Over-qualification of judgments is not helpful to commanders and should be avoided
Paul Crick
Throughout the 1990s, as Iraq was accused of developing Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), Coalition air forces maintained pressure on the country. The 9/11 attacks then saw President George Bush (junior) launch the global War on Terror against regimes and organizations identified as associated with international terrorism. Top of the target list was Osama bin Laden.
Forming the Islamist Al-Qaeda in 1988, he squeezed influential Saudis to finance the Mujahideen fighting the Marxist Afghan government that had seized power after the Soviet Army had withdrawn in 1989. The rejection by Saudi Arabia of his offer to help eject the Iraqis from Kuwait in 1990 and then Saudi Arabia permitting Western forces to enter the country led to him claiming that the ‘infidel’ presence insulted the sacred mosques of Mecca and Medina. Banished to Sudan, his vow to attack the US and its allies saw him expelled and move to Afghanistan, a country that had largely resisted invasion since Alexander the Great and was now governed by the Taliban, which had overthrown the government in 1993. The Taliban is a fundamentalist politico-religious Islamic organization that emerged in the early 1990s in religious schools for Afghan refugees in Pakistan and was introducing its fundamentalist brand to Afghanistan. By 1996, US intelligence believed that bin Laden was sheltering with the Taliban.
With a new international focus, Secretary of State for Defence Geoff Hoon introduced a New Chapter to the Strategic Defence Review that acknowledged the need for intelligence:
We need to look further into how we should allocate the investment which is needed, including, for example, to intelligence gathering, network-centric capability, including enhanced strike and Special Forces capabilities and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, improved mobility and fire power for more rapidly deployable lighter forces, temporary deployed accommodation for troops, and night operations.
For the Intelligence Corps, it was a significant statement that would stabilise its future during a period when it was evaluating its history and culture in greater depth than seen before. Faced with Mr Hoon’s challenge and with the Peace Dividend overtaken by the uncertainties of insurgency and international terrorism tinged with religious fanaticism, Brigadier Peter Everson, who had taken over as Director in 2001, laid out his strategy of:
A Corps that is commanded, trained, structured and resourced appropriately to deliver MI capability to meet current and future Defence tasks.
Military operations in Afghanistan began a month after 9/11 in the US-led Operation Enduring Freedom with the intention of removing bin Laden from Afghanistan and preventing Al-Qaeda from being a threat to the security of the US and its allies. The first British contingent arrived as part of Operation Veritas to assist the Afghan Transitional Authority with reconstruction. When HQ 3rd Division assumed command of the rotating new multi-national International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Operation Fingal, Intelligence Corps support to the HQ and the Kabul Brigade was considerable, if restricted by operations in Northern Ireland and the Balkans and actually getting to Afghanistan. The J2 Branch, which is the Operational Intelligence part of Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ), had predicted ‘the New World Order’ in a symposium, deployed with intelligence support for UK forces and eighteen other Troop Contributing Nations, but developing the Intelligence Cycle was hindered by slow deployments with the Task Force Intelligence Section initially providing the only ‘feed’. In due course, a Force Human Intelligence Team, a UK National Intelligence Cell detachment, an electronic warfare team and 89 (Airborne) Intelligence Section, then supporting 16 Air Assault Brigade, all deployed in December. The backbone of the multi-national All Sources Analysis Cell was formed by 33 MI Section from the new 4 MI Battalion. Within days of landing at Bagram Airfield, the Field Security Detachment, so called because it had deployed under operational conditions, concluded that the force protection of HQ ISAF in a Kabul sports and social club in the city centre and opposite the US Embassy was far from ideal. The Detachment also followed the practices of its predecessors by collecting information on tribal interfaces and government and police structures, advised Afghan officials on personal survival, vetted locally-employed civilians and conducted counter-intelligence investigations. While other Contributing Nations lived in buildings, conditions for the British were rough – tents and wrecked buildings, ‘compo’ rations and twenty minute weekly phone calls to UK.
Operation Fingal was concluded in June 2002 when ISAF command was transferred to Turkey. The British contingent of 3,500 was scaled down to 300 with operations primarily directed at internal security in Kabul and supporting the UK Afghan National Army Training Team.
By 2002, civil war had devastated Sierra Leone but when the Revolutionary United Front resisted attempts by African UN peacekeepers to restore order, the Permanent Force HQ launched in Operation Palliser was to restore law and order. In addition, 2 Military Intelligence Battalion provided a detachment to support Short Term Training Team 1 training the Sierra Leone Army. A second detachment provided Force Protection, which was deeply involved with counter-intelligence when eleven Royal Irish Rangers and Sierra Leone soldier were captured by the decidedly unstable West Side Boys. A sergeant was threatened by a drug-fuelled child soldier who demanded his weapon. A third team trained the Sierra Leone Force Intelligence and Security Unit, who were issued with stable belts donated by the Intelligence Corps Association. In 2003, an officer was attached to the US-led Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa established in Djibouti as part of Operation Enduring Freedom.
