THE strategic importance of Crete in all our Mediterranean affairs has already been explained by argument and events. British warships based on Suda Bay or able to refuel there could give an all-important protection to Malta. If our base in Crete was well defended against air attack the whole process of superior sea-power would come into play and ward off any seaborne expedition. But only a hundred miles away lay the Italian fortress of Rhodes, with its ample airfields and well-established installations, and locally in Crete everything had proceeded in a halting manner. I had issued repeated injunctions to have Suda Bay fortified. I had even used the expression “a second Scapa”. The island had been in our possession for nearly six months, but it would only have been possible to equip the harbour with a more powerful outfit of anti-aircraft guns at the expense of other still more urgent needs; nor was the Middle East Command able to find the labour, locally or otherwise, to develop the airfields. There could be no question of sending a large garrison to Crete or of basing strong air forces upon its airfields while Greece was still in Allied hands. But all should have been in readiness to receive reinforcements should they become available and should the need arise. The responsibility for the defective study of the problem and for the feeble execution of the directions given must be shared between Cairo and Whitehall. It was only after the disasters had occurred in Cyrenaica, in Crete, and in the Desert that I realised how overloaded and undersustained General Wavell’s organisation was. Wavell tried his best; but the handling machine at his disposal was too weak to enable him to cope with the vast mass of business which four or five simultaneous campaigns imposed upon him.
At no moment in the war was our Intelligence so truly and precisely informed. In the exultant confusion of their seizure of Athens the German staffs preserved less than their usual secrecy, and our agents in Greece were active and daring. In the last week of April we obtained from trustworthy sources good information about the next German stroke. The movements and excitement of the German 11th Air Corps, and also the frantic collection of small craft in Greek harbours, could not be concealed from attentive eyes and ears. In no operation did I take more personal pains to study and weigh the evidence or to make sure that the magnitude of the impending onslaught was impressed upon the Commanders-in-Chief and imparted to the general on the actual scene.
I had suggested to the C.I.G.S. that General Freyberg should be placed in command of Crete, and he proposed this to Wavell, who had immediately agreed. Bernard Freyberg and I had been friends for many years. The Victoria Cross and the D.S.O. with two bars marked his unsurpassed service, and like his only equal, Carton de Wiart, he deserved the title with which I acclaimed them of “Salamander”. Both thrived in the fire, and were literally shot to pieces without being affected physically or in spirit. At the outset of the war no man was more fitted to command the New Zealand Division, for which he was eagerly chosen. In September 1940 I had toyed with the idea of giving him a far greater scope. Now at length this decisive personal command had come to him.
Freyberg and Wavell had no illusions. The geography of Crete made its defence problem difficult. There was but a single road running along the north coast, upon which were strung all the vulnerable points of the island. Each of these had to be self-supporting. There could be no central reserve free to move to a threatened point once this road was cut and firmly held by the enemy. Only tracks unfit for motor transport ran from the south coast to the north. As the impending danger began to dominate directing minds strong efforts were made to carry reinforcements and supplies of weapons, especially artillery, to the island, but it was then too late. During the second week in May the German Air Force in Greece and in the Ægean established a virtual daylight blockade, and took their toll of all traffic, especially on the northern side, where alone the harbours lay. Out of 27,000 tons of vital munitions sent in the first three weeks of May under 3,000 could be landed, and the rest had to turn back. Our strength in anti-aircraft weapons was fifty guns and twenty-four searchlights. There were only twenty-five part-worn or light tanks. Our defending forces were distributed principally to protect the landing grounds, and the total of Imperial troops that took part in the defence amounted to about 28,600.
But of course it was only our weakness in the air that rendered the German attack possible. The R.A.F. strength early in May was thirty-six aircraft of which only one-half were serviceable. These were distributed between Retimo, Maleme and Heraklion and were but a trifle compared with the overwhelming air forces about to be hurled upon the island. Our inferiority in the air was fully realised by all concerned, and on May 19, the day before the attack, all remaining aircraft were evacuated to Egypt. It was known to the War Cabinet, the Chiefs of Staff, and the Commanders-in-Chief in the Middle East that the only choice lay between fighting under this fearful disadvantage or hurrying out of the island, as might have been possible in the early days of May. But there was no difference of opinion between any of us about facing the attack; and when we see in the light and knowledge of the after-time how nearly, in spite of all our short-comings, we won, and how far-reaching were the advantages even of our failure, we must be well content with the risks we ran and the price we paid.
