Warsaw Pact Intervention in the Third World

In November 1971, Ryszard Frelek, the newly appointed director of the International Department within the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party (CC PUWP) prepared a one-page memo for Secretary of the CC Stanisław Kania, who was then responsible for the supervision of the state-security apparatus:

The transfer of medical equipment already decommissioned by the Ministry of Defence would be highly appreciated by freedom movements as our humanitarian gesture. We need to take into account, that Poland so far has supported those groups in a smaller scale than other socialist countries. The need to increase our aid for the African national liberation movements also results from our economic relations with Portugal. The most controversial issue is related to sales of vessels which, according to freedom movements, are used by the colonial regime as a tool for dispatching their troops and military hardware. But after very detailed analysis of mutual Polish-Portuguese turnover, we decided that the agreement of selling 3 ships to Lisbon is clearly justified on economic grounds and should proceed. That deal should give us approximately 900 thousand USD. In this situation it seems that a visible increase of aid intended for freedom fighters would minimalize [sic] the threat from them of using the sale of ships for propaganda action against our country. Taking into consideration all those circumstances I suggest sending freedom fighters decommissioned medical equipment.¹

This short report bluntly presents the Polish communists' two-pronged approach towards the decolonization of Africa. Without unnecessary ideological appeals to Marxism–Leninism, Frelek points out that economic factors played the predominant role within Polish foreign policy in so-called Third World countries, and that Warsaw's support for anti-colonial movements had its limits. His attitude not only reflects behind-the-scenes decision making during Edward Gierek's rule as the first secretary of the PUWP (1970–80) but also mirrors the imponderables of the previous Polish position towards African countries.

Based on archival documents, some recently declassified, from the Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Archive of the Institute of National Remembrance and the Central Archive of Modern Records, this chapter argues that the Polish approach towards Africa had deep limitations and was frequently inconsequential and restrained. Authorities in Warsaw were usually circumspect and faintly aloof in ‘bringing the light of revolution’ to newly created postcolonial states. Just like other members of the Warsaw Pact, Poland supported decolonization, sent humanitarian aid and provided economic assistance, but its policy was not primarily determined by ideological goals. In reality, official proclamations; factors such as cost-effectiveness; the profitability of investments; and, particularly, a focus on safeguarding European interests dictated rather limited Polish activity in Cold War Africa. Taking into account the country's population size and level of industrialization within the Soviet bloc, Poland's involvement in Africa was low compared with that of other countries in the Warsaw Pact.

Warsaw's relations with Africa during the Cold War can be viewed in three overlapping phases. Between 1956 and 1970, under Władysław Gomułka as general secretary of the PUWP, policy was shaped by a pragmatic attitude towards international relations, as Warsaw underlined Poland's efforts to secure the stability of its western border. In the early 1960s, Poland aimed to become more active and visible on the African continent. The involvement was based on establishing diplomatic relations, opening embassies and trade offices, signing first agreements and contracts and exchanging official visits.² However, after a few years any anti-colonial enthusiasm had receded due to a lack of expected economic profits, and Polish involvement in some fields decreased. The second phase started under Gomułka's successor, Edward Gierek, who placed greater emphasis on activity within the United Nations and on developing relations with Western countries as well as with African national-liberation movements. In 1973, the Political Bureau of the PUWP adopted a resolution on the coordination of Polish external relations, which highlighted solidarity with national movements and progressive organizations.³ In the 1970s, Warsaw was thus quite active in supporting various guerrilla groups, sending them weapons and/or providing humanitarian aid. At the time, fruitful relations were also established with countries by no means perceived as ‘progressive’. This change in foreign policy was enabled by the reception of foreign loans, which bolstered the Polish economy and thus allowed Warsaw to conduct a more active policy in the international arena. This was the time when the regime spread the myth that Poland was the tenth-most developed country in the world, based on gross domestic product.⁴

Poland's centrally planned economy in fact proved difficult to modernize. The loans were mostly used for expanding heavy industry, and levels of debt rose rapidly after the 1973 oil crisis. In the late 1970s Poland's economy became stagnant, which laid the groundwork for social unrest and the establishment of the ‘Solidarity’ movement. After the introduction of martial law in December 1981, the military government tried to engage more strongly and highlight the Polish presence in Africa – sometimes in a spectacular way. However, such efforts failed due to a weakening economy.⁵ During this third phase of Warsaw's relations with Africa, many of Poland's embassies and consulates in the continent were shut down for economic reasons. In the era of General Wojciech Jaruzelski's rule (1981–90), the driving force of Polish relations with Africa was economic profit, which mostly supplanted Marxist ideology.

In Africa, Poland maintained the most active relations with the Maghreb countries and Egypt.⁶ The authorities in Warsaw usually did not consider the Maghreb as part of their ‘African’ policy, but rather separately focused attention on the Arab-speaking world. This distinction, however, did not relate to various border conflicts and clashes – as, for example, between the Polisario front (the national-liberation movement struggling for independence in Western Sahara) and Morocco.⁷ In 1979, the Polish Foreign Ministry listed Algeria, Angola, Libya, Morocco, Egypt and Nigeria as the group of most significant countries on the continent, while Tunisia and Sudan were listed as the second tier. Relations with the first group featured more active and frequent political, economic and scientific contacts, while there was only limited cooperation with the second group. In a separate category were ‘ideological’ partners: Libya, Algeria, Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia and Benin.⁸ Although appreciated for their pro-socialist attitude, these countries were not viewed as potential partners for establishing fruitful economic relations.

Poland was subjected to the forcible introduction of the Soviet-style system known as ‘Stalinization’ immediately after World War II ended in 1945. Polish foreign policy was thus quickly subjected to the Kremlin's goals, yet its scope was limited to Europe.⁹ However, after Joseph Stalin's death in March 1953, a political ‘thaw’ in the Soviet Union followed through to 1956, culminating in October when Władysław Gomułka again took the post of the first secretary of the CC PUWP.¹⁰ The internal changes within the country resulted in an increasing range of freedoms, which included the expulsion of the Soviet ‘advisors’ and a reduction in Moscow's influence on Poland's policy-making process. Soviet leaders still criticized the country's private agriculture and the strong position of the Catholic Church, but in practice the Kremlin reluctantly accepted this ‘Polish specificity’.¹¹ To some extent, Moscow's domination was also reduced in foreign policy, which allowed Gomułka to set his own tasks and conduct more ‘individual’ actions in the international arena, so long as they did not violate Marxists precepts. The Polish Government was especially interested in securing international recognition of the country's western borders. The Oder–Neisse line was treated by NATO countries as part of the status quo, but no official confirmation was voiced to assure the inviolability of the border.¹² This was why most of Warsaw's efforts, apart from developing relations inside the Soviet bloc, were concentrated on relations with Germany – but also with France, Great Britain and the USA. Polish diplomacy also tried to gain support from African countries for final confirmation of its border, but most of these attempts failed. Non-aligned countries were unfamiliar with the intricacies of the Polish–German borders, and did not want to damage their relations with West Germany by openly backing Warsaw.¹³

