The real difficulty is not so much in devising standards or procedures, as in ensuring that they are regularly and properly observed
The Radcliffe Report
A review of the Suez Crisis in 1956 and the ability of the Armed Forces to meet Britain’s commitments led to the conclusion that there was a need for a well-equipped Army. At the time, the Armed Forces were midway through the Kenya Emergency and the Cyprus Emergency and near the end of the Malaya Emergency, Of 199 officers then serving with the Intelligence Corps, 120 were on short commissions from other Arms and Services.
In associated discussions to plan for the future and the availability of fewer officers, on 22 January 1957, the Army Council Executive Committee agreed that the Intelligence Corps should have a cohort of Regular officers on the basis that:
For an efficient Intelligence system, it is essential to have a nucleus of officers with a sound military background who are experienced in knowing what information is required, and how to get it, to assess it and to present the results.
A notable influence in the decision was Major General Davidson who had taken over Colonel Commandant from General Sir Bernard Paget in 1952. It was his personality, foresight, commitment and determination that ensured the survival of the Corps. His fighting call:
Onwards and Upwards – you are a great Corps, so continue to keep it that way and show the Army lead.
The Council agreed that officer-cadets at Sandhurst could apply to join and in 1958 Second Lieutenant John Landholt was the first Regular subaltern to be commissioned. In 1961 Captain Derek Hawker gained a competitive vacancy to Staff College by scoring a minimum of seventy per cent in all papers. He was followed by Major Brian Parritt. In 1965, Major Hawker, then commanding the Depot, produced the first History of the Intelligence Corps in The Rose and The Laurel. Major Parritt then persuaded the Intelligence Corps Association to publish The Intelligencers, his study of British military intelligence up to 1914, a project extended to include the First World War and which was reprinted by Pen & Sword Books in 2010.
In April, the Defence White Paper proposed calling up the last National Service intake in January 1960. Regular other ranks would serve a minimum of six years. The Army was to be reduced in size by means of disbanding and amalgamating regiments, and BAOR was to be reduced from 77,000 to 64,000 men. The defence strategy would be nuclear and overseas garrisons would also be reduced. To redress the reduction, the Strategic Reserves would be strengthened by a larger Territorial Army. To meet crisis, the Strategic Reserve was strengthened and the concept of autonomous Brigade Groups capable of operating overseas established.
To address the shortage of senior officers in the Corps, on 6 July 1957, the Vice Chief of the Imperial General Staff issued Defence Council Instruction 281/57:
A permanent cadre of regular officers in the Intelligence Corps is to be formed and will provide a part of the officers required for intelligence duties in the Army. The cadre will consist of 100 officers. The remaining requirement will continue to be found by the present system.
‘The remaining requirement’ was Army and Royal Marines officers filling Staff intelligence appointments. lt was envisaged that the cadre would:
…not only improve the work of the Intelligence Corps through a better understanding of the use which is made of completed Intelligence work, but suitably qualified permanent regular Intelligence Corps officers would also have an opportunity to compete with other areas for promotion in appropriate branches of the Staff.
Transferring the officers took four years, the successful applicants styling themselves ‘The First 100’, some of whom had served in intelligence appointments. An early transferee was Major Peter Goss (8 Gurkha Rifles). He had fought in the first Arakan campaign in 1943 and at Imphal in 1944 before being parachuted into Burma as a member of SOE Force 136. A Czech, Russian and French interpreter, he transferred from the Infantry in 1957. Captain Lionel Savery (Royal Artillery) had served as an intelligence officer in Malaya and in Cyprus where he had led a turned EOKA squad and had accounted for twelve terrorists. He had recently been severely wounded in a firefight. One problem was that several Short Service Engagement officers already serving in the Corps were now required to pass the Regular Commissions Board. Some who had served during the Second World War resigned their commissions. Reliance again landed on the shoulders of other ranks, as it had done in 1945, to retain the experience so necessary in intelligence and security. Nevertheless, the First 100 set about creating a Corps capable of providing multi-skilled intelligence units to the Army and, as they climbed the seniority ladder over the next twenty years, solidified the existing esprit de corps. It was envisaged that sixty-five per cent of the majors would reach lieutenant colonel by an average age of forty-three. By 1971, sixty-two per cent had been promoted.
By December 1959, Major Felix Robson, a former Army pilot and now Commander, Intelligence Corps Strategic Reserve, had developed the concept of an autonomous Intelligence Platoon to support Southern Command. Consisting of a captain or lieutenant and his batman, a Warrant Officer 2 as second-in-command, two SNCOs and a Royal Engineer draughtsman, it was equipped with two Austin Champs and a 1ton Austin lorry and their trailers and a semi-covert VW Beetle. Platoons were expected to provide:
• Operational Intelligence support.
• Counter-Intelligence through its Field Security detachment.
• Interrogation.
• Air Photographic Reading Interpretation.
Within five months, 3rd (Strategic Reserve) Division at Colchester had accepted 4 Intelligence Platoon and was followed by:
• 1 (24 Infantry Brigade) Intelligence Platoon in Kenya.
• 2 (19 Infantry Brigade) Intelligence Platoon at Colchester.
• 3 (2 Infantry Brigade) Intelligence Platoon at Plymouth.
• 5 (5 Brigade) Intelligence Platoon at Barton Stacey.
• 6 (16 Independent Parachute Brigade) Parachute Intelligence Platoon at Aldershot.
Twenty Regular Platoons reporting to the Theatre HQ Intelligence Corps for domestic matters and specialist training were eventually formed and administered by the relevant Corps, Divisional and Brigade Headquarters Company, the size varying according to its role. Intelligence Platoons (TA) supported the Home Commands. In West Germany, the Platoons were controlled by HQ Intelligence Corps and Theatres Intelligence Unit, which was commanded by a lieutenant colonel reporting to HQ BAOR. Also under command was the Photographic Interpretation Company. Major F.S. Austin had been the first Intelligence Corps officer to command the Army Photographic Interpretation Unit (UK) in 1953, an appointment that had been amalgamated with Deputy Commander, Joint Air Photographic Interpretation Centre in 1952. Interpreters had been trained at Nuneham from 1947 until 1956, when the Air Photographic Reading Branch was formed at the School of Military Intelligence, Maresfield and tri-Service courses began at the Joint Air Reconnaissance Intelligence Centre.
