CHAPTER NINE

Bravery, Chaos, and a Rescue Mission

ON DECEMBER 22, 1943, TWO SIGNIFICANT EVENTS OCCURRED THAT were to have a major impact on Sterling Hayden. The first involved Capt. Melvin Benson, the OSS liaison to Tito’s Partisan forces in Yugoslavia. Stationed on the island of Vis, Benson was under the direct authority of Brig. Fitzroy Maclean of the SOE. Like many OSS members in the Balkans, Benson was growing weary of what he felt was both the treatment of the OSS by the British as stepchildren to the SOE, as well as the seemingly ineffective relationship that the British had with Partisan forces. The fact that he was the only American liaison officer assigned to cover the islands of Hvar, Brac, Korcula, and Vis grated on him, as he noted that Maclean had fourteen officers and forty-five other personnel to cover the same territory. His frustration boiled over in a message he sent that specifically noted that the British were intercepting communications directed to him from Cairo and using the information so that they could get credit for the American supplies that were delivered to the Partisans.¹ Commenting on the supply issue in a report on Operation AUDREY, Benson sent a message to Cairo that read in part, “The British are meeting the German threat to these islands with more liaison officers and barmen.”² Unfortunately for Benson, the message received a general release and one of the recipients was Brig. Maclean, who protested to Lt. Col. Paul West, chief of Special Operations, OSS-Cairo. Benson was ordered to report to Cairo to explain the situation before departing on December 22. The OSS hierarchy anticipated that the matter could likely be resolved with an apology to Maclean from Benson, and SO-SBS believed that Benson could possibly be returned to his duties with the Partisans in about a week.³ Hence, with Benson’s departure, there would be no American liaison officer to the Partisans for a short while. This proved problematic for several OSS members.

Capt. Hans Tofte felt that the absence of an American liaison officer, even for a short period of time, would be an “unthinkable” situation. He felt that his assistant, 2nd Lt. John Hamilton, possessed the ideal qualifications to take Benson’s place. Accordingly, utilizing Lt. Cdr. McBaine’s authority, he arranged for orders for Hamilton to depart for Vis on December 24. Hamilton would be accompanied by a radio operator to facilitate direct communications with SO-SBS. To maintain the efficiency of the shipping operations, he also sent three officers and three enlisted Navy personnel to accompany Hamilton.⁴ Adding to the urgency of Hamilton’s assignment was the fact that the Germans had launched Operation Herbstgewitter II, an offensive on the island of Korcula on the very day he was to report in for his new assignment. In his new role as the OSS liaison to the Partisans on the Dalmatian Islands, Hamilton’s mission had an added dimension: to assess the state of the German offensive on Korcula and determine whether the island had been overrun and, if so, to set up alternative shipping routes to supply the Partisans. His primary mission was to make contact with staff officers of Tito’s headquarters in charge of the coastal area of Dalmatia, situated on the island of Hvar.⁵

Hamilton departed on December 24 via surface craft, but due to extremely foul weather, the boat foundered and sank off the Italian coast. Along with his men, he was able to get back to Monopoli, making the extremely rough crossing the following evening and arriving at the island of Korcula the night of December 25. He arrived just as the mismatched foes were engaging. He noted that approximately 3,500 German and Ustasha troops, well-equipped and with four tanks and air cover, were in the process of driving some 1,500 ill-equipped Partisans off of the island. There was constant bombing by Stukas and ME-109s. During that time, Hamilton noted that he did not see any Allied aircraft.⁶

