EXCERPT FROM THE FINAL report of Captain Edward X. Delaney, NYPD-EXD-1SEP 1968.
“See my memorandum No. 563 dated 21 December, 1966, in which I strongly urged that every commanding officer of the NYPD of the rank of lieutenant and above be required to attend a course in the tactics of small infantry units (up to company strength), as taught at several bases of the U.S. Army and at Quantico, Virginia, where officer candidates of the U.S. Marine corps are trained.
“During my service as patrolman in the period 1946-49, the great majority of crimes were committed by individuals, and the strategy and tactics of the NYPD were, in a large part, directed toward thwarting and frustrating the activities of individual criminals. In recent years, however, the nature of crime in our city (and, indeed, the nation—if not the world) has changed radically.
“We are now faced, not with individual criminals, but with organized bands, gangs, national and international organizations. Most of these are paramilitary or military-type organizations, be they groups of militant college students or hijackers in the garment center. Indeed, the organization variously known as Cosa Nostra, Syndicate, Mafia, etc., even has military titles for its members—don for general or colonel, capo for major or captain, soldier for men in the ranks, etc.
“The realization of the organized military character of crime today led to my memo cited above in which I urged that police officers be given military training in infantry tactics, and also be required to take a two-week refresher course each year to keep abreast of the latest developments. I myself have taken such courses on a volunteer basis since my appointment as lieutenant in 1953.
“Hence, I saw the situation at 535 East Seventy-third Street, in the early morning hours of 1 September, 1968, as a classic military problem. My forces, gathered and gathering (it was now approximately 3:45 A.M.), occupied the low ground—on the street—while the enemy occupied the high ground—in a five-story apartment house. (‘War is geography.’) Of particular relevance to such a situation are the U.S. Army handbooks—USA-45617990-416 (House-to-House Combat) and USA-917835190-017 (Tactics of Street Fighting).
“I decided that, although a direct, frontal assault was possible (such an assault is always possible if casualties may be disregarded), the best solution would be vertical envelopment. This is a technique developed by the Germans in World War II with the dropping of paratroopers behind the enemy’s lines. It was further refined during the Korean Police Action by the use of helicopters. Attack, up to this time, had been largely a two-dimensional problem. It now became three-dimensional.
“During my reconnaissance along East Seventy-third Street, I had noted that the building immediately adjacent to 535 was what I judged to be a 16 to 18-story apartment house. It was flush against the east side of the beleaguered building. I realized at once that a vertical envelopment was possible. That is, I could have combat personnel lowered from the roof of the higher building or, with luck (a very important consideration in all human activities), I could have police officers exit through the windows of the higher building at perhaps the sixth or seventh floor and merely drop or jump to the terraces of the building occupied by the enemy.
“With a noisy display of force, I judged, the police personnel on the top floors of 535 could ‘spook’ the criminals and drive them down onto the street. I did not desire the police personnel on the upper floor (I estimated five would be an adequate number) to enter into combat with the enemy. Their sole duty would be to frighten the criminals down to the street level without endangering any tenants of the building who might be present.
“At that time the enemy would no longer enjoy the advantage of holding the upper ground. By careful, calculated timing, I would then have emplaced in a semicircle about the front of 535, four two-man squad cars and two searchlight cars, all personnel instructed to keep behind the cover and concealment offered by their vehicles as much as possible, and not to fire until fired upon. In addition, I intended to position a force of six men in the rear of 535—that is, in the cemented open space in the rear of the Seventy-fourth Street building that backed onto 535 East Seventy-third Street. This force, I felt, would be sufficient to block a rearward escape by the enemy. The fact that one, indeed, by his extraordinary ability and good fortune, did escape (temporarily), does not, in my opinion, negate the virtues of my plan of operations.
“By this time, the tactical squad (Tactical Patrol Force) had reported to me at my command post. This unit consisted of twenty men, in a bus, commanded by a Negro sergeant. There were two additional Negroes in the squad.
“The following comments may be considered by some to be unnecessary—if not foolhardy—considering the current state of ethnic and racial unrest in New York City. However, I feel my judgments—based on twenty-two years of service in the NYPD—may be of value to other officers faced with a comparable situation, and I am determined to make them. …
“It is said that all men are created equal—and this may be correct, in the sight of God and frequently—but not always—under the law. However, all men are not created equal as to their ethnic and racial origins, their intelligence, their physical strength, and their moral commitment. Specifically, ethnic and racial groups, whatever they may be—Negro, Irish, Polish, Jewish, Italian, etc.—have certain inborn characteristics. Some of these characteristics can be an advantage to a commanding officer; some may be a disadvantage. But if the commanding officer disregards them—through a misguided belief in total equality—he is guilty of dereliction of duty, in my opinion, since his sole duty is to solve the problem at hand, using the best equipment and personnel under his command, with due regard to the potential of his men.
“It has been my experience that Negro personnel are particularly valuable when the situation calls for a large measure of élan and derring-do. And they are especially valuable when they operate as units—that is, when several Negro officers are operating together. Hence, I ordered the Negro sergeant commanding the tactical squad to select the two other Negroes in his squad, augment them by two white officers, and execute the vertical envelopment. This would be the unit that would drop onto the terrace of 535 and flush the enemy down to the street.
“He acknowledged my order, and after a short discussion we agreed his men would be armed with one Thompson submachine gun, two riot guns, service revolvers, smoke, and concussion grenades. In addition, his squad of five men (including himself) would carry a walkie-talkie radio, and they would inform me the moment they had made their drop onto the terrace of 535. The officer’s name is Sergeant James L. Everson, Shield 72897537, and I hereby recommend him for a commendation. (See attached form NYPD-RC-EXD-109FGC-1968.)”