By 1960, the Platoon experiment had been re-assessed for several reasons, not least of which was that none were under direct command of an Intelligence Corps officer of field rank and they were often seen as a general duties resource. When Captain Angus Southwood arrived in Kenya in 1959 as GSO 3 (Intelligence) of the airportable HQ 24 Independent Infantry Brigade Group, its Intelligence Increment consisted of three Military Intelligence Officers and a Platoon officer, none of whom were Intelligence Corps, and four Intelligence Corps sergeants. Its 1 Intelligence Platoon was formed a year later but when Captain Chris Halsall arrived to command it, of its twelve NCOs, eleven had been lent to battalions as storemen and orderly room clerks. Trade training was also difficult to organize because operational and exercise commitments took priority. Although the Brigade had several Middle East Command Contingency Plans, the Brigade Commander saw no need for intelligence planning. One of its first operations was Kuwait in 1960. When the ruling al-Sabah dynasty handed its foreign affairs to Great Britain in 1899 and threatened Iraqi access to the Persian Gulf, Iraq rejected the treaty and declared in 1932 that Kuwait had been part of its territory for centuries. In July 1961, Iraq threatened to invade and the Brigade deployed to Mutla Ridge, several miles south of the border, where heat and lack of water took its toll. Three years later, Iraq recognized Kuwait. When Southwood was posted to HQ 2 Infantry Brigade in Plymouth, he found that, although 3 Intelligence Platoon was under strength, the Brigade Commander, who had commanded the SAS in Malaya, was using it appropriately.
The reduction in the size of the Army saw a fundamental shift in the employment of Intelligence Corps other ranks into two types of Class A tradesmen, supported by progressive promotion through three examinations over about a four year period. The intercept role of Wireless Intelligence reformed as Analyst, Special Intelligence (ANSI). Trained at Garats Hay and generally first posted to 9 and 13 Signal Regiments in Cyprus and West Germany respectively, NCOs returned for intensive training in Russian and other languages, such as Arabic. Some progressed to Interpreter courses at the Army Education Centre, Beaconsfield and Mulheim in West Germany.
The creation of Operator Intelligence and Security saw the Intelligence Corps taking dual responsibility for the provision of operational intelligence to commanders at all levels from the previous practice of All Arms intelligence clerks and the principles of FS, now known as Security. Indeed, FS sections were replaced by Security sections. Previously, intelligence clerks posted from any Arm or Service had assisted intelligence officers. Intelligence phase training included photographic interpretation, map marking, studying the tactical doctrines, equipment and uniforms of the Soviet Armed Forces and the British Army and the theories of counter-revolutionary warfare. The Intelligence Cycle remained a fundamental principle.
The jailing of eleven people between 1946 and 1962 for Official Secrets Act offences and a series of spy scandals exposed the depth of Soviet penetration into British society and the weaknesses of the security defences. On 14 November 1962, Prime Minister Harold Macmillan told the House of Commons,
I feel it right to warn the House that hostile intrigue and espionage are retentively maintained on a large scale.
Following the 1961 and 1962 Radcliffe Reports and the 1961 Romer Report into the breaches, the War Office formed Directorate of Military Security as the pinnacle of the General Staff security function found in all Army formations and represented at operational level by unit and branch security officers in all military and associated civilian organizations. Using the Second World War Defence Security curriculum as a format, the philosophy of Protective Security was developed to discover, assess and defeat or contain the overt and covert threats from espionage, sabotage and subversion from hostile intelligence services and domestic subversive organizations against the Army by continuous threat assessments and security planning. After 1969, terrorism became firmly entrenched in the bank of knowledge.
Since pure security is unlikely to be totally achieved, by applying the fundamental principles of sensible minimum standards, security awareness and defence in depth, the risk can be significantly reduced. All Army and civilian organizations were categorized according to threat assessments against the organization and were then subjected to rolling programmes of security surveys and inspections by Intelligence Corps Security sections on the basis of the greater the threat, the higher frequency of surveys and audits. Minimum standards were set out initially in Military Security Instructions, or MSIs, and Theatre Command security instructions and were supported by publications, such as Instructions for the Despatch and Carriage of Official Documents and Parcels (Army), and periodic amendments issued through Army Security Circulars, Policy Letters and Defence Council. In West Germany, this was BAOR Security Instructions or BSIs Instructions. Branch and unit security officers were expected to develop Security Standing Orders. MSIs were superseded by the Manual of Army Security in 1982. Classified documents were audited against classified document registers and controls of access into military installations and offices and the storage of vehicles, arms, ammunition, explosive and equipment tested. Surveys and inspections were supported by detailed reports listing observations and recommendations cross-referenced to Command security instructions and sent to Command Security Wings. Thereafter it was a General Staff (Security) decision to take action on recommendations. Dismissals of Heads of Branch and commanding officers for security failures were not unknown. Breaches of security, such as missing classified documents, damaged classified packages received in Forces Post Offices and weapon losses, were investigated. The Security sections also provided security architect liaison advice for new builds, rebuilds and refurbishments and were expected to possess detailed knowledge of the latest security technology. The Catalogue of Security provided the benchmark for security equipment, all of which had been tested to destruction against sabotage and theft.
Counter-intelligence remained a fundamental Corps skill with the booklet Their Trade is Treachery (Her Majesty’s Stationery Office) providing examples of the organizations of legal and illegal espionage networks and several illustrative case histories. Vetting, investigation interview skills and source handling figured in training. The persistent battle against hostile intelligence services led to claims that the Corps was on continuous active service.
When Lieutenant Colonel Ralph Dodds was posted to the BAOR in December 1963 as Commanding Officer Theatres Intelligence Unit, he was charged by Brigadier A.W. Vickers OBE DSO, the Inspector of Intelligence, to recommend a command and administrative structure capable of meeting the needs of the Army and the Intelligence Corps. After months of discussions, on 1 January 1965 Dodds launched an Intelligence and Security Group for a one year trial, followed by a Trials Report and Establishment Proposal written during the winter of 1965/66. When his recommendations were accepted by HQ BAOR on 1 September 1966, Dodds assembled a small headquarters at Rheindahlen that included an Adjutant and Regimental Sergeant Major and reformed the intelligence and security structures in West Germany into Intelligence and Security Group (Germany) thus:
Berlin
• 3 Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence Company.
Security Wing
• 4 Counter-Intelligence Company providing protective security and counter-intelligence to the rear areas and the reinforcement ports from its headquarters in Dusseldorf.
• 5 Counter-Intelligence Company supporting 1st (British) Corps from Hannover.
• HQ BAOR Security Section at Rheindahlen.
Intelligence Wing:
• 6 Photographic Intelligence Company.
• 7 Intelligence Company reformed from 8 Intelligence Platoon to provide HQ 1st (BR) Corps in Bielefeld and its divisions and brigades with Intelligence Sections in direct support.
• HQ BAOR Intelligence Section at Rheindahlen.
Importantly, the Intelligence Corps had regained direct control of its officers and other ranks with a regimental organization capable of managing their careers, training, welfare and aspirations.
