Sterling Hayden’s Wars

Missions to Albania and an Effort in Filmmaking

ALBANIA, NESTLED IN THE BALKAN PENINSULA BETWEEN THE YUGOSLAVIAN provinces and Greece, had emerged from World War I as an independent country. As a fledgling democracy, a monarchy was established when a 1928 coup was staged by Amhed Zog, who proclaimed himself king and proceeded to rule over the poorest country in Europe. His rule ended in April 1939, when the country was overrun by Mussolini’s Italian military.¹ After Mussolini’s forces attempted to invade Greece from their launching sites in Albania, they were bloodied by the Greek army and driven back where they were set upon by the Albanian resistance forces. In April 1941, Germany invaded both Yugoslavia and Greece, reliving some of the pressure on Mussolini. After the overthrow of Mussolini’s regime, German forces invaded and occupied Albania in September of 1943.²

The resistance forces in Albania were largely divided among two major groups, paralleling the political situation in Yugoslavia. The communist forces of the National Liberation Front, also called the Partisans, were led by the enigmatic Enver Hoxha. An unabashed admirer of Joseph Stalin, Hoxha was quick to demand aid and supplies from the Allies, although aid was mysteriously not provided by his Russian dictator idol. He did not care for Americans and he openly detested the British. The main competition to the Partisans for control of the resistance movement and ultimately for control of Albania was the Balli Kombetar (National Front), an anti-communist, anti-monarchist movement that often collaborated with the Nazis in their civil war against the Partisans. Also competing with the Partisans was the Legaliteti (Legality Party), a coalition of northern Albania tribes that sought to restore the monarchy under King Amhed Zog. Another similarity to the Yugoslavian situation was the fact that the communist Partisans were willing to openly engage the Nazis whereas the other two groups appeared to prefer not to engage them so as to preserve their resources for their internal struggle against the Partisans.

The British SOE had been involved in Albania first against the Italians and then against the Germans. Their actions were not merely that of supplying and training of resistance fighters, which increasingly meant Partisan forces (as they were the only group willing to engage the Germans), but also active fighting.³ The Americans initially sent a civilian to Albania as a liaison officer to the British, under whose authority Albanian operations fell, and the OSS then transferred the headquarters of its Albanian Section from Cairo to Bari in late 1943. The Albanian Section of the OSS at Bari was under the leadership of a civilian, Harry T. Fultz, who was a World War I veteran and was very knowledgeable about Albania. The mission of the OSS in Albania was to be the liaison with the British for intelligence gathering, and for the supplying of the Partisans. In addition, they would facilitate the transfer back to Bari of rescued American airmen who had gone down in enemy territory. Lastly, they would also be arranging for the transfer back to Italy of Italian prisoners of war. Unlike the British, they would not be engaging the Germans in combat. The first OSS member to enter Albania was Gy Sgt. Nick Kukich, USMC, who had arrived in theater in October 1943 aboard the same US Army transport ship that brought Sterling Hayden to the theater. Departing Bari aboard the fishing schooner Sea Maid, Kukich, along with a British SOE major whom he would be working with, arrived on the Albanian coast on December 31, 1943.

As was the case in Yugoslavia, supply to resistance forces by air drop was unfeasible, so supply by sea from Bari became the logical alternative. The British had established a base of operations in Albania called Seaview to facilitate their supply efforts. It was located in one of the water-level caves along the Adriatic coast that dotted the Karaburun Peninsula, also known as Cape Linguetta. It was a barren location that was both difficult to find and difficult to get to.⁴ It was at Seaview that the OSS had set up its liaison base alongside the British. Seaview was the destination where Gy Sgt. Kukich and the British major landed.