In 2002, UN Security Council Resolution 1441 demanded that Iraq cooperate with its Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission investigating evidence of Weapons of Mass Destruction. An analysis, commonly known as the ‘dodgy document’, that emerged from the Joint Intelligence Committee then made the case for war but controversy has since surrounded its credibility because it appears that Defence Intelligence Staff conclusions were ignored. In a letter to the Chilcott Inquiry examining the Iraq War, Major General Michael Laurie, Director General, Intelligence Collection in 2002, wrote:
We could find no evidence of planes, missiles or equipment related to WMD, generally concluding that they must have been dismantled, buried or taken abroad. There has probably never been a greater detailed scrutiny of every piece of ground in any country.
Meanwhile, the Land Manpower Establishment Review saw further rationalization as HQ Land Forces at Wilton was renamed HQ Land Command. It was supported by 473 MI Section. Land Security managed Protective Security ‘far and wide’, including units training in Canada and Kenya. Meanwhile, 3 (V) MI Battalion was earmarked for mobilization. Intelligence Corps support at the Defence Intelligence Staff increased to fifteen officers and twenty-three Intelligence Corps soldiers ranging from lieutenant colonel to lance corporals collating in the Joint Terrorist Assessment Centre and other branches. The Joint Service Signals Organisation and its field components supplied information to the Intelligence Collection Group that included Joint Air Reconnaissance Intelligence Cell, the Defence Geographic Centre and the Joint Aeronautical and Geospatial Organisation.
In February 2003, 1 MI Brigade deployed to Kuwait in support of 1st Armoured Division as the UK Lead Component for Exercise Lucky Warrior, the precursor to Operation Telic, the proposed invasion of Iraq. Meanwhile, 11 (HQ 1st Division) MI Section deployed to Camp Rhino, the British concentration area several miles north-west of Kuwait, as the lead component of the Divisional Operational Intelligence Support Group, which included the Joint Service 15 Psychological Operations Group. Based at Chicksands and parented by the Brigade, it supported operations by promoting unbiased political discussion among local populations and collected information on local life by visiting communities and delivering supplies to hospitals and schools. The UK National Intelligence Cell arrived from the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps and using Collection, Co-ordination and Information Management Requirements techniques controlled Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance assets during the planning stages. The Fusion Cell became the focal point for briefings. In the Phase One forming up deployment in mid-February, as the Divisional Tactical HQ deployed into the desert, 11 MI Section was enlarged into an All Sources Intelligence Cell and was reinforced by several lance corporals who had recently passed out from Chicksands. Two sergeants completed Intelligence Cycles by drafting daily Intelligence Summaries. The Cell also practiced military drills, such as CH-47 Chinook helicopter drills and managing the intimidating down force of two spinning rotors a few yards from where they crouched. With Company HQ based with HQ Joint Force Logistics Command at the huge US base at Camp Arifjan in southern Kuwait, the FS Company divided into three sections and a counter-intelligence detachment. 2 FSS at Camp Arifjan supervised unit security and demonstrated British aplomb by patiently waiting in long meal time queues. Meanwhile, 3 FSS ensured the security integrity of British units transiting through the British Centurion Lines in the Coyote concentration area and 5 Security Section conducted counter-intelligence operations within the Divisional Area of Operations and investigated security breaches.
As part of the Land Force Readiness Cycle, as 7 Armoured Brigade moved into Camp Rhino in early February, Brigade HQ divided into the two usual headquarters of Main and Step Up. Its 13 MI Section also split into two detachments, to support the two battle groups. Each was supported by a FS detachment. Both 16 Air Assault Brigade and 89 (Airborne) MI Section assembled in the Camp Eagle concentration area forty miles south of the border and the plan developed that the Brigade would conduct relief in place with the Americans near South Rumaylah oilfields, a warrant officer joined the 5th (US) Regimental Combat Team as the Brigade J2 Liaison Officer. The Light Electronic Warfare Troop, 14th Signal Regiment joined the Brigade Intelligence Surveillance Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance screen. Meanwhile, 3 Commando Brigade arrived with its joint Royal Marines and Intelligence Corps Section, which included two Field Security staff sergeants from 1 and 2 MI Battalions until they were diverted to provide Fusion management. And 245 Signal Squadron, with its capability to deploy lightweight, airportable and vehicle platforms, arrived from 14th Signal Regiment (Electronic Warfare) and joined the 1st US Marine Division for familiarization. Major General Robin Brims, commanding 1st Division, concluded that six battle winners were key to the success of Operation Telic: ‘the quality of our troops, especially the junior leadership; Challenger 2 tanks; Warrior APCs; Artillery and the cueing systems, especially Phoenix; HUMINT; and, lastly, the flexibility of our engineers’. In doing so he highlighted an intelligence product that was a fundamental operational asset of the Intelligence Corps. Human Intelligence and Joint Forward Interrogation Teams supported the Brigades, with ‘quality over quantity’ the mantra.