Adapting to the new concepts, the United Kingdom Intelligence Unit (TA) was formed in April 1961, primarily to provide general intelligence and security support in the UK and BAOR. Its HQ was adopted by the Borough of Heston and Isleworth in October. First commanded by Lieutenant Colonel C.T. Carter, seven counter-intelligence companies replaced the Home Command Intelligence Platoons; 11 Counter-Intelligence Company was earmarked to reinforce West Germany. In 1963, 7 (Travel Control Security) Platoon amalgamated with 11 Counter-Intelligence Company to form 18 Counter-Intelligence Company on lines of communication security to West Germany. Fortunately, the marriage of the two disparate organizations wearing the same cap badge worked well and it regularly trained in West Germany. Travel Control Security remains firmly embedded as a Corps skill. Inheriting an impressive training centre in Hampstead bordering Maresfield Gardens that was once the residence of Sir Thomas Lipton, the tea magnate, 18 Company enjoyed financial independence as custodians of the Travel Control Officers Mess silver and healthy Sergeants Mess funds. In 1964 the first TA recruit trade training course was held at Maresfield.
For many, Cyprus remained an interesting posting of sun, sea and sport, however, the volatile politics of the island was a constant reminder of the Emergency. In November 1963, sectarian tensions and the undermining of the Treaty of Guarantee by Archbishop Makarios led to the Turkish-Cypriots believing that enosis was inevitable. By December, the Field Security Unit (Cyprus) had reformed as the Counter-Intelligence Company (Cyprus) and was commanded by Major K.M.L. Frazer. During the Christmas Day morning service, he had passed a message to Major General Peter Young, Commander, British Forces Cyprus, that sectarian tension was escalating. Young immediately advised the War Office and was instructed by the Cabinet to restore order with a Truce Force. Taking two battalions to Nicosia, he was accompanied by Major M.J.D. Perrett-Young, the Cyprus Base Intelligence Officer, the intelligence gap at HQ British Forces in Episkopi being filled by Major Parritt, who had been transferred from Libya. When an Intelligence Corps source reported that Greek tanks had landed in the Panhandle, it was rubbished by a cavalry colonel at a morning Intelligence briefing. Parritt remembers:
I went to JARIC and asked our representative if he could arrange a photo flight over the area. This he did and next day at the end of the briefing, I was able to add, as an afterthought, ‘Oh yes, these pictures were taken yesterday showing Greek tanks dispersed around the Panhandle’. One of those rare satisfying moments for an Int Briefer!
In January 1966, 6 (Parachute) Intelligence Platoon, commanded by Lieutenant Lance Redler, arrived with 16 Parachute Brigade. Brigade Headquarters, which included Captain Mike Liley, the GSO 3 (Intelligence). In March, the UN Security Council formed the United Nations Force in Cyprus, with troops largely from neutral countries but also including British. Attached to Information Policy at Force Headquarters was an Intelligence Corps SNCO. United Nations culture denied that intelligence was a peacekeeping asset but acknowledged the value of ‘Military Information’. Perret-Young was Mentioned in Despatches and wore the oak leaf on khaki cloth as British soldiers then serving with the United Nations Force were not permitted to wear the United Nations blue and white ribbon.
For the next eight years, as Cyprus lurched from crisis to crisis, the Counter-Intelligence Company supported the two Sovereign Base Areas while the Joint Intelligence Staff (Near East) assessed military and political intelligence in Cyprus and the Middle East in a period that saw the 1967 Six Day and 1973 Yom Kippur Wars and escalation in international terrorism. When Makarios flirted with the Eastern Bloc, the Counter-Intelligence Company faced the additional problem of espionage and subversion against British Forces, Cyprus, from several East European communist embassies, complete with intelligence officers protected by diplomatic protocols and armed with target lists that included talent-spotting British Service personnel with access, or potential access, to classified information. Particularly at risk was 9 Signal Regiment, which electronically watched the region
Although the Emergency was still in force, Malaya achieved independence in 1957 and, consequently, 355 FSS withdrew to concentrate on affecting British military interests and supporting the newly-formed Malayan Intelligence Corps. A year after Far East Land Forces was formed in 1959, the Emergency was formally terminated. In many respects, the counter-insurgency principles developed by Briggs and Templer had set the benchmark for several counter-revolutionary campaigns in which Britain became involved. Nevertheless, regional threats to British interests in South East Asia had not been resolved and the departure of the French from Indo-China (Vietnam) in 1954 had further destabilized the region. Chin Peng lingered in southern Thailand and the threat of Chinese communists threatening Laos saw 28 Commonwealth Brigade developing an intervention contingency plan. Major Norman Dunkley adopted the Intelligence and Security Platoon concept to form HQ Intelligence Corps (Far East Land Force) at Tanglin thus:
• 19 (17 Gurkha Division) Platoon at Seremban.
• 20 (63 Gurkha Infantry Brigade) Platoon at Kluang.
• 21 (99 Gurkha Infantry Brigade) Platoon in Singapore and covering Johore Bahru was accompanied by the Counter-Intelligence Unit, Singapore, formerly the Singapore FSS.
• 22 (28 Commonwealth Infantry Brigade) Platoon at Taiping Camp. The Brigade was part of the South East Asia Treaty Organisation.
• 23 Platoon in Hong Kong and the Counter-Intelligence Unit.
In 1962, further changes occurred when 63 Brigade was posted to England:
• 19 (17 Gurkha Division) Platoon at Seremban covered all Malaya except Malacca and Johore.
• 21 (99 Gurkha Infantry Brigade) Platoon in Singapore and covering the Johore Bahru and Malacca.
• 22 (28 Commonwealth Infantry Brigade) at Terendak Camp as part of South East Asia Treaty Organisation Task Force 3.
• 23 Platoon in Hong Kong.
An unexpected threat surfaced in December 1962 when Brunei nationalists seized the Seria oilfields and took expatriates hostage. A small force from 99 Gurkha Infantry and 3 Commando Brigades despatched by HQ Far East under Plan Ale to restore order crushed the rebellion within the week. Supporting the Gurkhas was Captain Van Gelder and four NCOs of 21 Intelligence and Security Platoon, including Corporal Peter Mobbs. Major General Walter Walker, who commanded the 17th Gurkha Infantry Division, was flying to Brunei to command operations when he scribbled down his vital elements, the first two being a ‘first class intelligence machine’ and ‘timely and accurate information’. A veteran of Burma and the Malayan Emergency, his belief that the rebellion was a prelude to Indonesian ambitions was not supported by existing intelligence, indeed the major threat to Borneo was assessed to be from the domestic Clandestine Communist Organisation.
In the first large-scale operation post 1945, the in-depth interrogation procedure concentrated on the 2,000 prisoners held in three interrogation centres. When in early January 1963, Captain Alan Edwards arrived to run the Muara Lodge interrogation centre for important rebels, he stayed with the Head of Special Branch, Assistant Commissioner David St J. Forrer, a former Intelligence Corps National Serviceman. Instructed to ensure that the prisoners were not ill-treated, Edwards, nevertheless, had some difficulty persuading a military medical officer to visit the centre weekly. Staff Sergeant John Tucker, from 19 (Headquarters 17 Gurkha Infantry Division) Intelligence and Security Platoon, helped collate reports at Headquarters Special Branch. Intelligence coups from in-depth interrogation included information on the complete rebel order of battle and confirmation of Indonesian support for the insurrection. The only other Corps in the area was Major Peter Cox, a photographic interpreter and Japanese linguist; however, he was the Garrison Administrative Officer on Labuan providing base support for Operation Ale.
