Notes
CHAPTER 1. MAHAN’S TWO TRIDENTS
6 Kennedy, “Rise and Fall of Navies.” For more background, see Bruce Swanson,
Eighth Voyage of the Dragon: A History of China’s Quest for Sea Power (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1982), esp. 28–43; and Louise Levathes,
When China Ruled the Seas: The Treasure Fleet of the Dragon Throne, 1405–1433 (London: Oxford University Press, 1994).
7 Julian S. Corbett,
Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, intro. Eric J. Grove (1911; repr., Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1988), 94; K. M. Panikkar,
Asia and Western Dominance: A Survey of the Vasco da Gama Epoch of Asian History, 1498–1945 (New York: Day, 1954); and K. M. Panikkar,
India and the Indian Ocean: An Essay on the Influence of Sea Power on Indian History (New York: Macmillan, 1945).
8 Nicholas Evan Sarantakes, “The Last Days of the Royal Navy: Lessons from Britain’s Strategic Retreat from the Pacific,” in
Asia Looks Seaward: Power and Maritime Strategy, ed. Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2007), 32–45. See also Panikkar,
Asia and Western Dominance.
9 
[Zhang Ming and Chen Xiangjun],
[“Collision in the Pacific: Assessing the Development of Sino-Japanese Maritime Power and Possible Confrontation in the New Century”],
[
Shipborne Weapons] (November 2005): 19.
10 Geoffrey Till, “Maritime Strategy in a Globalizing World,”
Orbis 51, no. 4 (Fall 2007): 569–575; and Geoffrey Till,
Seapower (London: Frank Cass, 2003).
14 Margaret Tuttle Sprout, “Mahan: Evangelist of Sea Power,” in
Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler, ed. Edward Meade Earle (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1943), 415; Robert Seager II and Doris D. Maguire, eds.,
Letters and Papers of Alfred Thayer Mahan, vol. 2,
1890–1901 (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1975), 342.
15 For a definition of antiaccess, see Roger Cliff, Mark Burles, Michael S. Chase, Derek Eaton, and Kevin L. Pollpeter,
Entering the Dragon’s Lair: Chinese Antiaccess Strategies and Their Implications for the United States (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2007), 11.
16 Thomas P. Ehrhard and Robert O. Work,
Range, Persistence, Stealth, and Networking:
The Case for a Carrier-Based Unmanned Combat System (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 200), 137–138.
18 Mark Cozad, “China’s Regional Power Projection: Prospects for Future Missions in the South and East China Seas,” in
Beyond the Strait: PLA Missions Other Than Taiwan, ed. Roy Kamphausen, David Lai, and Andrew Scobell1 (Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, 2008), 287–325.
19 Alfred Thayer Mahan,
The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783 (1890; repr., New York: Dover, 1987), 25.
20 Alfred Thayer Mahan,
The Problem of Asia (1900; repr., Port Washington, N.Y.: Kennikat Press, 1970), 124.
21 Alfred Thayer Mahan,
The Interest of America in Sea Power, Present and Future (1897; repr., Freeport, N.Y.: Books for Libraries Press, 1970), 65–83, 277–292.
22 Mahan,
Problem of Asia, 124.
23 Carl von Clausewitz,
On War, ed., trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), 605.
24 Harold Sprout and Margaret Sprout,
The Rise of American Naval Power (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1939), 203, 217–222.
25 James R. Holmes, “China’s Way of Naval War: Mahan’s Logic, Mao’s Grammar,”
Comparative Strategy 28 (2009): 1–27.
26 Mahan,
Problem of Asia, 33.
27 Mahan,
Influence of Sea Power upon History, 22–23.
28 Alfred Thayer Mahan,
Retrospect & Prospect (Boston: Little, Brown, 1902), 246.
30 Mahan,
Influence of Sea Power upon History, 71.
CHAPTER 2. CHINA ENGAGES THE STRATEGIC THEORISTS
1 Robert S. Ross, “The Geography of the Peace: East Asia in the Twenty-first Century,”
International Security 23, no. 4 (Spring 1999): 81–118. See also Andrew J. Nathan and Robert S. Ross,
The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress: China’s Search for Security (New York: Norton, 1998).
2 Michael O’Hanlon, “Why China Cannot Conquer Taiwan,”
International Security 25, no. 2 (Fall 2000): 51–86.
3 Bernard D. Cole,
The Great Wall at Sea: China’s Navy Enters the Twenty-first Century (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2001), 181.
4 See Keith Crane, Roger Cliff, Evan Medeiros, James Mulvenon, and William Overholt,
Modernizing China’s Military: Opportunities and Constraints (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2005), 91–134.
12 Julian S. Corbett,
Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, intro. Eric J. Grove (1911; repr., Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1988), 94.
13 K. M. Panikkar,
Asia and Western Dominance: A Survey of the Vasco da Gama Epoch of Asian History, 1498–1945 (New York: Day, 1954); and Panikkar,
India and the Indian Ocean (New York: Macmillan, 1945).
14 
[Ni Lexiong],
” [“Sea Power Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow—Reading Mahan’s
The Influence of Sea Power upon History”], 中国图书评论 [
China Book Review], no. 8 (2006): 23.
15 Alfred Thayer Mahan,
The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783 (1890; repr., New York: Dover, 1987), 138.
17 Alfred Thayer Mahan,
The Problem of Asia (1900; repr., Port Washington: Kennikat, 1970), 38.
19 George W. Baer,
One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The U.S. Navy, 1890–1990 (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1994), 12.
20 V. R. Berghahn,
Germany and the Approach of War in 1914 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1973), 35.
21 See Sadao Asada,
From Mahan to Pearl Harbor: The Imperial Japanese Navy and the United States (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2006).
22 See, for instance, David Hale, “China’s Growing Appetites,”
The National Interest 76 (Summer 2004): 137–147.
23 On the buildup of China’s merchant fleet, see David Lague, “The Making of a Juggernaut,”
Far Eastern Economic Review, September 18, 2003, 30–33. “Mahan is alive and well and living in Beijing,” declares Lague, pointing to the rapid growth of the Chinese merchant fleet. Some news outlets have taken account of the Taiwan focus of the Chinese naval buildup. See, for example, Edward Cody, “With Taiwan in Mind, China Focuses Military Expansion on Navy,”
Washington Post, March 20, 2004, A12.
24 Harold Sprout and Margaret Sprout,
The Rise of American Naval Power (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1939), 203, 217–222.
25 Carl von Clausewitz,
On War, ed., trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), 605.
26 Michael I. Handel,
Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought, 3rd ed., repr. (London: Frank Cass, 2004), esp. 119–134.
27 Wu Shengli and Hu Yanlin, “Building a Powerful People’s Navy that Meets the Requirements of the Historical Mission for Our Army,”
Qiushi 14 (July 16, 2007), FBIS- CPP20070716710027.
28 Jiang Shiliang, “The Command of Communications,”
Zhongguo Junshi Kexue, October 2, 2002, 106–114, FBIS-CPP20030107000189.
29 Ye Hailin, “Safe Seas,”
Beijing Review 13 (April 2, 2009), FBIS-CPP200904 30716005.
30 Bruce Elleman, “A Comparative Historical Approach to Blockade Strategies: Implications for China,” in
China’s Energy Strategy: The Impact on Beijing’s Maritime Policies, ed. Gabriel B. Collins, Andrew S. Erickson, Lyle J. Goldstein, and William S. Murray (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2008), 365–386.
31 Dean Acheson, “Remarks by the Secretary of State (Acheson) before the National Press Club, Washington, January 12, 1950,” in
Documents on American Foreign Relations, vol. 12,
January 1–December 31, 1950, ed. Raymond Dennett and Robert K. Turner (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1951), 431.
32 Quoted in Samuel Eliot Morison,
The Two-Ocean War: A Short History of the United States Navy in the Second World War (Boston: Little, Brown, 1963), 476.
33 Quoted in Courtney Whitney,
MacArthur: His Rendezvous with History (New York: Knopf, 1956), 378–379.
34 See
[Zhan Huayun],
[“Oceanic Exits: Strategic Passageways to the World”],
[
Modern Navy] (April 2007): 28;
[Li Yuping],
[“Interpreting Sea Power through Taiwan’s Strategic Geography”],
[
Modern Ships] (April 2004): 5;
[Bai Yanlin],
[“Island Chains and the Chinese Navy”],
[
Modern Navy] (October 2007): 18; and Lu Baosheng and Guo Hongjun, “Guam: A Strategic Stronghold on the West Pacific,”
Jiefangjun Bao, June 19, 2003, FBIS-CPP20030619000057.
35 Peng Guangqian and Yao Youzhi,
The Science of Military Strategy (Beijing: Military Science Publishing House, 2005), 443.
39 See Nan Li, “The Evolution of China’s Naval Strategy and Capabilities: From ‘Near Coast’ and ‘Near Seas’ to ‘Far Seas,’”
Asian Security 5, no. 2 (2009): 145.
40 Jeffrey B. Goldman, “China’s Mahan,” U.S. Naval Institute
Proceedings 122, no. 3 (March 1996): 44–47.
41 
[Liu Huaqing],
[
Liu Huaqing Memoir] (Beijing: Liberation Army Press, 2004), 434.
42 
[Editorial Board of the Chinese Navy Encyclopedia],
[
Chinese Navy Encyclopedia] (Beijing: Haichao Publishers, 1999), 1154.
43 
[Yao Youzhi and Chen Zeliang],
[“Initial Exploration of Communication Battlefields in High-Technology Wars”],
[
China Military Science] 15, no. 3 (2002): 61.
44 Dai Xu, “Rise of World Powers Cannot Do without Military Transformation,”
Huanqiu Shibao, March 15, 2007, FBIS-CPP20070326455002.
45 For an account of China’s naval efforts during the Cold War, see John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai,
China’s Strategic Sea Power: The Politics of Force Modernization in the Nuclear Age (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1994); Alexander Chieh-cheng Huang, “The Chinese Navy’s Offshore Active Defense Strategy,”
Naval War College Review 47, no. 3 (Summer 1994): 9–18; and Jun Zhan, “China Goes to the Blue Waters: The Navy, Sea Power Mentality, and the South China Sea,”
Journal of Strategic Studies 17, no. 3 (September 1994): 180–208.
46 Mao Zedong, “Strategy in China’s Revolutionary War,” in
Selected Writings of Mao Tse-Tung, vol. 1 (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1966), 207, 224.
47 Sun Tzu,
The Art of Warfare, trans. Roger T. Ames (New York: Ballantine, 1993); Mao, “Strategy in China’s Revolutionary War,” 217–218.
48 Mao, “Strategy in China’s Revolutionary War,” 220, 234.
49 Ibid., 208, 211, 217, 234.
50 Milan N. Vego,
Naval Strategy and Operations in Narrow Seas (London: Frank Cass), 85–88. For the U.S. Army’s definition of interior lines, see Headquarters, U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-0,
Operations (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army, June 2001), 5-7-5-9,
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/service_pubs/fm3_0b.pdf.
51 Mao Zedong, “Problems of Strategy in Guerrilla War,” in
Selected Writings of Mao Tse-Tung, vol. 2 (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1966), 83.
54 Mao, “Strategy in China’s Revolutionary War,” 207, 224.
55 The offensive mindset “does not mean, however, that when we are already locked in battle with an enemy who enjoys superiority, we revolutionaries should not adopt defensive measures even when we are hard pressed. Only a prize idiot would think in this way.” Ibid., 208.
56 Admiral Liu is credited with coining the phrase “offshore active defense.” He urged China to adopt a phased strategy to wring control of the waters within the first island chain from the U.S. Navy before turning its attention to the waters within the “second island chain,” farther out in the Pacific, and ultimately to global competition for maritime supremacy. See Cole,
Great Wall at Sea, 165–168; Goldman, “China’s Mahan”; Jun, “China Goes to the Blue Waters,” 189–191; and Huang, “Chinese Navy’s Offshore Active Defense Strategy,” 18.
57 References to U.S. “encirclement” and “containment” are ubiquitous in the Chinese press. See, for example, Willy Wo-Lap Lam, “Hu’s Central Asian Gamble to Counter the U.S. ‘Containment Strategy,’”
China Brief 5, no. 15 (July 5, 2005), 7–8.
58 Mao, “Strategy in China’s Revolutionary War,” 205–249.
59 Alfred Thayer Mahan,
From Sail to Steam: Recollections of Naval Life (1907; repr. New York: Da Capo, 1968), 313–316.
61 Alfred Thayer Mahan,
Retrospect & Prospect: Studies in International Relations, Naval and Political (Boston: Little, Brown, 1902), 8–10.
62 Robert K. Massie,
Dreadnought: Britain, Germany, and the Coming of the Great War (New York: Random House, 1991), xxiii–xxiv. See also Margaret Tuttle Sprout, “Mahan: Evangelist of Sea Power,” in
Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler, ed. Edward Meade Earle (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1943), 415–445.
63 Wolfgang Wegener,
The Naval Strategy of the World War (1929; repr., Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1989), 22.
64 Mahan,
From Sail to Steam, 303.
65 Shinohara Hiroshi,
Kaigun sōsetsu shi [
History of the Navy’s Establishment] (Riburopōto, 1986), 409–13; David C. Evans and Mark R. Peattie,
Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887–1941 (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1997), 67–71.
66 Sadao,
From Mahan to Pearl Harbor.
67 For a sample of an excessive focus on the more bellicose dimensions of Mahan’s writings, see
[Liu Xinhua and Qin Yi],
[“Modern Sea Power and National Maritime Strategy”],
[
Journal of Social Sciences] (March 2004): 73.
68 Zhan Huayun, “Strategic Uses of the Sea—Knocking at the Door of a Grand Strategy,”
Dangdai Hiajun, May 1, 2007, 17–19, FBIS-CPP20070626436011.
69 Feng Zhaokui, “China’s Rise Cannot Rely Only on Heading towards the Sea,”
Huanqiu Shibao, March 23, 2007, FBIS-CPP20070402455001.
70 Gao Xinsheng, “Islands and China’s Coastal Defense in the New Century,”
Guofang, December 28, 2006, FBIS-CPP20061228478003.
71 
[Chen Zhou],
[“The Evolution of U.S. Strategy toward China and China’s Peaceful Development”],
[
Peace and Development], no. 4 (November 2008): 9–13.
72 See
[Liu Zhongmin],
[“The Question of Sea Power in Geopolitical Theory,” Parts 1–3],
[
Ocean World], May–July 2008.
