The year began badly. It would end with Arnold’s greatest military triumph, but as in the past, his extraordinary exploits on the battlefield were quickly followed by struggles to defend his honor against a growing number of angry fellow officers. The more Arnold achieved, the deeper the resentment he seemed to arouse among less brilliant officers and wary members of Congress. The year 1777 was no different.
It was puzzling why the hero of Quebec and Lake Champlain was passed over for promotion. True, neither campaign ended in victory, but in both instances Arnold’s behavior was exemplary. At the Lake his defense managed to protect upstate New York from invasion that year. Arnold wondered whether John Brown’s continued allegations that he had plundered the merchants of Montreal was the problem. Brown was busily distributing a pamphlet in his hometown of Pittsfield, Massachusetts, vilifying Arnold. Did Arnold’s reluctance to lobby Congress and the Massachusetts delegates turn them against him, or had he engaged in too much unskillful lobbying? Others, including Horatio Gates, lobbied delegates to Congress far more, and more successfully. Had Washington exerted too much pressure on Arnold’s behalf, or not enough? Actually Washington had not pressed for Arnold’s promotion, doubtless considering it a foregone conclusion. He had, however, recommended Benjamin Lincoln who was promoted to major general although only a militia officer. The commander in chief was as puzzled as Arnold at his being bypassed. As Congress reluctantly agreed to expand the army and lengthen enlistments, it was even more determined to micromanage the force and, in this case, hadn’t the courtesy to inform Washington about the promotions. The commander learned of his new major generals from a newspaper article. When Arnold’s name was not among them his first thought was that there must have been some mistake. Certainly if bypassing Arnold was intended, it was a terrible slight and he worried that Arnold would resign forthwith. Washington wrote him on March 3: “We have had several promotions to the rank of major general,” and confessed “I am at a loss whether you had a preceding appointment, as the newspapers would announce, or whether you have been omitted through some mistake. Should the latter be the case, I beg you not to take any hasty steps in consequence of it, but will allow time for recollection, which I flatter myself will remedy every error that may have been made. My endeavors to that end will not be wanting.”1 Despite his sense of humiliation Arnold did as Washington advised and bided his time.
Washington was as good as his word. Three days later he wrote Richard Henry Lee, a Congressman and friend from Virginia: “I am anxious to know whether General Arnold’s non-promotion was owing to accident or design, and the cause of it.”2 “Surely,” he reminded Lee, “a more active, a more spirited, and sensible officer fills no department in your Army.” Washington feared, “not seeing him then on the list of major generals, and no mention made of him, has given me uneasiness, as it is not to be presumed (being the oldest brigadier) that he will continue in the service under such a slight.” Arnold has been accused of being unusually sensitive about rank and precedent. Yet this was not the case. Washington himself saw the failure to promote him as a serious slight. And later that year other Continental officers were even more irate at what they regarded as an unwarranted promotion. When Generals Greene, Sullivan, and Knox heard a report that Congress had appointed a French officer, Ducondray, a major general in the army, all three wrote directly to Congress on the same day requesting permission to resign.3 “If the report be true,” Greene warned the legislators, “it will lay me under the necessity of resigning my commission, as his appointment supersedes me in command.” Faced with losing three outstanding officers, Congress backed off. That did not happen in Arnold’s case. Other good officers resigned in anger when passed over for promotion.
