The Tragedy of Benedict Arnold

Quebec, the chief city of British Canada, was a formidable target. Samuel de Champlain had an excellent eye for a perfect defensive site when he founded the city in 1608. Only General Wolfe’s brilliant and skillful battle plan had enabled the British to scale its heights unseen and capture it in 1759.

Quebec stands on the north shore of the St. Lawrence River near its conjunction with the St. Charles River. The St. Lawrence River valley is low and flat, and Quebec’s port and narrow, lower town is at water level. But steep cliffs loom over the lower town and on their summit stands the upper town, protected by stout stone walls giving its defenders a commanding view of the river. Added to this challenging location for would-be conquerors, the region’s long, frigid winter gave it additional protection for much of the year. And that frigid winter was beginning.

Arnold’s army on the southern bank of the St. Lawrence was threatening the city, but first he had to get across the river controlled by British ships. While he awaited the arrival of Montgomery, he learned with joy that Montreal had been taken. Unfortunately in the process the British Commander, General Carleton, had managed to slip away, but a victory was a victory. Just Quebec lay between the Americans and control of Canada. Still, Arnold was impatient to make some attempt on the Canadian capital, formidable as the task was. There was no time to lose. Winter was fast approaching. Far better to weather it in the confines of the city than enduring a miserable winter siege. Worse, the enlistments of the American troops ended with the end of the year.

Guy Carleton had his own share of troubles at that moment. He had abandoned Montreal but with one American army surrounding it and another across the river from Quebec where was he to go? He and his officers agreed he was needed at Quebec, some 160 miles to the east, despite the difficulty of slipping past enemy lines to reach it. His best option seemed to be to trust his safety to Captain Jean Baptiste Bouchette, a French-Canadian merchant and river pilot, who agreed to smuggle him down the river in a flat, open whaleboat. The general boarded the vessel disguised as a French-Canadian peasant, a habitant.¹

On the night of November 16 the boat managed to evade the American sentries and docked at Trois-Rivières where Carleton learned the bad news that Americans had reached Pointe-aux-Trembles, a few miles above Quebec. Thoroughly exhausted, he risked leaving his party and found a bed in the home of a local family. In the middle of the night he awakened to the noisy arrival of American soldiers also looking for shelter. Thanks to his disguise and passable French they didn’t recognize him. He slipped out and returned to the whaleboat. With all aboard her lying in the bottom of the boat, their hands over the sides, paddling as silently as possible, they rowed down the river hoping to look like a drifting log. Once beyond Montgomery’s men they met and boarded the Fell, a friendly merchant ship. Three days after setting off Carleton arrived at Quebec to the great joy of the garrison and friends of the British. He immediately took charge, but the city’s troops had wasted no time and were fully prepared to mount a vigorous defense, agreeing to defend Quebec “to the last extremity.”²

Carleton counted some 1,178 more or less reliable men and reckoned they had enough supplies to last them until spring. He quickly dispatched a messenger to London, however, asking that when the river was passable the government send supplies and reinforcements as well as prefabricated boats that could be assembled to sail down Lake Champlain and bring the war to the Americans. Despite all this he was pessimistic, writing Lord Dartmouth, “I think our Fate extremely doubtful, to say nothing worse.”³ There were enemies inside the walls, hostile French and reluctant Canadian militia. Would they support the regulars?

Carleton made what repairs he could to the blockhouses and placed cannon on the walls. Residents hostile to the British regime were given four days to quit the city and had to leave the entire district by December 1 or be treated “as rebels or spies.”⁴ All these preparations were not a moment too soon. On December 2 he was informed that Montgomery and Arnold had joined forces. Quebec was sealed tight and ready for the assault Washington had ordered.