73 
[Wang Sujuan],
[“Globalization Era and Chinese Sea Power”],
[
Journal of Chifeng College] (February 2007): 87; and
[Zhang Wenmu],
[“Survival, Development, Sea Power”],
[
Contemporary Military Digest] (July 2006): 30.
74 See
[Pu Yao],
[“The History, Current State, and Development Trends of Geopolitical Theory”],
[
Social Scientist] (June 2008): 144.
75 
[Huang Jiang],
[“On Modern Command of the Sea”],
[
China Military Science] 16, no. 2 (2003): 25.
76 Corbett,
Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, 91.
77 
[Ji Rongren and Wang Xuejin],
[“Assessing the Relationships between Command of Communications, Command of the Air, and Command of the Sea”],
[
China Military Science] 15, no. 4 (2002): 114. For a very similar description of command of the sea, see Liu Yijian, “Theory of the Command of the Seas and Its Trend of Development,”
Zhongguo Junshi Kexue, January 2005, FBIS-CPP20050427000217.
78 Luo Yuan, “Call from Blue Sea to Protect Development Interests of Country,”
Liaowang, February 9, 2009, FBIS-CPP20070621436010.
79 Mahan,
Problem of Asia, 190–191.
80 For the various Chinese uses of this particular passage by Mahan, see
[Li Yihu],
[“Sea Power Theory and the Sea-Land Relationship”],
[
Pacific Journal], no. 3 (2006): 21;
月[Liu Jiangping and Zhui Yue],
[“Ocean Planning in the 21st Century—What Course for the Chinese Navy?”],
[
Modern Navy] (June 2007): 8; and Liu Jiangping, “Chinese Navy Should Use Asymmetric Operations to Fight Against Sea, Air Threats,”
Huanqiu Shibao, June 4, 2009.
81 Andrew Erickson and David D. Yang, “On the Verge of a Game Changer,” U.S. Naval Institute
Proceedings 135, no. 5 (May 2009): 26–32.
82 See
[Liu Congde and We Xiaobo],
[“An Unchanging Formula? The Three Tests of Halford Mackinder’s ‘Heartland’ Theory”],
[
Journal of Central China Normal University] 40, no. 5 (September 2001): 52–56; and
[Wu Zhengyu],
[“Reacquainting ‘Heartland Theory’ and Its Strategic Meaning”],
[
Contemporary International Relations], no. 3 (2005): 55–61.
83 See Yu Sui, “Rice’s Trip Highlights Central Asia Hot Spots,”
Liaowang, October 15, 2005, 45–47, FBIS-CPP20051021510020; and Yang Danzhi, “Asia-Europe Meeting Poses No Threat to Anybody,”
Jiefangjun Bao, October 27, 2008, 5, FBIS-CPP 20081027710009.
84 For his earlier critique of sea-power advocates, see
[Ye Zicheng and Mu Xinhai],
[“A Few Thoughts on China Sea Power Development Strategy”],
[
Studies of International Politics] (August 2005): 5–17.
85 
[Ye Zicheng],
[“China’s Peaceful Development: The Return and Development of Land Power”],
[
World Economics and Politics] (February 2007): 24.
88 
[Ye Zicheng],
[“Examining Geopolitics from the Perspective of Grand History”],
[
Contemporary International Relations] (June 2007): 2.
90 Liu Zhongmin, “Argument about China-U.S. Sea Battle Misleading,”
Huanqiu Shibao, March 12, 2008, 11, FBIS-CPP20080407587002.
91 Liu Zhongmin, “Some Thoughts on the Issue of Sea Power and the Rise of Great Nations,”
Shijie Jingji Yu Zhengzhi, December 2007, 6–14, FBIS-CCP20080111590002.
92 Zhang Minqian, “Geopolitical Changes and China’s Strategic Choices,”
Xiandai Guoji Guanxi [
Contemporary International Relations], May 20, 2008, 18–19, FBIS-CPP20080724508001.
93 Cheng Yawen, “The Eurasian Continent Is the Center of Gravity of China’s Interests,”
Huanqiu Shibao, November 15, 2007, FBIS-CPP20071211587001.
94 Ye Zicheng, “China’s Sea Power Must Be Subordinate to Its Land Power,”
Guoji Xianqu Daobao, March 2, 2007, FBIS-CPP20070302455003.
95 Lu Rude, “Former Naval Lecturer Argues China Needs Strong Navy,”
Renmin Haijun [
People’s Navy], June 6, 2007, 4.
96 
[Ni Lexiong],
[“The Historical Inevitability of the Transition from Land Power to Sea Power”],
[
World Politics] (November 2007): 31.
97 Lu Ning, “Merging into ‘Maritime Civilization,’ China Should Havean Aircraft Carrier Battle Group,”
Dongfang Zaobao, March 24, 2009, FBIS-CPP20090325066002.
98 
[Li Yihu],
[“From Sea-Land Division to Sea-Land Integration—Reexamining China’s Sea-Land Relations”],
[
Contemporary International Relations] (August 2007): 6. See also Li Yihu, “Changes in the Entity of Geopolitics,”
Xiandai Guoji Guanxi, May 20, 2008, 6–7, FBIS-CPP20080718508008.
99 Li, “From Sea-Land Division,” 6.
100 Feng Liang and Duan Tingzhi, “Characteristics of China’s Sea Geostrategic Security and Sea Security Strategy in the New Century,”
Zhongguo Junshi Kexue, January 2007, 22–29, FBIS-CPP20070621436010.
101 Shi Chunlin, “A Commentary on Studies of the Last Ten Years Concerning China’s Sea Power,”
Xiandai Guoji Guanxi, April 20, 2008, 53–60, FBIS-CPP20080603590001.
102 See the editorial note in Wang Zaibang, “The Globalization Process and Evolution of the Geo-strategic Pattern,”
Xiandai Guoki Guanxi, May 20, 2008, 1–2, FBIS-CPP20080715508001.
CHAPTER 3. THE GERMAN PRECEDENT FOR CHINESE SEA POWER
1 Aaron Friedberg, “Will Europe’s Past Be Asia’s Future?”
Survival 42, no. 3 (Autumn 2000): 147–159.
2 Avery Goldstein,
Rising to the Challenge: China’s Grand Strategy and International Security (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2005), 204–219.
3 “Statement of Dr. Arthur Waldron, Full Committee Meeting on the Strategic Intentions and Goals of China,” House Armed Services Committee, June 21, 2000,
http://armedservices.house.gov/comdocs/testimony/106thcongress/00-06-21waldron.html. Similarly, former leading policymakers from Democratic and Republican administrations have used Imperial Germany’s experience as a cautionary tale. Even so, they have taken pains not to suggest that China’s future is fated. See Zbigniew Brzezinski, “Living with China,”
National Interest 59 (Spring 2000): 11, and Paul Wolfowitz, “Remembering the Future,”
National Interest 59 (Spring 2000): 42.
4 
[China Central Television],
[
The Rise of Great Powers: Germany],
[Beijing: China Democracy and Law Publisher, 2006], 137.
5 Tang Yongsheng, “Construct a Solid Geostrategic Prop,”
Xiandai Guoji Guanxi [
Contemporary International Relations], May 20, 2008, 20–21.
6 See Qiu Huafei, “The Development Trend in Sino-U.S. Strategic Relations in the New Century,”
Shehui Kexue [
Social Science], February 20, 2006, 18–26.
7 Wolfgang Wegener,
The Naval Strategy of the World War (1929; repr., Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1989), xxvii, 96–100.
8 Holger H. Herwig, “Introduction,” in ibid., xxviii, xxxvi, xxxix–xli.
9 Quoted in Robert K. Massie,
Dreadnought: Britain, Germany, and the Coming of the Great War (New York: Random House, 1991), xxiii–xxiv. See also Margaret Tuttle Sprout, “Mahan: Evangelist of Sea Power,” in
Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler, ed. Edward Meade Earle (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1943), 415–445.
10 Holger H. Herwig, “The Influence of A. T. Mahan upon German Sea Power,” in
The Influence of History on Mahan, ed. John B. Hattendorf (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 1991), 70–71.
11 Mahan,
Influence of Sea Power upon History, 71.
12 The
Times of London likened the revolution wrought by Mahan’s works to that “effected by Copernicus in the domain of astronomy.” Gregory Weeks, “Mahan, Alfred Thayer,” in
Encyclopedia of Historians and Historical Writing, vol. 2, ed. Kelly Boyd (Oxford: Routledge, 1999), 754.
13 Wegener,
Naval Strategy of the World War, 22.
16 Herwig, “Introduction,” xxxix–xli.
17 Paul M. Kennedy,
The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery (London: Ashfield, 1986), 205–218.
18 Meng Xiangqing, “When the Periphery Is Stable, China Is at Peace,”
Huanqiu Shibao [
Global Times], April 4, 2007, FBIS-CPP20070420455004.
19 Department of Defense,
Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, 2007 (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2007), 16.
20 Jiang Hong and Wei Yuejiang, “100,000 US Troops in the Asia-Pacific Look for ‘New Homes,’”
Guofang Bao, June 10, 2003, 1, FBIS-CPP20030611000068.
21 Feng Liang and Duan Tingzhi, “Characteristics of China’s Sea Geostrategic Security and Sea Security Strategy in the New Century,”
Zhongguo Junshi Kexue [
China Military Science], January 1, 2007, 22–29.
22 Quoted in Ma Haoliang, “China Needs to Break through the Encirclement of First Island Chain,”
Ta Kung Pao, February 21, 2009, FBIS-CPP20090221708020.
23 
[Jiang Yu],
[“Island Chain and Far Seas Development of the Chinese Navy”],
[
Shipborne Weapons], no. 12 (2008): 30–31.
24 
[Zhan Huayun],
[“Oceanic Exits: Strategic Passageways to the World”],
[
Modern Navy], April 2007, 28.
25 
[Li Yuping],
[“Interpreting Sea Power through Taiwan’s Strategic Geography”],
[
Modern Ships], April 2004, 5.
26 Quoted in Ma, “China Needs to Break.” See also Peng Guangqian and Yao Youzhi,
The Science of Military Strategy (Beijing: Military Science Publishing House, 2005), 443.
27 Lin Sixing, “Sino-North Korean Relations Are Indestructible though Not Stable,”
Yazhou Zhoukan, no. 32 (August 13, 2006), OSC-CPP20060814720006.
28 
[Wang Wei],
[“Thoughts on Taiwan Strait Strategy”],
[
Shipborne Weapons], no. 11 (2005): 79.
29 Jiang, “Island Chain and Far Seas Development,” 31.
30 
[Bai Yanlin],
[“Island Chains and the Chinese Navy”],
[
Modern Navy], October 2007, 18.
31 
[Yu Fengliu],
[“The Best Sea Lane In and Out of the Pacific: Strait of Luzon”],
[
Modern Navy], May 2007, 20.
32 Wegener,
Naval Strategy of the World War, 11.
33 Paul M. Kennedy, “The Development of German Naval Operations Plans against England, 1896–1914,” in
The War Plans of the Great Powers, 1880–1914, ed. Paul M. Kennedy (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1979), 171.
34 Paul G. Halpern,
A Naval History of World War I (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1994), 2.
35 Holger H. Herwig,
“Luxury” Fleet: The Imperial German Navy, 1888–1918 (London: Allen & Unwin, 1980), 95–110; and James R. Holmes, “Mahan, a ‘Place in the Sun,’ and Germany’s Quest for Sea Power,”
Comparative Strategy 23 (2004): 27–61.
36 V. R. Berghahn,
Germany and the Approach of War in 1914 (New York: St. Martin’s, 1973), 25–42.
37 Alfred von Tirpitz,
My Memoirs, vol. 1 (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1919), 142–165.
39 Herwig, “Introduction,” xviii.
40 Holger H. Herwig, “Imperial Germany: Continental Titan, Global Aspirant,” in
China Goes to Sea: Maritime Transformation in Comparative Historical Perspective, ed. Andrew S. Erickson, Lyle J. Goldstein, and Carnes Lord (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2009), 172–174.
41 Eyre Crowe, “Memorandum on the Present State of British Relations with France and Germany, January 1, 1907,” in
British Documents on the Origins of the War 1898–1914, vol. 3,
The Testing of the Entente, 1904–1906, ed. G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley (London: His Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1927), 402–417.
42 Paul M. Kennedy, “Tirpitz, England and the Second Navy Law of 1900,”
Militärgeschichtlische Mitteilungen 8 (1970): 38.
43 Herwig, “Introduction,” xviii.
44 Alfred Thayer Mahan,
Armaments and Arbitration: Or, the Place of Force in the International Relations of States (New York: Harper, 1912), 57.
45 Theodore Ropp, “Continental Doctrines of Sea Power,” in
Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler, ed. Edward Meade Earle (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1943), 446–456.
46 Alfred Thayer Mahan,
The Interest of America in Sea Power, Present and Future (1897; repr., Freeport: Books for Libraries Press, 1970), 198.
47 Tirpitz,
My Memoirs, 57–62.
48 Herwig, “The Influence of A. T. Mahan,” 72–73.
49 See David G. Muller,
China as a Maritime Power (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1984), 44–56, 111–116.
50 Ting Yu, “Complete Remake or ‘Old Medicine in New Bottle’? A Brief Discussion of the Role and Application of the Type 022 Stealth Missile Boat,”
Xiandai Bingqi [
Modern Weaponry], September 2, 2008, 35–43.
51 Roger Cliff, Mark Burles, Michael S. Chase, Derek Eaton, and Kevin L. Pollpeter,
Entering the Dragon’s Lair: Chinese Antiaccess Strategies and Their Implications for the United States (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2007), 11.
52 Mahan,
Influence of Sea Power upon History, 50–89.
53 Wegener,
Naval Strategy of the World War, 95.
55 On the deepening rivalry, see Paul M. Kennedy,
The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860–1914 (London: Ashfield, 1980), 410–431.
56 Winston S. Churchill,
The World Crisis (New York: Scribner, 1923), 115.
57 Wegener,
Naval Strategy of the World War, 11.
58 Howard K. Beale,
Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of America to World Power (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins, 1956), 36–38.
61 Quan Jinfu, “The Innovations and Development of the Chinese Navy’s Strategic Theory in the New Century,”
Journal of PLA Nanjing Institute of Politics, March 3, 2004, 81–85.
62 Cao Zhi and Chen Wanjun, “Hu Jintao Emphasizes When Meeting Deputies to 10th Navy CPC Congress,”
Xinhua, December 27, 2006.
63 Fang Yonggang, Xu Mingshan, and Wang Shumei, “On Creative Development in the Party’s Guiding Theory for Naval Building,”
Zhongguo Junshi Kexue [
China Military Science], August 20, 2007, 66–77.