The battle began on the morning of May 20, and never was a more reckless, ruthless attack launched by the Germans. In many of its aspects at the time it was unique. Nothing like it had ever been seen before. It was the first large-scale airborne attack in the annals of war. The German Air Corps represented the flame of the Hitler Youth Movement and was an ardent embodiment of the Teutonic spirit of revenge for the defeat of 1918. The flower of German manhood was expressed in these valiant, highly trained, and completely devoted Nazi parachute troops. To lay down their lives on the altar of German glory and world-power was their passionate resolve. They were destined to encounter proud soldiers many of whom had come all the way from the other side of the world to fight as volunteers for the Motherland and what they deemed the cause of right and freedom.
The Germans used the whole strength they could command. This was to be Goering’s prodigious air achievement. It might have been launched upon England in 1940 if British air-power had been broken. But this expectation had not been fulfilled. It might have fallen on Malta. But this stroke was spared us. The German Air Corps had waited for more than seven months to strike their blow and prove their mettle. Now at length Goering could give them the long-awaited signal. When the battle joined we did not know what were the total resources of Germany in parachute troops. The 11th Air Corps might have been only one of half a dozen such units. It was not till many months afterwards that we were sure it was the only one. It was in fact the spear-point of the German lance. And this is the story of how it triumphed and was broken.
At Maleme the bulk of our anti-aircraft artillery was put out of action practically at once. Before the bombardment was over gliders began to land west of the airfield. Wherever our troops were noticed they were subjected to tremendous bombardment. Counter-attacks were impossible in daylight. Gliders or troop-carriers landed or crashed on the beaches and in the scrub or on the fireswept airfield. In all, around and between Maleme and Canea over 5,000 Germans reached the ground on the first day. They suffered very heavy losses from the fire and fierce hand-to-hand fighting of the New Zealanders. At the end of the day we were still in possession of the airfield, but that evening the few who were left of the battalion fell back on its supports.
Retimo and Heraklion were both treated to a heavy air bombardment on that morning, followed by parachute drops in the afternoon. Heavy fighting followed, but at nightfall we remained in firm possession of both airfields. The result of this first day’s fighting was therefore fairly satisfactory, except at Maleme; but in every sector bands of well-armed men were now at large. The strength of the attacks far exceeded the expectations of the British command, and the fury of our resistance astonished the enemy.
The onslaught continued on the second day, when troop-carrying aircraft again appeared. Although Maleme airfield remained under our close artillery and mortar fire, troop-carriers continued to land upon it and in the rough ground to the west. The German High Command seemed indifferent to losses, and at least a hundred planes were wrecked by crash-landing in this area. Nevertheless the build-up continued. A counter-attack made that night reached the edge of the airfield, but with daylight the German Air Force reappeared and the gains could not be held.
On the third day Maleme became an effective operational airfield for the enemy. Troop-carriers continued to arrive at a rate of more than twenty an hour. Even more decisive was the fact that they could also return for reinforcements. Altogether it was estimated that in these and the ensuing days more than six hundred troop-carriers landed or crashed more or less successfully on the airfield. Under the increasing pressure the New Zealand Brigade gradually gave way until they were nearly ten miles from Maleme. At Canea and Suda there was no change, and at Retimo the situation was well in hand. At Heraklion the enemy were landing east of the airfield, and an effective hostile lodgment there began and grew.
Next night our weary troops saw to the northward the whole skyline alive with flashes and knew the Royal Navy was at work. The first German seaborne convoy had started on its desperate mission. For two and a half hours the British ships hunted their prey, sinking not less than a dozen caiques and three steamers, all crowded with enemy troops. It was estimated that about four thousand men were drowned that night. Meanwhile Rear-Admiral King, with four cruisers and three destroyers, had spent the night of the 21st patrolling off Heraklion, and at daylight on the 22nd he began to sweep northwards. A single caique loaded with troops was destroyed and by ten o’clock the squadron was approaching the island of Melos. A few minutes later an enemy destroyer with five small craft was sighted to the northward, and was at once engaged. Another destroyer was then seen laying a smoke-screen, and behind the smoke were a large number of caiques. We had in fact intercepted another important convoy crammed with soldiers. Our air reconnaissance had reported this fact to Admiral Cunningham, but it took more than an hour for this news to be confirmed to Admiral King. His ships had been under incessant air attack since daylight, and although they had hitherto suffered no damage all were running short of anti-aircraft ammunition. The Rear-Admiral, not fully realising the prize which was almost within his grasp, felt that to go farther north would jeopardise his whole force, and ordered a withdrawal to the west. As soon as this signal was read by the Commander-in-Chief he sent the following order:
Stick it out. Keep in visual signalling touch. Must not let Army down in Crete. It is essential no seaborne enemy force land in Crete.