Against a deteriorating political situation that focused on regime change, neutralization of the Weapons of Mass Destruction, the distribution of humanitarian aid after the 12-year blockade and the security of Iraqi oil infrastructure, the Coalition Forces crept through the desert. As 1st Division went firm eight miles from the border, its J2 Branch adopted the intense application of the Intelligence Cycle in between taking cover from Iraqi ‘Seersucker’ missiles speeding south. In possession of ten years of intelligence, processing systems were enhanced by vastly improved Coalition co-ordination and information technology. Three 6 MI Company NCOs reinforcing the Joint Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Regiment Intelligence Section experienced a tougher time when they found that the Intelligence Officer was inexperienced and they had to compete for the use of a 6-foot trestle table in a small tent and ended up working at night. A HQ Land Command Intelligence Cell sergeant detached to the RAF Joint Helicopter Force in Camp Rhino found that his skills were much in demand, particularly in its forward operating base at Safwan, which was on a main supply route to the forward areas and under the control of 51 Squadron, RAF Regiment. Any concerns that he had about their ability to develop the Intelligence Cycle disappeared when he discovered that their systematic approach was controlled by a former member of the Corps. When the sergeant searched a suspect building with a section, 51 Squadron placed snipers on top of a high building and deployed a 50mm mortar in support.
Saddam Hussein continued to resist international pressure and then during the night of 19 March, Coalition Forces advanced to the Iraqi frontier and then at 05.34 (Baghdad time) on 20 March, G-Day, engineers breached the border sand berms in the expectation the Iraqis were expected to capitulate quickly, as they had done in 1991. Crossing the border with 1st (US) Marine Division was an Intelligence Corps sergeant with Tango Troop, 245 Signal Squadron:
Moving up from (Camp) Matilda, my 10 man EW Platform moved a few kilometers from the Iraqi border, just forward of a long berm, and began operations. Two days later, tens of US artillery pieces formed up behind the length of the berm, and soon began a bombardment that was to last 18 hours. The noise was intense, as rounds flew directly overhead. Visibility at night had so far not been a problem, as the skies were so clear, and well lit by the moon and stars. The night we crossed into Iraq, however, was recorded as being the darkest for 10 years. The two other platforms joined us in a Troop move and after an occasionally perilous journey, we moved north into Iraq, into a location by a berm, which shielded us from an abandoned gas/oil separation plant. By this time, we were working an eight hours on, eight hours off shift system and getting some good results. The heat, dust, dirt and danger, the potential threat of chemical attack, land mines and conventional warfare, and the pressure of operations all combined to make Operation Telic a life-changing experience.
On 21 March, 3 Commando Brigade supported by 15 Marine Expeditionary Unit and Polish troops advanced across Southern Iraq toward the port of Umm Qasr but met unexpected resistance that took several days to clear. The US Marines’ customary and enthusiastic use of firepower was noted by 1 FSS, entering the port with 17 Port and Maritime Regiment. Inside the port perimeter created from shipping containers, the section vetted local dockworkers and administered pass issue until the Intelligence Cell, 102 Logistics Brigade took over the task. The section then conducted heliborne security surveys of key points, such as oil fields and road and rail infrastructure, and dispensed security advice on such matters as the destruction and degaussing of computer hard drives. A Tactical Questioning centre debriefed suspect Saddam Hussein loyalists arrested by the Royal Marines in their internal security operations to establish a sense of normality in the town. Arriving with the Prisoner of War Holding Organisation, 5 FSS set up at Camp Freddie where an Arabic-speaking lance corporal interrogated prisoners. On 21 April, a 45 MI Section sergeant and a 44 MI lance corporal were investigating a suspect being treated for face wounds on a Spanish hospital ship when an Ammunition Technical Officer concluded that several pellets were contaminated with explosive. The suspect’s explanation that a pipe had exploded while he was welding gymnastic asymmetric bars failed to convince the two NCOs that he was not a bomb-maker and they escorted him for tactical questioning.
