THE need to pass munitions and supplies of all kinds to the Soviet Government, and the extreme difficulties of the Arctic route, together with future strategic possibilities, made it eminently desirable to open the fullest communication with Russia through Persia. I was not without some anxiety about embarking on yet another new campaign in the Middle East, but the arguments were compulsive. The Persian oilfields were a prime war factor, and if Russia were defeated we would have to be ready to occupy them ourselves. And then there was the threat to India. The suppression of the revolt in Iraq and and the Anglo-French occupation of Syria, achieved as they were by narrow margins, had blotted out Hitler’s Oriental plan, but if the Russians foundered he might try again. An active and numerous German mission had installed itself in Teheran, and German prestige stood high. On the eve of my voyage to Placentia I had set up a special committee to co-ordinate the planning of an operation against Persia, and during my absence at sea they reported to me by telegram the results of their work, which had meanwhile been approved by the War Cabinet. It was clear that the Persians would not expel the German agents and residents from their country, and that we should have to resort to force. On August 13 Mr. Eden received M. Maisky at the Foreign Office, and the terms of our respective Notes to Teheran were agreed. A joint Anglo-Soviet Note of August 17 met with an unsatisfactory reply, and the date for the entry of British and Russian forces into Persia was fixed for the 25th.
In four days it was all over. The Abadan refinery was captured by an infantry brigade, which embarked at Basra and landed at dawn on August 25. The majority of the Persian forces were surprised but escaped in lorries. Some street fighting took place and a few Persian naval craft were seized. At the same time we captured the port of Khurramshahr from the landward side, and a force was sent north towards Ahwaz. As our troops were approaching Ahwaz news of the Shah’s “Cease fire” order was received, and the Persian general ordered his troops back to barracks. In the north the oilfields were easily secured. Our casualties were 22 killed and 42 wounded.
All arrangements with the Russians were smoothly and swiftly agreed. The principal conditions imposed on the Persian Government were the cessation of all resistance, the ejection of Germans, neutrality in the war, and the Allied use of Persian communications for the transit of war supplies to Russia. The further occupation of Persia was peacefully accomplished. British and Russian forces met in amity, and Teheran was jointly occupied on September 17, the Shah having abdicated on the previous day in favour of his gifted twenty-two-year-old son. On September 20 the new Shah, under Allied advice, restored the Constitutional Monarchy, and his father shortly afterwards went into comfortable exile and died at Johannesburg in July 1944. Most of our forces withdrew from the country, leaving only detachments to guard the communications, and Teheran was evacuated by both British and Russian troops on October 18. Thereafter our forces, under General Quinan, were engaged in preparing defences against the possible incursion of German armies from Turkey or the Caucasus, and in making administrative preparations for the large reinforcements which would arrive if that incursion seemed imminent.
The creation of a major supply route to Russia through the Persian Gulf became our prime objective. With a friendly Government in Teheran ports were enlarged, river communications developed, roads built, and railways reconstructed. Starting in September 1941, this enterprise, begun and developed by the British Army, and presently to be adopted and expanded by the United States, enabled us to send to Russia, over a period of four and a half years, five million tons of supplies. Thus ended a brief and fruitful exercise of overwhelming force against a weak and ancient state. Britain and Russia were fighting for their lives. Inter arma silent leges. We may be glad that in our victory the independence of Persia has been preserved.
We must now return to the dominant theatre of the Mediterranean. General Auchinleck had assumed formal command of the Middle East on July 5, and I started my relations with our new Commander-in-Chief in high hopes, but an exchange of telegrams soon made it clear that there were serious divergences of views and values between us. He proposed to reinforce Cyprus as soon as possible by one division, he appreciated the need for regaining Cyrenaica, but he could not be confident that Tobruk could be held after September. He said that the features and armament of the new American tanks introduced modifications in tactical handling, and time must be allowed for these lessons to be studied. He agreed that by the end of July he would have about five hundred cruiser, Infantry, and American tanks. For any operation however 50 per cent. reserves of tanks were required, thus permitting 25 per cent. in the workshops and 25 per cent. for immediate replacement of battle casualties. This was an almost prohibitive condition. Generals only enjoy such comforts in Heaven. And those who demand them do not always get there. Auchlinleck stressed the importance of time both for individual and collective training, and the team spirit, which was essential for efficiency. He thought that the North (i.e., a German attack through Turkey, Syria, and Palestine) might become the decisive front rather than the Desert.