If Carleton was pessimistic, Washington was hopeful. Montgomery had taken St. Johns and Montreal. Arnold had managed to bring his valiant little army through the wilderness, and it was now poised, when the two armies met, to attack Quebec. It was a triumphant and satisfying moment for Arnold as well. A flurry of letters all written on December 5 to him and from his superior officers to each other were full of his praise. Washington was in a jubilant mood writing Arnold, “It is not in the power of any man to command success, but you have done more—you have deserved it, & before this I hope, have met with the laurels which are due to your toils, in the possession of Quebec—My thanks are due & sincerely offered to you, for your Enterprising & persevering spirit—To your brave followers I likewise present them.”⁵ He added the prayer that “the Almighty may preserve & prosper you in it [the enterprise] is the sincere & fervent prayer of Dear sir. &c.” In a postscript Washington expressed his surprise that Enos had returned to Cambridge with the division under his command, adding, “I immediately put him under Arrest & had him tried for Quitting the Detachment without your Orders—He is acquitted on the Score of provisions.” Washington extolled Arnold’s achievement writing Schuyler the same day: “The merit of that officer is certainly great and I heartily wish that fortune may distinguish him as one of her favorites. He will do everything which prudence and valor may suggest, to add to the success of our arms.”⁶ Montgomery also wrote Schuyler about their two armies meeting, pointing out that his own vessels carried only “the few troops equipped for a winter campaign, about 300.” On the other hand he added, “I find Colonel Arnold’s corps an exceedingly fine one. Immune to fatigue and well accustomed to cannon shot, there is a style of discipline among them much superior to what I have been used to see in this campaign.”⁷

Arnold and Montgomery agreed it was time to take action. Protocol and good sense demanded that they first attempt to persuade the city to surrender. On December 13 with a flotilla carrying five hundred men Arnold set off to cross the river, taking great care to evade the British frigate and sloop nearby. They landed safely in Wolfe’s Cove where he hoped to cut off the city’s supplies and to send a messenger to call upon the city to surrender. A surrender would ensure defenders and residents better treatment and avoid bloodshed. The response was uncharacteristically abrupt. Carleton ordered his men to shoot at the messenger. Montgomery tried a somewhat different tack to negotiate a surrender. His first message to Carleton that general tossed into the fire. Next he sent a woman to Carleton calling for the surrender of the garrison. Carleton’s answer was to have her arrested.⁸ Frustrated, Montgomery and Arnold besieged the city although Arnold tried going himself to request surrender. Again the document he carried was burnt and Arnold left amid a chorus of insults.

As the year was drawing rapidly to a close and with it their men’s enlistments, the two American commanders planned their assault. The British and Americans were about equally matched in numbers, although the British had by far the best strategic position. The American attack was planned for Sunday, December 31. It was to be four-pronged, with Arnold’s men advancing from the northeast with his division of “Famine proof Veterans,” Montgomery’s from the west and south with most of the troops from Montreal.⁹ Colonel Livingston and his Canadian regiment were to attack the wall at St. John’s gate. Another attack was to take place at the riverbank near the end of the city walls.¹⁰ The signal to advance was three rocket blasts. Their men were to identify themselves with a strip of white paper pinned to the front of their hats bearing the words, “Liberty or Death.” They slept that night with their weapons.

At four in the morning in the pitch dark, shrouded by blinding, heavy snow they moved out. Snow on the ground might have helped them see their way, but a storm was different. John Henry, one of Arnold’s men, wrote, “The snow was outrageous and the cold wind extremely biting. In this northern country the snow is blown horizontally into the faces of travelers on most occasions—this was our case.”¹¹ Montgomery was leading an advance party. They plunged through the snow, their mission to push their way through the stout pickets at the edge of the riverbank and attack a blockhouse guarded by regulars armed with muskets and cannon. Abner Stocking explained that Cape Diamond around which they were to climb was a precipice. At its base next to the river enormous and rugged chunks of ice had piled making the route nearly impassable. Their path up was so narrow they had to climb single file. When they reached the wooden pickets Montgomery began pulling them out with his own hands shouting to his troops, “Men of New York, you will not fear to follow where your General leads. March on!”¹² They charged. The blockhouse’s cannon were lit. Cannon balls exploded all about them. Montgomery and a group of his soldiers were killed instantly. The rest of his men turned and fled.