On 24 March, 7 Armoured Brigade halted at the former RAF Shaibah, south-west of As-Asmarah. In the knowledge that the FS Company was following, its 13 MI Section reformed into two Operational Intelligence detachments covering Basra and the Rest of Area and dispatched JNCOs to the Battle Group headquarters as intelligence advisers. When 7 Armoured Brigade supported 3 Commando Brigade entering the south-eastern suburbs of Basra and experienced some of the fiercest fighting encountered by Division, 13 MI Intelligence Section exploited airborne and satellite intelligence collection assets to pinpoint positions. One prisoner turned out to be a senior Republican Guard officer sent from Baghdad to encourage Iraqi units to fight. Three days later, the Light Electronic Warfare Troop attached to the 3 Parachute Battalion detected a T-59 tank company twenty miles south-east of Basra preparing to counter-attack. After a Phoenix drone had confirmed the threat, C Squadron, Royal Scots Dragoon Guards Challenger-2 tanks supporting 3 Commando Brigade ambushed the Iraqis with devastating results. Then 245 Signal Squadron returned to 1st Armoured Division where its Analysis and Reporting Cell intercepts compromised Ba’athist Party personalities and pinpointed unit locations and ambushes. Meanwhile, 15 Psychological Operations Group challenged Iraqi broadcasts by suggesting there was an alternative to Saddam Hussein. By the first week of April, 1st Armoured Division had seized most of its objectives and even though 1 Parachute Battalion was still clearing the claustrophobic, narrow streets of the ‘old quarter’, HQ 4 Brigade occupied the sumptuous presidential palace overlooking the Shatt al-Arab waterway and commenced Phase 4 (Peace Support Operations). Fresh food was a distant memory and air conditioning non existent.
Meanwhile, as 16 Air Assault Brigade advanced north-west, it was supported by the Light Electronic Warfare Troop locating positions, such as an observation post co-coordinating the shelling of 3 Parachute Battalion as it attacked a bridge over the Shatt Al-Arab near Al-Rumailah in order to secure the gas oil separation plants. When its left flank came under artillery fire from the Iraqi 6th Armoured Division, 89 (Airborne) Military Intelligence Section deduced that Iraqi forward operations officers were using motorcycles. To give the Brigade an enhanced capability to address the increasing number of prisoners, two interrogators debriefing Iraqis at the Intelligence Exploitation Base were hurriedly issued with the paraphernalia of front line troops and soon after joining Brigade HQ at Al-Rumaylah had pinpointed a BM-21 multi-barreled rocket launcher battery mentioned by several civilians. But the inability to charge their laptops forced them to adopt the practices of their predecessors of writing their reports, which a captain found ‘frustrating at the end of very long days’. During the advance to the next objective of Al-Dayr astride the main road north to Baghdad, the Troop broadcast personal messages to several 6th Armoured Division tank battalion commanders and suggested that since Coalition artillery and aircraft had caused so many casualties, defeat was inevitable and anyone wishing to surrender should assemble at a rendezvous. During the night of 5/6 April, as 3 Parachute Battalion advanced eight miles to contact towards Al-Dayr, the interrogators following close behind the lead company during the final assault processed some of the 1,200 prisoners captured by the Royal Irish Rangers. By 12 April, the Brigade had reached Al-Amarah.
To the north, Baghdad fell and Saddam Hussein was on the run. When his home town of Tikrit was captured by US forces three days later, the Coalition declared the invasion to be over.
The Reconstruction Phase led to British force levels quickly reduced from 46,000 to 8,600 and the commencement of six monthly roulement Operation Telic tours. But, in spite of twelve years of preparing to dethrone Saddam Hussein, there was little official understanding of Shia/Sunni religious and political fault lines and internal security collapsed from inactive civil administrations, weak humanitarian services and the disbandment of the Iraqi Army and police. The crucial strategy of ‘hearts and minds’ was undermined. Frequent electrical black-outs played havoc with data processing the Intelligence Cycle. Nevertheless on 31 May, over 100 Corps gathered around the grave of CSM Maurice French for a simple Act of Remembrance in the Basra Commonwealth War Graves cemetery. He had died on 30 August 1947, aged 32, while serving with 266 FSS. The section was formed in Winchester in October 1940 and sailed for Iraq from Liverpool in April 1941to take over Port Security duties at Maqil.
In mid-July, HQ 3rd Division relieved HQ 1st Armoured Division on Telic II and then converted to HQ Multi National Division (South East). Its operations were monitored by a forward Permanent Joint HQ from the comfort and safety of Qatar. In Telic III at the end of December, 20 Armoured Brigade relieved 19 Mechanized Brigade. To preserve the integrity of sharing information within the Coalition, the Force MI Company, which included a Royal Artillery Surveillance Target Acquisition Battery, a Phoenix Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Battery and specialist capabilities such as Document Examination, formed up as the Divisional J2 All Sources Cell that included Dutch, Italians, Norwegians and Romanians. The UK National Intelligence Cell provided daily intelligence to the Divisional commander and twice weekly verbal briefings to the Command Group. And 1 MI Section, which had been formed from the Basra and Umm Qasar FS detachments and was based at the Shaibah Logistic Base, adopted counter-surveillance skills to enhance their survival in dangerous environments, particularly when visiting Iraqi Police stations and Coalition bases. In the first year, they completed over 300 tasks. One sergeant surpassed Middle Eastern diplomacy by greeting a sentry at a Kuwaiti Army base with ‘Shalom.’