That same February Congress also passed over John Stark, a tough veteran of the French and Indian War who played a crucial part in the victory at Trenton, choosing instead for brigadier general a well-connected man with little military experience. Stark, unlike Arnold, did resign in fury, stating, “I am bound on Honor to leave the service, Congress having tho’t fit to promote Junr. officers over my head.”4 Stark returned to his farm. 5
Washington’s letters were waiting for Arnold on his return to camp several days later. He replied on March 11 thanking Washington “for interesting yourself so much in my behalf in respect to my appointment, which I have had no advice of and know not by what means it was announced in the papers.”6 After acknowledging Congress’s right to promote “those whom from their abilities, and their long and arduous services, they esteem most deserving,” he found “their promoting junior officers to the rank of major general I view it as a very civil way of requesting my resignation, as unqualified for the office I hold.” This was, in fact, the understanding of officers of that era when they were passed over for promotion, a means of forcing their resignation.7 “My commission was conferred unsolicited and received with pleasure only as a means of serving my country,” he continued. “With equal pleasure I resign it, when I can no longer serve my country with honor.” On the question of honor Arnold held, “The person who, void of the nice feelings of honor, will tamely condescend to give up his right, and retain a commission at the expense of his reputation, I hold as a disgrace to the Army and unworthy of the glorious cause in which we are engaged. When I entered the service of my country my character was not impeached. I have sacrificed my interest, ease and happiness in her cause. It is rather a misfortune than a fault that my exertions have not been crowned with success. I am conscious of the rectitude of my intentions.”
He requested a court of inquiry into his conduct. His countrymen might be ungrateful, he noted, but “every personal injury shall be buried in my zeal for the safety and happiness of my country.” Washington must have been greatly relieved that Arnold agreed not to take any hasty step “that may tend to injure my country.” That is not a promise other officers who felt themselves slighted made. In a second letter Arnold pointed out that his being superseded “must be viewed as an implicit impeachment of my character” and repeated his request for a court of inquiry into his character.8
When Washington replied on April 2 he was able to tell Arnold that he was indeed passed over because Congress had decided numbers of general officers from each state were to be proportionate to the number of troops enlisted from that state and Connecticut already had two major generals.9 This was, Washington judged, “a strange mode of reasoning,” but added, “it may serve to show you that the promotion that was due to your seniority, was not overlooked for want of merit in you.” He judged the situation “of so delicate a nature, that I will not even undertake to advise, your own feelings must be your guide.” This was an explanation, but little comfort. If the intention was to win the war it made little sense to ignore merit as well as seniority. Still, Washington counseled him, “as no particular charge is alleged against you, I do not see upon what ground you can demand a court of inquiry.”
Although Washington found no “particular charge alleged” against Arnold, Arnold was right, the constant criticism of him from a growing number of sources may have had an impact on whether Congress chose to promote him. Among Arnold’s new critics was Brigadier General David Waterbury, who had commanded a ship alongside Arnold’s on Lake Champlain. Waterbury was clearly defensive about having surrendered his ship and crew. In a letter to Gates and in complaints to others he laid out his version of the battle and charged Arnold with recklessly wasting the ships and disregarding the lives of his men.10 This was a transparent attempt to exonerate himself and blame others for his own perceived failing. Arnold never accused Waterbury of cowardice, but his own heroic behavior made Waterbury’s conduct look unworthy. Making matters worse Waterbury’s views were then echoed by Brigadier General William Maxwell of New Jersey, an inveterate malcontent. Another retired British officer just recently promoted to brigadier general, Maxwell had objected to the promotion of Arthur St. Clair before him and accused both Gates and Arnold of incompetence.11 Maxwell, like Waterbury, accused Arnold of needlessly sacrificing the fleet and crew on Lake Champlain. In a private letter to Governor Livingston of New Jersey, Maxwell branded Arnold “our evil genius to the north” who “with a good deal of industry, got us clear of all our fine fleet” which were, Maxwell insisted, “by far the strongest.”12 He argued that Arnold should have retreated before the British fleet and, by not doing so, Maxwell implied, had disobeyed Gates’s orders. In fact, Gates had instructed Arnold to make the best defense he could, for as long as he could, and was delighted at how Arnold had managed to carry out those instructions against a far superior force.13
In sum, although Washington did not find any particular charge causing Congress not to promote the hero of Lake Champlain, Arnold was probably nearer the mark in attributing it to the charges circulating of recklessness and self-serving that turned his achievements into failings. Even Washington’s friend, Richard Henry Lee, who had praised Arnold’s heroism initially, by November was describing Arnold as having behaved in a “fiery, hot, and impetuous” manner, an officer who “without discretion, never thought of informing himself how the enemy went on, and . . . had no idea of retiring when he saw them coming, though so much superior to his force!”14 Arnold’s mission on Lake Champlain and Gates’s instructions to him were grossly distorted by these allegations. Maxwell’s odd assertion to the contrary, the British force was bound to be superior to any fleet the Americans managed to cobble together. Indeed, there was no point building a fleet, only to retreat when the enemy appeared. Arnold’s critics chose to ignore the crucial fact that Arnold’s obstinate defense convinced the British to retreat to Canada for the winter.