All this caused me sharp disappointment. The General’s early decisions were also perplexing. By long persistence I had at last succeeded in having the 50th British Division brought to Egypt. I was sensitive to the hostile propaganda which asserted that it was the British policy to fight with any other troops but our own and thus avoid the shedding of United Kingdom blood. British casualties in the Middle East, including Greece and Crete, had in fact been greater than those of all our other forces put together, but the nomenclature which was customary gave false impression of the facts. The Indian divisions, of which one-third of the infantry and the whole of the artillery were British, were not described as British-Indian divisions. The armoured divisions, which had borne the brunt of the fighting, were entirely British, but this did not appear in their names. The fact that “British” troops were rarely mentioned in any reports of the fighting gave colour to the enemy’s taunts, and provoked unfavourable comment not only in the United States but in Australia. I had looked forward to the arrival of the 50th Division as an effective means of countering these disparaging currents. General Auchinleck’s decision to pick this as the division to send to Cyprus certainly seemed unfortunate, and lent substance to the reproaches to which we were unjustly subjected. The Chiefs of Staff at home were equally astonished on military grounds that so strange a use should be made of this magnificent body of men.
A far more serious resolve by General Auchinleck was to delay all action against Rommel in the Western Desert, at first for three and eventually for more than four and a half months. The vindication of Wavell’s action of June 15, “Battleaxe”, is found in the fact that although we were somewhat worsted and withdrew to our original position the Germans were utterly unable to advance for the whole of this prolonged period. Their communications, threatened by Tobruk, were insufficient to bring them the necessary reinforcements of armour or even of artillery ammunition to enable Rommel to do more than hold on by his will-power and prestige. The feeding of his force imposed so heavy a strain upon him that its size could only grow gradually. In these circumstances he should have been engaged continuously by the British Army, which had ample road, rail, and sea communications, and was being continually strengthened at a much greater rate both in men and material.
A third misconception seemed to me to be a disproportionate concern for our northern flank. This indeed required the utmost vigilance and justified many defensive preparations and the construction of strong fortified lines in Palestine and Syria. The situation in this quarter however soon became vastly better than in June. Syria was conquered. The Iraq rebellion had been suppressed. All the key points in the desert were held by our troops. Above all, the struggle between Germany and Russia gave new confidence to Turkey. While this hung in the balance there was no chance of a German demand for the passage of her armies through Turkish territory. Persia was being brought into the Allied camp by British and Russian action. This would carry us beyond the winter. In the meanwhile the general situation favoured decisive action in the Western Desert.
Instead, I could not help feeling a stiffness in General Auchinleck’s attitude, which would not be helpful to the interests we all served. Books written since the war have shown how subordinate but influential portions of the Cairo Operations Staff had deplored the decision to send the Army to Greece. They did not know how fully and willingly General Wavell had accepted this policy, still less how searchingly the War Cabinet and Chiefs of Staff had put the issue to him, almost inviting a negative. Wavell, it was suggested, had been led astray by the politicians, and the whole chain of disasters had followed on his compliance with their wishes. Now as a reward for his good-nature he had been removed after all his victories in the moment of defeat. I cannot doubt that in these circles of the Staff there was a strong feeling that the new Commander should not let himself be pressed into hazardous adventures, but should take his time and work on certainties. Such a mood might well have been imparted to General Auchinleck. It was clear that not much progress would be made by correspondence, and in July I invited him to come to London.
His brief visit was from many points of view helpful. He placed himself in harmonious relations with members of the War Cabinet, with the Chiefs of Staff, and with the War Office. He spent a long week-end with me at Chequers. As we got to know better this distinguished officer, upon whose qualities our fortunes were now so largely to depend, and as he became acquainted with the high circle of the British war machine and saw how easily and smoothly it worked, mutual confidence grew. On the other hand, we could not induce him to depart from his resolve to have a prolonged delay in order to prepare a set-piece offensive on November 1. This was to be called “Crusader”, and would be the largest operation we had yet launched. He certainly shook my military advisers with all the detailed argument he produced. I was myself unconvinced. But General Auchinleck’s unquestioned abilities, his powers of exposition, his high, dignified, and commanding personality, gave me the feeling that he might after all be right, and that even if wrong he was still the best man. I therefore yielded to the November date for the offensive, and turned my energies to making it a success. We were all very sorry that we could not persuade him to entrust the battle, when it should come, to General Maitland Wilson. He preferred instead General Alan Cunningham, whose reputation stood high on the morrow of the Abyssinian victories. We had to make the best of it, and that is never worth doing by halves. Thus we shared his responsibility by endorsing his decisions. I must nevertheless record my conviction that General Auchinleck’s four and a half months’ delay in engaging the enemy in the Desert was alike a mistake and a misfortune.