After achieving independence in 1950, President Sukarno of Indonesia promoted a greater Indonesia to include the Philippines and Malaya, a concept that was rejected by Malaya, which preferred federation with Sarawak, North Borneo (later Sabah) and the Sultanate of Brunei. On 20 January 1963, Walker’s view proved correct when the Indonesian Foreign Minister broadcast a policy of konfrontasi (confrontation) opposing the federation. The lack of Indonesian military activity forced Walker to return his men to Malaya; nevertheless, he insisted that 17 Division be the regional strategic reserve as opposed to the War Office preference of despatching the United Kingdom Strategic Reserve. Then, on Good Friday, irregular Indonesian Border Troops attacked Tebedu Police Station in Sarawak. Immediately, 3 Commando Brigade reinforced 99 Gurkha Infantry Brigade and took with it a composite Intelligence Platoon assembled in Singapore and Malaya under command of Captain Edwards. The Brigade had been supported by an FS section in Burma. By May 1963 the cinders of the Brunei Revolt had been quashed but at the expense of a Military Intelligence Officer killed in the final days during the pursuit of the leadership.
With jungle covering Brunei, North Borneo and the five administrative Divisions of Sarawak, the Special Air Service (SAS) laid a tripwire along parts of the mountainous border. Their application of ‘hearts and minds’ by providing security, medical support and, in one instance, the rigging of an alcohol still, proved crucial. The indigenous Border Scouts provided Home Guards for the scattered longhouses. A longhouse was essentially a community living in a single building. The rivers were the roads. As the threat of Indonesian incursions supported by Chinese communists increased in a campaign that became known as Confrontation, Major General Walker was appointed Director of Operations, Borneo. To cover the incursions, he deployed his Brigades into sectors, each supported by their Intelligence Platoons.
In 1959, an important change in intelligence collection had occurred when Field Intelligence Officer posts in the Aden Protectorate were transferred from the RAF to the Army. Under circumstances that were similar to the deployment of PAI Force FS detachments along the railway to the Soviet Union, the Field Intelligence Officers were principally Intelligence Corps NCOs. They initially deployed in First and Second Divisions in West Sarawak and reported to all Arms Military Intelligence Officers accredited to Special Branch and independent of local commanders. The system is more accurately known as Field Intelligence NCOs or FINCOs. Since the Corps was understrength as National Service came to an end, Royal Army Service Corps and Royal Army Ordnance Corps SNCOs filled several slots. Expected to combine enterprise with military skills and yet live in the community, as opposed to the camps, their role was to collect information on external and internal military and political intelligence and subversive threats to British Borneo.
Corporal Mobbs arrived in September 1963, a month after he had returned to Malaya with 22 Intelligence and Security Platoon. The senior Military Intelligence Officer was Major Kevin Rooney (17/21st Lancers). Lodged in a Government bungalow in Serian and supported by an Auxiliary Police Sergeant interpreter, he wore civilian clothes, was armed with a 9mm Browning pistol and often travelled by bicycle. Uniform was worn and a Sterling sub-machine gun carried only when visiting longhouses on ‘hearts and minds’ visits. Helicopters eased travel but when the monsoon grounded aircraft it usually meant a wet walk along slippery tracks or a ride in a rickety bus, always at the risk of ambush. Mobbs recalls:
We never really worried about the danger aspect in our travels around border longhouses and considered the biggest risk to be the food and unhygienic conditions. On arrival, usually late afternoon, one would enter the communal part and call on the family (private room behind the communal area) with whom you would stay. In 1st Division, some longhouses had bachelor huts where we would sleep. Next, you would make your way down to the river, followed by a crowd of children and have a wash. After dark, you would have a meal in the family room and then join everyone else outside in the communal area for discussions, talks, drinks (tuak) and sometimes entertainment. Eventually we would say that we were tired, otherwise everyone would sit up all night talking, and retire with the family. We picked certain families that we knew had spare mattresses like a duvet and we would sleep on these, sometimes under a mosquito net. The next morning you would eat the leftovers from the previous meal along with tea made with condensed milk before moving on to another longhouse or returning to base.
Staff Sergeant Thompson, a Simanggang FINCO, had served in a cavalry regiment before and during the war and had been a teacher and sheep farmer in Patagonia before re-enlisting into the Corps. Mobbs recalls one legendary visit:
Ralph Thompson was a great story teller and the Iban put great store in tale telling. He may be remembered to this day in some longhouses for teaching them to dance the Hokey Cokey. Seeing a mass of people of all ages, many the worse for drink, shouting out the words and jumping up and down on the bouncing bamboo floor was an unforgettable sight.
When the Federation of Malaysia was declared on 16 September 1963 and a mob attacked the British Embassy in Jakarta, in an act of defiance that is part of British military folklore, Major Roderick ‘Rory’ Walker, the Military Attaché and a member of the Corps, ignored missiles and pleas from the police to desist, inflated his bagpipes and blew. Commissioned into the Sherwood Foresters, and awarded the Military Cross while serving with the SAS in the Middle East, he had transferred in 1960.
As the Indonesian threat increased, British force levels rose so that by early January 1964, four Brigade tactical areas of operations emerged, with the UK Strategic Reserve and Australians and New Zealanders from 28 Commonwealth Brigade supporting the Malaysian brigades, usually on six month rotations. For the first time, the Intelligence Corps was applying the Intelligence Cycle in an operational environment. Photographic Interpreters and Royal Engineer draughtsman in the Intelligence Platoons and Joint Air Reconnaissance Centre (Far East) in Singapore produced maps from imagery and patrol information and Signals Intelligence assets in Singapore and Hong Kong plotted Indonesian positions. Predicting Indonesian incursions was not easy but once in Sarawak, the Intelligence collected meant they could hardly move without someone reporting it, a factor that led to Indonesian officers believing their incursions were being tracked by special radar equipment.
The trouncing of a raid at Kalabakan by 1/10 Gurkha Rifles in December 1963 saw a strategic shift when Major General Walker, in one of the best kept secrets of modern warfare, gained political permission to retaliate in Operation Claret. His aim was to force Indonesian commanders onto the defensive by using infantry companies to raid Indonesian bases, initially up to 5,000 yards south of the border, in the knowledge that Sukarno could not complain without being reminded that in August 1964, small Indonesian parachute and amphibious forces had landed in West Malaysia. Walker stipulated ‘The Golden Rules’ that were mandatory for all patrols crossing the border, including that all evidence of a British presence was to be brought back, including the dead and empty tins of ‘compo’ rations. The ‘need to know’ principle was strictly applied to preserve operational security and journalists were fed disinformation about casualties. Intelligence was critical. Captain Nigel Flower an infantry officer and Staff Sergeant Tucker formed a Forward Interrogation Team at Jesselton Police Station and developed the concept of deploying mobile interrogators, including by helicopter, to units holding prisoners. By mid-1965 it had increased to two officers and six other ranks, commanded by Captain Tony Crawford, later a Director. By the end of Confrontation, more than 200 prisoners had experienced detailed interrogation, including an Army Headquarters signaller and a Marine Corps battalion commander and four others rescued by 42 Commando in February 1965 when their boat capsized near Sebatik Island on the border with Sabah. Corporal Tom Wall had little success extracting the location of an Indonesian base until he decided to teach the prisoner how to read air photographs. He pinpointed his base, which was then attacked by the Gurkhas.