64 Wu Shengli and Hu Yanlin, “Building a Powerful People’s Navy that Meets the Requirements of the Historical Mission for Our Army,”
Qiushi 14 (July 16, 2007), FBIS-CPP20070716710027.
67 Andrew S. Erickson and David D. Yang, “On the Verge of a Game-Changer,” U.S. Naval Institute
Proceedings 135, no. 5 (May 2009): 26–32.
68 Mahan,
Influence of Sea Power upon History, 35–42.
71 Yoichi Funabashi, “As a Maritime Nation, the Seas Await Japan,”
Asahi Shimbun, February 2, 2004.
72 Bai, “Island Chains and the Chinese Navy,” 17.
73 Barry R. Posen, “Command of the Commons: The Military Foundation of U.S. Hegemony,”
International Security 28, no. 1 (Summer 2003): 22.
CHAPTER 4. FLEET TACTICS WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS
1 Andrew J. Nathan and Robert S. Ross,
The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress: China’s Search for Security (New York: W. W. Norton, 1997), 24–26.
3 Mahan had in mind the ability of the U.S. Navy to impose command of the sea on the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea, astride the approaches to the isthmian canal, despite its overall inferiority to European navies. His most exhaustive geopolitical analysis of these waters came in two essays: “The Strategic Features of the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean,” which appeared in
Harper’s in 1887, and “The Isthmus and Sea Power,” which appeared in
The Atlantic in 1893.
4 Martin Andrew, “The Dragon Breathes Fire: Chinese Power Projection,”
China Brief 5, no. 16 (July 19, 2005): 5–8.
5 Alfred Thayer Mahan,
Naval Administration and Warfare (Boston: Little, Brown, 1908), 155–156.
6 Keith Crane, Roger Cliff, Evan S. Medeiros, James C. Mulvenon, and William H. Overholt,
Modernizing China’s Military: Opportunities and Constraints (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2005).
7 James R. Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara, “The Influence of Mahan upon China’s Maritime Strategy,”
Comparative Strategy 24, no. 1 (January–March 2005): 53–71; and Lyle Goldstein and William Murray, “Undersea Dragons: China’s Maturing Submarine Force,”
International Security 28, no. 4 (Spring 2004): 162–194.
8 Of the Japanese invasion of China, Mao wrote, “Japan, though strong, does not have enough soldiers. China, though weak, has a vast territory, a large population and plenty of soldiers.” Even if strong enemy forces seized key urban areas and communication nodes, then, China would retain “a general rear and vital bases from which to carry on the protracted war to final victory.” Mao Zedong, “Problems of Strategy in Guerrilla War,” in
Selected Writings of Mao Tse-Tung, vol. 2 (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1966), 158.
9 Mao Zedong, “Strategy in China’s Revolutionary War,” in
Selected Writings of Mao Tse-Tung, vol. 1 (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1966), 220, 234.
10 Wayne P. Hughes Jr.,
Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat, 2nd ed. (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2000). This work is a lightly revised version of Hughes’ classic
Fleet Tactics: Theory and Practice (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1986).
11 Hughes,
Fleet Tactics, 266.
12 Hughes,
Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat, 268–274.
13 Chester W. Richards, “A Swift, Elusive Sword: What If Sun Tzu and John Boyd Did a National Defense Review?” presentation at Boyd Conference, Marine Corps Base Quantico, Virginia, Fall 2001, Center for Defense Information Web site,
http://www.cdi.org/mrp/swift_elusive_sword.rtf.
16 Sun Tzu,
The Illustrated Art of War, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (1963; repr., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 125.
17 Samuel B. Griffith, “Introduction,” in Sun Tzu,
Illustrated Art of War, 17–30.
18 Carl von Clausewitz,
On War, ed., trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), 605.
19 Barry R. Posen, “Command of the Commons: The Military Foundation of U.S. Hegemony,”
International Security 28, no. 1 (Summer 2003): 5–46.
20 Bernard Brodie,
A Guide to Naval Strategy, 3rd ed. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1944), 252.
22 Hughes,
Fleet Tactics, 244.
23 Mahan deplored fortress-fleets, or fleets that operated purely in support of land fortifications (and within range of land-based fire support). Writing today, however, he might amend his analysis. The reach of shore-based weaponry would allow a fortress-fleet to roam far more widely than in Mahan’s day, diminishing the distinction between an independent fleet and one dependent on land-based fire support. Russian commanders’ reluctance to challenge Togo’s Imperial Japanese Navy too far from Port Arthur sparked his ire, but a PLA Navy backed up by, say, antiship ballistic missiles able to strike at enemy warships 2,500 km away would be a far different creature. Alfred Thayer Mahan, “Retrospect upon the War between Japan and Russia,” in
Naval Administration and Warfare (Boston: Little, Brown, 1918), 133–173.
24 Clausewitz,
On War, 528. See also James R. Holmes, “Roosevelt’s Pursuit of a Temperate Caribbean Policy,”
Naval History 20, no. 4 (August 2006): 48–53, which describes Theodore Roosevelt’s attempt to mount a contested zone in the Caribbean Sea and Gulf of Mexico.
25 Michael I. Handel,
Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought, 3rd ed., repr. (London: Frank Cass, 2004), esp. 119–134.
27 Ni, “Sea Power and China’s Development,” 2. For a more exhaustive look at Mahan’s influence in Beijing, see Holmes and Yoshihara, “Influence of Mahan,” 53–71.
28 Ni, “Sea Power and China’s Development,” 1–2. On Germany’s quest for sea power, see James R. Holmes, “Mahan, a ‘Place in the Sun,’ and Germany’s Quest for Sea Power,”
Comparative Strategy 23, no. 1 (January–March 2004): 27–62.
29 Thomas P. M. Barnett,
The Pentagon’s New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-first Century (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 2004), 62, 108, 152, 169.
30 Ni, “Sea Power and China’s Development,” 4.
31 Alfred Thayer Mahan, “Considerations Governing the Disposition of Navies,”
National Review, July 1902, 706.
32 Mahan saw battleships as the embodiment of offensive strategy: “the backbone and real power of any navy are the vessels which, by due proportion of defensive and offensive powers, are capable of taking and giving hard knocks.” Mahan,
The Interest of America in Sea Power, Present and Future (Boston: Little, Brown, 1919), 198.
33 Richard W. Turk,
The Ambiguous Relationship: Theodore Roosevelt and Alfred Thayer Mahan (New York: Greenwood Press, 1987), 1–6, 101–107.
34 W. S. Sims, “The Inherent Qualities of All-Big-Gun, One-Caliber Battleships of High Speed, Large Displacement, and Gun Power,” U.S. Naval Institute
Proceedings 32, no. 12 (December 1906): 1337–1366; and Hughes,
Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat, 69–70.
35 Richard A. Hough,
Dreadnought: A History of the Modern Battleship (New York: Macmillan, 1964), 34–37.
36 For an account of China’s naval efforts during the Cold War, see John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai,
China’s Strategic Sea Power: The Politics of Force Modernization in the Nuclear Age (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1994).
37 Alexander Chieh-cheng Huang, “The Chinese Navy’s Offshore Active Defense Strategy,”
Naval War College Review 47, no. 3 (Summer 1994): 9–18; and Jun Zhan, “China Goes to the Blue Waters: The Navy, Sea Power Mentality, and the South China Sea,”
Journal of Strategic Studies 17, no. 3 (September 1994): 180–208.
38 Mao, “Strategy in China’s Revolutionary War,” 207, 224.
39 Mao was no doctrinaire on operational matters. The offensive mindset “does not mean . . . that when we are already locked in battle with an enemy who enjoys superiority, we revolutionaries should not adopt defensive measures even when we are hard pressed. Only a prize idiot would think in this way.” Ibid., 208.
40 References to U.S. “encirclement” and “containment” are ubiquitous in the Chinese press. See, for example, Willy Wo-Lap Lam, “Hu’s Central Asian Gamble to Counter the U.S. ‘Containment Strategy,’”
China Brief 5, no. 15 (July 5, 2005): 7–8; and Mao, “Strategy in China’s Revolutionary War,” 205–249.
41 Jiang Shiliang, “The Command of Communications,”
Zhongguo Junshi Kexue, October 2, 2002, 106–114, FBIS-CPP20030107000189.
42 Bernard D. Cole,
The Great Wall at Sea: China’s Navy Enters the Twenty-first Century (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2001), 165–168; Jeffrey B. Goldman, “China’s Mahan,” U.S. Naval Institute
Proceedings 122, no. 3 (March 1996): 44–47; Jun, “China Goes to the Blue Waters,” 189–191; and Huang, “Chinese Navy’s Offshore Active Defense Strategy,” 18.
43 Bruce Elleman, “A Comparative Historical Approach to Blockade Strategies: Implications for China,” in
China’s Energy Strategy: The Impact on Beijing’s Maritime Policies, Gabriel B. Collins, Andrew S. Erickson, Lyle J. Goldstein, and William S. Murray, eds. (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2008), 365–386.
44 Some 80 percent of China’s oil imports, which accounts for 40 percent of total Chinese oil consumption, passes through the strait, giving rise to the “Malacca dilemma.” Office of the Secretary of Defense,
Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, 2005 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 2005), 33. On China’s demand for petroleum, see David Hale, “China’s Growing Appetites,”
National Interest 76 (Summer 2004): 137–147.
45 You Ji, “Dealing with the Malacca Dilemma: China’s Effort to Protect Its Energy Supply,”
Strategic Analysis 31, no. 3 (May 2007): 467–490.
46 Xu Zhiliang, “Clearly Delineate PRC Territorial Waters in Map Making,”
Nanfang Ribao, April 26, 2001, FBIS-CPP20010427000033.
48 Gurpreet Khurana, “New ‘Revelations’ on China’s Nuclear Submarine Base at Hainan: Must India Be Anxious?”
South Asia Defense & Strategic Review 2, no. 4 (July–August 2008): 28–29.
49 Author discussions with U.S. scholars, Newport, R.I., September 2008.
50 James R. Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara, “China’s ‘Caribbean’ in the South China Sea,”
SAIS Review of International Affairs 26, no. 1 (Winter–Spring 2006): 79–92.
53 Ted Parsons, “China Develops Antiship Missile,”
Jane’s Defense Weekly, January 18, 2006,
http://www.janes.com/defence/naval_forces/news/jdw/jdw060118_1_n.shtml; and Wendell Minnick, “China Developing Antiship Ballistic Missiles,”
Defense News, January 14, 2008,
http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=3307277 54 For details about the FT-2000, see James C. O’Halloran, ed.,
Jane’s Land-Based Air Defense (Surrey, U.K.: Jane’s Information Group, 2004), 109–110.
55 According to one of the Pentagon’s annual reports on Chinese military power, a brochure promoting the FT-2000 at the September 1998 Farnborough Air Show boasted that the system was an “AWACS killer.” See U.S. Department of Defense,
Annual Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, July 2003), 30.
56 To browse through any of the Pentagon reports published since 2002, see “Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People’s Republic of China,” Department of Defense Web site,
http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/china.html 57 For more on the Chinese undersea fleet, see Andrew S. Erickson, Lyle J. Goldstein, William S. Murray, and Andrew R. Wilson,
China’s Future Nuclear Submarine Force (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2007), esp. 59–76, 359–372.
59 Zhang Wenmu, “China’s Energy Security and Policy Choices,”
Shijie Jingji Yu Zhengzhi 5 (May 14, 2003): 11–16, FBIS-CPP20030528000169. See also Zhang Wenmu, “Sea Power and China’s Strategic Choices,”
China Security (Summer 2006): 17–31.
61 “RIM-7/-162 Sea Sparrow/ESSM,”
Jane’s Strategic Weapon Systems, February 8, 2008; and Joris Janssen Lok and Richard Scott, “Navies Face Choice Questions for Defense of Surface Combatants,”
International Defense Review, February 1, 2005.
62 The study was supervised by Wayne Hughes. Chase D. Patrick,
Assessing the Utility of an Event-Step ASMD Model by Analysis of Surface Combatant Shared Self-Defense (Monterey, Calif.: U.S. Navy Postgraduate School, September 2001), 51–54.
66 Hughes,
Fleet Tactics, 247.
CHAPTER 5. MISSILE AND ANTIMISSILE INTERACTIONS AT SEA
1 
[Yan Weijiang], 1982:
[“1982: The War Record of the Second Naval Aviation Squadron”],
[
World Outlook], February 2003, 75.
2 Lyle Goldstein, “China’s Falklands Lessons,”
Survival 50, no. 3 (June–July 2008): 65.
3 See Bates Gill, James Mulvenon, and Mark Stokes, “The Chinese Second Artillery Corps: Transition to Credible Deterrence,” in
The People’s Liberation Army as an Organization, ed. James Mulvenon and Andrew Yang (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2002), 555.
4 Roger Cliff, Mark Burles, Michael S. Chase, Derek Eaton, and Kevin L. Pollpeter,
Entering the Dragon’s Lair: Chinese Antiaccess Strategies and Their Implications for the United States (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2007), 11.
6 William S. Murray, “Revisiting Taiwan’s Defense Strategy,”
Naval War College Review 61, no. 3 (Summer 2008): 24.
7 Mark A. Stokes,
China’s Strategic Modernization: Implications for the United States (Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1999), 89.
8 Mark A. Stokes, “Chinese Ballistic Missile Forces in the Age of Global Missile Defense: Challenges and Responses,” in
China’s Growing Military Power: Perspectives on Security, Ballistic Missiles, and Conventional Capabilities, ed. Andrew Scobell and Larry M. Wortzel (Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2002), 114.
9 Jane’s Defence Weekly was first to report on the ONI’s finding. See Ted Parsons, “China Develops Antiship Missile,”
Jane’s Defence Weekly, January 17, 2006.
10 Office of Naval Intelligence,
Worldwide Maritime Challenges (Suitland, Md.: Office of Naval Intelligence, 2004), 22.
12 Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, 2009,” 21, available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/china.html. The 2009 issue even features a graphic depicting the flight trajectory of an antiship ballistic missile, drawn from an authoritative 2006 article published by the Second Artillery Engineering College.
13 National Air and Space Intelligence Center,
Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, April 2009, NASIC-1031-0985-09, 14.
14 Ronald O’Rourke,
China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, October 8, 2008), 2–4.
16 See Andrew Erickson and David D. Yang, “On the Verge of a Game-Changer,” U.S. Naval Institute
Proceedings 135, no. 5 (May 2009): 26–32.
17 ONI,
Worldwide Maritime Challenges, 21.