Seaview quickly proved to be a distasteful place as the two new arrivals saw it. The cave and the surrounding caves were filthy, lice-ridden, and very ill-equipped, and the place had a terrible stench. In addition, the caves were surrounded by dozens of “scarecrows”—hungry Italian soldiers who were now prisoners and were begging for transport on one of the supply vessels back to Italy.⁵

The major and Kukich soon found a good secondary base for their operations further south down the coast from Seaview. Located one hour’s travel time by boat was a much more suitable bay hidden by two mountains, where the water close to the beach was deep enough to allow supply boats to come closer in. The major described the bay as “perfect,” noting that it was well-protected and that the entrance to the bay was three times wider than the one at Seaview. The base was named for its location—Grama Bay. Once the base was functional, the OSS and the SOE alternated their operations between Grama Bay and Seaview, depending on German military activity. Most of the men preferred Grama Bay because of its more hospitable conditions. Very quickly, supply operations originating from across the Adriatic at Bari began to ramp up.

• • •

On January 20, 1944, Maj. Koch called Hayden into his office and gave him a new operational assignment. He was to procure an Italian fishing vessel, ensure its operational seaworthiness, and establish a supply operation to the bases on Cape Linguetta on the Albanian coast. In addition to running supplies to Albania under the cover of darkness, his mission would be to retrieve rescued American airmen and to bring back Italian prisoners. Once again, Hayden would bristle at what he considered the interference of the British as he attempted to acquire a vessel. With annoyance, he observed that there were ten ex-Royal Yugoslav Navy motor torpedo boats “doing nothing,” tied up to the docks at Brindisi. They had been seized by the Italians when Italy overran Yugoslavia and brought to Brindisi. Because of politics, the British never released them to the Partisans who truly needed them.⁶

Hayden spent a lot of time wrangling and cajoling British officials before they allowed him to acquire a fifty-foot Italian fishing boat, capable of a top speed of eight knots. He put together a crew of Partisans and within two weeks was ready to commence operations out of the port of Otranto. The initial trips to the Albania coast were accomplished despite the fact that their boat was unarmed; the SBS supply department claimed it was unable to acquire machine guns prior to their first two missions. All told, between February 15, 1944, and April 1, 1944, Hayden made ten transits across the Adriatic Sea to both Seaview and Grama Bay. He noted with disgust that after the third voyage the British informed him that it was against their policy for what they termed a “private navy” to operate in British waters.⁷ Their mission put them in harm’s way in many different ways. The weather in the Adriatic was often treacherous. They had to avoid Allied minefields upon departure and return to base. They had to avoid German sea patrols off the Yugoslavian coast. Had they been discovered, it was likely that the German patrol boats would have great firepower and would certainly decimate them in combat. Lastly, transferring supplies and men between the trawler and the shore by rowboat was fraught with difficulty, and if discovered during the process, the crew would be annihilated. The overly constricting British policies towards their alleged allies only served to greatly increase the stress levels to an already difficult assignment.

In his 1963 autobiography, Hayden only devoted a single sentence to his Albania mission. “In August,” he wrote in the third person, incorrectly recalling the month, “they ordered him to pick out a suitable Italian fishing craft, convert her to a minor-league blockade runner, and begin running to the environs of Cape Linguetta, on the Albanian coast, with agents and supplies.”⁸ In his narrative of November 2, 1944, he described an incident that occurred on one of his Albanian trips. He did not specify whether it was to Seaview or to Grama Bay; he simply described the coast as “treacherous.”

After offloading seven tons of rifles and ammunition and one OSS team of agents, he was informed by the British SOE major (who was Gy Sgt. Nick Kukich’s superior officer) that he was to take back to Italy sixty Italian soldiers and two officers who had escaped from Greece. The “scarecrows” were jeopardizing the security of Seaview.⁹ Hayden had to dodge two German patrol boats on his approach to the drop point. His boat was in an exposed position in the bay with a full moon to rise within the hour. Hayden informed the British major that they would load the men, or at least as many as they could before 2 a.m. By that time they would have to leave in order to reach the minefields off the Italian coast by daylight.¹⁰ At that point, he traveled back to the trawler with nine of the Italians, and assumed that the British would oversee the embarkation of the rest of the men from the beach.