In the late 1940s and mid-1950s, Poland had little involvement in Africa besides publicly voicing its support for decolonization.¹⁴ Those Poles who happened to live in Africa were mostly war refugees, who had found safe haven in the British colonies of Tanganyika, Uganda and South Africa.¹⁵ Polish involvement was restrained, especially when Warsaw had a chance to attain important goals in Europe at the expense of its support for decolonization. For example, in 1958 the Polish Government was even ready to withdraw its recognition of the Algerian government in exile, in exchange for a French endorsement of Poland's western border.¹⁶ Gomułka felt that efforts to secure Poland's own particular interests in Europe outweighed the potential benefits of increasing Polish influence in Africa. Nonetheless, that same year Poland took part in a covert mission conducted by Vietnamese communists to transport captured French weapons from Indochina to the Algerian National Liberation Front. Warsaw provided a ship, which successfully transferred the military equipment to North Africa – with commercial goods used as cover.¹⁷

The dawning of 1960, known as the ‘Year of Africa’, marked the beginning of Warsaw's new approach towards the continent. The employees of Department V within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs took over all matters related to Africa and the Middle East.¹⁸ In June 1965, a Polish Committee of Solidarity with Asian and African Nations was established. Its main goal was to maintain international relations with communist or ‘progressive’ national movements and non-state actors from around the world.¹⁹ As officially a ‘public organization’ that was officially sponsored by the general populace²⁰ the committee was used by the Polish Government for transfers of humanitarian aid, hosting wounded guerillas and providing scholarships. Also at this time, an African Studies programme was developed at Warsaw University.²¹

Africa's decolonization also affected Polish society in some ways. The initial idea of establishing an organization focused on promoting the history and culture of Africa appeared only in 1958. A group of people from Łódź submitted a request to the authorities asking permission to create an association dedicated to African affairs. The Ministry of the Interior rejected the idea, but shortly thereafter received many letters from ordinary citizens interested in the struggle against colonialism. The government wanted to have full control over such initiatives and enforce its communist, anti-imperialist line.²² This was the main reason that the Polish–African Friendship Association was created in 1962. Members of the association organized exhibitions, lectures and meetings with African students and diplomats. In 1963, they organized special courses at the Aviation Training Centre in Krosno for 21 people from Angola, Togo and Algeria. The Red Cross strongly needed experienced crews, and 13 of these students were trained to be pilots while the other eight were trained to be aircraft mechanics.²³ Because the organization was fully subordinated to the authorities, who aimed through it to fulfil political goals, the Polish–African Friendship Association was not flexible enough and failed to change the stereotypical image of Africa within Polish society.²⁴ The majority of Poles still did not know much about Africa, and the continent remained terra incognita. Yet, because information on the outside world was strictly limited, from the late 1950s onwards African students aroused great interest on grey, sad and ethnically homogeneous Polish streets.²⁵

From the 1960s, Warsaw backed many resolutions in the United Nations General Assembly supporting national-liberation movements in Africa, usually in accordance with guidelines sent from the Kremlin. Some evidence comes from the analysis of conferences and seminars organized by the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organisation (AAPSO) in which the Soviet Solidarity Committee was perceived – at least, by Polish delegations – as a coordinator of policy towards national-liberation movements. When multilateral talks during official summits came to an end, the Soviets always arranged unofficial meetings and gathered members of other socialist solidarity committees to summarize and recapitulate the debate. This was the moment when the Soviets presented their opinions and suggestions for further actions, which were usually taken into consideration by other delegations.²⁶ The communists were aware that newly independent African countries could provide more pro-Soviet votes in the UN, which later could be used for ideological purposes.²⁷

The Polish regime generally preferred to operate under a policy called ‘aid through trade’, which involved closer cooperation with those countries that could offer natural resources or other goods useful for the Polish economy.²⁸ Newly created states were very poor and needed loans for establishing long-term cooperation, but the Polish Government could not provide these to all interested countries. An emphasis was also placed on scientific and technical relations, and the use of Polish specialists. Poland thus prioritized economic goals over ideological factors. Relations with Guinea and Ghana showcased Gomułka's approach.

Warsaw's economic involvement in Guinea was limited. In July 1959, Poland established diplomatic relations with the country and opened its embassy in the capital, Conakry, the following year.²⁹ Politicians from both sides exchanged visits and signed several agreements, but these contacts did not boost economic turnover. The newly independent country needed military and economic assistance. After the USA refused to provide such aid, the government of Ahmed Sékou Touré sought support from Poland and other communist countries. A Guinean delegation visited Poland in February 1959, just a few months before the protocol establishing diplomatic relations was signed. The Guineans sought non-refundable support in economic and military areas.³⁰ Touré expected that communist countries would willingly transfer expertise and provide guidance with the implementation of economic reforms.³¹ While Czechoslovakia provided Conakry with much aid, Poland did not.³² According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Warsaw could not afford to build a dam and power station in Guinea in exchange for bananas and pineapples, offered at a price 30-per cent more expensive than on world markets – as the Soviets agreed to do.³³ Neither did Warsaw provide arms or counter-intelligence training to the Guinean Army – in contrast to the USSR and Czechoslovakia.³⁴ The fate of a joint Polish–Guinean fishing company, ‘Soguipol’, shows that entering African markets was not as easy as policy makers in Warsaw initially thought. The enterprise was established in 1961, but only after two years was shut down due to large economic losses. Vessels were sold to Guinean authorities, but only a few Polish specialists remained in Conakry providing assistance in developing the fishing industry.³⁵