As 1 Mechanized Brigade arrived on Telic IV, deteriorating internal security was being engineered by the Mahdi Militia, a Shi’ite paramilitary force formed in mid-2003 by the cleric, Muqtada al-Sadr, who was using his influence in local government and among the police to fill the security and humanitarian aid vacuum in Sadr City in Baghdad and several southern Iraqi cities. When the Coalition authorities banned his newspaper, an uprising conducted by lightly equipped militia using road-side bombs, some triggered by infra-red sensors, surged throughout Iraq on 16 April. Five days later there were several devastating bombs in Basra. In Al-Amarah, the Multi National Division Civil/Military Co-operation House was besieged for twenty-three day in fierce fighting. In an initiative designed to stabilise the political situation and enable the Coalition to reduce its military presence and promote sovereignty and democracy, some powers were transferred to a provisional government, In October, the Iraqi Coastal Defence Force at Umm Qasr took responsibility for Iraqi territorial waters. In early January 2004 in Telic V, the Basra FS Section began delivering intelligence and security training to an Iraqi brigade staff and the Civil Defence Corps.
Hopes for an end to the insurgency were dashed in May 2005 when vehicle bombs and suicide bombers tore into Shia communities and attacked mosques, markets and bus stations. Forty devices in 2003 in Iraq rose to 478 in 2005. The unrest on Telic V was absorbed by 12 Mechanised Brigade and its 161 MI Section. At about 11am on 11 September, Major Matthew Bacon, then serving with HQ Multi National Division, was killed on his way to Basra Airport after a meeting at the Palace when his lightly-armoured ‘Snatch’ Land Rover was wrecked by a roadside device. Corporal Neil Collins was badly wounded, as were two Royal Regiment of Fusiliers soldiers giving top cover. Major Bacon’s father has since conducted a vigorous campaign to expose the frailties of the ‘Snatch’. In commemoration of his son, he established the Matthew Bacon Bursary to finance older Army Cadet Force members taking part in Outward Bound courses or expeditions beyond their financial means.
After just a fortnight’s notice, a 63 (Joint Force HQ) MI Section lance corporal arrived midway through Telic V and was among several Intelligence Corps earmarked to join Task Force Eagle, which was tasked to replace the Dutch Task Force near As-Samawah in Al-Muthanna Province. After attending briefings at the Force MI Company, they were flown by Chinook to Camp Smitty where they took over from the Dutch Intelligence Cell then located in a leaking 12-foot by 12-foot frame tent. The section quickly moved into a more robust Corrimech prefabricated building. Generations of Intelligence Corps will recognize the NCO’s thoughts:
As an Intelligence Corps JNCO, the battalion accepted you as a specialist and allowed you a degree of privilege, meaning there were many opportunities to leave camp. Sometimes they would be jollies: to the Italian Camp Mittica where wine and beer was available in the cookhouse….. More often leaving camp meant work-related tasks, like top cover, eagle patrols (flying around the desert in a Merlin), a fact-finding visit to a town with Civil and Military Cooperation, or just attached to a patrol. Six months after my JNCO cadre, I was using the patrolling skills I learnt for real on the ground in Iraq. On the majority of my trips, I was accompanied by Trooper Frankie Vaughan (Queens Dragoon Guards), my unofficial minder and Intelligence Corps’ mascot’.
Towards the end of his tour, when the Australian Battle Group arrived, the lance corporal noted they were ‘a little over excited for this sleepy corner of south-east Iraq’. He was then posted to J2 at Basra Airport and astonished by the civility of permanent buildings, a bus service, a Pizza Hut and bars.
In November on Telic VII in a deployment that mirrored Intelligence Corps (Field) in 1944, Tactical HQ 4 MI Battalion deployed to Iraq and strengthened the cohesion of the functions controlled by the Force MI Company by taking under command the Human Intelligence Company, the Counter-Intelligence Company, Document Exploitation and Weapons Intelligence and developing the All Sources Cell to include Current Intelligence, Criminality, Governance, Regional Influence and Security Sector Reform desks. Counter-Intelligence/Security was kept busy vetting 6,000 locally employed civilians and contractors, and undertaking Protective Security tasks as brigades rotated. As with the establishing of FS Reserve Detachments to support FS sections in the advance through North-West Europe, Close Support Intelligence sections were formed to give direct support to the Divisions and their brigades while General Support sections provided indirect support. Operational Intelligence Support Groups enhanced the product by developing strategic Intelligence Summaries and thematic papers for military commanders and diplomats. The entire organisation numbered 390 all ranks The Form Operational Readiness Mechanism of supplying trained organizations and individuals to be in the right place and on time was achieved by a thirty month cycle of sections and individuals either being on deployment or resting or in Pre-Deployment Training of home and overseas exercises and studies dispersed by adventurous training and career progression. The mantra was ‘train hard, fight easy’.
During July, 472 (Spearhead Lead Element) MI Section deployed to Cyprus in Operation Highbrow to debrief civilians being evacuated from Lebanon after Israel forces moved against Hezbollah.