It was now too late to destroy the convoy, which had turned back and scattered in all directions among the numerous islands. Thus at least five thousand German soldiers escaped the fate of their comrades. The audacity of the German authorities in ordering these practically defenceless convoys of troops across waters of which they did not possess the naval command as well as that of the air is a sample of what might have happened on a gigantic scale in the North Sea and the English Channel in September 1940. It shows the German lack of comprehension of sea-power against invading forces, and also the price which may be exacted in human life as the penalty for this kind of ignorance.
Inflexibly resolved, whatever the cost, to destroy all seaborne invaders, Admiral Cunningham threw everything into the scale. It is clear that throughout these operations he did not hesitate for this purpose to hazard not only his most precious ships but the whole naval command of the Eastern Mediterranean. His conduct on this issue was highly approved by the Admiralty. In this grim battle the German command was not alone in playing the highest stakes. The events of these forty-eight hours of sea-fighting convinced the enemy, and no further attempts at seaborne landings were made until the fate of Crete had been decided.
But May 22 and 23 were costly days for the Navy. Two cruisers and three destroyers were sunk, one battleship, the Warspite, was put out of action for a long time, and the Valiant and many other vessels were considerably damaged. Nevertheless the sea-guard of Crete had been maintained. The Navy had not failed. Not a single German landed in Crete from the sea until the battle for the island was ended.
May 26 was decisive. Our troops had been under ever-growing pressure for six days. Finally they could stand it no more. Late that night the decision to evacuate Crete was taken, and we had to face once again a bitter and dismal task and the certainty of heavy losses. The harassed, over-strained Fleet had to undertake the embarking of about twenty-two thousand men, mostly from the open beach at Sphakia, across three hundred and fifty miles of sea dominated by hostile air forces. It was necessary for the troops to hide near the edge until called forward for embarkation. At least fifteen thousand men lay concealed in the broken ground near Sphakia, and Freyberg’s rearguard was in constant action.
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A tragedy awaited the simultaneous expedition by Admiral Raw-lings, which went to rescue the Heraklion garrison. Arriving before midnight, the destroyers ferried the troops to the cruisers waiting outside. By 3.20 a.m. the work was complete. Four thousand men had been embarked and the return voyage began. Fighter protection had been arranged, but partly through the change in times the aircraft did not find the ships. The dreaded bombing began at 6 a.m., and continued until 3 p.m., when the squadron was within a hundred miles of Alexandria. The destroyer Hereward was the first casualty. At 6.25 a.m. she was hit by a bomb and could no longer keep up with the convoy. The Admiral rightly decided that he must leave the stricken ship to her fate. She was last seen approaching the coast of Crete. The majority of those on board survived, though as prisoners of war. Worse was to follow. During the next four hours the cruisers Dido and Orion and the destroyer Decoy were all hit. The speed of the squadron fell to 21 knots, but all kept their southerly course in company. In the Orion conditions were appalling. Besides her own crew, she had 1,100 troops on board. On her crowded mess-decks about 260 men were killed and 280 wounded by a bomb which penetrated the bridge. Her commander, Captain G. R. B. Back, was also killed, the ship heavily damaged and set on fire. At noon two Fulmars of the Fleet Air Arm appeared, and thereafter afforded a measure of relief. The fighters of the Royal Air Force, despite all efforts, could not find the tortured squadron, though they fought several engagements and destroyed at least two aircraft. When the squadron reached Alexandria at 8 p.m. on the 29th it was found that one-fifth of the garrison rescued from Heraklion had been killed, wounded, or captured.
After such experiences, General Wavell and his colleagues had to decide how far the effort to bring our troops off from Crete should be pursued. The Army was in mortal peril, the Air could do little, and again the task fell upon the wearied and bomb-torn Navy. To Admiral Cunningham it was against all tradition to abandon the Army in such a crisis. He declared, “It takes the Navy three years to build a new ship. It will take three hundred years to build a new tradition. The evacuation [i.e., rescue] will continue.” By the morning of the 29th nearly 5,000 men had been brought off, but very large numbers were holding out and sheltering on all the approaches to Sphakia, and were bombed whenever they showed themselves by day. The decision to risk unlimited further naval losses was justified, not only in its impulse but by the results.
On the evening of the 28th Admiral King had sailed for Sphakia. Next night about 6,000 men were embarked without interference, and, though attacked three times during the 30th, reached Alexandria safely. This good luck was due to the R.A.F. fighters, who, few though they were, broke up more than one attack before they struck home. On the morning of the 30th Captain Arliss once more sailed for Sphakia, with four destroyers. Two of these had to return, but he continued with the other pair and successfully embarked over fifteen hundred troops. Both ships were damaged by near-misses on the return voyage, but reached Alexandria safely. The King of Greece, after many perils, had been brought off with the British Minister a few days earlier. That night also General Freyberg was evacuated by air on instructions from the Commanders-in-Chief.