It quickly became apparent to Hamilton that Korcula was lost, and with his team and the remnants of the Partisan army, he escaped the approaching enemy forces the night of December 26 to the island of Hvar after a treacherous sea journey through enemy-infested waters. They left behind approximately three hundred Partisans to act as spies and spotters. They arrived in Hvar just in time for two days of heavy dive-bombing raids by the Germans in preparation for an apparent invasion of the island. During that time, Hamilton was nearly killed on two occasions. While on Hvar, Hamilton met the Partisan leaders at their headquarters and had a six-hour conference with the Partisan staff officers. Their meeting took place in the open on the headquarters’ back porch. During this meeting, he gathered precise information on the military situation on the Dalmatian Islands as well as on the coast.⁷ While standing on that back porch, four Stukas descended and bombed the building, killing five civilians. The following day, while driving to inspect the Partisan line of defense, a German aircraft strafed their Fiat, killing the driver.⁸ Hamilton and the other surviving passengers unleashed a hail of machine-gun fire at the attacking aircraft, chasing it away. On both occasions, Hamilton survived without a scratch.

Shortly after, Hamilton crossed over from Hvar to Vis on a seventy-foot Partisan schooner. Also aboard were over four hundred women and children refugees. Hamilton found the conditions on Vis simultaneously encouraging and appalling. He noted that Vis was virtually a “young Gibraltar,” home to five thousand battle-hardened crack Partisan troops who were veterans of combat in Bosnia.⁹ Counterbalancing this positive situation was the humanitarian crisis that was developing on the island. Hamilton found over six thousand refugees living in a town that normally had a population of 1,200. “They had no clothing, blankets, or shoes, and the food allowance was ¼ lb. of bread per day per family.”¹⁰ Meeting with the commandant and commissar, he found that they had a lot of faith in American aid that they believed was forthcoming. Reflecting on the fact that all major policy decisions rested with the British, and, to Hamilton’s mind, they certainly had no intention of evacuating these civilians back to Italy, he determined that he would return to Italy and attempt to arrange for an evacuation of the refugees.

Before leaving Vis, Hamilton and his team scouted out prospective supply routes on Vis to get the supplies to the other side of the island and subsequently to the mainland of Yugoslavia. He departed Vis, arriving back in Bari on December 31, feeling that, after safely evacuating the refugees out of harm’s way, the Partisans and the British had conveyed to him that there was nothing left for him to do.¹¹ He was also acting in compliance with Tofte’s orders to return by midnight on December 31. He didn’t realize it, but he was stepping into a hornet’s nest, one that also arose as a result of another incident that occurred on December 22.

• • •

On November 8, 1943, a C-53 Dakota aircraft belonging to the 807th Medical Air Evacuation Squadron (MAES) took off from Catania, Sicily, bound for Bari, Italy. Aboard the converted C-47 aircraft were twenty-six American medical personnel, including twelve female nurses. The seemingly routine flight to deliver the nurses and medics to the hospital at Bari to attend to wounded Allied soldiers soon turned out to be a disaster. Encountering treacherous weather over the Mediterranean and Ionian seas, the aircraft soon got lost and was blown farther east over the seas, and finally crash-landed in central Albania, near the village of Elbasan. Fortunately, no one was killed in the crash and they were promptly met by Allied-friendly Albanian Partisans.

The situation was dire for the downed Americans. They were many miles from the Albanian coast on the other side of mountain ridges that separated them from any rescue ports. The harsh Albanian winter weather was the least of their hazards. They were behind German lines, and although their initial rescuers, the Partisans, were friendly, they would have to potentially contend with pro-German Albanian guerillas along any potential evacuation routes. The rescue of the medical team became of the utmost importance to both the American and British governments. The SOE and the OSS were assigned the tasks of locating the nurses and medics and bringing them out of Albania.

The Partisans were soon able to deliver the Americans to members of the British SOE, and the OSS sent Capt. Lloyd Smith to Albania to coordinate the rendezvous and rescue of the medical personnel from Albanian soil. Given all of these factors, it was slow-going. Senior officials grew frustrated over the seeming lack of progress with the rescue mission. This included President Franklin D. Roosevelt, who was closely monitoring the situation and wanted to see concrete results. Returning from Europe aboard the battleship USS Iowa, on December 12, 1943, Roosevelt called the SOE headquarters in Cairo directly. A stunned British duty officer answered the phone to hear the voice of the American president who proceeded to express his concerns and demands in a display of rarely used presidential profanity. “This is Franklin Roosevelt,” he announced. “Why the fuck is it taking you so long to get those nurses out?”