Closer cooperation was established with Ghana. In January 1959, a Polish delegation visited Conakry and held talks with Ghana's first president, Kwame Nkrumah, about potential cooperation. Polish diplomats concluded that Ghana had interesting prospects for economical involvement; however, due to continuing British influence and corruption, the possible partnership had its limitations.³⁶ The Polish Embassy was opened there in 1961, followed by the establishment of the Ghanaian Embassy in Warsaw the following year. In July 1961, Nkrumah visited Poland, becoming the first high-level African political figure to visit Warsaw after World War II. He met with Chairman of the State Aleksander Zawadzki and Prime Minister Józef Cyrankiewicz and signed an agreement to buy industrial equipment on credit terms. A couple of months later, during the non-aligned countries' conference in Belgrade, Nkrumah gave clear support to Polish demands urging the final confirmation of its western borders, which could be perceived as a simple quid pro quo exchange. The conference's public resolution on this matter was not adopted due only to West Germany's tempting offers of economic aid, made to several African countries.³⁷ Nonetheless, this issue would remain a significant aspect of Polish diplomacy in Africa. When Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie paid a visit to Poland in September 1964, he was also thoroughly briefed on the matter.³⁸ The Ghanaian Embassy in Warsaw was quietly shut down in 1967; the decision probably had to do with Nkrumah's overthrow in a military coup of the same year.³⁹

Beyond economic collaboration, the Polish authorities developed cultural and scientific exchange with Ghana.⁴⁰ In January 1964, several scholars from Warsaw University received scholarships to deliver public lectures and conduct research at the University of Ghana. In return, students and academics from Ghana were hosted by Polish institutions, which provided assistance and guidance on film production and the functioning of state theatres.⁴¹ However not all Polish scholars wanted to teach Marxist–Leninist theory to foreign students, thus rousing the concern of Polish diplomats. In December 1963, Eugeniusz Kułaga, the Polish ambassador to Ghana, held a meeting with all Polish scholars working there, at which he encouraged them to be more ‘socialist’:

‘Mechanical objectivism’ could not be perceived as a guideline for our scholars. They represent the politically involved science and that has to be underscored in their moral approach and lectures. It concerns particularly the economy and political science, so fields where Poles held important positions. We must work skillfully: in the Institute of Cadres, prof. Perczyński should openly teach Marxism with [a] strong critique of Western economic theories. The situation at Accra University is a little bit different. We need to keep an impartial approach but also try to choose material in the way that students would not have any doubts about the superiority of Marxist thought.⁴²

Jan Drewnowski was one of the few professors who did not fit into this ideological framework. Born in 1908, he defended his PhD in 1936 at Warsaw School of Economics (Szkoła Główna Handlowa, SGH). As a prisoner of war, he was held at Oflag Murnau from 1939 to April 1945. He returned to Warsaw the following year, joined the Polish Socialist Party (which in 1948 ‘merged’ with the Communist Party) and started to work as a director at the Central Planning Office. He was expelled from the Communist Party in 1950 under the suspicion of having ‘right-wing views’ and for teaching ‘bourgeois economics’. After the October ‘thaw’ of 1956, he continued to work as a professor at the Main School of Planning and Statistics (Szkoła Główna Planowania i Statystyki – the successor to the SGH) and travelled regularly to Western countries. In the early 1960s, he was chosen by the authorities to be sent as a scholar to Ghana. During the decision making process, no one apparently took into consideration the fact that his political beliefs were not strictly communist. Only when President Nkrumah frequently expressed his displeasure at Drewnowski, claiming that he was an outspoken ‘reactionary’ and supporter of Western economic thought, did the fact become known to the Polish Embassy in Accra.⁴³

Other opinions gathered by Ambassador Kułaga also confirmed the professor's ideological neutrality. According to Allan Nun May – a British scientist who had supplied the USSR with US and British atomic secrets during World War II, and who was acting vice-chairman of the Ghanaian Academy of Science at that time – Drewnowski shared certain economic attitudes with the British, and that is why they did not treat him as a ‘communist’ obstacle.⁴⁴ Indeed, Kułaga was forced to conclude that Professor Drewnowski was an exceptionally good manager, and an experienced and skilful teacher, but by no means was he a Marxist. When Drewnowski was asked to teach in Ghana, nobody required him to have a strong ideological background and nobody vetted his political beliefs or commitment to communism. Nevertheless, the Embassy rapidly removed him following Nkrumah's stinging critique. Drewnowski was promptly sent back home.⁴⁵

The case of Polish scholars in Ghana demonstrates that PUWP authorities did not pay much attention to ideology. It was not only Drewnowski who failed to hide scepticism towards the implementation of socialist solutions within the African economy.⁴⁶ Some evidence comes from a collaborator with the Polish security services codenamed ‘Przybył’, who worked in Guinea as a specialist in the fishing industry between 1964 and 1969. According to his report, the majority of the Poles living in Conakry befriended Western citizens and became involved in illegal trade on the black market. Some of them were focused only on earning hard currency.⁴⁷

The PUWP's policy also focused on economic profit. The emphasis placed on financial factors led to burgeoning Polish–South African economic relations, which flourished in the late 1950s.⁴⁸ In 1960, the Polish Government even seriously took into consideration the possibility of establishing mutual diplomatic relations with South Africa. The idea was abandoned after the Sharpeville massacre (March 1960), when police officers killed 69 black protestors in cold blood.⁴⁹ But later, Polish ships used South African seaports, where they bought oil and supplies, and in 1983 chartered flights between Warsaw and Cape Town were opened.⁵⁰

The opinions of Lucjan Wolniewicz, the chairman of the Polish Solidarity Committee, reflect Poland's sceptical approach. At the first joint meeting of the Eastern bloc solidarity committees held in June 1966 in East Berlin, Wolniewicz voiced doubts about prospects in Africa. During discussions, he was openly critical of Warsaw Pact policy in the continent as he questioned the ideological background of many anti-colonial ‘progressive’ organizations and national leaders that he had recently met on a tour of East Africa. He admitted to being a ‘little shocked’ because he was concerned whether those groups really represented ‘the people’. According to Wolniewicz, communist countries should have been more careful in choosing their African partners because some movements used a pro-socialist line as a ‘veil’ in order to procure financial and military support. He wanted to avoid myopic measures, and concluded, ‘I am not a pessimist. I just want to see what is really happening on this continent.’⁵¹ He also underlined doubts in a report on a meeting of AAPSO that he had attended in December 1967. He voiced mistrust as he described a three-hour-long discussion as a ‘fantastic lesson of collaboration with African and Asian countries’, because Arabs, Africans and Indians ‘throw off their European personality’ and showed their ‘real face’. All the participants wanted to speak at the same time and no one agreed with anyone, reported Wolniewcz.⁵²