On May 30 a final effort was ordered to bring out the remaining troops. It was thought that the numbers at Sphakia did not now exceed 3,000 men, but later information showed that there were more than double that number. Admiral King sailed again on the morning of the 31st. They could not hope to carry all, but Admiral Cunningham ordered the ships to be filled to the utmost. At the same time the Admiralty were told that this would be the last night of evacuation. The embarkation went well, and the ships sailed again at 3 a.m. on June 1, carrying nearly 4,000 troops safely to Alexandria.
Upwards of 5,000 British and Imperial troops were left somewhere in Crete, and were authorised by General Wavell to capitulate. Many individuals however dispersed in the mountainous island, which is 160 miles long. They and the Greek soldiers were succoured by the villagers and countryfolk, who were mercilessly punished whenever detected. Barbarous reprisals were made upon innocent or valiant peasants, who were shot by twenties and thirties. It was for this reason that I proposed to the Supreme War Council three years later, in 1944, that local crimes should be locally judged, and the accused persons sent back for trial on the spot. This principle was accepted, and some of the outstanding debts were paid.
Sixteen thousand five hundred men were brought safely back to Egypt. These were almost entirely British and Imperial troops. Nearly a thousand more were helped to escape later by various Commando enterprises. Our losses were about thirteen thousand killed, wounded, and taken prisoner. To these must be added nearly two thousand naval casualties. Since the war more than four thousand German graves have been counted near Maleme and Suda Bay, and another thousand at Retimo and Heraklion. Besides these were the very large but unknown numbers drowned at sea, and those who later died of wounds in Greece. In all, the enemy must have suffered casualties in killed and wounded of well over fifteen thousand. About 170 troop-carrying aircraft were lost or heavily damaged. But the price they paid for their victory cannot be measured by the slaughter.
The Battle of Crete is an example of the decisive results that may emerge from hard and well-sustained fighting apart from manœuvring for strategic positions. We did not know how many parachute divisions the Germans had. But in fact the 7th Airborne Division was the only one which Goering possessed. This division was destroyed in the Battle of Crete. Upwards of five thousand of his bravest men were killed, and the whole structure of this organisation was irretrievably broken. It never appeared again in any effective form. The New Zealanders and other British, Imperial, and Greek troops who fought in the confused, disheartening, and vain struggle for Crete may feel that they played a definite part in an event which brought us far-reaching relief at a hingeing moment.
The German losses of their highest class fighting men removed a formidable air and parachute weapon from all further part in immediate events in the Middle East. Goering gained only a Pyrrhic victory in Crete; for the forces he expended there might easily have given him Cyprus, Iraq, Syria, and even perhaps Persia. These troops were the very kind needed to overrun large wavering regions where no serious resistance would have been encountered. He was foolish to cast away such almost measureless opportunities and irreplaceable forces in a mortal struggle, often hand to hand, with the warriors of the British Empire.
We now have in our possession the “battle report” of the 11th Air Corps, of which the 7th Airborne Division was a part. When we recall the severe criticism and self-criticism to which our arrangements were subjected, it is interesting to read the other side. “British land forces in Crete,” said the Germans, “were about three times the strength which had been assumed. The area of operations on the island had been prepared for defence with the greatest care and by every possible means.… All works were camouflaged with great skill.… The failure, owing to lack of information, to appreciate correctly the enemy situation endangered the attack of the 11th Air Corps and resulted in exceptionally high and bloody losses.”
The naval position in the Mediterranean was, on paper at least, gravely affected by our losses in the battle and evacuation of Crete. The Battle of Matapan on March 28 had for the time being driven the Italian Fleet into its harbours. But now new, heavy losses had fallen upon our Fleet. On the morrow of Crete Admiral Cunningham had ready for service only two battleships, three cruisers, and seventeen destroyers. Nine other cruisers and destroyers were under repair in Egypt, but the battleships Warspite and Barham and his only aircraft-carrier, the Formidable, besides several other vessels, would have to leave Alexandria for repair elsewhere. Three cruisers and six destroyers had been lost. Reinforcements must be sent without delay to restore the balance. But, as will presently be recorded, still further misfortunes were in store. The period which we now had to face offered to the enemy their best chance of challenging our dubious control of the Mediterranean and the Middle East, with all that this involved. We could not tell they would not seize it.