Before the startled duty officer could even respond, Roosevelt threatened, “Captain, if any of those girls is so much as touched, there’ll be serious consequences!” After a slight pause, Roosevelt ended his one-way conversation by saying, “They are the flower of American womanhood. They must be saved at all cost!”¹²

Back at Bari, Hayden was put on alert on December 8 and ordered to be ready to depart on a moment’s notice to pick up Capt. Smith and the rescued Americans once they reached the coast. To accomplish the evacuation, Hayden had a stripped-down converted ex-Royal Yugoslav Navy PT boat ready to depart from the port of Otranto, located on the “heel” of the Italian boot 125 miles up the coast from Bari. It would be a direct shot across the Strait of Otranto to the Albanian coast to facilitate the pickup. In an act of nostalgia for past accomplishments, Hayden named his boat Yankee.

By the third week of December, Lloyd Smith was not able to link up with the downed Americans, whose location could not be accurately determined. The pressure on the OSS and the SOE from the highest levels of the American and British governments was becoming intense. It was then that the SBS decided to insert itself into the situation and attempt its own rescue mission.

On December 22, 1943, Lt. Cdr. Turner McBaine, officer in charge of SO-SBS, contacted Capt. Hans Tofte and instructed him to report to his office. Upon arrival, Tofte saw that four other officers were present for the meeting convened by McBaine. Tofte noticed that Maj. Richard Weil Jr. was among those in attendance. McBaine got directly to the point. He reviewed the entire story of the crash-landing in Albania the previous month on November 8, and the unsuccessful efforts thus far to rescue the medical team. The passengers and crew were believed to have been initially rescued by Albania Partisans. SO-SBS, McBaine announced, would be mounting a rescue mission whereby the five officers present would parachute into Albania to accomplish the mission.¹³ The mission was to be headed up by Maj. Weil.

Weil was an unusual breed of warrior, the kind that gravitated to the OSS. Prior to the war, the thirty-seven-year-old was a New York lawyer. A descendent of a wealthy Jewish family in New York that owned the Macy’s department store, he was an intellect who loved to quote Aristotle and write poetry. Only grudgingly did he give up a career in literature to enter the family business.¹⁴ Weil had never been in a combat situation prior to leading the rescue mission.

Looking around the room, Tofte had an uneasy feeling as he studied the other members of the newly formed team. That night, he went to see McBaine to express his dissatisfaction with the team’s composition. His recommendation was straightforward—one of the five team members should be dropped from the mission; instead, 2nd Lt. John Hamilton should be assigned to the team.¹⁵ During the several weeks that they worked together in Bari and Monopoli, the rugged Marine had impressed Tofte with his work ethic and can-do spirit. He felt it vital that Hamilton be made a part of the rescue mission. McBaine informed Tofte that it was Weil’s mission and he would have to take it up with him. In addition, McBaine pointed out that Hamilton had just left for Vis and wouldn’t be available to participate. McBaine told Tofte that he was very hesitant to remove the other officer from the mission if he had already been informed of the assignment. Lastly, he informed Tofte that he was leaving OSS-SBS in the morning and the new officer in charge was going to be Maj. Robert Koch.¹⁶

At 5 a.m. the following morning, a very angry Maj. Weil appeared at McBaine’s room and informed him of the conversation that he had the prior evening with Hans Tofte, who apparently, along with Robert Thompson, went straight from his meeting with McBaine to see him. After Weil refused Tofte’s request that Hamilton be added to the team, Tofte somewhat arrogantly informed Weil that as he, Tofte, was the only member of the rescue team who had actually experienced combat, he felt duty-bound to go over Weil’s head and take his demand that Hamilton be added to the team to the commanding officer of the overall rescue sortie.¹⁷ Weil ordered him not to and stated, in no uncertain terms, that if Tofte went outside the OSS chain of command and sought to go over his head, he would bring him up on disciplinary charges. Tofte ignored Weil’s threat and proceeded to argue his case to the rescue sortie’s overall commanding officer, who sent an “equivocal” note to Weil. Weil simply ignored the note.¹⁸