In 1964 HQ Intelligence Corps (Far East Land Forces) formed 2 Intelligence Company to administer the Field Intelligence Officers. Corporal Mobbs, on his second tour, took over Batu Lintang, the site of the Japanese prison camp, from another corporal and joined the trend of troops collecting wild animals by obtaining a hornbill. Since the town was the trading focus of eight Indonesian longhouses, Mobbs and the corporal set up the ‘Field Immigration Office’ and instructed that traders must register with them, during which they were debriefed on military activity south of the border on the basis of ‘No talk – no trade’. A conscripted Indonesian art teacher captured by the Gurkhas lived with them and spent several months sketching Indonesian uniforms and badges. A female singer, who had one brother who was the Pontianak Police Chief and another who was an Army commander opposite Batu Lintang, was strongly suspected of supplying information to the Indonesians. Mobbs supplied her with a Box Brownie camera that he bought in the market to take photos when she crossed the border and convinced her to arrange a meeting with her Army brother. His suspicions about her were confirmed in mid-June 1964 when a 2/2nd Gurkha patrol, searching thirteen Indonesians ambushed near Empedi longhouse, found a sketch of Batu Lintang and mention of ‘three tanks’ (in fact Saracen Armoured Personnel Carriers) drawn by the singer. Several new Instamatic cameras sent from Singapore were rejected by most Field Intelligence Officers because they were unobtainable in the markets.
In spite of the importance of ‘hearts and minds’ was crucial; however, the demeanour of some Malaysian soldiers was counter-productive. When a battalion in Batu Lintang relocated several border longhouses, Mobbs mediated with an angry delegation claiming that the soldiers had stolen blowpipes, knives and baskets. In another incident, a corporal arranged for a helicopter to fly a woman with labour complications from a longhouse to Simanggang Hospital; however, mother and baby died. The corporal knew her longhouse would not believe both were dead until they returned home but when the RAF were unable to help, Mobbs and the corporal helped pay for a boat and decided, in future, to let nature take its course.
Corporal David Kitching arrived as Field Intelligence Officer Sarikei in December 1964 and, while investigating local Chinese communists, photographed documents discreetly removed from the subversive Sarawak Advanced Youth Organisation offices. When a trusted trader mentioned the People’s National Commando of Sarawak, Kitching debriefed four members persuaded to cross the border and then met their leader, who confirmed that while their philosophy was to subvert Dayaks, most of his members were Catholic and unarmed. When President Sukarno’s promise to crush Malaysia by the time the cock crowed on 1 January 1965 looked decidedly precarious, attacks on 2 Parachute Battalion at Plaman Mapu and the 18th Milestone Police Station in mid-1965 led to Operation Claret patrols penetrating up to 10,000 yards in a period usually known as the Battle of the Rivers. One operation penetrated to 20,000 yards. In September, the Indonesian Army reacted to an attempted Indonesian Communist Party coup d’etat by overthrowing Sukarno. As hostilities de-escalated, Kitching received several letters from the paramilitary police 203 Battalion, Mobile Brigade company commander, who had recently been deployed to Aruk. But when there was a major incident, Kitching responded with a sharp letter and a bullet-ridden Indonesian army jacket, warning that any incursions would be dealt with firmly. Eventually, he met several officers in a jungle clearing astride the border and struck up a profitable relationship with an inspector and his sergeant. The last act of Confrontation was the capture of Lieutenant Sumbi in Brunei in September 1966 after he had been tracked for a month through jungle sodden by monsoon rains.
Confrontation was the first campaign to involve the restructured Intelligence Corps and, while markedly successful, HQ 17th Gurkha Infantry Division commented in its 1969 report ‘Lessons Learned from Borneo Operations’ that:
There was no Counter-Intelligence presence at Force level and the CI element of the Brigade Intelligence Platoons was rarely used. This led to unsatisfactory standards of security, both physical and personal. An Int (b) officer at HQ DOBOPS could have improved the situation considerably both by training and educating officers in their security responsibilities and in the control and tasking of the CI elements of the Brigade Intelligence Platoons.
An example of a breach of the Golden Rules occurred before 42 Commando attacked Sedjingen in April 1966. A model, as expected by the Golden Rules, was built in the Commando base at Biawak but it was sometimes uncovered before local employees had left during the afternoon. Although there is no evidence to suggest the Indonesians anticipated the attack, the Commando fought a tough battle but lost a corporal posted ‘believed killed’. His body was found twenty-five years later by the British Defence Attaché in Jakarta several miles from the border. After the battle, Corporal Kitching was tasked to discover the extent of enemy casualties and undermined Indonesian claims of a ‘few’ when he met a boatman press-ganged to crew several longboats, who said that each of the twelve body bags being shipped to a cemetery contained two dead soldiers.
Of the Field Intelligence Officer concept, the report commented:
The FINCO (FIO) organisation was a great success and the NCOs themselves displayed great initiative and efficiency. They showed themselves capable of accepting responsibilities far in excess of those normally given to comparatively junior NCOs. This demonstrated the care which must be taken in the selection of men for these tasks.
In many respects, Confrontation contributed to changes in the culture of the Corps, in particular, proof that it could provide operational intelligence. The Field Intelligence NCO concept was sufficiently successful to be resurrected in Northern Ireland, Hong Kong and Belize.
Midway through Confrontation, in 1964 Prime Minister Harold Wilson’s new Labour Government Defence White Paper concluded that the Armed Forces were overstretched, inappropriately equipped and in some situations in which political necessity did not match military capability. While instability in Africa, such as the Rhodesian Unilateral Declaration of Independence, and communist subversion in South East Asia was of concern, the principal threat to the United Kingdom was nuclear and the Group of Soviet Forces, Germany and, therefore, the Priority One task must be to support NATO. One saving saw the three Service ministries merge into the Ministry of Defence and the associated establishments of the Defence Intelligence Staff and overseas subsidiaries.
With the ending of Confrontation, in 1967 Lieutenant Colonel Goss formed Intelligence and Security Group (Far East Land Forces) of:
• Singapore: 2 (Intelligence) and 8 Security Companies.
• Malaysia: 9 Intelligence and Security Company.
• Hong Kong: 10 Intelligence and Security Company supporting HQ British Forces, Hong Kong and 48 and 51 Gurkha Infantry Brigades.