Moscow often took advantage of Warsaw's ideological blindness. In the early 1960s, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko had some problems in establishing official contacts with Madagascar, so the Soviet authorities encouraged Warsaw to develop relations. Moreover, the Soviets politely asked Poland to open an embassy in Senegal and intensify activity in Morocco because they believed that Warsaw was perceived as less hostile than the USSR.⁵³ Relations with Ivory Coast may also serve as a good example for illustrating Poland's highly flexible approach towards Africa. The Soviets saw Félix Houphouët-Boigny of Ivory Coast as ‘reactionary’ and pro-Western.⁵⁴ Mutual diplomatic relations between Moscow and Abidjan were not established until 1967, and were severed two years later. Meanwhile, Warsaw established diplomatic relations with Ivory Coast in 1974, during which time Soviet–Ivorian relations were still frozen (they remained so until 1986). This may demonstrate that the Poles were used as a Soviet proxy. Warsaw's policy in Africa, aimed more at achieving economic goals than promoting communist ideology, might have been used by Kremlin authorities as a key for opening doors in several African states ruled by right-wing governments. For example, one can observe this in Polish relations with Liberia. In 1956, Warsaw did not establish diplomatic contacts with Monrovia because its Ministry of Foreign Affairs wanted to wait for the Soviet Union to do so first.⁵⁵ They sent a permanent trade delegation to Monrovia in 1964, but did not establish diplomatic relations with Liberia until 1973. Moreover, when Liberia broke off its relations with Moscow in 1985, it was Poland who took over the representation of Soviet interests.⁵⁶

By the late 1960s, Polish officials became increasingly disappointment with the outcomes, and thus their enthusiasm for Africa declined. In 1969, an official of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs concluded, ‘After the period of socialist states’ active involvement in African events in the early 1960s, when new countries emerged there, socialist states, including Poland, have recently weakened their attention towards this continent.’⁵⁷ Leaders of the Polish Solidarity Committee were also to some extent disappointed. Five years after establishment of the organization they came to this conclusion:

There is a need for a more effective ‘outcome’ of Polish initiatives in the international arena and a more secure ‘acknowledgement’ of the receipts of the material assistance that is provided by us. It still happens that our material assistance is spent without any political benefits to our government, or goes to the wrong people. Equally important matter is a further development of our cooperation with the Solidarity Committees from socialist countries, the need to better coordinate our cooperation and eradication of all forms of ‘competitiveness,’ which unfortunately inform our contacts, especially in economic relations with the so called Third World countries⁵⁸

The situation started to change in December 1970 when Gomułka was overthrown and replaced by Edward Gierek. The new First Secretary wanted to increase Poland's international prestige, and this agenda influenced the country's approach towards Africa.

Gierek's Phase: Support for Anti-Colonial Movements and the Development of Economic Ties

In November 1971, Kwiryn Grela, the general secretary of the Polish Committee of Solidarity with Asian and African Nations, sent to the International Department of the Central Committee of the PUWP a confidential report about the Warsaw Pact's support for African national-liberation movements. He stated that in comparison with other Eastern European countries, Poland's involvement in economic and military assistance was perceived as unworthy of its position and capabilities, particularly when it came to backing anti-Portuguese resistance movements in Angola and Mozambique. In particular, he referred to a case in which the leaders of the national-liberation movements criticized Warsaw for selling Polish ships to Lisbon. Such occurrences undermined Poland's image as a state that supported the anti-colonial struggle. The national-liberation movements had good access to publishing houses; they printed many bulletins, journals, and leaflets; and took part in international conferences. They could therefore, argued Grela, influence the news, constructing an image of Polish–Portuguese collusion.⁵⁹

Warsaw's reputation as an anti-colonial state was poor in the 1960s. In 1969, the leader of the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO), Eduardo Mondlane, complained that Poland was the only country among socialist states that did not support his movement.⁶⁰ Moreover, in June 1970 António Alberto Neto, a member of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), met with representatives of the Polish Solidarity Committee and complained that Polish ships were used to transport Portugal's troops from Europe to its colonies.⁶¹ Grela's report of November 1971 thus suggested activating contacts with the MPLA, FRELIMO and the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC). Prior to this, Polish support for PAIGC had been limited and boiled down to providing medicine (1967, 1971) and clothes (1969). This was why Warsaw increased its total value of aid, delivering 300–500 automatic pistols with ammunition to each of the organizations and inviting some of their leaders – such as the PAIGC commander, Amilcar Cabral – to Poland.⁶²

Figures show that the Polish authorities genuinely improved their support for the liberation movements. While in 1971, PAIGC received 28 boxes of medicine (2,532 kg/5,580 lb), MPLA 17 boxes (1,389 kg/3,060 lb) and FRELIMO 4 boxes (537 kg/1,180 lb), the next year Polish aid increased to 970 boxes with medicine, clothes and technical equipment for PAIGC (75,000 kg/165,000 lb), 406 boxes (31,427 kg/69,280 lb) for MPLA and 488 boxes (39,113 kg/86,230 lb) for FRELIMO.⁶³ Such an increase in assistance for these movements represented an attempt to preserve Poland's anti-colonial reputation in a relatively inexpensive way. Beginning in 1973, the level of support to PAIGC dropped to previous levels and included machetes, medical equipment and medicines.⁶⁴ However, other Warsaw Pact states continued to play a much bigger role in supporting the liberation movements, and Poland's support for the PAIGC and FRELIMO remained pragmatic.⁶⁵ The same was true for Polish relations with the MPLA. Mutual contacts flourished in the 1970s, with Warsaw providing the Angolans with large quantities of military equipment. In 1978 the MPLA's leader, Agostinho Neto, visited Poland and the following year the Polish chairman of the state, Henryk Jabłoński, paid a return visit to Luanda, where an inter-party agreement was signed.⁶⁶

During Gierek's rule, Poland was more active in the international arena and joined the United Nations Council for Namibia in 1972.⁶⁷ This is why the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) was one of the national-liberation movements that maintained quite active and multidimensional relations with Poland.⁶⁸ Contacts dated back to 1962, when SWAPO had received two scholarships for students to study medicine. One was given to Libertina Amathila, who in 1969 became the first African woman to have graduated as a doctor of medicine in Poland and was to became the first female doctor in the history of Namibia. She moved to Tanzania, where in 1970 she became the deputy secretary for health and welfare on the SWAPO Central Committee and director of the SWAPO Women's Council.⁶⁹ In the 1970s, Warsaw provided SWAPO with medicine, weapons, ammunition, tents, four trucks and hosted 60 wounded fighters for medical treatment until 1986.⁷⁰ SWAPO's leader, Sam Nujoma, visited Poland twice. In the 1980s, the frequency of relations largely decreased and scholarships remained the only important element of Polish support. As of 1986, 13 members of this organization were hosted in hospitals in Warsaw and other Polish cities.⁷¹ However Warsaw's assistance to other African organizations – such as the African National Congress, the Tanzanian Party of the Revolution and the Liberation Front in Algeria – was limited.⁷²