18 Evan S. Medeiros, “‘Minding the Gap’: Assessing the Trajectory of the PLA’s Second Artillery,” in
Right-Sizing the People’s Liberation Army: Exploring the Contours of China’s Military, ed. Roy Kamphausen and Andrew Scobell (Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, 2007), 173.
19 Eric McVadon, “China’s Maturing Navy,”
Naval War College Review 59, no. 2 (Spring 2006): 96.
20 Cliff et al.,
Entering the Dragon’s Lair, 92–93.
21 Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr., “The Pentagon’s Wasting Assets: The Eroding Foundations of American Power,”
Foreign Affairs 88, no. 4 (July/August 2009): 23.
22 Wayne P. Hughes,
Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2000), 305.
23 Lisle A. Rose,
Power at Sea: A Violent Peace (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2007), 216–218.
24 For general overviews of the U.S. ballistic-missile defense system since 2006, see
[Wang Shubin and Rong Xiangsheng],
[“The Historical Evolution of the U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense System”], 江苏航空 [
Jiangsu Aviation], no. 3 (2007): 30–31;
[Zhu Wei],
[“The Gradual Formation of a Four Dimensional Integrated Missile Defense System”],
[
National Defense Science and Technology] (January 2007): 49–51;
[Wen Deyi],
[“Building a Sky Net: What Is the United States Busy Doing These Days?”],
[
Global Military], no. 124 (April 2006): 38–39; and
[Wen Deyi],
[“The New Trends in U.S. Missile Defense Deployment Plans”],
[
Defense Science and Technology Industry] (April 2006): 59–60. For a translation of an article by Rear Admiral Alan B. Hicks, program director of Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense, see
[Shi Jiangyue],
[“U.S. Sea-Based Ballistic Missile Defense System”],
[
Modern Ships] 4A (2007): 16–19. The citation for the original article is Alan B. Hicks, “Extending the Navy’s Shield: Sea-Based Ballistic Missile Defense,” U.S. Naval Institute
Proceedings 133, no. 1 (January 2007): 56–59.
25 
[Ren Dexin],
[“Aegis Ships Encircle China”],
[
Naval and Merchant Ships] (September 2007): 12.
26 17
[“Seventeen Aegis Vessels Surround China”],
[
Sunset] (July 2007): 18.
27 
[Yang Xiaowen],
“
” [“BMD: ‘Three Kingdoms’ Is Being Performed on China’s Periphery”],
[
Global Military], no. 1 (2008): 11.
28 
[Chen Lihao],
[“Aegis Ship Successfully Intercepts Medium-Range Ballistic Missile”],
[
World Outlook], no. 531 (January 2006): 9.
29 
[Ren Dexin],
[“Aegis Anti-Ballistic Missile System in the Pacific”],
[
Contemporary Military Digest] (October 2007): 18–19.
30 
[Hai Yan],
[“Strategic Military Site—Yokosuka Naval Base”],
[
Modern Navy] (September 2006): 59.
31 
[Liu Jiangping],
[“Aegis Anti-Ballistic Missile Fleet in the Pacific”],
[
Modern Navy] (June 2008): 29.
32 
[Ren Dexin and Cheng Jianliang],
[“The Deployment and Use of Aegis Anti-Ballistic Missile System in the Pacific”],
[
Naval and Merchant Ships] (July 2007): 17.
33 
[Dai Yanli],
[“The Functioning and Threat of Aegis Ships on Our Periphery”],
[
Naval and Merchant Ships] (September 2007): 18.
34 
[Qi Yanli],
[“The U.S. Sea-Based Midcourse Defense System”],
[
Missiles and Space Vehicles], no. 3 (2005): 61.
35 
[Bai Yanlin],
[“World Navies along the Island Chains”],
[
Modern Navy] (October 2007): 14.
36 See
[Lu Desheng],
[“America’s BMD, Which Way Is It Going?”]
[
China Militia], no. 3 (2008): 50–51.
37 
[Feng Huo],
[“Extreme Interception: Analysis of the Standard Missile-3 Destruction of Satellite”],
[
Modern Ships] 4A (2008): 16.
38 
[Huo Mu],
[“What Is the Real Intention behind the U.S. Use of Sea-Based Ballistic Missile to Destroy an Out-of-Control Satellite?”],
[
Modern Navy] (April 2008): 23; Wu Ganxiang, “The New Space Threat?”
Beijing Review, March 20–March 26, 2008, CPP20080401715024; and Li Daguang, “What Is the Significance behind US Decision to Down a Satellite by Missile?”
Banyue Tan, April 1, 2008, 85–87, CPP20080501436001.
39 Hong Yuan, “US ‘Ulterior Motives’ in Destroying Satellite with Missile,”
Xinjing Bao, February 28, 2008, CPP20080222050001.
40 
[Dai Yanli],
[“Discussion of U.S. Sea-Based Anti-Ballistic Missile System’s Interception of Satellite”],
[
Ordnance Knowledge], no. 4 (2008): 39.
41 
[Wu Qin],
[“The Spear and the Shield of U.S. Space Warfare”],
[
Contemporary Military] (May 2005): 47.
42 
[Yuan Chonghuan],
[“Global Ballistic Missile Defense System: Can It Really Effectively Protect America’s Own Security?”],
[
Recent Developments in Science and Technology Abroad], no. 4 (2006): 38–48.
43 
[Guo Lisong, Liu Zhichun, Song Yifei, and Zhang Rui],
[“Analyzing the Development of the U.S. Navy’s Ballistic Missile Defense System”],
[
Ship Electronic Engineering], no. 6 (2007): 53; and
[Xu Liming and Li Xun],
[“Standard Missile-3 Singlehandedly Supports the U.S. Navy’s Theater Ballistic Missile Defense System”],
[
Modern Ships] 7A (2005): 37.
44 
[Peng Hao and Zhang Sumei],
[“A View of Japan’s Ballistic Missile System”],
[
Winged Missiles] 1 (2007): 22.
45 
[Wang Chengyang],
-3 [“Japan Test Fires New Standard Missile-3 Sea-Based Ballistic Missile Interceptor”],
[
Modern Navy] (May 2006): 15.
46 
[Lin Guoli, Zhu Jingcheng, and Yang Hairong],
[“A Perspective on Japan’s Ballistic Missile System Development”],
[
National Defense Science and Technology] (December 2005): 35.
47 Wang Baofu, “Why U.S., Japan Speed Up Missile Shield Deployment?”
Renmin Ribao, July 17, 2006, CPP20060717701001.
48 Shen Hung and Liang Yu-kuo, “Japan Seeks Hegemony under Pretext of ‘Missile Defense,’”
Ta Kung Pao, July 6, 2006, CPP20060712715004.
49 
[Chen Jiaguang, Wu Zhenxue, and Chen Hao],
[“Japan’s Defense White Paper Makes Irresponsible Remarks to Other Countries”],
[
Global Military], no. 155 (August 2007).
50 
[Luo Shanai],
[“What Does Japan Use to Protect Tokyo?”],
[
Global Military], no. 118 (January 2006): 17. For similar commentary, see
[Lin Yan],
[“An Analysis of Japan’s First Sea-Based Ballistic Missile Interception”],
[
Modern Navy] (February 2008): 17.
51 
[Yuan Chong],
[“Japan Accelerates Steps to Deploy Anti-Ballistic Missiles”],
[
International Data Information], no. 4 (2008): 39.
52 
[Zhou Xiaoguang and Chen Yonghong],
[“New Trends in Japan’s Naval Strategy”],
[
Modern Navy] (July 2006): 64.
53 
[Shi Jiangyue],
[“Who Is America’s Accelerated Increases in Pacific Military Power Directed At?”],
[
Modern Ships] 10A (2006): 11.
54 
[Wang Pengfei and Sun Zhihong],
,BMD
[“Joining U.S. and Taiwan, BMD Will Soon Enable Japan’s Anti-Ballistic Missile System to Intervene over Taiwan”],
[
World Outlook], no. 18 (2007): 55.
55 For Chinese descriptions of the operational advantages of sea-based BMD, see
[Meng Shaoxiang], 21
[“Aegis of the Twenty-First Century”],
[
Information Command Control System and Simulation Technology], no. 6 (December 2005): 3; and
[Zhong Jianya],
[“Japan’s Ballistic Missile Defense System”],
[
Aerospace China], no. 10 (October 2005): 38.
56 
[Hou Jianjun],
[“The New Strategy and New Equipment of Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Forces”],
[
Modern Navy] (February 2006): 20; and
[Lu Xiushun],
[“Comments on Japan’s and South Korea’s Newest Aegis Destroyers”], 舰载武器 [
Shipborne Weapons] (July 2007): 64.
57 
[Gao Shan],
[“Coping with China—The Conceptual Development of Japan’s Future Capital Ships”],
[
Modern Ships] 2A (2006): 31;
[Li Jie],
[“Japan’s and South Korea’s New Generation Aegis Destroyers”],
[
Modern Navy] (May 2007): 33;
-3 Block 2A
[“Raytheon Corporation Will Soon Develop Standard Missile-3 Block 2A”],
[
Winged Missiles], no. 9 (2006): 9.
58 
[Bo Huijun],
[“Japan: Forging Ahead Rapidly to Become a Great Military Power”],
[
Global Military], no. 120 (February 2006): 59–60.
59 
[Wen Deyi],
[“The Shield and the Sword—The Influence of Japan’s Accelerating Development of Ballistic Missile Defense System”],
[
Modern Weaponry] (January 2006): 12.
60 
[Yuan Lin and Jin Lin],
[“The Subtlety of Ballistic Missile Defense Is in the Offense”],
[
Contemporary Military Digest] (June 2006): 64.
61 
[Yuan Lin],
[“Ballistic Missile Defense System Relies on Offense for Defense”],
[
China Newsweek], January 23, 2006, 87.
62 
[Li Rui],
[“The Influence of Rapid U.S.-Japan Military Integration on Taiwan Strait Security”],
[
The Science Education Article Collects] (December 2007): 124–125.
63 Wang and Sun, “Joining U.S. and Taiwan,” 55.
64 
[Li Jie]，
[“Why Are Aegis Ships Gathering in the Asia Pacific?”],
[
Modern Navy] (November 2007): 26. For an analysis of South Korea’s potential participation in the U.S.-Japan BMD architecture, see
[Liang Feng and Guan Tianxia],
[“Why Is South Korea in a Hurry to Build the Aegis?”],
[
Modern Navy] (July 2008): 45. The authors argue that South Korean membership in a trilateral BMD arrangement would stimulate a competitive Russian response.
65 Cao Zhigang, “US, Japan Suffer from ‘Missile Allergy,’”
Jiefangjun Bao, July 19, 2007, 5, CPP20070719710015.
66 Ren, “Aegis Ships Encircle China,” 15.
67 
[Du Chaoping],
[“The Net at East Longitude 135 Degrees 的网—The Direction of Japanese-Australian Military Cooperation”],
[
Modern Ships] (May 2007): 10–11.
68 For an overview of the evolution of the Aegis system, see
[Shi Zheng],
[“The U.S. Navy’s Protective Umbrella—The Aegis System”],
[
Ocean World], no. 8 (2006): 40–46.
69 
[Ding Guangchao, Lu Weimin, Peng Jin, and Liu Dong],
[“A Study of Antiship Cruise Missile Penetration Tactics against Carrier Formations”],
[
Winged Missiles], no. 10 (2008): 37.
70 
[Xiao Peng],
VS
[“A Close Look at Competition between Two Types of Modern Cruisers—Ticonderoga vs. Kirov”],
[
Contemporary World], no. 4 (2007): 58.
71 
[Wang Yifeng],
VS
[“Carrier Killer vs. Carrier Guardian—A Review of the
Slava-class and the
Ticonderoga-class”],
[
Shipborne Weapons] (May 2005): 17.
72 
[Yi Xiang],
[“A Close Look at Aegis”],
[
Modern Weaponry] (August 2008): 7.
73 
[Wen Wu],
VS KDX-3—
[“
Atago-class vs. KDX-3—Aegis Competition in Northeast Asia”],
[
Modern Navy] (July 2007): 73.
74 
[Chen Angang],
[“Opening Up Japan’s Aegis Warship”],
[
Modern Ships] 10A (2006): 22.
75 
[Tian Ying],
[“The Sword and Shield—The
Sovremenny and the
Kongo in East Asian Waters”],
[
Shipborne Weapons] (March 2007): 44.
76 
[Da Li],
[“Small ‘Moskit’ Can Swallow Big Carrier”],
[
Space Exploration], no. 10 (2008): 49.
77 
[Hai Chao],
[“Japan Forges an Air Defense Shield at Sea—The Evolution of the Performance of Japan’s
Kongo-class Aegis Destroyer”],
[
Shipborne Weapons] (August 2005): 56.
78 
[Wu Hongmin],
[“Target—
Kongo Fictitious Battlefield”],
[
Shipborne Weapons] (June 2004): 87.
79 
[Guan Dai],
[“The Influence of the
Ticonderoga Cruise on Taiwan”],
[
Modern Ships] 2A (2005): 22.
80 
[Zhao Yu],
[“Comprehensive Assessment of Japan’s Naval Power—The Navy’s Combat Power”],
[
Modern Navy] (September 2005): 58.
81 
[“How China’s Air Arm Can Penetrate Aegis Encirclement”],
[
Naval and Merchant Ships] (October 2007): 18.
82 
[Xu Cheng, Li Yongsheng, and Sun Jin],
MARKOV
[“An Assessment of Antiship Missile Penetration Capabilities against Fleet Formations Based on the MARKOV Process”],
[
Flight Dynamics] 27, no. 2 (April 2009): 95.
83 
[Chen Na],
[“Unlimited Striking Power of the Sword—Taking Stock of America’s Future Shipborne Combat Systems”],
[
World Outlook] 24 (2007): 53.
84 Wang is accompanied by Wu Guifu from the China Institute for International Strategic Studies and Yang Chengjun from the Second Artillery Army Institute in this summary of a conference hosted by Qinghua University’s Institute of International Studies.
[Wu Guifu, Yang Chengjun, and Wang Xiangsui], 21
[“Aerospace Technology and the Transformation of New Military Affairs in the Early Twenty-first Century”],
[
Pacific Journal], no. 3 (2006): 14.
85 Yu Jixun, ed.,
The Science of Second Artillery Campaigns (Beijing: People’s Liberation Army Press, 2004), 402.
CHAPTER 6. CHINA’S EMERGING UNDERSEA NUCLEAR DETERRENT
1 John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai,
China’s Strategic Sea Power: The Politics of Force Modernization in the Nuclear Age (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1994).