After about forty-five minutes, the sea state was making their departure necessary. They made repeated attempts to signal the men on the shore, but their signals went unanswered. Hayden decided that he and his assistant, Sgt. John Harnicker, USMC, had to go ashore and find out what was causing the delay. On the run in to the beach, the surf was so rough that their boat was swamped. Fortunately, it wasn’t damaged, and once they righted it, it continued onto the beach.

When they arrived on the beach, they found six dead bodies beside a cave with the rest of the Italians gathered around their two officers. The six had drowned in the surf while attempting to swim out to the trawler. Hayden and Harnicker were told that the dozen men from the British mission had gone back to their camp, leaving no one to supervise the evacuation. Hayden sent a message to the British major, who in turn sent Gy Sgt. Kukich back with his reply: he was too busy to come down to the beach. The window of opportunity for escape was rapidly closing and Hayden informed the senior Italian officer that they were leaving now and he only had room in the rowboat for him and five other Italians.

It took four attempts through the rough surf to finally reach the trawler and make their getaway. It was then that Hayden learned that both the Italian officers had deserted their men on the beach in an attempt to get back to Italy. Hearing this, the Partisan first mate, who spoke fluent Italian, ordered the two officers to return to their men, but they refused. “Therefore,” reported Hayden, “the mate beat them both up with a piece of wood that was handy.”¹¹

After their uneventful return trip to Italy, the disgusted Hayden approached the Albanian desk at Bari and lodged a formal complaint. He informed them that unless they were to have the full cooperation of the British on the reception end, it was foolish to risk property and good manpower on such an operation.¹² Hayden’s complaint only served to further fuel the bad blood between the British and the Americans. While the SOE and OSS attempted to work out a compromise, Hayden made three more voyages across the Adriatic, delivering supplies and agents to several of the Greek islands north of Corfu. It was during this time that the SOE decided that it would take over control of Operation AUDREY and all shipping functions in the Balkans. “This would have not been necessary,” opined Hayden, “had the SBS really fought for its rightful participation in what was called ‘Allied effort.’”¹³

When he wrote his narrative in November of 1944, it is highly likely that Sterling Hayden had no idea who the British SOE major was that he dealt with in Albania. In an ironic twist of fate, the major was also an actor—Anthony Quayle, who was a major star of the British stage, having been the actor who replaced Laurence Olivier in the Old Vic tour of Henry V in London just prior to joining the British Army.¹⁴ After the war, he would go on to a distinguished film career and would be knighted by Queen Elizabeth II in 1985. When he and Nick Kukich reported to Seaview, he became the ranking officer on the scene.

Kukich found it difficult to get along with Quayle, whom he considered aloof and snobbish, an English aristocrat who looked down on Kukich’s coal miner roots.¹⁵ Although they worked closely together, it was a tense relationship. Kukich resented being ordered around by Quayle and being excluded from important meetings. He felt that Quayle only wanted minimal interaction with him because he was an enlisted man.

Kukich found a way to retaliate against what he regarded as unfair and demeaning treatment by Quayle. He began withholding intelligence reports from his British superior officer while continuing to send them back to OSS headquarters in Bari. When Quayle learned what Kukich was doing, he was furious and confronted the young Marine. Kukich responded authoritatively, saying, “When you stop treating me badly, I’ll share intelligence. I am a representative of the OSS and the American government and I expect to be treated as such. I expect to be treated equally.” Following that blowup, Kukich reported, “After that, we got along like Eisenhower and Montgomery.”¹⁶ The new, somewhat more cordial relationship between the two men would soon be severely strained over an incident involving the OSS agent known as Lt. John Hamilton.