In addition, 8 Company provided support to the Defence Intelligence Staff (Far East), which reported to the Joint Intelligence Committee (Far East). Since much of the strategic attention focused on Vietnam, Australian Intelligence Corps provided desk officers. The Australians generally had a good Vietnam war but were often let down by their allies. For example, a NCO working with the 1 Royal Australian Regiment found a large file in a leather satchel that listed the entire Viet Cong order of battle and infrastructure in South Vietnam. However, it went missing after it was sent back to a US HQ, probably intercepted by South Vietnamese officers who were integrated into the US HQ as interpreters and for document translation. Several SNCOs on Y4 Assistant Defence Attaché appointments in British Embassies witnessed the 1968 Tet Offensive and fall of Saigon in 1975 and the clearing of Phnom Penh by the Khmer Rouge.
Several Corps who visited US and Commonwealth forces in South Vietnam included Major Anthony Bedford-Russell, an entomologist, then serving as the Assistant Military Attaché in Saigon. An Australian brigadier later commented, ‘A British major was here three weeks ago exhibiting sang froid by going on patrol with a butterfly net’. From 1961 to 1970, the Intelligence Corps provided three-week counter-intelligence and operational intelligence courses for South-East Asian officers, including South Vietnamese, as part of the Foreign Office Services Training Assistance Programme. Some foreign NCO delegates were promoted to ‘Third Lieutenant’ to avoid Mess complications. When the South Vietnamese requested more courses, the length was reduced to two weeks. Each course was assisted by two interpreters. Some Intelligence Corps attended Vietnamese language courses in Australia. The Vietnamese delegates often spent their pay by buying luxury items, to the extent that Major Keith Wilkes, the last Group second in command, gave up restricting them to their authorised 40lb flight allowance. Ten-course Chinese dinners were part of the social programme. After years of negotiation, Lieutenant Colonel Brian Parritt, the last Group Commanding Officer, visited South Vietnam and, while impressed with the quality of US imagery, topographical study and electronic collation, he found interrogation techniques to be ‘robust’. He noted two interesting concepts. Divisional J2 (Intelligence) had authority to deploy a reconnaissance platoon to investigate an intelligence lead and the South Vietnamese ‘Intelligence Corps’ was a combat organization tasked to collect facts. As Far East Land Forces was preparing to leave Singapore and Malaysia in 1970, the South Vietnamese Army J2 Assistant Chief of Staff visited Singapore and took part in a ceremony that ended an interesting episode of Intelligence Corps history. The final link with South Vietnam was the transfer of Corporal Robin ‘Roo’ Rencher, who had fought in the iconic battle of Long Tan with 6 Royal Australian Regiment in 1966 from the Australian Intelligence Corps.
The disbandment of the Intelligence and Security Group (Far East Land Forces) saw several Intelligence Corps posted to the Intelligence and Security Unit, 28 (Australian, New Zealand and UK) Brigade (ANZUK). Among those made redundant was Mr Foo Yit Kim, who had worked with 1 FSS in 1946 and had been employed in the Pass Issue Office from 1953 until 1970.
Blistered onto the border with China was the Colony of Hong Kong, entrusted to the British in agreement with China after two previous treaties which saw Hong Kong Island and Kowloon ceded in perpetuity and control of the New Territories governed by a 99-year lease, as agreed by 1898 Convention for the Extension of Hong Kong Territory. The nature of the lease did not hinder the development of the Colony as an important commercial and financial centre in the Far East. The People’s Liberation Army lurked across the border and only posed a threat during periods of tension, for instance during the Korean War. China abided by the treaty. Subversion and espionage were the main threats.
In 1966, 10 Intelligence and Security Company, which was based in the former Second World War prison camp in Argyle Camp, was stretched by serious disturbances inspired by the Maoist Red Guard coup in China, to the extent that when the People’s Liberation Army closed up to the border, Corps Day celebrations were abandoned.
Otherwise, the Company supported HQ British Forces, Hong Kong with ‘hearts and minds’ projects that included a community relations programme of building a school playground on Chep Lak Kok, a small island off Lantau Island; organizing Duke of Edinburgh Award training for Tak Oi Secondary School, which usually culminated in a hike in the New Territories; and Rural Area patrols in remote parts of the Colony.
British links with Aden dated from 1838 when it was ceded by a South Arabian sultan as the first colony of Queen Victoria’s reign. It became an important coaling station between India, the Far East and Australasia. For administrative purposes, it later was divided into the Western Protectorate and the Eastern Protectorate. When, after Suez, Egyptian-inspired, anti-British subversion from North Yemen led to incursions, in 1959, the threatened rulers in the Protectorate signed the accord that formed the Federation of Arab Emirates. It was joined by nine others in January 1963 to form the Federation of South Arabia. The mostly eastern states did not join and became the Protectorate of South Arabia.
In June 1963, Corporal George Jubb, who had been transferred from Bahrain, was part of a Middle East Command adventure training expedition that veered off course near the border and lost four soldiers killed, two wounded and twenty-one captured in an ambush. Twenty-seven, including Jubb, reached the National Guard fort at Tor el Baha. While diplomacy saw the prisoners released, the attack emboldened the fiercely-independent Radfan sultans astride the Dhala Road to dominate the trade and pilgrim route to Mecca. Eruptions of Arab nationalism in Aden saw a State of Emergency being declared in December by the new Federation of Arab Emirates, however, its Federal Regular Army had little impact in restoring order in the Radfan and in April 1964 it appealed for British military support.
HQ 39 Infantry Brigade arrived from Tidworth but since its Intelligence Platoon had just been disbanded, it was loaned 15 (5 Infantry Brigade) Intelligence and Security Platoon. then based in Iserlohn in West Germany. Based at Thumeir and under canvas for the next six months near a fort, the Platoon had five broad tasks:
• Intelligence – study enemy activity based on patrol reports, air reconnaisance and observations post operations.
• Brief and debrief battalion and company operations.
• Technical Intelligence – evaluate captured weapons.
• Security – Provide advice to Thumeir Base.
• Psychological operations – maintain contact with the local population.
When the Territorial Army Emergency Reserve was mobilized in April 1965 for six month tours, included in the ‘Ever Readies’ were several Intelligence Corps from Intelligence and Security Group (TA).
In October, 24 Infantry Brigade, with its 1 Intelligence and Security Platoon, rotated with 39 Brigade. The Brigade Commander, Brigadier Richard Bremner, later became Inspector, Intelligence Corps.
The Aden Emergency was declared in December 1963. The 1964 Defence White Paper declaration that Great Britain intended to retain Aden led to the Egyptian-backed National Liberation Front (NLF) and the Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen (FLOSY) conducting a terrorist campaign intent on driving the British from Aden. The thirty-six incidents in 1964 increased massively to 2,908 incidents in 1967, with grenades being the preferred weapon. By 1965, the Aden Special Branch had been crippled by assassination. An extract from the 1965 The Rose and The Laurel gives some flavour:
We remember the night Ma’ala main road was lit up, literally, by Sergeant Birrell’s car colliding with a Bazooka rocket. Another rocket narrowly missed Staff Webster’s flat and, on another occasion, two grenades landed in Lance Corporal Crawley’s beer whilst he was on a liaison visit to the Seaman’s Mission.