2 On the technical aspects of operating ballistic-missile submarines during the Cold War, see Robert G. Loewenthal, “Cold War Insights into China’s New Ballistic-Missile Submarine Fleet,” in
China’s Future Nuclear Submarine Force, ed. Andrew S. Erickson, Lyle J. Goldstein, William S. Murray, and Andrew R. Wilson (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2007), 286–303.
3 John Foster Dulles, “The Evolution of Foreign Policy,”
Department of State Bulletin 30 (January 25, 1954).
4 For an excellent snapshot of the debates over U.S. nuclear strategy, see Lawrence Freedman, “The First Two Generations of Nuclear Strategists,” in
Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986), 735–778.
7 Interview with a U.S. submarine officer, Newport, R.I., February 15, 2008.
8 U.S. Department of Defense,
Soviet Military Power: Prospects for Change, 1989, Federation of American Scientists Web site,
http://www.fas.org/irp/dia/product/smp_89.htm . For a collection of primary documents detailing U.S. thinking about SSBNs’ role in U.S. naval strategy (as well as a range of other topics), see John B. Hattendorf,
U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1970s, Newport Paper no. 30 (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 2007).
9 John B. Hattendorf,
The Evolution of the U.S. Navy’s Maritime Strategy, 1977–1986, Newport Paper no. 19 (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 2004), 23–36.
11 Hattendorf,
Evolution of the U.S. Navy’s Maritime Strategy, 23–36.
12 Also worth consulting is Avery Goldstein,
Deterrence and Security in the 21st Century: China, Britain, France, and the Enduring Legacy of the Nuclear Revolution (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2000), 139–216.
13 See
[Jin Qifeng],
[“The Last Work—The French Le Terrrible Strategic Nuclear Submarine”],
[
Modern Ships] 5A (2008): 17–20; and
[Ji Yaojiu],
[“The French
Le Triomphant-Class Ballistic Missile Nuclear Submarine”],
[
Modern Ships], no. 1 (2004): 27–28.
14 
[Xia Liping],
[“The Characteristics and Influence of French Nuclear Policy and Nuclear Strategy”],
[
Peace and Development], no. 2 (May 2008): 56.
15 
[Cha Changsong, Jing Tao, and Zhang Longfu],
[“French Sea-Based Strategic Nuclear Power in the New Century”],
[
Contemporary Military] (April 2005): 56.
16 
[Sun Ye],
[“French Nuclear Weapons, Standing Tall at Sea”],
[
Global Military], no. 7 (2008): 50.
17 With regard to naval affairs, observes Hattendorf, Americans “tended to view the new Soviet capabilities in terms of mirror-imaging and refighting World War II.” Jack Snyder of the RAND Corporation disputed the notion that people from all societies make strategy in the same manner. Snyder coined the term “strategic culture,” giving rise to a debate that rages on today. Hattendorf,
Evolution of the U.S. Navy’s Maritime Strategy, 23; and Jack Snyder,
The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Nuclear Options (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1977), 9.
18 Hattendorf,
Evolution of the U.S. Navy’s Maritime Strategy, 33.
19 Terms ascribed to China’s nuclear posture, including “minimum deterrence,” are highly contested in the West. Moreover, the Chinese policy community does not employ terms and concepts that correspond to those in the Western lexicon. For purposes of terminological clarity, we use the term “minimum deterrence” somewhat loosely, connoting high confidence in the ability to inflict modest damage that is nonetheless unacceptable to an adversary.
23 Wang Zhongchun, “Nuclear Challenges and China’s Choices,”
China Security (Winter 2007): 60.
24 Bates Gill, James Mulvenon, and Mark Stokes, “The Chinese Second Artillery Corps: Transition to Credible Deterrence,” in
The People’s Liberation Army as an Organization: Reference Volume v 1.0, ed. James C. Mulvenon and Andrew N. D. Yang (Washington, D.C.: RAND, 2002), 536.
25 Jeffrey G. Lewis,
The Minimum Means of Reprisal: China’s Search for Security in the Nuclear Age (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2007), 52.
26 Jing-dong Yuan, “Effective, Reliable, and Credible: China’s Nuclear Modernization,”
Nonproliferation Review 14, no. 2 (July 2007): 276.
27 For an excellent summary of the terminological evolution, see Liu Bin, “China’s Nuclear Strategy: Adapting to Change,”
Nanfang Zhoumo, June 17, 2009, OSC-CPP20090622682003. For “effective defense,” see Wei Guoan, “What Nuclear Strategy Should China Maintain?”
Huanqiu Shibao, March 6, 2009, OSC-CPP20090309710002. For “limited self-defense counterattack,” see
[Jiang Yifeng],
[“New Strategy Ballistic Missile Force Strengthens China’s Nuclear Defense Power”],
[
Baokan Huicui] 7 (2008): 72; and
[Sun Kuaiji],
[“Interpreting Our Nation’s Self Defensive Nuclear Strategy”],
[
Shishi Baogao], no. 2 (2007): 58–60. For “counter nuclear coercion,” see
[Li Bin],
[“An Analysis of Chinese Nuclear Strategy”],
[
World Economics and Politics], no. 9 (2006): 17. For “counter nuclear deterrence,” see
[Rong Yu and Hong Yuan],
[“From Counter Nuclear Deterrence Strategy to Minimum Nuclear Deterrence Strategy: The Evolutionary Path of China’s Nuclear Strategy”],
[
Journal of Contemporary Asia-Pacific Studies], no. 3 (2009): 122.
28 Rong and Hong, “From Counter Nuclear Deterrence Strategy,” 130.
29 
[Sun Xiangli],
[“An Analysis of the Characteristics and Distinguishing Features of Chinese Nuclear Strategy”],
[
World Economics and Politics], no. 9 (2006): 26.
30 
[Jing Zhiyuan and Peng Xiaofeng],
[“Constructing the Strategic Missile Force with Chinese Characteristics”],
[
Seeking Truth], no. 3 (2009): 54.
31 For Chinese critiques of Western assessments, see Rong and Hong, “From Counter Nuclear Deterrence Strategy,” 120–122; and Li, “An Analysis of Chinese Nuclear Strategy,” 16–17.
32 This assumption does not impute any permanence to China’s strategic nuclear posture. Should circumstances (such as a radical reordering of the international security environment) warrant, China would certainly harness the necessary political will and resources to depart from minimum deterrence.
35 Hans M. Kristensen, Robert S. Norris, and Matthew G. McKinzie,
Chinese Nuclear Forces and U.S. Nuclear War Planning (Washington, D.C.: FAS/NRDC, November 2006), 89.
36 The ability of ICBMs to fully exploit China’s strategic depth would depend on whether the country’s road networks are extensive enough and robust enough to support the size and weight of the DF-31.
37 Paul Godwin calls this qualitative and quantitative mix “assured minimum deterrence.” His assessment dovetails with conclusions drawn by Gill, Mulvenon, and Stokes (cited earlier) that the second-generation strategic weaponry would finally (after decades of “incredible” deterrence) endow China with a credible retaliatory capability. Paul H. B. Godwin, “Potential Chinese Responses to U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense,” in
China and Missile Defense: Managing U.S.-PRC Strategic Relations, ed. Alan D. Romberg and Michael McDevitt (Washington, D.C.: Henry L. Stimson Center, 2003), 66–67.
38 The only effective response to a capable Chinese SSBN is the employment of traditional antisubmarine-warfare assets, particularly SSNs.
39 
[Yang Lianxin],
[
Exploring Nuclear Submarines] (Beijing: Ocean Press, 2007), 120.
40 Jing-dong Yuan, “Do China’s New Submarines Signal a New Strategy?”
WMD Insights, July/August 2007, 4.
41 
[Hong Hai],
[“China Should Develop Sea-Based Nuclear Capabilities”],
[
Naval and Merchant Ships], no. 4 (2009): 24–26.
42 
[Lan Hai],
[“Doubts About China’s Development of Sea-Based Nuclear Capabilities”],
[
Naval and Merchant Ships], no. 4 (2009): 27–29.
43 For an assessment of the command-and-control challenge, see Andrew S. Erickson and Lyle J. Goldstein, “China’s Future Nuclear Submarine Force: Insights from Chinese Writings,”
Naval War College Review 60, no. 1 (Winter 2007): 69–70.
44 
[Li Bin and Nie Hongyi],
[“Exploring Sino-U.S. Strategic Stability”],
[
World Economics and Politics], no. 2 (2008): 15–17.
45 Lewis and Xue,
China’s Strategic Sea Power.
46 For a brief history of the
Xia-class development, see
[Hong Lu],
[“The Sea-Based Nuclear Deterrent of the People’s Navy—A Record of the Development of China’s Nuclear Submarines”],
[
Shipborne Weapons], no. 1 (2004): 31–34.
47 This study acknowledges cost differentials between two very different economies, including calculations of purchasing power parity. But the figures are suggestive. Ted Nicholas and Rita Rossi,
U.S. Weapons Systems Costs, 1994 (Fountain Valley, Calif.: Data Search Associates, April 1994), 6–10. This figure does not include the costs of research, development, training, and education and the price of SLBMs prior to and during construction of each SSBN.
48 According to an anonymous PLA naval officer interviewed for a report, the cost of a nuclear submarine is simply too high for China. He observes, “The price of one nuclear submarine can buy several, even more than ten, conventional submarines. . . . As a developing country, our nation’s military budget is still quite low, and thus the size of the navy’s nuclear submarine fleet can only be maintained at a basic scale” (jiben gueimo [
]). See
[“Gangtie Shayu”], 三
[
Sanlian Shenhuo Zhoukan] 20 (May 19, 2003): 29–30.
49 Zhang Baohui, “The Modernization of Chinese Nuclear Forces and Its Impact on Sino-U.S. Relations,”
Asian Affairs 34, no. 2 (Summer 2007): 92. Open-source photos of the Type 094 reveal only twelve launchers on board the submarines. Nevertheless, the arithmetic associated with multiple warheads is instructive.
50 For instance, Washington’s unwillingness to cut its nuclear arsenal more deeply in part reflects a fear that China may seek to “race to parity.”
51 Despite U.S. nuclear superiority over China, Washington remains acutely aware of the PRC’s nuclear modernization program and has provided explicit policy guidelines to put the Chinese deterrent at risk. See excerpts from the 2002 Nuclear Posture Review,
GlobalSecurity.org,
http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/policy/dod/npr.htm. Indeed, America’s evolving nuclear posture suggests that defense planners are looking to attain “absolute security” in deterrent relations with Russia and China. According to a RAND study, major technological advances combined with the anticipated U.S. nuclear force structure suggest that the United States will be increasingly capable of executing a “war winning” strategy premised on devastatingly effective preemptive nuclear strikes to disarm major powers. The report states, “What the planned force appears best suited to provide beyond the needs of traditional deterrence is a
preemptive counterforce capability against Russia and China. Otherwise the numbers and the operating procedure simply do not add up.” Glenn C. Buchan, David Matonick, Calvin Shipbaugh, and Richard Mesic,
Future Roles of U.S. Nuclear Forces: Implications for U.S. Strategy (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2003), 92. In this broader context of U.S. nuclear strategy (and assuming that these analysts are right), it is hardly conceivable that U.S. defense planners would stand idly by as China builds up its arsenal.
53 Office of Naval Intelligence, “Seapower Questions on the Chinese Submarine Force,” unclassified document obtained under the Freedom of Information Act by Hans M. Kristensen.
54 Stephen Saunders,
Jane’s Fighting Ships (Surrey, UK: IHS Jane’s, 2009), 128; and Duncan Lennox,
Jane’s Strategic Weapons Systems (Surrey, UK: Jane’s Information Group, 2009), 38.
55 Eleanor Keymer,
Jane’s World Navies (Surrey, UK: IHG Jane’s, 2009), 84; and Lyle Goldstein and William Murray, “China Emerges as a Maritime Power,”
Jane’s Intelligence Review (October 2004): 35. For other studies on the logic of a Chinese SSBN bastion strategy, see, for example, “Chinese Navy’s Submarine Development Strategy,”
Kanwa Defense Review, July 1, 2005, 44–46, FBIS-CHI-CPP20050801000242. A Japanese analyst speculated that China is propping up North Korea for fear that a collapse scenario would harm Chinese SSBN deployment options in the Bohai Sea, which is flanked by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. See Junichi Abe, “Why China Does Not Want to See the Unification of the Korean Peninsula,”
Sekai Shuho, February 8, 2005, 54–55, FBIS-JPP20050203000035.
56 See
[Dong Qifeng],
[“Comparative Analysis of U.S. and Soviet/Russian Nuclear Submarine Development Strategies”],
[
Modern Ships], no. 11B (November 2007): 34. The author claims that the Soviet Union’s bastion strategy essentially rendered obsolete the antisubmarine defenses developed by the United States and its NATO allies in the Norwegian Sea and along the Greenland-Iceland-UK gap.
57 One Chinese analyst argues that geography is a major determinant of how countries design their SSBNs and associated deployment options. A long coastline directly facing the ocean and quick access to deep waters just off the shoreline are the ideal operational conditions for an SSBN. In an implicit reference to China, he observes that a country whose long coastal waters are part of the continental shelf may need to deploy submarines more than two hundred kilometers out to sea to find water deep enough for fleet boats to hide. He concludes that such geographic constraints would force the country to develop smaller SSBNs to operate in shallower sea-lanes and harbors. See
[Wu Xie],
[“Zhanlue Heqianting Sheji Fangan Jianxi”],
Bingqi Zhishi, no. 4 (April 2004): 53.
58 It is worth noting that the
Xia-class SSBN is based at the Jianggezhuang Submarine Base, fifteen miles east of Qingdao on the Yellow Sea. For satellite imagery of the
Xia at Jianggezhuang, see Thomas B. Cochran, Matthew G. McKinzie, Robert S. Norris, Laura S. Harrison, and Hans M. Kristensen, “China’s Nuclear Forces: The World’s First Look at China’s Underground Facilities for Nuclear Warheads,”
Imaging Notes (Winter 2006),
http://www.imagingnotes.com/go/page4a.php?menu_id=23. There is speculation that the Type 094 could be homeported at this facility, a location that might favor a bastion strategy.
59 Apparently referring to the lower forty-eight states, the Federation of American Scientists and the Natural Resources Defense Council point out that, “Even with a possible range of 5,095 miles (8,200 km), the JL-2 would not be able to target the continental United States from the Bo Hai Bay.” However, a 5,000-mile range would allow China to target the entire states of Alaska and Hawaii as well as the critical node at Guam. Such a limited reach would still largely conform to China’s minimalist doctrine. Kristensen, Norris, and McKinzie,
Chinese Nuclear Forces, 85.