We now have a very full knowledge of what the German High Command thought of Rommel’s situation. They greatly admired his audacity and the incredible successes which had crowned it, but none the less they deemed him in great peril. They strictly forbade him to run any further risks until he could be strongly reinforced. Perhaps, with his prestige, he might bluff it out, in the precarious position in which he stood, until they could bring him the utmost aid in their power. His line of communications trailed back a thousand miles to Tripoli. Benghazi was a valuable short cut for a part at any rate of his supplies and fresh troops, but a toll of increasing severity had to be paid on the sea transport to both these bases. The British forces, already largely superior in numbers, were growing daily. The German tank superiority existed only in quality and organisation. They were weaker in the air. They were very short of artillery ammunition, and feared greatly to have to fire it off. Tobruk seemed a deadly threat in Rommel’s rear, from which at any moment a sortie might be made, cutting his communications. However, while we remained motionless they could be thankful for every day that passed.
Both sides used the summer to reinforce their armies. For us the replenishment of Malta was vital. The loss of Crete deprived Admiral Cunningham’s fleet of a fuelling base near enough to bring our protecting sea-power into action. The possibilities of a seaborne assault on Malta from Italy or Sicily grew, though, as we now know, it was not until 1942 that Hitler and Mussolini approved such a plan. Enemy air bases both in Crete and Cyrenaica menaced the convoy route from Alexandria to Malta so seriously that we had to depend entirely on the West for the passage of supplies. In this task Admiral Somerville, with Force H from Gibraltar, rendered distinguished service. The route the Admiralty had judged the more dangerous became the only one open. Fortunately at this time the demands of his Russian invasion compelled Hitler to withdraw his air force from Sicily, which gave a respite to Malta and restored to us the mastery in the air over the Malta Channel. This not only helped the approach of convoys from the West but enabled us to strike harder at the transports and supply ships reinforcing Rommel.
Two considerable convoys were fought through successfully. The passage of each was a heavy naval operation. In October over 60 per cent. of Rommel’s supplies were sunk in passage. But my anxieties were not allayed, and I urged even greater efforts upon the Admiralty. I desired specially that a new surface force should be based upon Malta. The policy was accepted, though time was needed to bring it about. In October a striking force known as “Force K”, comprising the cruisers Aurora and Penelope and the destroyers Lance and Lively, was formed at Malta. All these measures played their part in the struggle which was now to begin.
Descriptions of modern battles are apt to lose the sense of drama because they are spread over wide spaces and often take weeks to decide, whereas on the famous fields of history the fate of nations and empires was decided on a few square miles of ground in a few hours. The conflicts of fast-moving armoured and motorised forces in the Desert present this contrast with the past in an extreme form.
Tanks had replaced the cavalry of former wars with a vastly more powerful and far-ranging weapon, and in many aspects their manœuvres resembled naval warfare, with seas of sand instead of salt water. The fighting quality of the armoured column, like that of a cruiser squadron, rather than the position where they met the enemy, or the part of the horizon on which he appeared, was the decisive feature. Tank divisions or brigades, and still more smaller units, could form fronts in any direction so swiftly that the perils of being outflanked or taken in rear or cut off had a greatly lessened significance. On the other hand, all depended from moment to moment upon fuel and ammunition, and the supply of both was far more complicated for armoured forces than for the self-contained ships and squadrons at sea. The principles on which the art of war is founded expressed themselves therefore in novel terms, and every encounter taught lessons of its own.
The magnitude of the war effort involved in these Desert struggles must not be underrated. Although only about ninety or a hundred thousand fighting troops were engaged in each of the armies, these needed masses of men and material two or three times as large to sustain them in their trial of strength. The fierce clash of Sidi Rezegh, which marked the opening of General Auchinleck’s offensive, when viewed as a whole, presents many of the most vivid features of war. The personal interventions of the two Commanders-in-Chief were as dominant and decisive and the stakes on both sides were as high as in the olden times.