On December 28, 1943, McBaine wrote a memo to Lt. Col. John Toulmin, director of OSS-ME in Cairo. The subject of the memo was “Capt. Hans Tofte, Lt. Robert Thompson, Lt. John Hamilton.” After reviewing the details of the proposed rescue mission and Tofte’s insubordination towards Weil, McBaine charged Tofte with disobedience of orders, and accused him of bringing discredit on the organization, to the prejudice of the successful completion of the proposed mission. He made three recommendations to Toulmin: 1) that letters of censure be written for Tofte, Thompson, and Hamilton, and that the letters be entered into their official personnel records, 2) that any recommendation for promotion concerning any of the three men be canceled and that the men be notified of this action, and 3) that Tofte be recalled from Bari and given another assignment in the OSS.¹⁹

On December 30, 1943, Lt. Col Toulmin responded back to Koch.²⁰ He acknowledged that Lt. Cdr. McBaine had updated him on the situation in Bari. Toulmin, having recently been forced to recall Louis Huot to Cairo after relieving him from command of Operation AUDREY, no doubt was also tiring of the drama coming from Bari. McBaine had brought several weekly reports with him to Cairo and, as usual, there was the ever-increasing demand for more supplies to ship to the Partisans. Toulmin noted with annoyance that every arriving Partisan was claiming a new urgent priority need and it was the job of OSS-ME to provide for the entire theater. It was therefore impossible to provide every request submitted by Tito’s men. Testily, Toulmin told Koch: “I wish you would explain this to Tofte.”

Tofte had previously written to Toulmin and requested permission that either he or Thompson be allowed to travel to Washington, DC, to directly brief Joseph Scribner, assistant chief of the Special Operations branch, on Operation AUDREY. Toulmin’s reaction to the request was unequivocal: “The answer is definitely ‘No’ and you may so inform him.” Tofte had also written to Toulmin requesting the promotion of Lt. Thompson. Toulmin coldly informed Koch that Thompson’s promotion couldn’t be considered at that time “for obvious reasons.”

Toulmin then turned to the personnel situation in Bari. He acknowledged that he had received and read McBaine’s memo of December 28 and told Koch: “You will handle this case as you see fit but, if you wish any men recalled you will then advise me.” He closed his memo with one last item: “While it is agreed that the moving picture project might be sound, I believe it is premature at the moment.” He was referring to a proposal submitted by one of the officers in Bari to make a movie about the Partisans in Yugoslavia and their valiant struggle against the Nazi invaders. The target audience would be viewers in the United States and Great Britain. The officer who submitted the proposal was in fact a genuine Hollywood movie star, 2nd Lt. John Hamilton, USMCR, formerly known as Sterling Hayden.

The already tense situation in Bari was soon to worsen considerably. On December 23, 1943, Maj. Robert Koch replaced Lt. Cdr. McBaine as the director of SO-SBS. Bad blood was already present between Tofte, Thompson, and Hamilton on one hand and Koch on the other. Hayden was highly critical of Koch in his November 2, 1944, narrative. The command structure had already labeled the three officers as loose cannons, despite the results they had achieved thus far with Operation AUDREY. When it was reported to Koch that Lt. Hamilton was seen on the docks at Bari on the evening of December 31, 1944, he was livid and immediately demanded that Hamilton report to his office to explain his absence from Vis. At the time, Hamilton was likely unaware of the feud between Weil and Tofte over the proposed rescue mission. Tofte was barely on speaking terms with Koch and Weil. Koch and Weil were also unaware that Tofte had issued orders to Lt. Hamilton that directed him to return to Bari “no later than 2400 hours, New Year’s Eve.”²¹