At the same time, Gierek's government was also developing economic ties with African countries that were not perceived by the Soviet bloc as ‘progressive’. During the 1970s, the Polish Government maintained fruitful relations with Nigeria, which was then developing its relations with Western countries.⁷³ This collaboration was not motivated by ideology but instead purely limited to trade and investments, which might be the key to understanding its success. Early in the decade, the Polish Embassy even represented East German interests there for some time, because authorities in Lagos did not recognize that country in the international arena.⁷⁴ The number of specialists that Poland sent to Nigeria reached more than 400 in late 1970s.⁷⁵ Moreover, the amount of trade between the two countries was greater than what Poland enjoyed with any other African country.⁷⁶ In 1976, Poland signed with Nigeria a most-favoured nation clause, and the following year its exports there amounted to US$40 million while its imports barely existed. The majority of exports went through joint Polish–Nigerian companies like Daltrade, Polfa, Nigpol or Polconsult Associates, which covered the Nigerian fishing industry, construction business and pharmaceutical industry.⁷⁷ Over subsequent years, economic relations flourished, and in 1983 the number of Polish contract workers reached 800.⁷⁸ This development of economic relations had nothing to do with the promotion of Marxism; maybe that is why mutual cooperation was so efficient.

In the 1970s, Poland tried to stay out of Ethiopia. At that time, Poland relied on foreign loans and maintained relatively favourable relations with the West. It wanted to avoid helping to build a repressive system in Ethiopia, and feared that their involvement would spark unnecessary criticism and lead to the reduction of Western loans. In 1977, the Ethiopian Ministry of Internal Affairs asked for support in establishing an advanced penitentiary system. The idea was discussed in detail within the directorate of the Polish Ministry of Internal Affairs. A handwritten comment by a high-ranking official indicates that Deputy Minister Mirosław Milewski personally opposed the prospect of Poland's involvement. This opinion was shared by Colonel Józef Chomętowski, director of the Ministry of Internal Affairs' Cabinet, who wrote to the Fifth Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘We believe that it would be inadvisable for Poland to provide assistance in this matter.’ Accordingly, the Poles politely rejected the offer.⁷⁹ At the same time, however, PUWP officials did not hesitate to supply the Ethiopian Army with light military hardware and medical equipment.⁸⁰ Sending several dozen boxes of ammunition and AK-47s was a much easier task than providing the sort of long-term assistance implicit in sending qualified advisors. In 1978, the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) appointed Poland to develop particular branches of the Ethiopian economy, especially the textile and leather industry. Warsaw offered cooperation, but Addis Ababa lacked foreign currency, and thus economic relations remained limited.⁸¹

Meanwhile, providing scholarships remained the principal way in which Poland supported African states and national-liberation movements. In the 1967/8 academic year, among the 1,679 foreign students in Poland, 463 came from Africa.⁸² In 1974/5, among 3,876 foreign students, there were 533 Africans.⁸³ By 1979, their number had increased to 1,100.⁸⁴ The most important institution responsible for hosting guests from abroad was the School of Polish for Foreigners, established in 1952 in Łódź. Nearly every foreign student who was given a scholarship was sent there first to learn basic Polish. The school provided education to approximately 30,000 students from Europe, Africa, the Middle East, Asia and Latin America during the Cold War.⁸⁵ Between 1956 and 1975, 1,145 Africans completed the programme, accounting for 23 per cent of all graduates.⁸⁶

Warsaw used scholarships as a simple, easy, inexpensive and useful tool for showcasing support for Africa. The provision of scholarships was often the only aspect of cooperation between Poland and some African countries – as for example, with Ethiopia, with the number of students from that country increasing from two in 1961 to 20 in 1965.⁸⁷ When PUWP officials recognized some regime or national movement as ‘friendly’ but did not want to spend a lot of money on investment projects, they simply offered scholarships. To promote relations with Sudan, the PUWP leadership decided to provide a large number of scholarships, with more than 300 Sudanese graduating from Polish universities by 1986 – most of them with a medical degree.⁸⁸ Scholarships also formed the major form of cooperation with Zambia, with students receiving education in medicine, engineering, architecture, regional and economic planning, and agriculture in Poland.⁸⁹ However, Polish assistance in scholarships remained at much lower levels as compared with other countries of the Warsaw Pact. In 1979, Poland provided only 18 scholarships to Benin.⁹⁰ At the same time, Bulgaria offered 30 scholarships for ideological training in Sofia alone, while the GDR organized a six-week-long seminar about ‘socialist management’ for 200–300 people, providing assistance with shaping Benin's university-level scholar education.⁹¹

Several key factors drove the scope and complexity of the Polish approach towards developing relations with African countries. First, economic conditions did not allow Poland to conduct a wider and more fruitful policy in Africa, and the government was aware that spending public money on international support for so-called Third World countries would not gain much popularity amongst the Polish public. The same situation dissuaded the authorities from providing much-needed loans and made long-term cooperation difficult. A high rate of civil unrest known as the ‘Polish months’ of June 1956, March 1968, December 1970, June 1976 and August 1980 also made it difficult for the government to transform Africa into an interesting and important goal for Polish diplomacy.

Second, the PUWP's leadership was moderately interested in improving its rather modest contribution to the decolonization process. Apart from backing anti-colonial resolutions at the UN or announcing public statements and resolutions condemning ‘racist’ or ‘imperialist’ Western policy, Warsaw did not engage as deeply on the ‘ideological’ field as other Eastern bloc members. Poland did not provide or sell as much military equipment as Czechoslovakia, nor did it help with Marxist education for local African cadres or provide as much security training as the GDR.⁹² One should mention that the state's economic and political interests were strictly limited and focused mostly on Europe. Polish authorities did not have to seek international recognition as did the GDR, nor assert its presence or exert influence to mark its importance within the communist bloc, as did Bulgaria or Romania. Gomułka did not perceive Africa as a place where Warsaw could prove its importance within the Soviet bloc. Conversely, Poland's ideological flexibility allowed Moscow to often use Warsaw to facilitate cooperation with those countries where relations were strained for ideological reasons.