Across town with a cacophony of bells, drums, and muskets making a mockery of a predawn Sunday surprise, Arnold led another small advance group followed by the rest of his men toward Sault-au-Matelot. He expected some small batteries ranged against them before reaching the lower town where the two wings of the American army were to meet. Enemy muskets blazed. Arnold, in the vanguard, was struck by a musket ball that entered his left leg just below the knee. Refusing to leave the field, he continued marching, dragging his bleeding leg.¹³ Once the rest of his men caught up he turned back toward the hospital a mile away, urging on his men as he passed them. Unlike Montgomery’s soldiers, Arnold’s kept advancing. When they ran out of ammunition they advanced with bayonets drawn.

Dr. Isaac Senter, based at the hospital, reported that within an hour of the attack the wounded came pouring in.¹⁴ Later the enemy began venturing out of the city capturing American horses, carriages, and supplies. Dawn was just breaking when Arnold arrived at the hospital supported by two soldiers. Dr. Senter was able to remove the musket ball from where it was wedged in a muscle near Arnold’s Achilles tendon. Shortly after, the doctor and his patients learned the grave news of Montgomery’s death and the “fall” of two young officers of his army. Arnold wept when he learned of Montgomery’s death. More bad news followed. The enemy was outside the city walls and advancing on the hospital. Men were ordered into the street with field pieces to repel them and managed to put them to flight. There was no news of Arnold’s men, and it was assumed they were dead. The doctor and officers in the hospital urged Arnold to leave for the country where he could not as easily be discovered. He would have none of it. Dr. Senter writes:

He would neither be removed, nor suffer a man from the hospital to retreat. He ordered pistols loaded, with a sword on his bed adding that he was determined to kill as many as possible if they came into the room. We were all now soldiers; even to the wounded in their beds were ordered a gun by their side, that, if they did attack the hospital, to make the most vigorous defense possible.¹⁵

The snowstorm continued. Requests for help from local militia fell on frightened ears. A message was sent to Congress pleading for immediate assistance, but Philadelphia was a long way off on a winter’s day.¹⁶ Senter found the prospect “gloomy on every side. The loss of the bravest of Generals, with other amiable officers smote the breasts of all around with inexpressible grief.”¹⁷

As the ranking officer Arnold, wounded and in pain, was in command at Quebec. Americans held Montreal, however, where Brigadier General Wooster, Montgomery’s second in command, had a garrison of five hundred men. Wooster and Arnold were both from New Haven. Wooster, then sixty-five, had a long career interspersed with military action, from the attack on Louisburg in 1745 through the French and Indian War. He had brought a contingent of Connecticut men to this campaign. Arnold wrote him the following day of their losses and his desperate need for Wooster to replace him, bringing reinforcements and cannon. “I am in such excessive pain from my wound . . . Your presence will be absolutely necessary.”¹⁸ But bold as Wooster may have been in his youth, he was now an older and more cautious man. He was reluctant to come to Arnold’s aid himself or even to send any of his men to the siege outside Quebec. He would eventually send a few New York troops but without their equipment—no weapons, uniforms, or even snowshoes to help them manage the deep drifts. Not until April did Wooster arrive to replace Arnold.

On January 4 Arnold, still hopeful help would arrive, agreed to be moved to a safer, more comfortable location behind the lines. He was taken by sleigh to Montgomery’s former headquarters. Now, for the first time, he felt able to write Hannah of their predicament and his injury. He apologized for not having written sooner but, “a continual hurry of business has prevented me. The command of the army, by the death of General Montgomery, has devolved upon me; a task,” he confessed, “I find, too heavy under my present circumstances.”¹⁹ He described how he had been wounded and his painful walk back to the hospital “under the continual fire of the enemy from the walls.” Hannah wrote back anxiously asking when he meant to return home. Arnold was clear, he would not consider it “until I first enter it [Quebec] in triumph. My wound has been exceedingly painful, but is now easy and the Providence, which has carried me through so many dangers, is still my protection. I am in the way of my duty and know no fear.”²⁰