Hamilton reported to Koch as instructed. His explanation for his absence from Vis was, as noted, that the Partisans and the British had told him that there was nothing for him to do so he decided to come back. He did confirm that he had received the communications brought by his radiomen, and Koch pointed out that he was sure that instructions for Hamilton to remain on Vis “were certainly contained in the message brought by the radio men.” Hamilton explained that he had left orders for his detachment remaining on Vis and that he was going to return to the island the following day on a British LCI.²² Koch proceeded to again brief Hamilton on his duties, which included overseeing the shipping of supplies and transport of refugees, the preparation to receive over one hundred Operational Group personnel, and the critical liaison duties with the British. Hamilton again expressed his desire not to return as “there was nothing to do there,” but said he would, of course, follow his orders. The meeting ended satisfactorily from Koch’s standpoint, and Hamilton was told to return back to Koch’s office the following morning, January 1, 1944, at 8:30 a.m., to prepare for his return to Vis.

The following morning, Hamilton failed to report as he had been ordered. Koch was livid, so he drove down to Monopoli with Weil and Maj. Linn Farish. They quickly found both Hamilton and Tofte. Tofte offered the explanation that as a result of a storm, the sea state was too rough to transport Hamilton back to Vis. Hamilton appeared to be hung over, and when questioned about it, he indicated that it was a result of “too much New Years’ Eve.”²³ Koch noted that there was evidence of a “considerable party” and Koch requested that Hamilton return after lunch while he conferred with Tofte.

The subsequent meeting between Koch and Tofte was in essence an acrimonious continuation of their prior meeting of December 22. Once again, Tofte requested that Hamilton not be returned to Vis, deeming it a waste of his talents and also opining that Vis was bound to fall to the Germans and therefore a waste of a valuable man to send any OSS members there. Koch reminded Tofte that the importance of maintaining a liaison with the British was paramount regardless of Tofte’s opinions; the assignment was crucial and the liaison with the British would go on. The matter was settled. Next on the agenda was the subject of finances. Koch indicated his frustration with Tofte’s methods in his report to Toulmin on January 3, 1944. “The meeting then turned to finance in which certain principles about the expenditure of money were repeated for the fourth time and a statement was made that money was available for any expenditure but that there would have to be an adequate accounting.”²⁴ Koch then departed the meeting while Farish continued to talk with Tofte and Thompson.

After lunch, Tofte requested that Koch and Farish meet him in his cabin. When the two arrived, Tofte was there, as were Lt. Thompson, Lt. Ellen, and Lt. Hamilton. The meeting began with Tofte dropping a bombshell: he announced “that the five of them conferred and decided that the organization of O.S.S. did not suit them, that they were no longer in sympathy with the organization and that they wanted to be transferred out. The implication was that they were dissatisfied with the present setup in Cairo and Bari.”²⁵ Trying to remain calm and dispassionate, Koch informed Tofte that there was a word for this conduct in the American Army. He would not discuss the issue with the “committee of five,” but would meet with them individually over the next several days. He dismissed the group, but as Hamilton rose to leave, he ordered the young Marine to meet with him immediately.

During the subsequent meeting, Hamilton once again stated his preference not to return to Vis but told Koch that he would dutifully follow his orders. Upon questioning him in an attempt to ascertain if Hamilton concurred with Tofte, Hamilton informed Koch that Tofte had spoken for him without consulting him. He again apologized for missing his meeting that morning, explaining that he had partied too hard the night before. Koch seemed to accept the Marine’s word and he dismissed him, ordering him to report for duty in the front office while he and Weil decided what to do about situation with Operation AUDREY.