Poland's involvement was not unconditional, had its limits and vacillated over time. Mostly restrained during Gomułka's rule, it became more active in the 1970s, which saw substantial support to anti-Portuguese resistance and to Angola after independence. However, the PUWP leadership wanted at the same time to back ‘socialist’ or ‘progressive’ paths of modernization, develop economic cooperation and generate financial profits. These combined goals were often difficult to achieve because assistance was provided on a non-refundable basis or required complementary support from the USSR or the GDR. Warsaw was also unable to become a powerful player in Africa because of internal instability, and the PUWP did not try to compete with other members of the Warsaw Pact in this respect. Describing Polish–Cameroonian relations, Jacek Knopek concluded that both partners expected from each other more than they could offer.⁹³ This opinion might be extrapolated into the whole Polish attitude towards Africa during the Cold War. The initial optimistic expectations of the early 1960s turned into ‘realpolitik’ based on beneficial relations with countries like Nigeria, which were far from being perceived as Marxist. Pragmatism ruled the Polish approach to Africa.

1.Archiwum Akt Nowych (hereafter, AAN), KC PZPR, LXXVI-503, Ryszard Frelek to Secretary of Central Committee of the PUWP Stanisław Kania, November 1971.

2.Jacek Tebinka, ‘Dyplomacja popaździernikowa (1957–1960)’ [Post-October Diplomacy (1957–1960)], in Wojciech Materski and Waldemar Michowicz (eds), Historia Dyplomacji Polskiej [History of Polish Diplomacy. Volume VI (1944/1945–1989)] (Warsaw, 2010), pp. 579–80.

3.AAN, KC PZPR, sygn. LXXVI-32, Resolution of the Polish Political Bureau of CC PUWP on coordination and organization the Polish external relations, January 1973, p. 4.

4.Marcin Zaremba, ‘Propaganda sukcesu. Dekada Gierka’ [The Propaganda of Success] in Piotr Semków (ed.), Propaganda PRL. Wybrane problemy [The Propaganda of the Polish People's Republic. Selected Problems] (Gdańsk, 2004), pp. 29–30.

5.From 1985 to 1987, the Polish helicopter squadron (Polish Relief Helicopter Squadron in Ethiopia) took part in a relief operation in famine-stricken areas of Tigray and Northern Wollo. The contingent consisted of 22 persons, including ten highly trained pilots who flew three helicopters. The squadron was responsible for selecting and preparing drop zones as well as carrying out airdrops in remote areas.

6.Wanda Jarząbek, PRL w politycznych strukturach Układu Warszawskiego w latach 1955–1980 [The Polish People's Republic in the Political Structures of Warsaw Pact, 1955–1980] (Warsaw, 2008), pp. 87–8; Jacek Knopek, ‘Stosunki Polski z Afryką Arabską po II wojnie światowej’ [Polish relations with North African Arab countries after World War II], Forum Politologiczne, vol. 3 (2006), pp. 139–71; Przemysław Gasztold-Seń, PRL wobec państw Maghrebu 1970–1989 [The Polish People's Republic towards the Maghreb Countries, 1970–1989], Olsztyńskie Studia Afrykanistyczne, vol. 1 (2010), pp. 141–51.

7.Archiwum Ministerstwa Spraw Zagranicznych (hereafter, AMSZ), Department V, 26/86, w-1, 10-4-82, 22-2-82, K. Baliński's Memo on Minister J. Czyrek's talks with Algerian Foreign Minister Achmed Taleb Ibrahimi, 2 June 1982.

8.AMSZ, Departament V, 26/86, w-6, 023-50-82, The Party-Technical Meeting in the Department V, 4 January 1979.

9.Wanda Jarząbek, Polska Rzeczpospolita Ludowa wobec polityki wschodniej Republiki Federalnej Niemiec w latach 1966–1976. Wymiar dwustronny i międzynarodowy [The Polish People's Republic towards the East Policy of the Federal Republic of Germany. Bilateral and International Dimension] (Warsaw, 2011), p. 23.

10.From 1943 to 1948, he had been General Secretary of the Polish Workers' Party, but was removed from the post on charges of supporting ‘right-wing nationalist deviation’ and imprisoned in 1951 during internal purges; he was released in 1954.

11.Andrzej Paczkowski, ‘1956 rok – XX Zjazd. Polski Październik. Walka o autonomię’ [1956–XX Congress. Polish October. The Struggle for Autonomy] in Adam Daniel Rotfeld and A.V. Torkunow (eds), Białe plamy-czarne plamy. Sprawy trudne w polsko-rosyjskich stosunkach 1918–2008 [The Blank Spots-Black Spots. Difficult Issues in Polish-Russian Relations, 1918–2008] (Warsaw, 2010), p. 492.

12.Andrzej Skrzypek, Dyplomatyczne dzieje PRL w latach 1956–1989 [Diplomatic History of Polish People's Republic, 1956–1989] (Pułtusk-Warsaw, 2010), pp. 38–9.

13.Piotr Madajczyk, ‘Dyplomacja polska w latach sześćdziesiątych’ [Polish Diplomacy in the 1960s], in Wojciech Materski and Waldemar Michowicz (eds), Historia dyplomacji polskiej. Tom VI. 1944/1945–1989 [The History of Polish Diplomacy Volume VI, 1944/1945–1989] (Warsaw, 2010), p. 619.

14.Jacek Knopek, Stosunki polsko-zachodnioafrykańskie [Polish-West African Relations] (Toruń, 2013), pp. 124–34, 171.

15.Anna Hejczyk, Sybiracy pod Kilimandżaro. Tengeru, Polskie osiedle w Afryce Wschodniej we wspomnieniach jego mieszkańców [Sybiracy at Kilimanjaro. Tengeru, Polish Resettlement Camp in East Africa in the Memories of its Inhabitants] (Rzeszów-Kraków, 2013).

16.Jacek Tebinka, Uzależnienie czy suwerenność? Odwilż październikowa w dyplomacji Polskiej Rzeczpospolitej Ludowej 1956–1961 [Dependency or Sovereignty? The October Thaw in the Diplomacy of the Polish People's Republic, 1956–1961] (Warsaw, 2010), p. 256.

18.Krzysztof Szczepanik, Organizacja polskiej służby zagranicznej 1918–2010 [The Organization of Polish Diplomacy, 1918–2010] (Warsaw, 2012), p. 219.

19.AAN, KC PZPR, LXXVI-503, Draft Memo on providing support to national movements in Africa, November 1971.