How is one to explain the courage, dedication, and fortitude of Benedict Arnold, the proud, determined, seafaring merchant from New Haven? How account for the military brilliance, the confidence to lead, the ability to inspire men, to see military opportunities, and dare to take them? He may have felt he had little to live for except the cause to which he was fiercely dedicated. Perhaps it was simply his trust in Providence, instilled by his mother, sister, wife, and his own experience of overcoming tremendous odds. Certainly he often referred to the protection God had been pleased to grant him. And there was his absolute dedication to personal honor. Washington was fortunate to have such an obstinate man in his army, America to have such a natural and dedicated soldier in her cause. But bravery alone could not achieve this particular victory. A long winter lay ahead as the depleted American force suffered cold, smallpox, discouragement, despair.

Snow continued to fall all day, as Carleton directed the city’s defense. At dawn he sent a search party to gather the wounded and dead. Someone found a frozen hand just visible above the snow at the barrier. It was Montgomery’s. His body lay between those of two of his aides, MacPherson and Cheeseman.²¹ Carleton learned of the death that afternoon and ordered Montgomery’s body to be brought into Quebec. The man had, after all, been a fellow officer and a comrade. They had served together. One of Carleton’s officers wrote of Montgomery’s death, “Those who knew him formerly in this place, sincerely lament his late infatuation. They say he was a genteel man, and an agreeable companion.”²² Carleton was determined to give Montgomery a proper military funeral. At sunset on the evening of January 4 with Carleton and a few other British officers in attendance, General Montgomery, the reluctant warrior, was laid to rest in a flannel-lined coffin in the city’s St. Louis bastion. It was a simple, dignified ceremony. Two other Americans were buried in the same plot. Under a flag of truce Carleton later sent Montgomery’s widow, Janet, his watch and seal.²³

But that was not the end of the story for this fine soldier, loved and respected by both sides. Some forty-three years later, as his wife stood on her porch at Rhinebeck, New York, a barge bringing Montgomery’s remains from Quebec paused in the river below his old home before moving on to New York where they were laid to rest at St. Paul’s Church. Congress ordered this first national monument, erected there in his honor, where passersby on the street could see it and remember. Benjamin Franklin arranged for the French sculptor, Caffieres, to design it, and personally composed the inscription for this final tribute.²⁴

Arnold’s men had not been killed as at first feared, they had been taken prisoner. Much to Arnold’s surprise Carleton treated them very humanely, hoping to convince them of the wisdom of giving up rebellious notions. One of them, Major Return Meigs, was permitted to retrieve their baggage from the American lines. As he prepared to return to the city Arnold handed him a substantial amount of his own money to distribute among his imprisoned officers.²⁵

The three long winter months that intervened before Wooster came to Arnold’s aid were particularly trying ones. The weather was terrible, one of the most severe winters in memory. His men were sickening as smallpox raged through the ranks. He and Schuyler both wrote Congress pleading for money and supplies, Arnold pointing out, “We have been obliged to beg, borrow, and squeeze to get money for our subsistence.”²⁶ He also asked for someone to take charge of financial matters and accounts. “The multiplicity of accounts which daily arise here, and many which originated in the life of Genl Montgomery, together with those of the commissaries & quartermasters . . . and do not immediately fall under any particular department, renders it impossible for a commanding officer to pay that attention to them which they deserve and at the same time do his duty as a soldier.”²⁷ He requested that a paymaster or committee take charge of the accounts. It was a sensible request, especially after the fiasco about finances and supplies at Ticonderoga. But despite this plea Arnold would later be charged with not having kept careful accounts of expenditures during the wilderness expedition and afterward. Arnold was frank with Washington: “The severity of the climate, the troops very ill clad and worse paid, the trouble of reconciling matters among the inhabitants, and lately an uneasiness among some of the New York & other officers, who think themselves neglected in the new arrangement, while those who deserted the cause and went home last fall have been promoted, in short the choice of difficulties I have had to encounter has rendered it so very perplexing that I have often been at a loss, how to conduct matters.”²⁸ The men were hungry and resorted to stealing from the locals and scrounging for firewood which, of course, turned the local residents against them. Of Arnold and Montgomery’s combined force only eight hundred men remained and half of these were new French Canadian recruits.