Near the end of his memo to Col. Toulmin, Koch vented his disgust with Tofte and Thompson. He offered grudging praise for their overall mission accomplishment while simultaneously demeaning their work. “It seems to me that the time has come to end this sort of erratic neuroticism and the alleged ‘martyrdom’ of the Thompson-Tofte pair. We have all admitted that a good over-all job has been done,” he wrote. Questioning whether the two were truly critical to the mission’s success, he suggested that anyone spending the time and money that they did on the Partisans would be equally popular. Giving the Partisans credit for the back-breaking work of loading and unloading the ships and then sailing them through enemy-infested water, Koch belittled Tofte and Thompson’s contribution by stating: “Our pair have been liason [sic] with a bottomless expense account.”²⁶

With obvious frustration, Koch stated that the situation had gone far enough. Because he found it too confining, Tofte would simply not acknowledge the authority of the OSS. He wanted no oversight or restrictions hampering his efforts. “It is frankly believed that Capt. Tofte does not want to accept any authority except that which is so vague or so far removed as to constitute no regulatory function at all.” In Koch’s mind, the situation was beyond salvation.

Koch’s recommendations were direct, to the point, and harsh. He recommended that Tofte be removed from Bari “or that permission be given to bring charges against him in a Courts Martial in Bari.” He recommended against transferring him to any other organization. Repeating McBaine’s charges from his December 28, 1943, memo to Toulmin, he accused Tofte, Thompson, and Hamilton of disobedience of orders, bringing discredit on the OSS, and jeopardizing the success of Weil’s mission. In addition, he singled out Tofte for another serious charge: that of actions tantamount to mutiny. “These charges are repeated and in Tofte’s case is added violation of Articles of War 64, 66 & 67—Willfully Disobeying Superior Officer, Attempt to Create Sedition, Failure to Suppress Sedition.”²⁷ He recommended that Thompson, Hamilton, and Ellen, all be removed from Bari.

It was the beginning of the end for Operation AUDREY.

The very same day, January 3, 1944, Lt. Col. Toulmin wrote to Koch in response to both his letter written on Christmas Day, and also the verbal reports given to him by Lt. Cdr. McBaine. Although he had not yet received Koch’s letter written on that same day, he was already well informed on the problems with the men running Operation AUDREY. He had already had his fill dealing with Louis Huot. He was in no mood to deal with the situation much longer. “So far as Tofte and Thompson are concerned,” he wrote, “I have little, if any, sympathy for their recent doings. I am sure you can handle this matter but, as I stated when I wrote before, I will recall either or both whenever you say the word.”²⁸ Koch now had the green light to proceed with his plans.

On January 8, 1944, Koch officially relieved Tofte, Thompson, and Hamilton from their duties concerning Operation AUDREY. Hayden was disgusted by the way their relief was handled. The Partisans, who greatly trusted and admired the Tofte-Thompson-Hamilton-Ellen team, were not told about their relief until after the fact and, according to Hayden, were “very much distressed” by it.²⁹ Koch had taken a liking to Hayden and told him he wanted him to learn the front-office end of the operation at the headquarters in Bari pending a new assignment. Feeling that Hayden “had been led astray” by Tofte and Thompson, Koch instructed the young Marine that he was to have nothing to do with them whatsoever.³⁰ Disgusted with the whole situation, Hayden requested a transfer to another theater of operations, but suspected that the request never went through the proper channels. Tofte was replaced by Capt. Stephen T. Jacobs, who, according to Hayden, “knew nothing whatsoever of the situation, the business, or the Partisans, and what’s more, who cared less!”³¹

Ultimately, Hayden and Thompson would remain at Bari, while Tofte was sent to Cairo for reassignment. Lt. Ward Ellen was the only one of the four who would remain with Operation AUDREY, continuing to supervise the maintenance of the ships.

Over the next two months, the shipping operation was transitioned away from the OSS. The procuring and loading of supplies for the Partisans became the responsibility of the SOE’s Force 266, while the sailing of the ships was taken over by the Royal Navy. The OSS-SBS continued to finance the operation through the month of April, but in March 1944, withdrew all of its personnel.³²

The final official report for Operation AUDREY reflected that the results achieved by the dismissed team of Huot, Tofte, Thompson, Ellen, and Hamilton were due much credit, despite their ignominious removal from the operation. They delivered 155 cargo shipments with a total tonnage of 11,637 tons. Operating forty-four ships, they evacuated twenty thousand Partisan refugees and seven hundred Partisan wounded. The total cost of the operation was $136,103.38.³³ It is perhaps most accurate to state that those responsible for the planning and execution of Operation AUDREY may have demonstrated initiative and resourcefulness more than prudence, but that should not detract unduly from their accomplishment.³⁴