20.Archiwum Instytutu Pamięci Narodowej (hereafter, AIPN), 1585/20320, The Statue of Polish Committee of Solidarity with Nations of Asia and Africa, 1970, p. 12.

21.Konrad Czernichowski, Dominik Kopiński and Andrzej Polus, ‘Polish African Studies at Crossroads: Past, Present, Future’, Africa Spectrum (2012), vols 2–3, pp. 171–2.

22.Błażej Popławski, ‘Z dziejów pewnego towarzystwa. O początkach działalności Towarzystwa Przyjaźni Polsko-Afrykańskiej w Warszawie’ [The History of Some Association. Beginnings of the Polish-African Friendship Association], in Patryk Pleskot (ed.), Cudzoziemcy w Warszawie 1945–1989. Studia i materiały [Foreigners in Warsaw 1945–1989. Studies and Documents] (Warsaw, 2012), pp. 189–92.

23.AIPN Rz, 055/8, The Head of Division VII of 2. Department of Ministry of Internal Affairs to Head of II Division within the Citizen's Militia headquarters in Rzeszów, 1 July 1963, pp. 3–4.

24.See Maciej Ząbek, Biali i czarni. Postawy Polaków wobec Afryki i Afrykanów [White and Black. Poles towards Africa and Africans] (Warsaw, 2007).

26.AAN, Polski Komitet Solidarności z Narodami Azji Afryki i Ameryki Łacińskiej [Polish Committee of Solidarity with the Nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America] (hereafter, PKSzNAAiAŁ), Report from the X. Session of OSAA Steering Committee, 1971.

27.Danuta Eitner, Tadeusz Łętocha and Jerzy Prokopczuk, Państwa Afryki w ONZ 1960–1962 [African Countries in UN, 1960–1962] (Wrocław, 1967).

28.Madajczyk, ‘Dyplomacja polska w latach sześćdziesiątych’, pp. 617–18.

29.Krzysztof Szczepanik, Anna Herman-Łukasik and Barbara Janicka (eds), Stosunki dyplomatyczne Polski. Informator. Tom IV. Afryka i Bliski Wschód 1918–2009 [The Diplomatic Relations of Poland. Directory. Volume IV. Africa and Middle East 1918–2009] (Warsaw, 2010), pp. 81–3.

30.Director General's circular on the visit of Guinean Delegation, 18 February 1959, in Piotr Długołęcki (ed.), Polskie Dokumenty Dyplomatyczne 1959 [Polish Diplomatic Documents 1959] (Warsaw, 2011), pp. 128–9.

31.Dale C. Tatum, Who Influenced whom? Lessons from the Cold War (Lanham, MD, 2002), p. 84.

32.Philip E. Muehlenbeck, Czechoslovakia in Africa, 1945–1968 (New York, 2015).

35.AIPN Gd, 003/29, Plan of operational actions for a case codename ‘Aweni’ on West African seaports, 21 January 1964, pp. 29–30.

36.Memorandum of the Director of Department V on visit of governmental delegation in African countries, March 1959, in Długołęcki, Polskie Dokumenty Dyplomatyczne, pp. 174–6.

38.Degefe Gemechu, ‘Stosunki polsko-etiopskie. Zarys problematyki’ [Polish-Ethiopian Relations: Outline of the Problem], Forum Politologiczne, vol. 3 (2006), pp. 180–1.

39.Szczepanik, Herman-Łukasik and Janicka, Stosunki dyplomatyczne Polski. Informator, p. 76.

40.Lukasz Stanek, ‘Architects from Socialist Countries in Ghana (1957–67): Modern Architecture and Mondialisation’, Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians, 74 (4) (December 2015), pp. 416–42.

41.AIPN, 1585/1942, Plan of implementation of the agreement between Polish People's Republic and Ghana on cultural cooperation for 1965 (undated, but 1965), pp. 5–9.

44.Keith Jeffery, The Secret History of MI6, 1909–1949 (New York, 2011), pp. 658–9.

46.W. Scott Thompson, Ghana's Foreign Policy, 1957–1966: Diplomacy Ideology, and the New State (Princeton, NJ, 1969), p. 277.

47.AIPN Gd, 003/29, Copy of information obtained from source codenamed ‘Przybył’ about Poles in Guinea, 1969, p. 164–7.

48.Jerzy Prokopczuk, Afryka. Likwidacja kolonializmu i neokolonializm [Africa. The Liquidation of Colonialism and Neo-Colonialism] (Warsaw, 1963), pp. 138–9.

50.AIPN, 0449/1 vol. 5, Urgent Note on arresting Polish charter plane by Zambian authorities, 8 January 1987, pp. 84–5.

51.Bundesarchiv-Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der DDR, DZ8/32, Consultation Meeting between the representatives of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee of the European Socialist countries, 28–29 June 1966, p. 57 (I am grateful to Natalia Telepneva for sharing this document with me).

52.AAN, PKSzNAAiAŁ, sygn. 66, Report of Polish Solidarity Committee with Nations of Asia and Africa's Delegation from OSAA Conference in Cairo, 27–29 December 1967.

54.Jerzy Prokopczuk, Problemy ruchu komunistycznego i narodowo-wyzwoleńczego na Bliskim Wschodzie i w Afryce [The Problems of Communist and National-Liberation Movements in the Middle East and Africa] (Warsaw, 1970), p. 49.

56.Szczepanik, Herman-Łukasik and Janicka, Stosunki dyplomatyczne Polski. Informator, p. 176.

57.W. Jarząbek, ‘Dyplomacja polska w warunkach odprężenia (styczeń 1969–lipiec 1975)’ [Polish Diplomacy in a Period of Detente (January 1969–July 1975)], in Materski and Michowicz, Historia dyplomacji, pp. 720–1.

59.AAN, KC PZPR, LXXVI-503, Draft Memorandum on providing support to national movements in Africa, November 1971.

60.AAN, PKSzNAAiAŁ, sygn. 66, Jerzy Prokopczuk's report on the ‘International Conference in Support of the People of Portuguese Colonies and Southern Africa’, which was held in Khartoum, 18–19 January 1969.

61.AAN, PKSzNAAiAŁ, sygn. 66, Note on talks with MPLA's Antonio Alberto Neto, 1970.

62.AAN, KC PZPR, LXXVI-503, Draft Memorandum on providing support to national movements in Africa, November 1971; AAN, KC PZPR, LXXVI-512, Note on sending delegation to Guinea, 1972.

