry 7, no. 5 (2007): 531–7.
13 At http://www.plenitas.com/en/plastic-surgery-video-testimonials.htm.
14 See Edward H. Livingston, “Development of Bariatric Surgery-Specific Risk Assessment Tool,” Surgery for Obesity and Related Diseases 3, no. 1 (January 2007): 14–20.
15 See A. Towbin, T. Inge, V. Garcia, H. Roehrig, R. Clements, C. Harmon, and S. Daniels, “Beriberi after Gastric Bypass Surgery in Adolescence,” Journal of Pediatrics 145, no. 2 (2004): 263–7.
16 George Dvorsky, “Better Living through Transhumanism,” Humanist 64, no. 3 (May 2004): 7–10.
17 Julian Huxley, Religion without Revelation (London: E. Benn, 1927).
18 Julian Huxley, “Transhumanism” (1957), repr. in Journal of Humanistic Psychology 8 (1968): 74–5.
19 Francis Fukuyama, “Transhumanism,” Foreign Policy, no. 144 (Sept./Oct. 2004): 42–3.
20 Leviathan, 407–8.