Despite his dissatisfaction at being stuck in an office routine, Sterling Hayden was actually quite fortunate that he wasn’t brought down by the actions of Tofte. It was not long before he was back in the thick of the action again. In fact, on January 8, the day he officially was relieved, Hayden left on a new assignment—he was heading to Albania to take part in the rescue of the downed American nurses and medics. These were the very same people that Maj. Weil had proposed to go into Albania to rescue, a mission that he would never undertake. Getting underway at midday on January 8, Hayden piloted the Yankee to the rendezvous point the SOE camp in a cove designated as Seaview. He arrived shortly after midnight.

It took several trips by rowboat to transport the nurses and medics from the beach to the Yankee. No doubt several of the nurses recognized the tall, handsome boat captain who helped them get aboard. Things got underway shortly after loading all of the passengers. Rum was distributed to the grateful rescued nurses and medics as they began to loop south to avoid a naval skirmish that had broken out between Allied and German boats. Most of the passengers became seasick due to the rough seas.³⁵ At 1:30 p.m. on January 9, the Yankee pulled into Bari Harbor amidst much fanfare. A large crowd, led by the commanding officer of the 807th Medical Air Evacuation Squadron, was on hand to greet the nurses and medics and welcome them back after their fifty-eight-day ordeal. Within a couple of weeks, Sterling Hayden would be heading back to Albania on multiple missions.

• • •

During his tour of duty in the Balkans, Hayden developed an unbridled respect and admiration for the Partisans, so much so that other OSS personnel began to suspect he was a communist. He would reflect back on the literature that Warwick Tompkins had encouraged him to read, realizing that it was Tito and his Partisans who were doing the heavy fighting, despite having limited weapons, supplies, and food, while “the legitimate Royal Yugoslav Government was settled down in a command post in Claridge’s Hotel in far-off London, issuing communiques as to the efficacy of their man in the field, Colonel Draja Mikhailovitch [sic], and his ‘Glorious Fighting Chetniks.”³⁶ He would later recall: “We established a tremendously close personal feeling with these people. We had enormous, I would say unlimited, respect for the way they were fighting.”³⁷ Seeing the commitment of Tito’s communist forces was an eye-opener for Hayden, leading him to deduce that perhaps Tompkins had been right all along in his ideology.

In his barracks, Hayden would receive many books and pamphlets from Tompkins. During Operation AUDREY, he began to write letters back to the United States nightly, especially to Warwick Tompkins. Enthusiastic praise of the Partisan cause and Tito were the main themes throughout the letters. In between missions, Hayden spent a good deal of his time in theater reading communist literature and propaganda and passing it on to his fellow officers, encouraging them to read it as well.³⁸ After the war, when he testified before the HUAC in 1951, Hayden would state that Tompkins “bombarded” him with communist literature such as People’s World, Daily Worker, and New Masses.³⁹ All of this served to pique Hayden’s interest and curiosity in learning more about this theoretical world of Warwick Tompkins that seemed to have been translated into reality by the Partisans.

During this time, he was also frequently corresponding with his other mentor, Lincoln Colcord. One day he received a special gift from Colcord: a copy of Henry David Thoreau’s book Walden. The book struck a chord with Hayden. Nightly he would read the words of Thoreau and scribble notes in the margins. It was the first book he ever read that confirmed in him his own sense that it was possible to carve out one’s own niche in life apart from the common concerns of most men.⁴⁰ Thoreau spoke to him, appealing to the individualist that he had always been and always would be.

While at Bari in December of 1943, Hayden conceived of an idea that would showcase both the will and commitment of Tito’s Partisans as well as the crucial role of the OSS in helping them achieve their goals. It would take the form of a motion picture.