63.Deputy Director of Department V Włodzimierz Paszkowski to International Organizations' Department on support revolutionary movements in Africa, 27 January 1973, in Piotr Majewski (ed.), Polskie Dokumenty Dyplomatyczne 1973 [Polish Diplomatic Documents 1973] (Warsaw, 2006), pp. 31–2.

66.AAN, KC PZPR, LXXVI-605, Agreement of Cooperation between The Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola – Labour Party and Polish United Workers' Party, 1979–1980, undated.

67.Andrzej Abraszewski, Polska w Organizacji Narodów Zjednoczonych (1945–1975) [Poland in the United Nations, 1945–1975] (Warsaw, 1975), p. 150.

68.AAN, KC PZPR, LXXVI-592, Letter from President of SWAPO Sam Nujoma to the Secretary of Central Committee of the Polish Workers' Party in Warsaw, 4 December 1979; Arkadiusz Żukowski, Polsko-południowoafrykańskie stosunki polityczne [Polish-South African Political Relations] (Olsztyn, 1998), pp. 194–8.

69.Libertina Inaaviposa Amathila, Making a Difference (Windhoek, 2012). She also served as the Deputy Prime Minister of Namibia from 2005 to 2010.

70.AAN, KC PZPR, LXXVI-605, Letter from President of SWAPO Sam Nujoma to Comrade Ambassador of the People's Republic of Poland in Luanda about receipt of material aid, 15 December 1980.

71.AAN, KC PZPR, LXXVI-449, South West Africa People's Organization – memorandum prepared in the International Department of the Central Committee of the PUWP, 1986.

72.AAN, KC PZPR, LXXVI-577, Agreement on Establishing Permanent Representation of Zimbabwe Patriotic Front in Poland, 1979; AAN, KC PZPR, LXXVI-592, Evaluation of Polish Solidarity Committee with Nations of Asia and Africa, 1980; AAN, KC PZPR, LXXVI-452, Memorandum prepared in the International Department of the Central Committee of the PUWP on Secretary of the Central Committee of ZANU Nelson T. Mawema's visit in Poland, 8–11 December 1988, 14 December 1988; AAN, KC PZPR, LXXVI-449, The National Liberation Front – memorandum prepared in the International Department of the Central Committee of the PUWP, February 1986; AAN, KC PZPR, LXXVI-449, African National Congress – note prepared in the International Department of the Central Committee of the PUWP, February 1986; AAN, KC PZPR, LXXVI-449, South African Communist Party – note prepared in the International Department of the Central Committee of the PUWP, 17 February 1986; AAN, KC PZPR, LXXVI-449, The revolutionary party in Tanzania, encyclopedic information, Relations with PUWP – memorandum prepared by the International Department of the Central Committee of the PUWP, February 1986; AAN, KC PZPR, LXXVI-449, Congolese Labor Party – note prepared in the International Department of the Central Committee of the PUWP, February 1986; AAN, KC PZPR, LXXVI-592, Program of cooperation between Central Committee of the Congolese Labor Party and PUWP for 1980–1981, undated.

73.See Machowski, ‘Achievements of Poles Employed in Nigeria’, in Zygmunt Łazowski (ed.), Poland's Relations with West Africa (Warsaw, 2004), pp. 155–6.

75.AAN, KC PZPR, LXXVI-577, Report on First Session of Polish-Nigerian Joint Committee on Economic, Scientific and Cultural Cooperation, 5 July 1979.

76.AAN, KC PZPR, LXXVI-577, Program of Cultural and Educational Cooperation between Polish People's Republic and Federal Military Government of Nigeria, 1979–1980, undated.

77.AIPN, 2602/26771, Report on external policy of Nigeria, undated, but 1979, p. 65.

78.AIPN, 01789/389/CD, Report to the Director of the 1st Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs Fabian Dmowski, Warsaw, 6 May 1983, p. 9.

79.AIPN 1585/15315, Note from Colonel J. Chomętowski to Deputy Director of Department V Julian Sutor, 16 May 1977, pp. 8–9.

80.AAN, KC PZPR, LXXVI – 438, Current Situation in Africa and Polish projects – memorandum prepared in the Department V, May 1978.

82.AIPN, 2602/9853, General Mieczysław Bień to General Wojciech Jaruzelski, 12 March 1968, pp. 11–12.

83.AIPN, 003172/9 t. 6, Memorandum on foreign students in Poland, 10 July 1975, p. 71.

84.AIPN, 1585/1811, Memorandum on Polish relations with African countries prepared for a meeting of Parliamentary Commission of Foreign Affairs, 15 October 1979, p. 100.

85.AIPN, 1510/2283, Memorandum on the goals of II Division of Provincial Office of Internal Affairs in Łódź in the field of counteracting threats in The School of Polish for Foreigners. Captain Zbigniew Głowacki's Master of Arts written under supervision of Colonel Dr R. Głukowski in the Institute of Criminalistics and Criminology Academy of the Interior, 1989, p. 43.

86.AIPN, 1510/3609, The organization of counter-intelligence work among the students from non socialist countries in The School of Polish for Foreigners. Captain Janusz Jasiński's Master of Arts written under supervision of Colonel Dr Zbigniew Wiąckiewicz in the Methodology of Counter-Intelligence Chair within the Institute of Criminalistics and Criminology Academy of the Interior, 1976, p. 64. Overall, by 2002, 3,791 African students had graduated from Łódź University.

88.AAN, KC PZPR, LXXVI-449, The Republic of Sudan – memorandum, 11 February 1986.

89.National Archives of Zambia, Cabinet Office, CO 2/6/001, Political brief on Poland for use by the Right Honourable Prime Minister Mr K. S. K. Musokotwane when He meets the Polish Parliamentary Delegation on 4th May 1985 (I am grateful to Jodie Yuzhou Sun for sharing this document with me).

90.AAN, KC PZPR, LXXVI-576, Note prepared in the International Department of the Central Committee of the PUWP, 1 June 1979; AAN, KC PZPR, LXXVI-577, Report on the progress of implementation of the Protocol concerning the results of the talks between the delegations of Poland and Benin, 16 August 1979.

91.AAN, KC PZPR, LXXVI-577, Memorandum on relations between communist parties and socialist countries with the People's Revolutionary Party of Benin, 17 August 1979.

92.Garteth M. Winrow, The Foreign Policy of the GDR in Africa (Cambridge, 1990), p. 223.

93.Jacek Knopek, ‘Stosunki polsko-kameruńskie: geneza, struktury, funkcjonowanie’ [Polish-Cameroonian relations: origins, structures, and development], Wrocławskie Studia Politologiczne, no. 14 (2013), pp. 31–2.