Apart from such major problems there were smaller but vexing irritants. His old enemies from the Ticonderoga campaign, Major John Brown and Colonel James Easton, who had been in Montgomery’s army, were now under Arnold’s command. Brown, typically unreliable and insubordinate, refused to obey Arnold’s orders to bring in the six siege mortars left at St. Roch’s after the battle, thus abandoning them to the British. Brown was obviously a poor choice for that mission, never having been keen to put himself in harm’s way.

Brown also claimed to have been promoted to colonel and therefore deserved an independent command. Easton, as always, backed Brown’s claims. Brown insisted Montgomery had promised to promote him to colonel. But Arnold, writing to Hancock of this claim, pointed out that Montgomery had informed him that “Colonel Easton and Major Brown were publicly impeached with plundering the officers’ baggage taken at Sorrel, contrary to articles of capitulation and to the great scandal of the American Army, he could not, in conscience or honor promote him until these matters were cleared up.”²⁹ Montgomery then had sent for Brown to tell him this. Arnold noted, several officers were witness to the conversation and the episode was well known to the officers and men at Montreal. Arnold advised that while Brown and Easton had “a sufficient share of modest merit to apply to the Honorable Continental Congress for promotion . . . I believe it would give great disgust to the Army in general if those gentlemen were promoted before those matters were cleared up.” He added in a postscript that he did not mean the contents of his letter to be kept from “the gentlemen mentioned therein.” This episode added to the festering bitterness Brown and Easton felt for Arnold, hatred that would plague him for the rest of his career.

In contrast to Brown’s claimed promotion, Arnold actually was promoted. When Congress learned of Arnold’s fortitude leading his men through the wilderness and valor in the assault on Quebec they voted unanimously to promote him to brigadier general. He thanked Congress for the honor that he would “study to deserve.”³⁰ Washington and Schuyler exchanged letters commiserating about the failure to take Quebec and the deaths and injuries caused in the attempt. “I condole with you on the fall of the brave and worthy Montgomery,” Washington wrote, adding, “I am much concerned for the intrepid and enterprising Arnold.”³¹ He wrote Arnold, “Wishing you a speedy recovery & the possession of those laurels, which your bravery & perservance justly merit.”³² Arnold replied promising his “utmost exertions shall not be wanting to effect your wishes in adding it [Canada] to the United Colonies.”³³ He was now “able to hobble about my room,” and “though my leg is a little contracted and weak; I hope soon to be ready for action.” He intended to continue the blockade of Quebec, informing Congress on January 11: “I expect General Wooster from Montreal with a reinforcement every minute.”³⁴ In February, with Arnold still in the hospital, Wooster wrote Washington marveling that Arnold, “to his great honor, kept up the blockade with such a handful of men that the story when told hereafter will scarcely be believed.”³⁵ That situation, however, failed to convince Wooster to come to Arnold’s aid. Instead he informed Arnold he could not leave Montreal.³⁶ Arnold still hoped for someone else to take command writing Washington, “I hope soon to have the pleasure to seeing Genl Lee or some experienced officer here.”³⁷ Grim as his army’s situation was, since Arnold expected Wooster to appear with reinforcements and anticipated additional help from Washington and Congress. He began planning for an attack in early spring. It was essential to capture the city before the British could reinforce Carleton.

For his part Carleton preferred to await reinforcements in the spring rather than attack the weak American force that winter. He had no confidence his Canadian militia would do well in an open battle, and even if they did, bringing American prisoners, some suffering from smallpox, into the city was irresponsible. Nor could he afford to risk losing Quebec. Happily for the Americans, apart from the occasional skirmish outside the walls, the British sat tight throughout the winter.

At last, on April 1 Wooster appeared at Arnold’s camp to take command. Arnold had still not completely recovered from the shot to his leg and a day after Wooster’s appearance was hurt when his horse fell as he rode to one of the outposts. Nevertheless, as he wrote General Schuyler, he was keen to take “an active part” at Quebec. But, he complained, General Wooster “did not think proper to consult me.” Arnold requested permission to leave Quebec and take command of Montreal.³⁸ Wooster agreed. This would not be the last time Arnold chafed under the supervision of a superior officer who was cautious and indecisive. Arnold’s very energy and boldness seemed to cause such men to resent and distrust him.