Anthony Quayle was always very hesitant to talk about his World War II experiences. His autobiography, A Time to Speak, was published in 1990, the year after he died. In the book, he paints a very unflattering picture of Sterling Hayden as a result of the incident involving the Italian prisoners that Hayden described in his 1944 narrative. Quayle described the incident as having taken place at the mouth of Grama Bay during a supply mission.¹⁷ In his account of the event, Quayle rowed out to the trawler and urged the crew to bring the trawler closer to the shore to make it easier to transfer the supplies to the shore. His request was met with drunken laughter by the Serbian Partisan crew who proceeded to drop the supplies down to Quayle’s rowboat, the first one hitting him in the head, and continuing until the rowboat was nearly sunk.

After Quayle and his men made several exhausting trips between the trawler and the beach, he wrote a “furious note to whoever might be in command of the ship. ‘For God’s sake, come ashore and speak to me. It is safe to bring your boat in. There is plenty of water.’”¹⁸ Soon after, he saw a small boat leaving the trawler heading to the beach. Once on the beach, Quayle described an “enormous man, a man built on the scale of the Trojan War” get off the boat and walk up to him. He subsequently described his encounter as follows: “An American voice called out, ‘Well—what’s all the trouble?’” Quayle explained that it was safe to bring the trawler closer to the shore, which would make the transfer process much easier. The response from the American skipper was blunt: “I am the captain of this ship and I do not think it is safe. Therefore, I shall remain outside. What’s more, in another twenty minutes I shall up-anchor and sail.”¹⁹

The trawler’s captain promptly returned to the ship and shortly after, the men on the beach heard the boat’s engines come alive and could hear the anchor chain being hoisted. According to Quayle, “most of the Italians collapsed on the beach in despair; some tried to swim out to the ship. Three were drowned.”²⁰ Adding to his dislike of the American trawler captain, Quayle also described an incident that occurred later at Seaview when he had to leave behind sixty Italian prisoners after a German patrol suddenly appeared. All of the Italians were taken prisoner by the Germans, including some of the ones that the trawler skipper refused to take aboard that night in Grama Bay.²¹

Several weeks later, after recovering from a bout of malaria, Quayle returned to Bari. On his first day there, he walked into the headquarters mess hall and saw, “lunching there, a man I was unlikely ever to forget—a tall, handsome man with the head of an ancient hero. It was the American captain who would not bring his trawler into Grama Bay.

“I turned to the mess sergeant. ‘That big man over there, at the long table. Who is he?”

“The sergeant was surprised by my ignorance. ‘Don’t you know, sir? That’s Sterling Hayden, the movie star.’

“I turned and left the room. I had no desire for further acquaintance with Mr. Hayden.”²²

• • •

In his 1963 autobiography, Hayden was home on leave in the United States when he related an anecdote concerning a mission to Albania to his friend Lincoln Colcord. In this version of the events, Hayden was sent to Albania to pick up thirty Italian soldiers hidden in one of the caves, likely either Seaview or Grama Bay. They had been on the run for over a year, trying to get from Greece to the Albanian coast and then back to Italy. After successfully evading a German patrol boat, Hayden sent his pilot, a Partisan named Ivosevitch, ashore in a rubber boat to arrange the pickup of the Italians. Hayden noticed that Isovevitch had taken a Thompson submachine gun with him, which he assumed was for self-defense, should they encounter any Germans. Hayden described what happened next: “He took a Thompson gun ashore with the rubber boat, and then I heard the firing. He came back on board alone. ‘We go!’ he had cried. All the Italians were dead. I didn’t know what to say to this man whose wife had been raped to death.”²³

It is difficult for the historian to determine what exactly transpired in the incident that Sterling Hayden and Anthony Quayle described so differently. In the last version that was described in Wanderer, Hayden might have been taking some poetic license, and his version seems like a creation or an amalgamation of many of his experiences in the Balkans. This was confirmed by Nick Kukich in interviews that he gave to author Peter Lucas for his book The OSS in World War II Albania, published in 2007. He described Hayden’s story of the murder of the thirty Italians as either a figment of his imagination, or perhaps a totally different incident that could have taken place in Yugoslavia. “It did not happen where we were,” explained Kukich. “It could not have happened. We would have known. There were no bodies.”²⁴