The Intelligence Corps contributed to the Aden Intelligence Centre, supported 24, 39 and Aden Brigades with Intelligence and Security platoons supported 24, 39 and the Aden Brigades and contributed to operations in the Radfan Mountains. Several Corps subalterns underwent their infantry attachments with Army and Royal Marines units in Aden. One was Mentioned in Despatches.
A major and warrant officer from the Joint Service Interrogation Wing sent to the Fort Morbut Interrogation Centre in 1964 again proved that interrogation was vital, even though the skill was scrutinized by Amnesty International, an organization founded by a former Intelligence Corps officer. Several Intelligence and Security Group ‘Ever Readies’ supported Fort Morbut on six month emergency tours. When the Prendergast Report led to a centralized intelligence strategy and the B (Counter-Terrorist) Group being formed in 1966, Intelligence Corps NCOs supported Special Branch Operations officers by analysing information from Brigade operational logs. Human Intelligence and Fort Morbut reports led to weapons and explosive finds and arrests in the districts of Crater, Sheik Othman and Ma’alla to the extent that the NLF was forced to re-organize. Throughout the Emergency, the terrorists tried to undermine Service morale by attacking families, a trend that began in Cyprus and continued in Northern Ireland. On 28 February 1967, a Foreign Office official and his wife invited several civilian and military security officers to supper, unaware that the NLF had kidnapped the mother of their houseboy and threatened to kill her unless he planted a bomb in their flat. At 9.00pm, it exploded in the dining room killing two people, including Mrs Ruth Wilkes, the wife of Major Keith Wilkes, who commanded the Counter-Intelligence Company. Radio Sana’s broadcasting from North Yemen had dubbed the Company the ‘Vipers of Villiers Street’. Although its members were placed near the top of assassination lists, its Cloak and Dagger Club was popular. In July, the Counter-Intelligence Company moved from Waterloo Lines.
During the final phases of the British withdrawal, the 3 Commando Brigade Intelligence Section on board the commando-carrier HMS Bulwark was supported by two JNCOs and then at midday on 29 November, two Intelligence Corps boarding a C-130 Hercules at RAF Khormaksar bound for Bahrain were among the last British troops to leave Aden.
The 1966 Defence White Paper was harsh and saw not only several regiments either disband or amalgamate, but also the rationalization of several Corps, notably the Royal Corps of Transport. It also led to the first of several attempted takeovers of the Intelligence Corps when the War Office proposed merging it with the Royal Military Police – on the grounds that eliminating at least one specialist Corps would soften the cuts. Although history linked the two Corps, the evolution of the Corps since 1940 enabled Brigadier Bulkeley, the Inspector of Intelligence, to convince the War Office Intelligence community that significant subversive and military threats to British interests remained and that in the event of a general war, assembling the Intelligence Corps in 1914 and 1939 had both initially proven counterproductive.
The acceptance of the Intelligence Corps as a body into the peacetime Army saw HQ Intelligence, the Depot and School of Military Intelligence vacate Maresfield in January 1966 and move to the new, compact, centrally-heated Templer Barracks on the outskirts of the Kentish market town of Ashford. The barracks were so named to acknowledge the immense contribution made by Gerald Templer, now a Field Marshal, to British military intelligence and the Intelligence Corps, in particular. To commemorate its eighteen years in Maresfield, the Corps presented the Parish Church with an oak bookcase inscribed with its crest and scroll in a small ceremony on 16 September 1965. Accessible from the A20 and backing onto Rowcroft Barracks, a focal point was Repton Manor and its tithe barn, both overlooked by an imposing oak tree. The Manor had been the family home of the Kentish landowner, Sir John Fogge (c1417-1490), who was described by the official biographer of Members of Parliament as ‘a great soldier, a good comrade and a powerful official’. He had survived the Wars of the Roses by allying himself to the winning side as the throne passed between the Houses of Lancaster, York and Tudor.
The period after the Defence White Paper was particularly difficult for the Intelligence Unit (United Kingdom) (TA) because the Ministry of Defence proposed to retain a small Army Reserve and there were anxieties it would be disbanded. When the news broke that that the Unit would survive, 14 Counter-Intelligence (East Command) Company joined 18 Counter-Intelligence Company at Hampstead in November 1966, in their third deployment in six years. On 1 April 1967, Lieutenant Colonel John Wilson formed the Intelligence and Security (Volunteers) and centralized several small Intelligence Corps units at the desirable Artillery House, Handel Street, London with an establishment of 161 officers and 342 other ranks divided into:
• 20 Security Company based Fitzjohns Avenue with detachments in London, Birmingham and Edinburgh.
• 21 Photographic Interpretation Company.
• 22 Interrogation Company at Handel Street.
• 10 Port Security Platoon at Belfast.
In spite of assurances, morale dipped, nevertheless, Wilson rejected suggestions that his plans for the Annual Camp were too ambitious and instructed the Group for its Annual Camp at St Martin’s Plain, Folkestone. He then launched Exercise Mixed Bag and dispersed the Group in mixed detachments across southern England to complete several tasks. Old loyalties and traditions were replaced by a new culture, culminating on 16 June in the ‘Fly Past’ at Templer Barracks. Wilson again ignored the recipe for collisions, chaos and breakdowns and watched as thirty-five Land Rovers and trailers lined on the parade square, without incident. Wilson’s faith was well founded and, with Brigadier Bulkeley taking the salute, Ex Mixed Bag became a part of Intelligence and Security Group (Volunteers) folklore.
The period after 1968 saw interesting blends of Regular and Territorial Army officers and other ranks emerge and as the surviving First 100 moved into senior positions, a trickle of officers from Sandhurst complemented transfers and the historically important commissioned other ranks continuing to provide experience and knowledge at middle management level. A steady flow of transferees representing a wide spectrum of the Army, some with active service experience, balanced direct entrants and Intelligence Corps trained by the All Arms Junior Leaders Regiment until about 1969, and then with the Royal Army Ordnance Corps Apprentices College, Deepcut from 1970 to 1977. Education and military training, interspersed with battle camps, sport and adventure training, dominated the junior leaders curriculum. Intelligence Corps also completed a Staff Clerk course at Blackdown. Connections to the Corps were limited to a visit to Ashford and the final Pass Out parade to receive their Green Lanyards. Other ranks continued to leave the Depot as lance corporals. Several squads have since been made entirely of transferees for trade training. In 1975 the blend of experience was enriched when the Women’s Royal Army Corps were permitted to join the Corps in an operational capacity, as opposed to administrative. Women supporting the Corps had a long history stretching back to 1914 and were proud to wear the Corps badge.