Arnold’s estimation of Wooster’s passivity turned out to be sadly accurate. Once Arnold left for Montreal, an historian found, “all vigorous efforts in the field to capture Quebec and unite the Canadas with the United Colonies terminated.”³⁹ Perhaps no amount of military skill and vigor would have saved the campaign. When Enos and his division abandoned the trek through Maine, Arnold lost a third of his own army. Those additional men might have tipped the balance. Now British Canada would prove, as Washington feared, a powerful weapon against the American cause.

No sooner had Arnold taken command at Montreal when three commissioners sent by the Congress appeared there—Benjamin Franklin, then seventy years old, and Samuel Chase and Charles Carroll, both from Maryland. Carroll’s brother, the Reverend John Carroll, first Roman Catholic Archbishop of the American colonies, came with them hoping his presence would reassure French Catholics that Americans welcomed those of that faith. Arnold greeted the commissioners warmly with a special reception and a resounding cannonade from the fortress. Their mission was to persuade Canadians that the Americans meant to defeat Carleton and enable the Canadians to pursue their own liberty.⁴⁰ The commissioners’ description of the army they found mirrors Arnold’s:

The army is in a distressed condition, and is in want of the most necessary articles—meat, bread, tents, shoes, stockings, shirts, etc. They said they were obliged to seize by force flour to supply the garrison with bread.⁴¹

But help was on the way. As Arnold was planning for a spring offensive Washington wrote that Major General John Thomas was on his way to take command in Canada, replacing Wooster. He also informed Arnold of the great success at Boston.⁴² Cannon hauled from Ticonderoga during the winter had permitted Washington to threaten General Gage and the British troops besieged in Boston. In late March the British army evacuated the city sailing to the north. The worrisome aspect of this victory was that the British army and fleet were likely headed for Halifax. Washington hoped Quebec would be in American hands before the ice on the St. Lawrence River broke that spring enabling the British to reinforce Carleton.

It wasn’t just the affiliation of Canada that was at stake. If Carleton and the British retained control of Canada their next move would be to attempt to take command of Lake Champlain and advance down the Hudson River to New York. In fact they were arranging to bring over some thirteen thousand troops from England, Ireland, and Germany to do just that.

In addition to all his other concerns that spring Arnold was confronted with a terrible dilemma.⁴³ He had stationed some four hundred men under Colonel Bedel at The Cedars, a point thirty-six miles from Montreal on the north side of the river. In May a British force of 150 English and Canadian soldiers and 500 Indians came down the river under Captain Foster. Colonel Bedel “fled” to Montreal to get reinforcements, leaving Major Butterfield in charge. Butterfield was terrified of the Indians and keen to surrender without a fight. Arnold immediately sent Major Sherburne with 140 men to relieve the post and followed himself. But Butterfield surrendered just before Sherburne arrived and Sherburne and his men were ambushed by the Indians. Some fifty-two men were killed, even some who had surrendered. Furious at this, Arnold dashed to St. Anne just in time to see the Indians taking their prisoners to the mainland from an island three miles away. Since his own boats had not yet arrived he was unable to pursue them but sent a friendly Indian chief to demand that if the prisoners were not returned, “he would destroy their villages, and pursue and put to the sword any one who fell into his hands.”⁴⁴ Back came the reply refusing to give up their prisoners and threatening that if Arnold followed them and attacked they would immediately kill all the prisoners. As soon as his boats appeared Arnold made straight to the island where his men had been held. He found five men, stripped and starving. Two others who were very weak had been killed. Arnold was furious and would not be deterred. His little fleet of boats tracked the British and found them camped for the night. Arnold was determined to attack at dawn when a message came signed by Major Sherburne for an equal exchange of prisoners, the British prisoners to be sent to Quebec, but the American hostages when released were to return home and not fight against the British again. Arnold was again warned that if he did not agree the American prisoners would be killed. Arnold had the men to make good an attack but was reluctant to sacrifice the hostages. He finally agreed to the exchange of prisoners provided they were on equal terms, writing to the British captain, Foster, that if he refused the equal terms “my determination was to attack him immediately; and if our prisoners were murdered, to sacrifice every soul which fell into our hands.”⁴⁵ Arnold wrote Congress:

Words cannot express my feelings . . . torn by conflicting passions of revenge and humanity; a sufficient force to take ample revenge, raging for action, urged me on, on one hand; and humanity for five hundred unhappy wretches, who were on the point of being sacrificed if our vengeance was not delayed, plead strongly on the other.

Captain Foster agreed to Arnold’s demand for equal treatment. Congress was upset about honoring this extorted agreement though Washington was prepared to honor it. In the end the British lost interest. Arnold and his men returned to Montreal.

If Congress was upset about this incident, Arnold was in anguish about the terrible situation that he was dealing with. At the end of May he wrote Horatio Gates of his dismay:

I shall be ever happy in your friendship and society, and hope with you, that our next winter quarters will be more agreeable, though I must doubt it, if affairs go as ill with you as here. Neglected by Congress below; pinched with every want here; distressed with the small-pox; want of Generals and discipline in our army—which may rather be called a great rabble—our late unhappy retreat from Quebeck and loss of the Cedars; our credit and reputation lost, and great part of the country; and a powerful foreign enemy advancing upon us; are so many difficulties we cannot surmount them. My whole thoughts are now bent on making a safe retreat out of this country; however, I hope we shall not be obliged to leave it until we have had one bout more for the honor of America.⁴⁶

He hoped they could make a stand and keep control of Lake Champlain but admitted, “I am heartily chagrined to think we have lost in one month all the immortal Montgomery was a whole campaign in gaining, together with our credit, and many men and an amazing sum of money. The commissioners this day leave us as our good fortune has long since, but as Miss, like other Misses, is fickle, and often changes, I still hope for her favors again; and that we shall have the pleasure of dying or living happy together.”

The following day, as the British began reinforcing Carleton, Arnold admitted there was no hope for the Canadian expedition’s success. Already, as Arnold wrote Gates, General Thomas and his army had been forced to retreat from Quebec and were pursued up the river. Arnold conceded to Schuyler in a letter of June 13 that “The junction of the Canadas with the colonies is now at an end.”⁴⁷ “Let us quit them,” he advised, “and secure our own country before it is too late.” Typically he considered what the honorable approach was in the circumstances. He had changed his mind about wanting one more bout. “There will be more honor in making a safe retreat,” he ventured, “than in hazarding a battle against such superiority; and which will be attended with the loss of men, artillery, etc., and the only pass to our country.” Just in case Schuyler should think him cowardly for the recommendation, he added, “These arguments are not urged by fear for my personal safety: I am content to be the last man who quits this country, and fall, so that my country may rise. But let us not fall altogether.”

And so it turned out. General Sullivan, who replaced General Thomas who had died of smallpox on the retreat, abandoned Canada leaving only Arnold’s forces at Montreal. It was the last place in American hands. Before leaving the city Arnold confiscated “a quantity of goods for use of the army,” from local merchants, “some bought, some seized,” sending these on to St. Johns.⁴⁸ “Everything is in the greatest confusion,” he admitted to Schuyler, “Not one contractor, commissary or quarter-master. I am obliged to do the duty of all.”⁴⁹ This seizure of goods would later be seized upon by Arnold’s enemies claiming Arnold was plundering to enrich himself.

Arnold led the retreat to St. Johns, scene of Montgomery’s triumph eight months earlier, breaking down all the bridges once his army had passed, to slow the advancing British. After all his men were safely aboard ships heading south he and a single comrade, young Captain James Wilkinson, rode to the shore. Night was coming on. They saw the British troops approaching. Arnold galloped back to the shore, stripped his horse of its saddle and bridle and shot the animal to prevent the British seizing it. As night enfolded him he boarded the boat, the last man to leave Canada.