Whether because Washington agreed with Arnold’s not Gates’s military advice or because Gates was preoccupied with his own advancement, he had little incentive to correct the general understanding of his orders to Arnold. The day after Arnold was passed over for promotion Congress asked Gates to resume the post of adjutant general, a desk job. They intended that St. Clair, just promoted to major general, take his place as Schuyler’s second in command. This was not at all what Gates wanted. His aim was Schuyler’s post commanding the northern army. He now bent his efforts to persuade Congress to appoint him to replace Schuyler.
As to Arnold’s critics, it is surprising how successful they were, branding his heroic actions as merely rash and self-serving, when he had repeatedly risked his life for the cause. Where his British opponents were impressed by his skill and bravery in the battle on Lake Champlain, some American officers and congressmen saw only vainglory.
Undeterred by Washington’s caution, Arnold decided to petition Congress and left his Rhode Island post heading south. En route he went home to spend time with Hannah and his sons. While in New Haven he hoped to improve his financial affairs. Given British vessels were preying upon American ships, the best opportunity was investing in privateering. Privateers, really licensed pirates sailing in armed merchant ships, preyed in their turn upon British vessels. If they managed to capture a ship bringing supplies to British forces, they could sell the cargo for a handsome profit. Arnold’s ship, Polly, was already engaged in privateering.15
He hadn’t long to concentrate on financial matters, however. Early on March 26 a breathless courier arrived at Arnold’s home with news that the British were invading Connecticut. Some twenty-six ships were spotted off Norwalk making for Compo Beach, twenty-five miles south of New Haven. Their obvious object was the supply depot at Danbury that was only lightly defended. Generals Wooster and Silliman leading six hundred militia had already marched off hoping to protect the supplies at Danbury. Arnold rushed to join them. The officers and men arrived at Bethel four miles from Danbury at two in the morning, only to learn that the depot was already in flames along with many houses in the town. The British, led by William Tryon, Governor of New York, having accomplished their goal were gone.16
The American leaders were determined to head them off. They divided their exhausted troops intent on pursuing the British but unsure which route they meant to take. Pursuers and pursued struggled through driving rain. Members of the Connecticut militia were proud to rally behind Arnold, and joined him. The British were heading for Ridgefield and seemed well informed. At Ridgefield they set the homes of known patriots ablaze and torched the Presbyterian church where munitions were stored. Wooster had taken two hundred men along another route aiming to get behind the enemy. He did catch up with the British but in the fighting the elderly general received a fatal wound.
Arnold and Silliman began a forced march to Ridgefield with five hundred militia. They caught up with the regulars at eleven that morning. Their troops were greatly outnumbered by the two thousand British soldiers, but Arnold was determined to cut off the British retreat to their ships. He ordered his men to throw up a barricade of wagons, logs, stones, and earth.17 Behind this makeshift barrier they were able to hold off three charges. They were finally forced to retreat when a British force flanked them. During one of the charges Arnold’s horse was shot, trapping him under it.18 A young local Tory dashed up to him, bayonet fixed, shouting “Surrender, you are my prisoner!” With a mighty effort Arnold freed himself from the horse replying, “Not yet,” and drawing his pistol shot the man in the chest. He then leaped over a fence and ran through a swamp, bullets spraying all around him. The following day Arnold sent off a message to General McDougall to prepare to waylay the regulars from the front, while Arnold and his men attacked them from the rear.19 The British learned of the ambush and managed to circumvent it, but were harassed and fired on by Arnold’s men while Arnold had yet another horse killed under him. When the retreating regulars reached Compo Beach they counterattacked, driving off the militia just long enough to board their ships.