By the beginning of 2006, as the strategic priority shifted to Afghanistan, disengagement in Iraq was relying upon the newly-elected local authorities to take control of internal security. But when 20 Armoured Brigade arrived on Telic VIII in May with its 141 MI Intelligence Section, on its second tour, it was pitched into another Mahdi Army uprising after a breakdown in negotiations. In early June, fierce fighting developed around the former Iraq Air Force base at Camp Abu Naji two miles south of Al-Amarah. Nevertheless, by July the British had returned Muthanna Province, in the south-east, to Iraq civil control, the first administration to be handed over. At the end of August, as the Brigade looked south to address extensive smuggling, Camp Abu Naji was transferred to 4 (Iraqi) Brigade. One officer who spent his six month tour as part of the Military Transition Team training Iraqi intelligence officers in the brigade found that his logistic difficulties were solved by ‘someone’s friend or brother who fixes various pieces of equipment.’ In September, Operation Sinbad targeted the subversion of the police and then focused on the militia. On 12 November, the Intelligence Corps lost its second fatality in Iraq when Staff Sergeant Sharron Elliott, aged 34, was killed, along with three servicemen when their assault boat was wrecked by an improvised explosive device under a bridge spanning the Shatt Al-Arab waterway. It was the heaviest loss of life in a single incident for British forces for six months, bringing the death toll to 125. Staff Sergeant Elliott is commemorated by the annual Rugby competition.
By February 2007, part of HQ Multi National Division (South-East) had moved from Basra Palace to the Airport but there was then a difficult summer of attacks, bombs and rocket attacks. During a ceasefire, British consolidation at the Airport during the night of 3 September led to accusation from within the Coalition that the British counter-insurgency strategy, at which it had excelled in other campaigns, had failed in Basra.
By the time that Brigadier Everson handed over the Director, on promotion, to Brigadier Ewan Duncan in 2007, he had largely met his vision. Further evidence of the influence and esteem of the Intelligence Corps emerged when Major General Everson was appointed the V (US) Corps Deputy Commander with direct responsibility for Coalition Operations, Intelligence and Security, an important and influential appointment that saw him commanding Coalition forces when its commander was away. The first Intelligence Corps Major General was Graham Messervy-Whiting, who was promoted in 2000 to take up the appointment of Head of Interim Military Staff of the European Union, itself a significant sign of the influence of the Intelligence Corps in the international political and military arena. Three other Intelligence Corps brigadiers were also appointed to be Deputy Commanders, Intelligence and Security of the Coalition forces, an important appointment that linked strategic, political and diplomatic intelligence with events on the ground, not only in Iraq but also regionally. Iraqi intelligence and security services were included in a Joint Intelligence Committee.
Within days of 4 Mechanized Brigade arriving on Telic XI in April 2008, Second Lieutenant Joanna Yorke Dyer, aged 24, who was attached to 2 Duke of Lancaster’s Regiment to gain operational experience was killed on 5 April, the Corps third fatality in Iraq. She had joined the Battalion Medical Group supporting a patrol when its Warrior triggered a powerful device west of Basra. Three other soldiers, including two Royal Army Medical Corps, one of them another woman, and an interpreter were killed. A fifth soldier was admitted to Basra military hospital. In the same intake as Prince William at Sandhurst, when asked by Brigadier Duncan why she was not seeking another cap badge, her answer epitomized Intelligence Corps past and presents ‘I am joining the Army in order to join the Int Corps’.
By the end of March 2009, as the Coalition continued to disengage, the Multi National Division (South East) had merged with the US-led Multi National Division. A month late, Secretary of Defence John Hutton announced the formal completion of Operation Telic. Within four months, British combat forces had withdrawn from Iraq with the last Intelligence Corps soldier leaving Kuwait in early September.
By 2004, the Intelligence Corps in Northern Ireland had the distinct impression that the Province had taken a back seat. HQ 8 Infantry Brigade had moved to Ballykelly in October 2003. In September the following year, when 3 Brigade was disbanded, 122 and 123 Intelligence Sections absorbed some of the NCOs from its 124 Intelligence Section. The last Operation Banner Corps Day began on 21 July with a study afternoon on Corps history and the Museum followed by a cocktail party at Hillsborough Castle. Next day was Families Day and a 1970s Fancy Dress Night at the Officers’ Mess Annex. And then, ten days later, nine years after the Good Friday Agreement, a HQ 39 Infantry Brigade watchkeeper radioed ‘Operation Banner is terminated’. In spite of attempts to discredit its contribution, the Intelligence Corps had come of age during the course of Operation Banner. Its development of Operational Intelligence and Security Intelligence and the maintenance of Protective Security in an operational setting meant, for the first time, that units, police and other agencies in Northern Ireland, England and Europe and other parts of the world came to respect the level of expertise and professionalism of all ranks. Those who served in Northern Ireland should be proud of the commitment and legacy that led to the Peace Process.