Kukich believed that Quayle actually took two separate incidents—his confrontation with Hayden, where three Italian soldiers did drown, and the capture of the sixty Italians—and combined them into one incident in his book. Kukich was not present at Grama Bay when Quayle supposedly had his confrontation with Hayden; he had heard about it later. The incident involving the sixty Italians took place at Grama Bay, not Seaview, as Quayle had described. Embellishing on the incident at Grama Bay, Kukich explained that the Italians were on the beach, ready for transfer, when they spotted a vessel at the entrance to the bay. Certain it was one of the Partisan trawlers, Kukich prepared to signal their position when Quayle ordered him not to. Quayle was certain it was a German destroyer. “No way is that a German destroyer,” insisted Kukich. “It’s an Italian ship. I knew because I studied the charts. I knew it was an Italian ship used by us [the OSS]. I went to signal. Quayle ordered me to stop. ‘If you signal I’ll have you court-martialed,’ he said. I argued with him but it was no use.”²⁵

After being chased from Grama Bay by the Germans, Quayle and Kukich stayed at a house in Dukat. The following morning, looking out the window, Kukich saw a column of the sixty Italians being marched along the road, directed by their German captors. “I told Quayle,” he related. “He looked out the window and then he looked at me. He felt guilty. It never should have happened, but it did.”²⁶

Hayden’s Albania adventures ended with his return to Bari on March 20, 1944.

• • •

By mid-spring, Hayden had completed his Albanian mission. He would soon be hampered by medical issues. Upon his return to Bari he was feeling fatigued, had lost weight, and his skin had yellowed. For the next three weeks, he remained in the hospital with what he simply described as jaundice. Most likely he was suffering from a case of acute hepatitis. While in the hospital, he continued corresponding with friends back home and continued to read the leftist/communist literature sent to him by Warwick Tompkins. After his recovery, he reported back to the headquarters at SBS, ready to resume his mundane routine of office work. He quickly became enthusiastically involved in a new project proposed by one of his colleagues.

Together with Lt. Robert Thompson, Hayden conceived of an audacious plan involving a series of sabotage operations in northern Yugoslavia that was tentatively called Operation DRAVO. It would entail a coordinated attack on the German lines of communications in the northern part of Yugoslavia through which practically all German materiel and personnel would eventually have to retreat.²⁷ The plan called for the OSS to play a major role. After detailed planning and a three-week reconnaissance mission behind enemy lines in Yugoslavia to facilitate the plan, Hayden angrily learned that the British were planning a similar operation. They launched Operation RATWEEK on September 1, 1944, and it was successful in destroying German railway lines of retreat as well as their communication network.²⁸ As Hayden was to testily recall in his 1944 narrative, the OSS had no apparent role in the operation.

• • •

During the time that Hayden was busy with the proposed Operation DRAVO, he was also involved in a unique project that he apparently conceived of soon after he began working with the Partisans in December of 1943. Impressed with their fighting spirit and also enamored with their communist ideology, Hayden’s movie background came to the forefront with a proposal he pitched to headquarters at SBS. The previously mentioned memo sent by Lt. Col. Toulmin on December 30, 1943, acknowledged that while a proposed movie project that Toulmin reviewed was sound, the timing was not right at that particular time. After his disappointment with the result of his efforts for Operation DRAVO, Hayden requested a transfer to a different theater of operations and he was scheduled to go to Caserta, Italy. While awaiting his transfer orders, in May 1944, he resumed his lobbying efforts to create a movie about the Partisans. It is interesting to note that he did not mention the movie project in either his November 1944 narrative or his 1963 autobiography.