In recognition of Arnold’s immediately taking action to rally the militia to drive the British out of Connecticut, on May 2 the members of Congress voted to promote him to major general. His appointment read:
In CONGRESS
The DELEGATES of the UNITED STATES
TO
Benedict Arnold, Esquire
We reporting special Trust and Confidence in your Patriotism, Valor, Conduct, and Fidelity, DO by these presence, constitute and appoint you to be
Major General
No issue, now, of the numbers of major generals Connecticut already had. However, Congress did not agree to restore Arnold’s seniority over the five men who had been promoted to major general in February.
Washington was delighted that Arnold had been “restored” to the Continental Army and on May 8 asked him to take command at Peekskill in the Hudson Highlands.20 This was a key location as the fort sat high above the Hudson River guarding the Hudson Highlands from any British move north from New York City. The threat was real. In March there had been a British raid on the fort. Some five hundred regulars with two field guns were put ashore to destroy the supplies there. The American garrison retreated burning the supplies as they left. A small force attacked the British the next day but the British withdrew, having accomplished their mission. The episode left Washington anxious to protect the region in case the British chose to move in that direction during the coming campaign season.
Before Arnold took up the commission at Peekskill, he wanted Congress to appoint a committee to investigate the charges against him. He paid a visit to Washington with that request. Washington understood the concern and sent along a letter to Congress pointing out that “if any such aspersions lie against him, it is but reasonable, that he should have an opportunity of vindicating himself and evincing his innocence.”21 He added that Arnold was concerned that Congress had failed to grant him the seniority he was due. Arnold wrote Congress himself asking for an opportunity to justify his financial claims against the charges “of a catalog of crimes which, if true, ought to subject me to disgrace, infamy, and the just resentment of my countrymen.”22 Congress agreed to hold a hearing.
Arnold made his case to the Board of War the following evening, producing documents from the Canadian expedition. He reminded Congress that they had ignored his plea for a paymaster. The chaotic situation of his troops to and from Canada made careful recordkeeping nearly impossible. Some funds that were to go to divisional commanders had been captured with the financial records during the expedition to Quebec, other records were destroyed when the Royal Savage was captured and burned. Many members of Congress regarded his requests for funds unreasonable and insisted that rather than owing Arnold restitution he owed them $9,000.23 They did, however, concede he had lost horses in battle and granted him money for new mounts. The New Englanders had always been among the most skeptical of Arnold. But even John Adams, who chaired the Board of War, sympathized with Arnold against Brown’s claims. On May 30 Adams wrote of meeting with Arnold and acknowledged he had been “basely slandered and libeled.”24 Still Congress would not restore his seniority. Arnold had had enough and in July wrote to resign his commission.
Military threats to the American cause were especially dire that summer. A major British invasion from Canada, this time led by General John Burgoyne, was advancing on Albany. On June 26 Burgoyne reached Crown Point. The small garrison there fled to Ticonderoga with the British only a few days behind them. In the dead of night on July 6, with British cannon on a nearby hill poised to fire on Fort Ticonderoga, its garrison slipped away. The great fort fell without a shot being fired. Its commander, Arthur St. Clair, along with General Philip Schuyler would face a court-martial for abandoning it. By July 10 the British army was at the north end of Wood Creek laying plans for proceeding to the Hudson. A second British army had taken another route from Canada and was threatening central New York’s Mohawk Valley.
Arnold’s letter of resignation crossed with Washington’s recommending that Arnold be sent to assist Schuyler in the emergency. Indeed Schuyler had asked for Arnold’s assistance. Once again Arnold gave way, putting the defense of the cause ahead of his personal honor. Once again worries about rank and reputation took second place to his loyalty to his country. After he set off on this key commission Congress voted on a resolution to restore his seniority. It was voted down.