Auchinleck’s task was first to recapture Cyrenaica, destroying in the process the enemy’s armour, and, secondly, if all went well, to capture Tripolitania. For these purposes General Cunningham was given command of the newly named Eighth Army, consisting of the XHIth and XXXth Corps, and comprising, with the Tobruk garrison, about six divisions, with three brigades in reserve, and 724 tanks. The Western Desert Air Force totalled 1,072 serviceable modern combat aircraft, in addition to ten squadrons operating from Malta. Seventy miles behind Rommel’s front lay the garrison of Tobruk, comprising five brigade groups and an armoured brigade. This fortress was his constant preoccupation, and had hitherto prevented by its strategic threat any advance upon Egypt. To eliminate Tobruk was the settled purpose of the German High Command, and all preparations possible had been made to begin the assault upon it on November 23. Rommel’s army comprised the formidable Afrika Korps, consisting of the 15th and 21st Panzer Divisions and the 90th Light Division, and seven Italian divisions, of which one was armoured. The enemy had 558 tanks. Of the medium and heavy, two-third were German and carried heavier guns than the 2-pounders of our tanks. The enemy were moreover markedly superior in anti-tank weapons. The Axis Air Force consisted of 120 German and about 200 Italian serviceable aircraft at the moment of attack.
Early on November 18, in heavy rain, the Eighth Army leapt forward, and for three days all went well. Part of XXX Corps’ British 7th Armoured Division took Sidi Rezegh, but it was then attacked by the Afrika Korps, whose armour had been kept more concentrated. During the whole of the 21st and 22nd a savage struggle raged, mainly around and upon the airfield. Into this arena virtually all the armour on both sides was drawn, and surged to and fro in violent struggles under the fire of rival batteries. The stronger armament of the German tanks and the larger numbers they brought to the points of collision gave them the advantage. In spite of the heroic and brilliant leadership of Brigadier Jock Campbell the Germans prevailed, and we suffered more heavily than they in tanks. On the night of the 22nd the Germans recaptured Sidi Rezegh. Our force lost two-thirds of its armour, and was ordered to withdraw about twenty miles in order to reorganise. This was a heavy setback.
Meanwhile on November 21, the enemy armour being committed to battle, General Cunningham ordered the XIIIth Corps to advance. They captured the headquarters of the Afrika Korps, and on the 23rd nearly regained Sidi Rezegh, from which their comrades of the 7th Armoured Division had just been driven. On November 24 Freyberg concentrated the bulk of his New Zealanders five miles to the east of the airfield. A sortie from Tobruk had been launched, and was fighting hard against German infantry, but had not broken through. The New Zealand Division stood before Sidi Rezegh after a triumphant march. The enemy frontier garrisons had been cut off, but their armour had won its battle against the XXXth Corps. Very heavy blows and severe losses had been exchanged, and the battle hung in the balance.
There was now a dramatic episode which recalls “Jeb” Stuart’s ride round McClellan in 1862 on the York Town peninsula in the American Civil War. It was however executed with an armoured force which was an army in itself, and whose destruction would have doomed the rest of the Axis army. Rommel resolved to seize the tactical initiative and to force his way eastward to the frontier with his armour in the hope of creating so much chaos and causing so much alarm as to prevail upon our command to give up the struggle and withdraw. He may well have had in his mind the fortune which had rewarded his armoured incursion in the preceding Desert battle of June 15 and led to our retreat at the crucial moment. How nearly he succeeded this time will be apparent as the story proceeds.
He collected the greater part of the Afrika Korps, still the most formidable body in the field, and narrowly missing the headquarters of the XXXth Corps and two great dumps of supplies, without which we could not have continued the fight, he reached the frontier. Here he split his force into columns, some of which turned north and south, and others drove on twenty miles into Egyptian territory. He wrought havoc in our rearward areas and captured many prisoners. His columns however made no impression on the 4th Indian Division, and were pursued by hastily-organised detachments. Above all our Air Force, which had now gained a high degree of mastery in the air above the contending armies, harried him all the time and all the way. Rommel’s columns, virtually unsupported by their own Air, suffered the pangs our troops had known and endured when it was Germany who dominated the battle skies. On the 26th all the enemy’s armour turned northwards and sought haven in and near Bardia. Next day they hurried off to the west, back to Sidi Rezegh, whither they were urgently summoned. Rommel’s daring stroke had failed, but, as will now be seen, only one man—the opposing Commander-in-Chief—stopped him.
The heavy blows we had received and the impression of disorder behind our front, caused by Rommel’s raid, had led General Cunningham to represent to the Commander-in-Chief that a continuation of our offensive might result in the annihilation of our tank force, and so endanger the safety of Egypt. This would mean acknowledged defeat and failure of the whole operation. At this decisive moment General Auchinleck intervened personally. At Cunningham’s request he flew with Air Marshal Tedder to the Desert Headquarters on November 23, and, with full knowledge of all the dangers, ordered General Cunningham “to continue to press the offensive against the enemy”. By his personal action Auchinleck thus saved the battle and proved his outstanding qualities as a commander in the field.