In early May, Hayden wrote to Lt. Cdr. Edward Green, commanding officer of SBS, to formally request permission to shoot his film.²⁹ He began his proposal for a “Project for Photographic Unit” by noting that SBS now had its own photographic unit consisting of Specialist 1st Class J. B. Allin and Specialist 1st Class Nelson McEdward. The two men has been transferred to Bari the previous December as a result of an agreement between Maj. Walter M. Ross, commanding officer of their parent command, Company B of the 2677th Regiment OSS (Provisional), and Capt. George Vujnovich, operations officer at Bari.³⁰ Having completed their last assignment, the two cameramen were eager for a new one.

Hayden proposed that he and the two cameramen leave as soon as feasible for Vis, where they would set up their base in the quarters still currently occupied by Special Operations. The facilities on the base had adequate billeting, messing, and also had the capabilities to create a dark room if needed for film development. The mission of the unit would be twofold: “First; To make a photographic record of the Partisan movement as it exists in the Dalmatian Island and Coastal Area,” and “Second; To make a film of the activities of the Operational Groups now stationed on, and operating from, Vis. Upon arrival, this officer will outline his ideas to the commanding officer.”³¹ Hayden added that he had attached his completed script, as well as a schedule of the work that would need to be done for the project.

To assist them with equipment, scripting, and various anticipated tasks, Hayden stated that the unit must be “increased by three non-commissioned officers of the highest possible caliber.” Lastly, he requested that the orders from the CO of SBS for the mission clearly state the unit’s two clear-cut objectives, and point out that all of the work of the team would be “the responsibility of this officer, who will be directly responsible to the C.O., SBS in his efforts to carry out the twofold mission.” In closing, he added one last request to provide himself maximum flexibility to carry out the mission as he saw fit, and to hopefully avoid British interference, by requesting “that full permission be obtained from the director, Force 266 for the Unit to operate freely in the Dalmatian Coastal Area as this officer believes necessary.”

On May 19, Lt. Cdr. Green met with Hayden to discuss the proposed film project. That afternoon, he wrote to Hayden with his endorsement. Arranging a temporary transfer of Allin and McEdward to Special Operations, so they would come under Hayden’s personal supervision, he somewhat cautiously ended his endorsement by stating that Hayden must “prepare a written script which shall be approved in advance before any definite steps are launched.”³²

Hayden’s proposed film project now had the blessing of his parent command and now Lt. Cdr. Green passed it up his chain of command for their endorsements. On May 30, 1944, Green wrote to the “CO, OSS/Italy” to outline the proposed film.³³ He began by pointing out that the two cameramen had been at Bari for several months with little to do and that their photographic skills were of “relatively little value.” Therefore, to better utilize their talents, they were assigned to Lt. John Hamilton “because of his contacts with British, Partisan and American officers and his wide experience along the Dalmatian coast, where the best photographic subjects are located.” All of this was accurate, but it is also interesting to note that he did not mention that Lt. Hamilton was actually Sterling Hayden the movie star. It is possible that Green and others at Bari didn’t know his real identity, but given his striking good looks and impressive height and physique, this seems highly improbable. Nonetheless, Lt. Hamilton’s film background was not brought up in the memo.

Green also pointed out Hamilton’s two objectives for the filming: to showcase the activities of the largest resistance and best organized movement in Europe, and to film the activities of the Operational Group personnel currently stationed on Vis. Hinting none-too-subtly about Hayden’s sympathetic views towards the communists, Green sought to assure the CO. “While it is recognized that the shooting script which has been prepared by Lieut. Hamilton might be questionable if it were to be used for immediate release, it should be borne in mind that the ultimate results of photographic activity will come under the control of the person who edits the film after it had been developed. If, in his enthusiasm to portray the Partisan spirit, anything should be incorporated which might be of questionable nature, this can be deleted by the consorts before the film is released.”³⁴

On June 8, 1944, Col. Edward Glavin, commanding officer of the 2677th Regiment (Provisional), provided an endorsement for the mission.³⁵ He wanted the “Field Photographic Mission” to be coordinated with the Special Intelligence and Special Operations branches prior to undertaking it. With the approval of both parties and several other stipulations, the mission could commence under the control of SO. As an interesting flourish, Glavin wrote across the top of Green’s original memo “get name for this mission” and underlined it.

