THE FOLLOWING SECTION (AND several below) is excerpted from the final report of Captain Edward X. Delaney—a document that has become something of a classic in the literature of the New York Police Department, and that has been reprinted in the police journals of seven countries, including Russia. It’s official file number is NYPD-EXD-1SEP1968.
“I arrived at the corner of East Seventy-third Street and York Avenue at approximately 3:24 A.M. I had driven over from the 251st Precinct house. My driver was Officer Aloysius McClaire. I immediately saw the squad car that had been parked across Seventy-third Street, supposedly blocking exit from the street. However, it was improperly situated. This was car George Twenty-four (See Appendix IV for complete list of personnel involved.) After identifying myself, I directed that the car be parked slightly toward the middle of the block at a point where private cars were parked on both sides of the street, thus more effectively blocking exit from the street.
“There is a public phone booth located on the northwest corner of East Seventy-third Street and York Avenue. My investigation proved this phone to be out of order. (N.B. Subsequent investigation proved all the public phone booths within a ten-block area of the crime had been deliberately damaged, apparent evidence of the careful and detailed planning of this extremely well-organized crime.)
“I thereupon directed Officer McClaire to force open the door of a cigar shop located on the northwest corner of East Seventy-third Street and York Avenue. He did so, without breaking the glass, and I entered, switched on the lights, and located the proprietor’s phone. (I was careful to respect his property, although recompense should be made by the City of New York for his broken lock.)
“I then called Communications Center and spoke to Lieutenant John K. Fineally. I informed him of the location of my command post and requested that the telephone line on which I was speaking be kept open and manned every minute. He agreed. I also requested that Inspector Walter Abrahamson, on his way in from Queens, be directed to my command post. Lieutenant Fineally acknowledged. I then directed my driver, Officer McClaire, to remain at the open phone line until relieved. He acknowledged this order.
“I was dressed in civilian clothes at this time, being technically off duty. I divested myself of my jacket and carried it over one arm, after rolling up my shirt sleeves. I left my straw hat in the cigar store. I borrowed a Sunday morning newspaper from one of the officers in the car blockading Seventy-third Street. I placed the folded newspaper under my arm. Then I strolled along the south side of East Seventy-third Street, from York Avenue to East End Avenue. As I passed 535 East Seventy-third Street, across the street, I could see, without turning my head, the truck parked in the service entrance. The side doors of the truck were open, but there was no sign of human activity.
“I saw immediately that it was a very poor tactical situation for a frontal assault. The houses facing the beleaguered building offered very little in the way of cover and/or concealment. Most were of the same height as 535, being town houses or converted brown-stones. A frontal assault would be possible, but not within the directives stated in NYPD-SIS-DIR-#64, dated 19 January, 1967, which states: ‘In any action, the commanding officer’s first consideration must be for the safety of innocent bystanders and, secondly, for the safety and well-being of police personnel under his command.’
“When I reached the corner of East Seventy-third Street and East End Avenue, I identified myself to the officers in car George Nineteen, blocking the street at this corner. Again, the car was improperly parked. After pointing out to the driver how I wished the car to be placed, I had him drive me around the block, back to my command post on York Avenue, and then directed him to return to his original post and block the street at that end in the manner in which I had directed. I then returned the newspaper to the officer from whom I had borrowed it.
“In the short drive around the block to my command post, I had formulated my plan of attack. I contacted Lieutenant Fineally at Communications Center via the open telephone line in the cigar store. (May I say at this time that the cooperation of all personnel at Communications Center during this entire episode was exemplary, and my only suggestion for improvement might be a more formalized system of communication with more code words and numbers utilized. Without these, communications tend to become personalized and informal, which just wastes valuable time.)
“I ordered Lieutenant Fineally to send to my command post five more two-man squad cars. I also requested an emergency squad—to be supplied with at least two sets of walkie-talkies; a weapons carrier, with tear gas and riot guns; two searchlight cars; and an ambulance. Lieutenant Fineally stated he would consult his on-duty roster and supply whatever was available as soon as possible. At this time—I estimate it was perhaps 3:40 or 3:45 A.M.—I also asked Lieutenant Fineally to inform Deputy Arthur C. Beatem, the standby deputy of that date, of what was going on and leave it to Deputy Beatem’s judgment as to whether or not to inform the commissioner and/or the mayor. “I then began to organize my forces. …”