On his return to Cairo on the 25th he decided to replace General Cunningham temporarily by General Ritchie, his Deputy Chief of Staff, “because I have reluctantly concluded that Cunningham, admirable as he has been up to date, has now begun to think defensively, mainly because of our large tank losses.” The Minister of State, Oliver Lyttelton, explained and strongly supported the Commander-in-Chief’s decision. To him I at once telegraphed our approval.
Here I shall leave this incident, so painful to the gallant officer concerned, to his brother the Naval Commander-in-Chief, and to General Auchinleck, who was a personal friend of both. I particularly admired General Auchinleck’s conduct in rising superior to all personal considerations and to all temptations to compromise or delay action.
Meanwhile, Freyberg and his New Zealanders, supported by the 1st Army Tank Brigade, pressed hard upon Sidi Rezegh. After two days of severe fighting they recaptured it. Simultaneously the garrison of Tobruk resumed its sortie and on the night of the 26th joined hands with the relieving force. Some units entered beleaguered Tobruk. This brought Rommel back from Bardia. He fought his way to Sidi Rezegh, attacked in flank by the reorganised 7th Armoured Division, now mustering 120 tanks. He recaptured Sidi Rezegh, and drove back the New Zealand Brigade with crippling loss. Most of them were withdrawn south-eastwards to the frontier, where the heroic division reformed after losing more than three thousand men. The Tobruk garrison, again isolated, held on by a bold decision to all the ground gained.
General Ritchie now regrouped his army and Rommel made a final thrust to rescue his frontier garrisons. It was repulsed. The general retreat of the Axis army to the Gazala line then began.
On December 1 Auchinleck went himself to the Advanced Headquarters, and remained for ten days with General Ritchie. He did not assume the command himself, but closely supervised his subordinate. This did not seem to me the best arrangement for either of them. However, the power of the Eighth Army was now predominant, and on December 10 the Commander-in-Chief could tell me: “Enemy is apparently in full retreat towards the west … I think it now permissible to claim that the siege of Tobruk has been raised. We are pursuing -vigorously in fullest co-operation with the Royal Air Force.” We now know from German records that the enemy losses in the battle were about 33,000 men and 300 tanks. The comparable British and Imperial Army losses in the same period were about half, together with 278 tanks. Nine-tenths of this loss occurred in the first month of the offensive. Here then we reached a moment of relief, and indeed of rejoicing, about the Desert war.
But at this crucial moment our naval power in the Eastern Mediterranean was virtually destroyed by a series of disasters. Our interval of immunity and advantage came to its end. The U-boats arrived upon the scene. On November 12, while returning to Gibraltar after flying more aircraft into Malta, the Ark Royal had been struck by a torpedo from a German U-boat. All attempts to save the ship failed, and this famous veteran, which had played such a distinguished part in so many of our affairs, sank when only twenty-five miles from Gibraltar. A fortnight later the Barham was struck by three torpedoes and capsized in as many minutes with the loss of over 500 men. More was to follow. On the night of December 18 an Italian submarine approached Alexandria and launched three “human torpedoes”, each controlled by two men. They penetrated the harbour while the boom gate was open for the passage of ships. They fixed time-bombs, which detonated early next morning under the battleships Queen Elizabeth and Valiant. Both ships were heavily injured and became a useless burden for months. We were successful in concealing the damage to the battle fleet for some time, but Force “K” was also stricken. On the very day of the Alexandria disaster news reached Malta of an important enemy convoy heading for Tripoli. Three cruisers and four destroyers at once went out to catch them. Approaching Tripoli our ships ran into a new minefield. Two of the cruisers were damaged, but were able to steam away. The third, drifting in the minefield, struck two more mines and sank. Only one man of her crew of over 700 survived—and he as a prisoner of war after four days on a raft, on which his captain, R. C. O’Connor, and thirteen others perished. All that remained of the British Eastern Mediterranean Fleet was a few destroyers and three cruisers of Admiral Vian’s squadron.
On December 5 Hitler, realising at last Rommel’s mortal peril, ordered the transfer of a whole Air Corps from Russia to Sicily and North Africa. A new air offensive against Malta was launched under General Kesselring’s direction. The attacks on the island reached a new peak, and Malta could do no more than struggle for life. By the end of the year it was the Luftwaffe who held the mastery over the sea routes to Tripoli, and thus made possible the refit of Rommel’s armies after their defeat. Seldom has the interaction of sea, air, and land warfare been so strikingly illustrated as in the events of these few months.
But now all paled under the stroke of world events.