With about sixty-five per cent of 1 MI Brigade on operations and thirty-five per cent of the Corps deployed, Force reductions in Northern Ireland, Iraq and Germany and the quality of transferees allowed the Brigade to meet its Future Army Structures, the burgeoning reputation of the Corps led to the Directorate concentrating on configuring its structures to meet Defence Planning Assumptions, a final phase being the addition of a Headquarters Company in the existing battalions and proposals to form a Defence Human Intelligence Unit at Chicksands. This severed the Corps link with the Far East when 10 Intelligence Company, formerly of Hong Kong, was disbanded. The termination of Territorial Army Annual Camps and Mandatory Training Tests meant that the relationships between Intelligence Corps Regular and Reserve battalions were fully integrated. The 633 Reserve officers and soldiers spread over twelve locations between Exeter and Edinburgh were split into:
• 3 (V) MI Battalion of three companies and the Defence Intelligence Staff Support Section at the Ministry of Defence.
• 5 (V) MI Battalion nationwide with Weapons Intelligence, Psychological Warfare, Intelligence Exploitation, Operational Intelligence and Human Intelligence resources. In 2009, thirty-one soldiers were deployed on Full Time Reserve Service.
In Afghanistan, the six monthly rotational Operation Herrick commenced in October 2003 when two Provincial Reconstruction Teams and the rapid reaction Afghanistan Roulement Infantry Battalion were formed. It was supported by 2 MI Battalion providing a Field Security detachment to advise on protective security and a UK National Intelligence Centre detachment.
After the Ministry of Defence had announced in January 2006 that 3,300 troops would be sent on a stabilisation mission to Helmand Province, where Taliban insurgency and system of government were particularly active, Secretary of Defence John Reid optimistically suggest nine months later that they would return home after three years ‘without a shot being fired’. As HQ Helmand Task Force settled in, the relative lack of existing Preliminary Operations intelligence meant, not for the first time, that British forces would be committed with a near clean intelligence sheet. The UK Task Force was controlled by the Permanent Joint Headquarters. Helmand Task Force was supported by HQ 1 MI Company and 162 Security Section as the Operational Intelligence Support Group. The brigades, as usual, rotated every six months, each one bringing its own Military Intelligence section.
HQ 16 Air Assault Brigade led the deployment on Herrick IV. It was, as usual, supported by 89 (Close Support) MI Section, reinforced by Regulars and Full Time Service Reservists from 3 (V) MI Battalion. As anxiety in the compounds north of Helmand rose, the brigade set out to create a security breakwater by occupying fortified Platoon Bases in Sangin, Musa Qa’ala, Naw Zad and Garmsir but they were soon under siege in intense fighting. The fighting, escalation in civilian casualties and damage to local infrastructure from artillery and air strikes led to increasing alienation and damage to ‘hearts and minds’. A lance corporal was at Naw Zad and a corporal joined a Manoeuvre Outreach Group tasked to destabilize attacks. A 3 MI Battalion (V) warrant officer driving a Land Rover equipped with a heavy weapons fit was wounded in an ambush near Garmsir. On 1 July, Lance Corporal Jabron Hashmi, aged 24, was in a sangar on top of regional headquarters in Sangin when a rocket propelled grenade hit the sangar killing him and a Royal Signals corporal and wounding four others. A member of the Light Electronic Warfare Troop, 233 Squadron, Hashmi was born in Pakistan and had moved with his family to Birmingham when he was aged 12 years. His older brother had also served in the Intelligence Corps.
In November 3 Commando Brigade arrived on Herrick V, supported by part of 461 (Commando) Military Intelligence Section; the remainder were on HMS Albion hovering off Sierra Leone. Thoroughly familiar in winter operations, during the six week Operation Volcano, the brigade disrupted mid-level Taliban command structures by clearing twenty-five compounds in the north and south of the Upper Sangin valley, which gave the Royal Engineers opportunities to undertake reconstruction projects near the Kajaki Dam. The dam had been built in 1953 to provide electricity and irrigation to Helmand and Kandahar but of the two of three turbines installed, one was unserviceable. As Task Force levels doubled in February 2007, 12 Mechanised Brigade and its 431 (Close Support) MI Section deployed on Herrick VI and, in Operation Achilles, undermined the customary spring offensive by disrupting insurgent activity from Sangin and Gerick. As the newly-formed 52 Infantry Brigade assembled for Herrick VII, it was supported by 481 (Close Support) MI Section, who assembled while attending their Tactical Intelligence Course at Chicksands and the Combined Arms Staff Trainer at Warminster.