60 Chinese defense planners have devoted their attention (almost exclusively) to a Taiwan contingency since the 1995–1996 missile crises. In this broader strategic context of a more urgent security challenge, it seems unlikely that Beijing would place SSBN protection ahead of another expected confrontation over Taiwan. At the same time, however, it is important to acknowledge that the maritime capabilities developed to protect SSBNs in a Bohai/Yellow Sea bastion might play complementary roles in a Taiwan Strait crisis or war. Further, an SSBN fleet could very well play a more direct role in a Taiwan scenario should Chinese nuclear deterrence or coercion enter the equation. For an abstract, generic analysis of how nuclear weapons can deter great-power intervention on behalf of a client state, see
[Chang Ying],
[“Qiantan Heweishe de Liangge Zuoyong”],
Bingqi Zhishi, no. 4 (April 2004): 51–52. Some U.S. analysts have speculated that an assured second-strike capability underwritten by a more survivable arsenal could embolden China to engage in nuclear brinkmanship, including a “demonstration shot” in-theater to dissuade U.S. and allied intervention in the Strait. Intriguingly, one article describes China’s SSBN as an “assassin’s mace” (
shashoujian [
]) that can be employed to deter American and Japanese intervention in a cross-strait conflict.
[Gao Xintao],
[“Zhongguo Haijun Qianting Zhanlue”],
[
Guang Jiao Jing] (January 16–February 15, 2005): 69.
61 Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes, “Command of the Sea with Chinese Characteristics,”
Orbis 49, no. 4 (Fall 2005): 677–694.
62 Christopher McConnaughy, “China’s Undersea Nuclear Deterrent: Will the U.S. Navy Be Ready?” in
China’s Nuclear Force Modernization, ed. Lyle J. Goldstein and Andrew Erickson (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 2005), 44.
63 
[Liu Jiangping],
[“Maritime Challenges Hasten a Naval Transition”],
[
Ocean World], no. 8 (2007): 72.
65 Ronald O’Rourke,
Navy Attack Submarine Procurement: Background and Issues for Congress (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, May 20, 2009), 3.
66 The Chinese are quite aware of the ASW challenge. The permanent homeporting of
Los Angeles–class SSNs at Guam has not gone unnoticed in China. For an in-depth Chinese analysis of Guam’s importance to America’s security posture in Asia, see
[Li Wensheng],
[“Jujiao Guandao”],
Bingqi Zhishi, no. 9 (September 2004): 15–19. One Chinese author argues that the PLA Navy must acquire its own ASW platforms to respond to such a shift in U.S. naval posture in the Pacific. See
[Tai Feng],
[“Does China Need Anti-submarine Patrol Aircraft?”],
[
Jianzai Wuqi], March 1, 2005, 70–75.
67 Oga Ryohei, “What the PRC Submarine Force Is Aiming For,”
Sekai no Kansen, July 1, 2005, 96–101.
68 A Chinese analysis argues that SSBN open-ocean patrols will not occur until the PLA Navy develops a more balanced force structure that includes aircraft carriers. Strategic nuclear submarines would then be able to operate in blue waters under the protective cover of carrier aircraft. “Heqianting yu Zhongguo Haijun,”
Jianchuan Zhishi, no. 306 (March 2005): 13.
69 
[Li Jie and Liu Tao],
[“Key Debates and Thinking about Strategic Nuclear Submarine Development”],
[
Modern Ships] 11A (2008): 19.
70 For the most widely cited work on this issue, see Alastair Iain Johnston, “China’s New ‘Old Thinking’: The Concept of Limited Deterrence,”
International Security 20, no. 3 (Winter 1995/96): 18–38.
71 Robert A. Manning, Ronald Montaperto, and Brad Roberts,
China, Nuclear Weapons, and Arms Control (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2000), 47.
72 Stephen J. Hadley, “A Call to Deploy,”
Washington Quarterly 23, no. 3 (Summer 2000): 26.
73 For a range of potential technological breakthroughs in the future, see Stephen F. Cimbala, “Nuclear Weapons in the Twentieth Century: From Simplicity to Complexity,”
Defense and Security Analysis 21, no. 3 (September 2005): 279.
74 The depressed trajectory of SLBMs reduces their vulnerability to missile defenses and significantly stresses the response times of ballistic-missile-defense systems.
76 Shen Dingli, “Nuclear Deterrence in the 21st Century,”
China Security 1 (Autumn 2005): 13.
77 For an American analysis of this point, see James Mulvenon, “Missile Defenses and the Taiwan Scenario,” in
China and Missile Defense: Managing U.S.-PRC Strategic Relations, ed. Alan D. Romberg and Michael McDevitt (Washington, D.C.: Henry L. Stimson Center, 2003), 58–60. The author postulates a thought-provoking scenario in which Taiwan unilaterally conducts offensive, conventional precision strikes against the mainland during a cross-strait conflict. Unable to determine the real source of these attacks, worst-case thinking could lead Beijing to mistakenly conclude that Washington was exercising its preemptive option in a bid to disarm Chinese nuclear forces. At this point in the crisis, the PRC would face the same type of decision-making crossroad that Zhu and Shen identified earlier.
78 Rong Yu and Peng Guangqian, “Nuclear No-First-Use Revisited,”
China Security 5, no. 1 (Winter 2009): 85.
79 For an analysis of possible Chinese BMD countermeasures, see Andrew S. Erickson, “Chinese BMD Countermeasures: Breaching America’s Great Wall in Space?” in
China’s Nuclear Force Modernization, ed. Lyle J. Goldstein and Andrew Erickson (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 2005), 77–88. For a Chinese overview of ballistic-missile decoy technologies, see
[Li Wensheng],
[“Manhua Zhanlue Dandao Daodan Youer Jishu”],
Bingqi Zhishi, no. 2 (February 2005): 28–31.
CHAPTER 7. SOFT POWER AT SEA
2 See Henry Steele Commager,
The Search for a Usable Past and Other Essays in Historiography (New York: Knopf, 1967), 3–27. Commager’s view of common history, traditions, and legends is consistent with scholarship on ethnonationalism. See, for instance, Ted Robert Gurr,
Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 1993); Benedict Anderson,
Imagined Communities, rev. ed. (London: Verso, 1991); and Anthony D. Smith,
The Ethnic Origins of Nations (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986).
3 Ronald L. Jepperson, Alexander Wendt, and Peter J. Katzenstein, “Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security,” in
The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 33.
4 George Washington, “Farewell Address,” in
George Washington: Writings (New York: Library of America, 1997), 962–977. For a sampling of commentary on early America, see Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay,
The Federalist Papers, ed. Clinton Rossiter (New York: Penguin, 1961), esp. 77–84, 320–325; Thomas Paine,
The Thomas Paine Reader, ed. Michael Foot and Isaac Kramnick (London: Penguin, 1987), 65–115; Alexis de Tocqueville,
Democracy in America, trans. George Lawrence, ed. J. P. Mayer (New York: HarperPerennial, 1988), esp. 226–230; and Bernard Bailyn,
The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967), 55–93.
5 Samuel Flagg Bemis,
A Diplomatic History of the United States, revised edition (New York: Henry Holt, 1942), 463–478. Bemis titled the chapter on the Spanish-American War and its aftermath “The Great Aberration of 1898.”
6 See, for instance, Richard H. Collin,
Theodore Roosevelt’s Caribbean: The Panama Canal, the Monroe Doctrine, and the Latin American Context (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1991).
7 Reginald Stuart explores the “war myth” that the United States, throughout its history, has only embarked on moralistic crusades that culminate in total war. In reality, contends Stuart persuasively, the American Founders’ thinking inclined strongly to limited wars of the kind envisioned by the Prussian strategic theorist Carl von Clausewitz. See Reginald C. Stuart,
War and American Thought: From the Revolution to the Monroe Doctrine (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1982), 182–194. See also Max Boot,
The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power (New York: Basic Books, 2002).
8 Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein, “Norms, Identity, and Culture,” 60.
9 John King Fairbank, “Introduction: Varieties of the Chinese Military Experience,” in
Chinese Ways in Warfare, ed. Frank A. Kierman and John King Fairbank (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1974), 7.
10 Andrew Scobell,
China and Strategic Culture (Carlisle Barracks, Penn.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, May 2002), 3–4. For a fuller exposition of these views, see Andrew Scobell,
China’s Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
11 See, for example, Alastair Iain Johnston, “Thinking about Strategic Culture,”
International Security 19, no. 4 (Spring 1995): 32–64; and Alastair Iain Johnston,
Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995), esp. 1–31, 61–108.
12 Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein, “Norms, Identity, and Culture,” 33.
13 For a thorough review of the literature on strategic culture, see Jeffrey S. Lantis, “Strategic Culture and National Security Policy,”
International Studies Review 4, no. 3 (December 2002): 87–113; and Toshi Yoshihara, “Chinese Strategic Culture and Military Innovation: From the Nuclear to the Information Age” (Ph.D. diss., Fletcher School, Tufts University, 2004), 13–62.
14 For instance, international relations scholars of realist inclinations, most prominently Kenneth Waltz, contend that lesser powers tend to band together to counterbalance the rise of a new, potentially dominant great power. More recently, some scholars of Asian politics have declared that balance-of-power politics is primarily a Western phenomenon, and that the Asian system inclines less to balancing than to hierarchy. For an overview of the realist analysis, see Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Emerging Structure of International Politics,”
International Security 18, no. 2 (Fall 1993): 44–79; and Kenneth N. Waltz,
Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979). For a sample of other realist analyses, see Aaron Friedberg, “Ripe for Rivalry,”
International Security 18, no. 3 (Winter 1993/94): 5–33; Richard K. Betts, “Wealth, Power, and Instability: East Asia and the United States after the Cold War,”
International Security 18, no. 3 (Winter 1993/94): 34–77; and Avery Goldstein, “Great Expectations: Interpreting China’s Arrival,”
International Security 22, no. 3 (Winter 1997/98): 36–73. For a rejoinder to the realists, see David C. Kang, “Getting Asia Wrong: The Need for New Analytical Frameworks,”
International Security 27, no. 2 (Spring 2003): 57–85; and David C. Kang, “Hierarchy in Asian International Relations: 1300–1900,”
Asian Security 1, no. 1 (January 2005): 53–79.
15 Thucydides,
The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War, ed. Robert B. Strassler, intro. Victor Davis Hanson (New York: Free Press, 1996), 43.
16 Johnston,
Cultural Realism, 10.
18 Charles Kupchan,
The Vulnerability of Empire (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1994), 1–32.
20 For the sake of avoiding clutter, we have avoided bringing strategic theory into this analysis. It is worth noting, nonetheless, that the notion of using strategic culture to amass public support for particular decisions is consistent with Carl von Clausewitz’s notion of the “paradoxical trinity.” Clausewitz proclaimed that wise statesmen must manage the government, the armed forces, and the people in order to maintain a cohesive war effort. Language and concepts derived from a society’s traditions offer political and military leaders a mechanism to influence the citizenry, which the Prussian theorist depicted as the province of primordial passions. This conception of the public helps explain why political leaders can find it difficult to control public expectations they have created. See Carl von Clausewitz,
On War, ed., trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), 89.
21 Jack Snyder,
The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Nuclear Options (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1977), 9.
22 Kupchan,
Vulnerability of Empire, 5–6.
23 For the sake of analytical clarity, many analysts have confined strategic culture solely to the realm of military strategy. For instance, Alan Macmillan, Ken Booth, and Russell Trood maintain that if strategy “is allowed to mean more than the
military dimension of
security, then the word simply becomes synonymous with security, and so loses its special meaning.... In this event,
strategic culture simply becomes synonymous with
political culture. This, most will agree, would not be helpful” (Macmillan, Booth, and Trood, “Strategic Culture,” in
Strategic Cultures in the Asia-Pacific Region, ed. Ken Booth and Russell Trood [New York: St. Martin’s, 1999], esp. 10–11; their emphasis). One virtue of Charles Kupchan’s analysis is that he does not limit strategic culture to military affairs but widens it to consider how states use diplomatic, economic, and ideological instruments alongside the military instrument. If we allow for the concept of grand strategy, we must allow culture to function at the grand strategic level. Alastair Iain Johnston makes a similar assumption. Colin Gray, despite sharp differences with Johnston in many areas, argues that culture provides “context” that suffuses all aspects of strategy-making, not just the military domain. And, in a similar vein, Toshi Yoshihara envisions a comprehensive “‘hierarchy of strategy,’ which is expressed as an interlinked set of preferences that flow from grand strategy to operations and tactics.” See Kupchan,
Vulnerability of Empire, 7–8; Johnston,
Cultural Realism; Colin S. Gray, “Strategic Culture as Context: The First Generation of Theory Strikes Back,”
Review of International Studies 25 (1999): 49–69; and Yoshihara, “Chinese Strategic Culture,” v, 89, 105.
24 Gray, “Strategic Culture as Context,” 50. Gray is responding here to criticism from Iain Johnston, who has accused Gray’s generation of theorists of postulating an unfalsifiable theory of strategic culture, among other sins. If strategic culture interpenetrates both ideas and actions, maintains Johnston in essence, then there is no way to measure it scientifically. He thus attempts to confine culture to the domain of ideas in an effort to measure its influence on actions. Gray’s rejoinder: “Anyone who seeks a falsifiable theory of strategic culture in the school of Johnston, commits the same error as a doctor who sees people as having entirely separable bodies and minds.... We cannot understand strategic behaviour by that method, be it ever so rigorous” (ibid., 53). Agrees Ken Booth: “Theories in these subjects might become richer if less weight is given to ‘rigour’” (Booth, “The Concept of Strategic Culture Affirmed,” in
Strategic Power: USA/ USSR, ed. Carl G. Jacobsen [New York: St. Martin’s, 1990], 125).
25 Joseph S. Nye,
Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 2004); and Joseph S. Nye, “Asia’s Allure Lies in Soft Power,”
Straits Times, November 16, 2005.
26 Joseph S. Nye, “The American National Interest and Global Public Goods,”
International Affairs 78, no. 2 (April 2002): 238.
27 Chen Jian distinguishes usefully between “centrality” and “dominance” in Chinese political thought. He observes, “The Chinese collective memory of the ‘Central Kingdom’s’ glorious past—remembered not just as the center of civilization, but civilization
in toto—and the nation’s humiliating experience in the modern age constituted a constant source for national mobilization in the twentieth century.” For Chen, then, China’s ascent to great-power status need not involve territorial conquest or military domination. See Chen Jian,
The China Challenge for the Twenty-first Century (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 1998), 4–8.