On 1 April, Lieutenant Colonel Peter Madsen, who had fought with the Danish Resistance, formed Intelligence and Security Group (United Kingdom) to support the Army Strategic Reserve formed from 3rd Division by providing Operational Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence detachments for Divisional Headquarters and 5, 19 and 24 Infantry Brigades. The Detachments were supported by a Royal Army Ordnance photographer and a Royal Engineer draughtsman. An Intelligence Section supporting the Allied Mobile Force (Land) tasked to bolster NATO’s northern and southern flanks regularly exercised in Norway and Southern Europe. However, 89 (Parachute) Intelligence Section was not included in the re-organisation. When 3 Commando Brigade returned from the Far East, its Intelligence Corps Section reverted to Royal Marines. During the year, two NCOs from Intelligence and Security Group (Far East Land Forces) joined a 1 Kings Shropshire Light Infantry group sent to intervene in sectarian disturbances in Mauritius.
But the Corps, numbering 202 officers and 771 other ranks, was subjected to another takeover bid, this time by the Royal Signals, but this was quickly sunk by Brigadier David Williams, Brigadier, General Staff at the Ministry of Defence Intelligence Staff Committee, who announced that both Corps were mutually supportive, with the Royal Signals intercepting and tracking enemy transmissions and the Intelligence Corps analyzing information. The latter also had a historical, core skill that did not exist in the Royal Signals – Security and counter-intelligence. The survival of the Corps now assured for the foreseeable future, the principal of ‘Joint Service saw Armed Forces intelligence and security training centralized at Templer Barracks in 1969. The School of Military Intelligence was reformed into the Instructional Wing, Intelligence Centre until, in 1971, it was renamed the School of Service Intelligence. Commanded by an Intelligence Corps lieutenant colonel, instructors were drawn from the three Services and included an Australian Intelligence Corps exchange officer, usually with experience of Vietnam, and from 1973, a US officer. The School soon developed an enviable reputation for its expertise. Among delegates in June 1974 was His Royal Highness Lieutenant the Prince Charles RN attending an intelligence course. The Joint Services Interrogation Wing and its training compound, that doubled as a wartime Combined Services Detailed Interrogation Centre, was briefly part of the School. Supported by 22 Intelligence Company (V), HMS Ferret (Royal Navy Reserve) and 7640 Flight (RAF Volunteer Reserve), it ran interrogation courses for selected Intelligence Corps officers and SNCOs and All Arms Tactical Questioning and Prisoner Handling and Resistance to Interrogation courses and, later, contributed to interview training at the Special Intelligence Wing at Repton Manor. Its regular exercise schedule included exercising prone to capture troops, Special Forces selection and All Arms Combat Survival, RAF aircrew escape and evasion at RAF Mountbatten and near Munich in the winter, and the NATO Long Range Patrol School. Deviation from adhering to Section 17 of the Third Geneva Conventions of giving regimental number, surname, first names and date of birth usually meant failure. It also ran courses for the US Armed Forces in the US and for the Royal Hong Kong Police. But always, hovering in the background, was the controversy that interrogation had attracted since the events at Bad Nenndorf in 1946/47.
A silver Celtic Cross unveiled as an Officer’s Mess table piece in December 2007 commemorates the contribution made by the Intelligence Corps to Operation Banner in Northern Ireland, however sensitivities about some activities during the thirty-seven years of The Troubles means that its story can only be summarized, however it did dominate the evolution of the Corps.
The first connection between the Intelligence Corps and the Republican movement appears to have been in 1941 when Captain George Devenish and two Field Security NCOs tasked to intercept the mail of Mr Cahir Healy, a Sinn Fein MP, found several letters suggesting contact with the Germans. Healy was interned in July and Devenish was quickly moved to England as a prison camp commandant. Healy later became a Westminster MP.
Two FS sections spent most of the Second World War in Northern Ireland. Formed in Sheerness, 43 FSS was on its way to Cherbourg when the French capitulated. Returning to England, it worked with the Corps of Military Police in several London railway stations before joining VI Corps in Omagh in June 1943. Working with the Royal Ulster Constabulary during a period after the IRA had conducted a bombing campaign in England, its duties were border surveillance, which included investigating a report of a U-Boat being refuelled in a Donegal inlet and investigating a walking stick containing a roll of film. It also gave security awareness talks to audiences ranging from Women’s Institutes to 2,000 US servicemen. Shortly before D-Day, the Section returned to England for pre-D-Day preparations at Kennington area near Ashford. The other Section, 48 (HQ Northern Ireland District) FSS was mainly tasked in Port Security, however it was also involved in the capture of a German agent parachuted into the country, seemingly in connection with Plan Kathleen to invade Ireland and threaten Great Britain’s back door and its transatlantic lines of communications. In 1955, it went to Libya where it remained for three years.
For decades Roman Catholics in Ulster had faced discrimination from the Protestant majority but then, in 1968, as violent left-wing protests spread across Europe, Irish radicals formed the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association. When it was joined by the Campaign for Social Justice in a march in Dungannon, the Association developed into a populist movement, but the Northern Ireland Government at Stormont assessed it to be a republican and communist front. The loyalist Ulster Volunteer Force, which had been formed in 1912, resurfaced with bombings in early to mid-1969 and then on 14 August, the Apprentice Boys paraded provocatively close to the Catholic Bogside estate in Londonderry. The overstretched Royal Ulster Constabulary was unable to prevent the disorder that escalated into Catholic families being forced from their homes. Comments by the Irish Prime Minister Jack Lynch that Dublin could ‘no longer stand by’ was interpreted as military intervention and when Stormont asked London to provide military assistance to the civil authorities, Prime Minister Harold Wilson prophetically said to his Cabinet, ‘If we go in, it will take years to get out’. Nevertheless, at 4.30pm on 14 August, the Ministry of Defence was instructed to reinforce Northern Ireland District in the deployment known as Operation Banner. This decision is generally regarded as the beginning of the thirty-seven year ‘Troubles’.
Before the deployment, the Intelligence Corps presence was confined to an officer and seven other ranks of the Counter-Intelligence Detachment (Northern Ireland) and two other ranks with HQ 39 Infantry Brigade based in Thiepval Barracks, Lisburn. Driving to Dundalk for Sunday lunch was not unknown.
Within hours of Wilson’s decision, the Spearhead Battalion, 3 Light Infantry, deployed. HQ 24 Airportable Brigade, and its 1 Intelligence and Security Section, were recalled from exercise in France and flown from Plymouth to RAF Ballykelly ready to cover Londonderry, Fermanagh and Armagh. But intelligence, mostly supplied by the Royal Ulster Constabulary, was not always credible, some of it dating to 1939/40 bombings in England and Flying Columns raids during the 1956/62 Border War. The Army quickly restored order and, although impartial, Catholics generally viewed their presence with some relief. But those with republican beliefs saw the Army as occupiers.