With growing menace of improvised explosive devices a top priority, the provision of intelligence was enhanced by the Battlefield Artillery Targeting System (BATES) beaming images of storage areas and disturbed ground to Imagery Intelligence detachments attached to 22 (Gibraltar 1779-1783) Battery, with whom the Corps already had a long association, and to 57 (Bhurtpore) Battery. The use of drones to collect intelligence was not new to the Army. During the early 1970s, 94 Locating Regiment and its small Imagery Analysis detachment had supported 1st (British) Corps with Midges. As joint UK/US MQ-1 Predator operations escalated in Iraq and Afghanistan, a small Intelligence Corps detachment provided No. 1115 Flight RAF, which was attached to 15 Reconnaissance Squadron USAF at Nellis Air Force Base, with Mission Co-ordinators guiding pilots remotely flying the drones with the feed being reviewed by two Imagery Analysts. The Corps also provides mission support to 39 Squadron RAF pilots flying MQ-9 Reaper drones. The drones also provide surveillance cover for patrols and convoys. Another intelligence asset was the NIMROD Sentinel R1 Airborne Stand-Off Radar platform assigned to 5 (Army Co-Operation) Squadron sending images to ground stations at Camp Bastion and Kandahar. In many respects, the fighting in Afghanistan is a battle between sophisticated military intelligence technology and determined guerrillas using motor bikes, communicating with mobile phones and armed with Kalashnikov assault rifles and RPG-7 rocket launchers.
The return of 16 Air Assault Brigade on Herrick VIII in April 2008 saw 89 (Close Support) MI Section deploy a sergeant to an Estonian unit at Naw Zad and a lance corporal permanently attached to the 2 Parachute Battle Group. On 17 June, the Corps lost its third woman when Corporal Sarah Bryant was killed east of Lashkar Gah when her Snatch Land Rover, one of six vehicles, detonated a roadside device that also killed three other soldiers and wounded a fifth soldier, who had been checking for improvised explosive devices. Corporal Bryant was serving with 152 Psychological Operations Effects Team supporting the brigade as the Target Audience Analyst – 152 Psychological Operations is part of 15 (UK) Psychological Operations Group that used a radio station network that broadcast music, poetry and debate introduced by local announcers. The Coroner’s Inquiry again focused on the vulnerability of the Snatch. ‘Armed Forces News’ in The Times dated 2 March 2010 suggested that thirty-two soldiers had been killed in similar incidents. In addition to the radio station other projects included spreading information by leaflets and posters, for instance, warning children against picking up ammunition. In October 2012, the Group was awarded the Firmin Sword of Peace for its ‘valuable contribution to humanitarian activities by establishing good and friendly relations with the inhabitants of any community at home or overseas’.
In an operation that required detailed intelligence, in Operation Eagle’s Nest, HQ 16 Air Assault Brigade successfully diverted the attention of the Taliban to a military diversion on a highway while a 100-vehicle convoy moved a 220-tonne electric turbine 108 miles from Khandahar to the Kajaki Dam. NATO hailed the operation’ as a psychological victory that would contribute to winning the ‘hearts and minds’ of the Afghan people. In October 3 Commando Brigade, returning in Herrick IX, experienced an escalation of improvised devices attacks. HQ 19 Light Brigade rotated on Herrick X in April 2009 and, ahead of the Afghan presidential elections, launched Operation Panther’s Claw to seize canal and river crossings in the Helmand valley and allow a permanent ISAF and Afghan Army presence to be established among Taliban strongholds. Mines and devices remained a serious problem. In Operation Storm, the brigade breached an improvised explosive device belt, attacked Taliban safe areas and forced the insurgents to deploy devices as protection. But by the time 11 Light Brigade arrived in October 2009 on Herrick XI, 19 Brigade had lost sixty-nine killed.
The former brigade was smaller than other brigades and was configured around the Counter Improvised Explosive Device Task Force made up from Weapons Intelligence, a Royal Signals Electronic Counter-Measures Troop, Royal Engineer Search Teams and Improvised Explosive Device Disposal Teams. Applying the Intelligence Cycle was the Brigade’s 491 (Close Support) and 452 (General Support) MI Sections. The enhanced Intelligence Corps support allowed Continuity NCOs to be attached to Battle Group and Company Intelligence Support Detachments. By this time, the Land Intelligence Fusion Centre (Afghanistan) was providing intelligence support for Operation Herrick, in much the same way as had happened on pre-Operation Banner deployments. Managed by 44 Military Intelligence Company using the latest intelligence from Afghanistan, a website and orientation and immersion packs help familiarise battle groups on their operational areas. Short university courses are available for J2 staff. In April 2010, the joint Intelligence Exploitation Force at Lashkar Gah combined Intelligence Cycle skills developed in Northern Ireland and policing techniques learnt from the RUC and Weapons Intelligence with the exploitation of the latest information technology and quickly achieved results. The Corps representation included an officer loaned from the Intelligence Exploitation Force and an Imagery Intelligence IED sergeant expert from the Weapons Intelligence Specialist Company. Attached to the Joint Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Regiment were two Corps monitoring, on a global scale and in Afghanistan, the use of chemical agricultural ingredients in devices. At least twelve attacks had been logged, mainly on girls’ schools.