28 Thomas C. Schelling,
The Strategy of Conflict (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), esp. 21–52; and Thomas C. Schelling,
Arms and Influence (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1966), esp. 35–91. See also Jeffrey Z. Rubin and Jeswald W. Salacuse, “The Problem of Power in International Negotiations,”
International Affairs 66 (April 1990): 21–80.
29 On the Ming dynasty’s turn away from the oceans, see, for instance, Valerie Hansen, “China in World History 300–1500 CE,”
Education about Asia 10, no. 3 (Winter 2005): 4–7.
30 For an account of China’s naval efforts during the Cold War, see John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai,
China’s Strategic Sea Power: The Politics of Force Modernization in the Nuclear Age (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1994).
31 Bernard D. Cole,
The Great Wall at Sea: China’s Navy Enters the Twenty-first Century (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2001), 165–168; Jun Zhan, “China Goes to the Blue Waters: The Navy, Sea Power Mentality, and the South China Sea,”
Journal of Strategic Studies (September 1994): 180–203; and Alexander Chieh-cheng Huang, “The Chinese Navy’s Offshore Active Defense Strategy,”
Naval War College Review 47, no. 3 (Summer 1994): 9–18.
32 See, for instance, David Hale, “China’s Growing Appetites,”
National Interest 76 (Summer 2004): 137–147.
33 Taiwan is of course a complicating factor in China’s emerging maritime strategy, but we consider it a neutral factor in the analysis presented here. Not only does the island sit at the center point of the first offshore island chain, potentially obstructing China’s access to the Pacific high seas, it also sits astride sea-lanes connecting northern Chinese seaports with the Strait of Malacca and thence to suppliers of much-needed oil and natural gas. Either way, consequently, settling the Taiwan question on its terms will remain uppermost in the minds of China’s leadership. See Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes, “Command of the Sea with Chinese Characteristics,”
Orbis 49, no. 4 (Fall 2005): 677–694. For a contrary view, see Robert D. Kaplan, “How We Would Fight China,”
Atlantic 295, no. 5 (June 2005): 49–64. Kaplan prophesied that the PLA will indeed surge out eastward into the Pacific, as Liu Huaqing urged.
34 Edward L. Dreyer, “The Poyang Connection, 1363: Inland Naval Warfare in the Founding of the Ming Dynasty,” in
Chinese Ways in Warfare, ed. Frank A. Kierman and John King Fairbank (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1974), 202–240.
35 Louise Levathes,
When China Ruled the Seas: The Treasure Fleet of the Dragon Throne, 1405–1433 (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 73.
36 “Carry Forward Zheng He Spirit, Promote Peace and Development,”
Renmin ribao (People’s Daily), July 13, 2005, FBIS-CHN-200507131477. See also the other installments in this series, published in the
People’s Daily on July 15, 19, and 20.
37 Editorial, “On Our Military’s Historic Missions in the New Century, New Stage—Written on the 50th Anniversary of the Founding of ‘
Jiefangjun Bao,’”
Jiefangjun bao, February 17, 2006, FBIS-CHN-200602171477.
38 Bruce A. Elleman,
Waves of Hope: The U.S. Navy’s Response to the Tsunami in Northern Indonesia (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, February 2007), 103–105.
39 
[Qu Zhaowei],
[“Hospital Ship: The Maritime Platform for China to Maximize Its Soft Power”],
[
Modern Weaponry], no. 3 (2009): 14.
40 Elleman,
Waves of Hope, 104.
41 
[Wei Zhenhua],
[“Zheng He’s Expedition to the Western Seas and China’s Oceanic Culture”],
[
Pearl River Water Transport] 7 (2006): 144.
42 
[Zhu Guangyan],
[“Awakening Sea Power from Its 600-Year Deep Slumber—Commemoration of and Reflections on Zheng He’s Expedition to the Western Seas”],
[
Friends of Party Members and Cadre], July 2005, 19.
43 
[Wang Xiang],
[“An Inquiry into the Peaceful Foreign Policy of Zheng He’s Expeditions to the Western Seas”],
[
China Water Transport] 4, no. 3 (March 2006): 12–13; and
[Yun Fei],
[“Promote the Zheng He Spirit, Toward an Oceanic Power”],
[
Pearl River Water Transport] 7 (2006): 152.
44 
[Zhou Siming],
[“Interpreting Zheng He’s Expedition to the Western Seas from the Angle of Confucian Thought”],
[
Journal of Jilin Teachers Institute of Engineering and Technology] 22, no. 10 (October 2006): 29–30.
45 
[Xiao Yaocheng],
[“China’s Oceanic Consciousness and the Current State of Sea Power”],
[
Journal of Yunyang Teachers College] 25, no. 5 (October 2005): 88.
46 
[Cai Yiming],
[“On Zheng He’s Seafaring Spirit and Our Nation’s Harmonious Ocean Outlook”],
[
Navigation of China], no. 4 (December 2006): 3.
47 See, for instance, Kang, “Hierarchy in Asian International Relations,” 53–79.
48 David Kang,
China Rising: Peace, Power, and Order in East Asia (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 49.
49 Zheng Bijian, “China’s ‘Peaceful Rise’ to Great-Power Status,”
Foreign Affairs 84, no. 5 (September/October 2005): 18–24; and Esther Pan, “The Promise and Pitfalls of China’s ‘Peaceful Rise,’” Council on Foreign Relations Web site, April 14, 2006,
http://www.cfr.org/publication/10446/.
50 Speech by Chinese President Hu Jintao at the University of Pretoria on China-Africa Cooperation, “Enhance China-Africa Unity and Cooperation to Build a Harmonious World,” February 7, 2007, available at
http://www.internationalepolitik.de/.
51 Chen Jian and Zhao Haiyan, “Wen Jiabao on Sino-U.S. Relations: Cherish Harmony; Be Harmonious but Different,” Zhongguo xinwenshe (China News Service), December 8, 2003, FBIS-CPP-20031208000052.
52 “Kenyan Girl Offered Chance to Go to College in China,” Xinhua, March 20, 2005, FBIS-CHN-200503201477.
53 “Enlightenment Drawn from Global Worship of Confucius,”
Renmin ribao, September 29, 2005, FBIS-CHN-200509291477. Beijing’s network of Confucian Institutes aims to popularize the teachings of Confucius and, in the process, further buttress China’s soft power vis-à-vis its Asian neighbors. For more on China’s use of soft power, see James R. Holmes, “‘Soft Power’ at Sea: Zheng He and China’s Maritime Diplomacy,”
Southeast Review of Asian Studies 28 (2006),
http://www.uky.edu/Centers/Asia/SECAAS/Seras/2006/2006TOC.html.
54 Yu Sui, “Peace Is Priceless in the Pursuit of Happiness,”
China Daily, August 14, 2006.
55 In Zheng He’s day, notes one Chinese commentator in a riposte to the Pentagon’s 2005 report on Chinese military power, the Ming dynasty “did not make use of its formidable national strength to extend its boundaries and territory; conversely, it extended and strengthened the Great Wall for its own defense. Furthermore, instead of establishing overseas colonies and plundering other countries, China’s mighty fleet treated other nations kindly and generously but demanded little in return.” Li Xuejiang, “U.S. Report ‘The Military Power of the People’s Republic of China’ Harbors Sinister Motives,”
Renmin ribao, July 27, 2005, FBIS-CHN-200507271477.
56 State Council Information Office, “White Paper: China’s Peaceful Development Road,” Xinhua, December 22, 2005, FBIS-CHN-200512221477. See also Hu Jintao, “Strengthen Mutually Beneficial Cooperation and Promote Common Development,” speech at the Mexican Senate, September 12, 2005, Xinhua, September 13, 2005, FBIS-CHN-200509131477.
57 “See China in the Light of Her Development,” speech by Premier of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China Wen Jiabao, Cambridge University, United Kingdom, February 2, 2009.
58 See, e.g., “China Celebrates Ancient Mariner to Demonstrate Peaceful Rise,” Xinhua, July 7, 2004.
59 Bruce Swanson,
Eighth Voyage of the Dragon: A History of China’s Quest for Sea Power (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1982), 28.
60 The dimensions of the
baochuan are a matter of some dispute. Ming histories report that the vessels were 440 feet long and 180 feet wide—a ratio that would make them so broad-beamed as to be “unresponsive even under moderate sea conditions,” in the opinion of one modern analyst, Bruce Swanson. Swanson contends that the treasure ships more likely resembled the large junks put to sea in succeeding centuries, estimating their length at 180 feet. He further contends that ships with these dimensions would have been large enough to accommodate ship’s companies of the size reported in the histories. Others, notably Louise Levathes, accept the figure from the histories. Either way, the treasure ships dwarfed the ships sailed by Zheng He’s near-contemporaries, Christopher Columbus and Vasco da Gama. (Columbus’
Santa Maria was all of 85 feet long.) See Swanson,
Eighth Voyage of the Dragon, 33–34; and Levathes,
When China Ruled the Seas, 19.
61 Swanson,
Eighth Voyage of the Dragon, 34–36. In contemporary parlance, compartmentation—using watertight bulkheads to subdivide the interior of a ship’s hull into many small compartments—restricts flooding to one or a few compartments. Barring major damage to the hull that breaches multiple bulkheads, a compartmented ship stands a good chance of withstanding “progressive flooding” that might sink a ship not so equipped.
62 Levathes,
When China Ruled the Seas, 47, 50–52. On China’s present-day “Malacca dilemma,” see Ian Storey, “China’s ‘Malacca Dilemma,’”
China Brief 6, no. 8 (April 12, 2006): 4–6; and Liu Jiangping and Feng Xianhui, “Going Global: Dialogue Spanning 600 Years,”
Liaowang (
Outlook), September 8, 2005, FBIS-CHN-200509081477.
63 “China Launches Activities to Commemorate Sea Navigation Pioneer Zheng He,” Xinhua, September 29, 2003, FBIS-CPP-20030928000052.
64 “Premier Wen’s Several Talks during Europe Visit,” Xinhua, May 16, 2004, FBIS-CPP-20040516000069. Wen sounded similar themes during a spring 2005 trip to South Asia. See Xiao Qiang, “Premier Wen’s South Asian Tour Produces Abundant Results,”
Renmin ribao, April 13, 2005, FBIS-CHN-200504131477. On the extent of Chinese predominance in fifteenth-century Asia, see Roderich Ptak, “China and Portugal at Sea: The Early Ming Trading System and the
Estado da Índia Compared,” in Roderich Ptak,
China and the Asian Seas: Trade, Travel, and Visions of the Others (1400–1750) (Aldershot, U.K.: Ashgate, 1998), 21–37.
65 “China Launches Activities,” see note 61.
66 It is worth noting that Indians point out that Hindu kingdoms ruled the Indian Ocean before the Ming treasure voyages. While they are not as effective spokesmen for their maritime past as are the Chinese, Indians commonly point to their own grand seafaring past. The age of Hindu maritime supremacy ended a century before Zheng He’s expeditions, however, leaving Indian maritime enthusiasts at a disadvantage vis-à-vis Chinese maritime diplomacy.
68 Intriguingly, Hu’s questionable claims were based on Menzies’
1421, an account deemed wildly speculative by most academic experts. Menzies claims, for example, that Zheng He reached American shores seventy years before Columbus. See Gavin Menzies,
1421: The Year China Discovered America (New York: William Morrow, 2003); Hansen, “China in World History,” 4–7; and Wang Gungwu, “China’s Cautious Pride in an Ancient Mariner,”
YaleGlobal Online, August 4, 2005.
69 Chinese spokesmen have portrayed Beijing’s contemporary policies, in particular peaceful development, as an extension of venerable Chinese traditions. To name one such spokesman, Xiong Guangkai, deputy chief of the PLA’s General Staff, maintains that “China’s persistently taking the road of peaceful development has historically inherited China’s outstanding traditional culture and has also given important expression to the idea of peaceful diplomacy.” During Zheng He’s voyages, “what the Chinese nation disseminated to the outside world was the friendly heartfelt aspiration of peace, development and cooperation.” See Xiong Guangkai, “Unswervingly Take the Road of Peaceful Development and Properly Deal with Diversification of Threats to Security,” Xinhua, December 28, 2005, FBIS-CHN-200512281477.
70 Edward L. Dreyer,
Zheng He: China and the Oceans in the Early Ming Dynasty, 1405–1433 (Old Tappan, N.J.: Pearson Longman, 2006), xii.
71 Levathes,
When China Ruled the Seas, 114–118; Frank Viviano, “China’s Great Armada,”
National Geographic, July 2005, 41.
72 
[Wu Weixing],
[“Thoughts on the Strengthening of China-ASEAN Nontraditional Security Cooperation in Recent Years from a Soft Power Perspective”],
[
Around Southeast Asia] (September 2008): 69.
73 
[Zhu Zhijiang],
[“On Non-War Military Operations”],
[
Journal of Nanjing Institute of Politics] 19, no. 5 (2003): 84.
74 
[Gao Yue],
[“Military Exercises: Non-Contact Style Confrontation and Political Contest”],
[
Shipborne Weapons], no. 11 (2005): 15–18.
75 Su Shiliang, “Persistently Follow the Guidance of Chairman Hu’s Important Thought on the Navy’s Building, Greatly Push Forward Innovation and Development in the Navy’s Military Work,”
Renmin Haijun, June 6, 2009, 3, CPP20090716478009.
76 Quoted in Lu Xiang, “Navy Holds Meeting to Sum Up Experience in the First Escort Mission,”
Renmin Haijun, May 29, 2009, CPP20090702318002.
77 See
[Li Daguang],
[“Gulf of Aden Escort—New Milestone in the Chinese Navy’s Development”],
[
Defense Science and Technology Industry] 1 (2009): 20; and
[Bei Jun],
[“Chinese Navy Bound for Somalia”],
[
Ocean World] 1 (2009): 18.
78 
[Shan Dong and Wang Liwen],
[“The Chinese Navy’s Open Ocean Escort Mission Conveys Great Meaning”],
[
World Affairs], no. 3 (2009): 4.
79 See Li Daguang, “Chinese Navy Has Capacity to Fight against Piracy,”
Wen Wei Po, December 28, 2008, CPP20081225716007; and Lin Dong, “Global War on Terror Shifts from Land to Sea,”
Zhongguo Qingnian Bao, November 28, 2008, CPP20081128710011.
80 
[Li Daguang],
[“Combating Somali Piracy, China Displays Responsible Great Power Image”],
[
Life and Disaster] 1 (2009): 23.