• • •

Hayden’s script was entitled “The People Fight.”³⁶ It was eleven pages long and contained 151 scenes. Reading it, one can tell it was written by someone who was very familiar with screenplays and movie staging. Viewing it with contemporary eyes, it seems contrived and overdramatic, even within the context of World War II films that were often instruments of propaganda. What is most striking to the reader is that contrary to one of his two explicit mission objectives, there is no mention of the OSS Operational Group activities on Vis at all. All of the activity on Vis appears to be conducted by the Partisans. On the top of the second page, Hayden wrote, “Today Vis is garrisoned by several thousand Partisans, many of them equipped by the Allies.” That is the only mention of any Allied contribution to the resistance effort in Yugoslavia.

Hayden’s praise of the Partisans knew no bounds. The stage is set in the opening scene as the dedication solemnly states: “Dedicated to the Yugoslav National Army of Liberation. Which for three bitter years has resisted every attempt made by the Germans and Fascists to annihilate it and by so doing conquer Yugoslavia. These Partisans, under the leadership of Marshal Tito, have given the world an unequalled example of self-sacrifice and an unconquerable will to smash the common enemy.

“As this is filmed over three hundred thousand Partisans are fighting and dieing [sic] to free their country. They fight, work and live with one motto—Smrt Fasizmu-Sloboda Narodu DEATH TO FASCISM—LIBERTY TO THE PEOPLE.

“Between battle and burials they sing.”³⁷ At this point, one of the Partisan marching songs arises in the background. Hayden used the image and the sounds of the Partisans singing as they march to battle in several spots in the script.

The script documents the typical Partisan routine from Vis. Boats are loaded and run over to the German-controlled Dalmatian coast under the cover of darkness and are hidden in coves. The boats are hidden during the day as German planes fly over the coast. The following night, under the cover of darkness, the boats go to different unloading points along the coast. He points out the transport of the supplies to inland Yugoslavia over the Velebut mountain range to “the blood-soaked plains of Yugoslavia, the home and the heart of the Peoples War of National Liberation.”³⁸

In one melodramatic scene showing a boat approaching from the sea and being signaled by lights on the shore, the script solemnly announces: “This is nineteen hundred and forty-four. In 1776 and 1812 it was not much different.”³⁹ This is the only reference to the United States in the script. Describing the Partisan leaders as young, tough, and consumed with the desire to fight, Hayden emphasizes that attacking the enemy is their one objective. At this point, the script calls for five hundred feet of combat scenes to be inserted and notes that it would be obtained later by the unit and inserted into the film at that time.

The script’s final scene shows the Partisan brigade marching away into the distance as the sound of the Partisan Hymn begins to swell. As the volume of the music rises, on the screen, just before the fade-out appear the words: “Death to Fascism—Liberty to the People.”

• • •

Also that month, Hayden learned that his wife Madeleine Carroll was working at the 61st Station Hospital, a US Army hospital in Foggia, Italy. She had volunteered to become a nurse’s aide for the American Red Cross and had dedicated her life to caring for injured servicemen. Foggia was only sixty miles away from Bari, and Hayden’s team was still waiting for final approval for their photographic mission. Hayden decided to spend a weekend with his wife, whom he hadn’t seen for well over a year. He made no mention of this side trip in his 1944 narrative and mentioned it only in passing in Wanderer. Once again writing in the third person, he noted that he found out “his wife had been transferred to the 61st Station Hospital in Foggia, a bombed-out town ninety miles north of Bari. He rested a week, spent one weekend with her.”⁴⁰

• • •

Due to the confusing chain of command that had evolved during the course of the war, it became unclear where to next forward the film project proposal to. More significantly, the planning for the upcoming Yugoslav campaign that would become Operation RATWEEK had taken top priority. Accordingly, permission to begin the film project was not obtained.

Sterling Hayden’s film tribute to the Partisans and Marshal Tito would never be made.