81 Wu Shengli, “Make Concerted Efforts to Jointly Build Harmonious Ocean,”
Renmin Haijun, April 22, 2009, 1, CPP20090615478011.
83 Joshua Kurlantzick,
Charm Offensive: How China’s Soft Power Is Transforming the World (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2007), 10–11.
84 See for instance Kang, “Getting Asia Wrong.”
85 See Evelyn Goh, “Great Powers and Southeast Asian Regional Security Strategies,”
Military Technology (January 2006): 321–323; and Denny Roy, “Southeast Asia and China: Balancing or Bandwagoning?”
Contemporary Southeast Asia (August 2005): 311–312.
86 Bhaskar Balkrishnan, “China Woos Mauritius, Eyes Indian Ocean,”
Political and Defence Weekly 7, no. 41 (July 2009): 7–9, SAP20090731525005.
87 P. S. Das, “India’s Strategic Concerns in the Indian Ocean,” in
South Asia Defence and Strategy Year Book, ed. Rajan Arya (New Delhi: Panchsheel, 2009), 96–100.
89 Arun Prakash, “Indian Ocean: A Zone of Conflict?” in
South Asia Defence and Strategy Year Book, ed. Rajan Arya (New Delhi: Panchsheel, 2009), 43–50.
90 M. K. Bhadrakumar, “Sri Lanka Wards Off Western Bullying,”
Asia Times, May 27, 2009.
91 For an Indian view of President Hu Jintao’s rendition of the Zheng He narrative, see Sunanda K. Datta-Ray, “Frozen by China—India Has to Snap Out of Its Stupor if It Wants to Be a Force to Reckon With in Asia,”
Hindustan Times, January 8, 2007, 10, SAP20070108384011. Datta-Ray was a visiting senior research fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore.
92 Thomas Mathew, “Mighty Dragon in the Sea,”
Hindustan Times, June 24, 2009.
93 G. Parthasarathy, “Challenges from China: India Faces Growing Hostility after 26/11,”
Tribune, March 19, 2009, SAP20090319378013.
94 Arun Kumar Singh, “Let’s Prepare to Meet the Chinese in India’s Ocean,”
Deccan Chronicle, February 20, 2009.
95 Walter Russell Mead,
Power, Terror, Peace, and War: America’s Grand Strategy in a World at Risk (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004), 37.
96 China’s ambition to dislodge America from its leading role in Asian affairs is already on display. In mid-December 2005, partly at Beijing’s insistence, Asian nations held their inaugural East Asia Summit, a gathering that pointedly excluded the United States.
CHAPTER 8. U.S. MARITIME STRATEGY IN ASIA
2 James R. Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara, “China and the Commons: Angell or Mahan?”
World Affairs 168, no. 4 (Spring 2006): 172–191.
3 For the history of the 1986 strategy, we rely heavily on three compendia: John B. Hattendorf,
The Evolution of the U.S. Navy’s Maritime Strategy, 1977–1986, Newport Paper no. 19 (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 2004); John B. Hattendorf, ed., Newport Paper no. 30,
U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1970s: Selected Documents (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 2007); and John B. Hattendorf, ed.,
U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1980s: Selected Documents, Newport Paper no. 33 (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 2008).
4 Carl von Clausewitz,
On War, ed., trans. Peter Paret and Michael Howard (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), 136, 139.
5 Michael Handel,
Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought, 3rd ed. (London: Frank Cass, 2001), 117.
6 Samuel Huntington, “National Policy and the Transoceanic Navy,” U.S. Naval Institute
Proceedings 80, no. 5 (May 1954): 483–493.
7 Milan L. Hauner, “Stalin’s Big-Fleet Program,”
Naval War College Review 57, no. 2 (Spring 2004): 87–120.
8 George W. Baer,
One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The U.S. Navy, 1890–1990 (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1994), 395, 398, 420, 422; Robert Waring Herrick,
The USSR’s “Blue Belt of Defense” Concept: A Unified Military Plan for Defense against Seaborne Attack by Strike Carriers and Polaris/Poseidon SSBNs (Arlington, Va.: Center for Naval Analyses, 1973).
9 Alfred Thayer Mahan,
Naval Strategy Compared and Contrasted with Principles and Practices of Military Operations on Land (Boston: Little, Brown, 1911), 385, 391, 393, 397, 403, 441.
10 Sergei G. Gorshkov,
The Sea Power of the State (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1979).
12 Norman Friedman,
The Fifty-Year War: Conflict and Strategy in the Cold War (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2000).
13 Hattendorf,
U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1970s, 53–101.
14 James L. Holloway III,
Aircraft Carriers at War: A Personal Retrospective of Korea, Vietnam, and the Soviet Confrontation (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2007), 31.
15 William M. McBride,
Technological Change and the United States Navy, 1865–1945 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 2000), 233.
16 Nathan Miller,
The U.S. Navy: A History, 3rd ed. (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1997), 273.
17 Hattendorf,
U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1970s, 102–133.
18 Hattendorf,
Evolution of the U.S. Navy’s Maritime Strategy, 75.
19 “The Maritime Strategy, 1986,” in Hattendorf,
U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1980s, 203–258.
20 John J. Mearsheimer, “A Strategic Misstep: The Maritime Strategy and Deterrence in Europe,”
International Security 11, no. 2 (Fall 1986): 3–57. For a sampling of other commentary on the Maritime Strategy, see Robert W. Komer, “Maritime Strategy vs. Coalition Defense,”
Foreign Affairs 60, no. 5 (Summer 1982): 1124–1144; Barry R. Posen, “Measuring the European Conventional Balance: Coping with Complexity in Threat Assessment,”
International Security 9, no. 3 (Winter 1984–1985): 47–88; and Christopher A. Ford and David A. Rosenberg, “The Naval Intelligence Underpinnings of Reagan’s Maritime Strategy,”
Journal of Strategic Studies 28, no. 2 (April 2005): 379–409.
21 Alfred Thayer Mahan,
From Sail to Steam: Recollections of Naval Life (1907; repr., New York: Da Capo, 1968), 267–268.
22 Alfred Thayer Mahan,
Retrospect & Prospect: Studies in International Relations, Naval and Political (Boston: Little, Brown, 1902), 8–12.
23 Carl Schurz, “Armed or Unarmed Peace,”
Harper’s Weekly Magazine, June 19, 1897, 603.
24 Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay, “‘For America, the Age of Geopolitics Has Ended and the Age of Global Politics Has Begun,’”
Boston Review, February/ March 2005,
http://www.cfr.org/publication/9186/; and Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay,
America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 2003). For a sampling of similar views, see Joseph S. Nye,
Power in the Global Information Age: From Realism to Globalization (London and New York: Routledge, 2004); and Michael Mandelbaum,
The Ideas That Conquered the World: Peace, Democracy, and Free Markets in the Twenty-first Century (New York: Public Affairs, 2002).
25 Julian S. Corbett,
Some Principles of Maritime Strategy (1911; repr., intro. Eric J. Grove, Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1988), 91–94.
26 For Corbett, concentration was a “kind of shibboleth” that obscured the lessons of British naval history. “Division,” he maintained, was “bad only when it is pushed beyond the limits of well-knit deployment.” Ibid., 131–132, 134.
31 Alfred Thayer Mahan,
The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783 (1890; repr., New York: Dover, 1987), 76.
32 Ibid., 39, 53–54, 70–82.
36 Joseph S. Nye, “The American National Interest and Global Public Goods,”
International Affairs 78, no. 2 (April 2002): 238; and Eyre Crowe, “Memorandum on the Present State of British Relations with France and Germany, January 1, 1907,” in
British Documents on the Origins of the War 1898–1914, vol. 3,
The Testing of the Entente, 1904–6, ed. G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley (London: His Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1927), 403–417.
37 Peter Dombrowski and Andrew C. Winner, “The U.S. Maritime Strategy and Implications for the Indo-Pacific Region,” Paper presented to the Royal Australian Navy Seapower Conference, Sydney, Australia, February 2008.
38 U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard, “A Cooperative Strategy,” 4.
42 Robert O. Work and Jan van Tol, “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower: An Assessment” (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, March 26, 2008), 1–3.
44 Huntington, “National Policy and the Transoceanic Navy,” 483.
45 Work and van Tol, “An Assessment,” 12.
48 Dombrowski and Winner, “U.S. Maritime Strategy,” 11–13.
49 Andrew S. Erickson, “Assessing the New U.S. Maritime Strategy: A Window into Chinese Thinking,”
Naval War College Review 61, no. 4 (Autumn 2008): 36, 38–39; and Su Hao, “The U.S. Maritime Strategy’s New Thinking: Reviewing the ‘Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower,’”
Naval War College Review 61, no. 4 (Autumn 2008): 70.
50 Wang Baofu, “The U.S. Military’s ‘Maritime Strategy’ and Future Transformation,”
Naval War College Review 61, no. 4 (Autumn 2008): 62–64.
51 Ibid., 66. It is noteworthy that some American observers, notably Thomas Barnett, have likewise accused the Pentagon of cynically using China to whip up support for bigger defense budgets. Barnett declares that China has joined a realm of peace among the advanced nations. See Thomas P. M. Barnett,
The Pentagon’s New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-first Century (New York: Putnam, 2004), 62, 108, 152, 169.
52 Lu Rude, “The New Maritime Strategy Surfaces,”
Naval War College Review 61, no. 4 (Autumn 2008): 58.
54 
[Du Chaoping],
[“Dance with Wolves—America’s ‘Thousand-Ship Navy’ Plan and China’s Choices”],
[
Shipborne Weapons] (December 2007): 25–26.
55 
[Li Jie], ‘
[“The Unfathomable ‘Thousand-Ship’ Navy”],
[
Ordnance Knowledge], no. 2 (2007): 44.
56 
[Yang Chengjun and Sun Yi],
[“The One-Hundred Satellite Plan—Joy with Pain”],
[
Ordnance Knowledge], no. 8 (2007): 22; and Lu Desheng, “‘100 Satellite Program’ Might Not Work as Wished,”
Jiefangjun Bao, June 19, 2007, 5, OSC-CPP20070619702001.
57 Author discussions, Naval War College, Newport, R.I., August 8, 2008.
58 Quotations in this section come from an exchange of e-mail correspondence between James Holmes and Gurpreet Khurana, September 28–30, 2008.
59 Andrew S. Erickson, “New U.S. Maritime Strategy: Initial Chinese Responses,”
China Security 3, no. 4 (Autumn 2007): 45.
CHAPTER 9. WHO HOLDS THE TRIDENTS?
1 David A. Shlapak, David T. Orletsky, Toy I. Reid, Murray Scot Tanner, and Barry Wilson,
A Question of Balance: Political Context and Military Aspects of the China-Taiwan Dispute (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2009), 126.
6 David A. Shlapak, David T. Orletsky, and Barry A. Wilson,
Dire Strait? Military Aspects of the China-Taiwan Confrontation and Options for U.S. Policy (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2000), 56.
9 Shlapak et al.,
A Question of Balance, 141.
10 Robert S. Ross, “The Stability of Deterrence in the Taiwan Strait,”
National Interest 65 (Fall 2001): 70.
12 Robert S. Ross, “Balance of Power Politics and the Rise of China: Accommodation and Balancing in East Asia,”
Security Studies 15, no. 3 (July–September 2006): 372.
13 Robert Ross, “For China, How to Manage Taiwan?”
Forbes, October 27, 2007.
14 Bernard D. Cole,
The Great Wall at Sea: China’s Navy Enters the Twenty-first Century (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2001), 174.
15 Bernard D. Cole, “The Modernization of the PLAN and Taiwan’s Security,” in
Taiwan’s Maritime Security, ed. Martin Edmonds and Michael M. Tsai (London: Routledge, 2003), 72.
16 Bernard D. Cole, “The Military Instrument of Statecraft at Sea: Naval Options in an Escalatory Scenario Involving Taiwan: 2007–2016,” in
Assessing the Threat: The Chinese Military and Taiwan’s Security, ed. Michael D. Swaine, Andrew N. D. Yang, and Evan S. Medeiros (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2007), 198.
17 Bernard D. Cole, “Right-Sizing the Navy: How Much Naval Force Will Beijing Deploy?” in
Right-Sizing the People’s Liberation Army: Exploring the Contours of China’s Military, ed. Roy Kamphausen and Andrew Scobell (Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2007), 552–553.
18 Richard Sharpe, ed.
Jane’s Fighting Ships (Surrey, UK: Jane’s Information Group, 1990), 79.
19 Michael G. Gallagher, “China’s Illusory Threat to the South China Sea,”
International Security 19, no. 1 (Summer 1994): 181.
20 Christopher D. Yung,
People’s War at Sea: Chinese Naval Power in the Twenty-First Century (Alexandria, Va.: Center for Naval Analyses, 1996), 52.
21 Gerald Segal, “Does China Matter?”
Foreign Affairs 78, no. 5 (September/ October 1999): 29.
22 Bates Gill and Michael O’Hanlon, “China’s Hollow Military,”
National Interest 56 (Summer 1999): 62.
23 Michael O’Hanlon, “Why China Cannot Conquer Taiwan,”
International Security 25, no. 2 (Fall 2000): 82.
25 Thomas J. Christensen, “Posing Problems without Catching Up: China’s Rise and Challenges for U.S. Security Policy,”
International Security 25, no. 4 (Spring 2001): 5–40.
26 Cole,
Great Wall at Sea, 184.
27 See Peter Lorge,
War, Politics and Society in Early Modern China (London: Routledge, 2005), 89–90; Ralph D. Sawyer,
Fire and Water: The Art of Incendiary and Aquatic Warfare in China (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 2004); Peter Lorge, “Water Forces and Naval Operations,” in
A Military History of China, ed. David A. Graff and Robin Higham (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 2002); David A. Graff,
Medieval Chinese Warfare (London: Routledge, 2002), 131–135; David A. Graff, “Dou Jiande’s Dilemma: Logistics, Strategy, and State Formation in Seventh-Century China,” in
Warfare in Chinese History, ed. Hans Van den Ven (Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 2000), 77–104; Billy K. L. So,
Prosperity, Region, and Institutions in Maritime China: The South Fukien Pattern, 946–1368 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000); and Gang Deng,
Maritime Sector, Institutions and Sea Power of Premodern China (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1999).
28 Cole,
Great Wall at Sea, 186–187.
29 Anthony Cordesman and Martin Klieber,
Chinese Military Modernization: Force Development and Strategic Capabilities (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2007), 137.
35 Michael I. Handel,
Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought, 3rd ed. (London: Frank Cass, 2001), 117.